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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish
the influence of Martin Heidegger*s philosophy on leading
contemporary theologians. In doing so it will be shown
how various and occasionally opposing theological views
can validly claim to have adapted the thoughts of the
same philosopher. The first division of this analysis
will consider the nature of Heidegger*s philosophy. It
will be maintained that ontology is his primary interest
and that he pursues Being through the consideration of such
topics as man (Dasein), language, and thought, as well as
Being itself (in its various manifestations as truth,
nothingness and the *ontological difference').
This philosopher's development will be traced from an
earlier emphasis on the initiative of man (Dasein) in the
relation to Being to a reactionary emphasis on Being as
totally dominating man to a final, balanced appreciation of
the role of both man and Being in their relationship. This
balance will be the criterion by which the various
theological adaptations of this philosophy will be gauged.
In the second division Rudolf Bultmann*s theology will be
seen as strongly influenced by the earlier, existential
concerns of Heidegger. The resulting lack of balance in
his theology will be seen in the often heard charges that
it is subjective and anthropocentric. The relevance of
the later Heidegger's more balanced views will then be
suggested. It will then be established that the 'new
hermeneutic' theologians (Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling and
ii
Heinrich Ott) are strongly Influenced by Heidegger's
later belief that Being as language totally dominates man.
The extremity of their views will be exposed in the expanded
role they assign to language and hermeneutics (It is through
language that all beings are granted their Being and that
the authenticity of existence is gained. Hermeneutics thus
concerns all of reality and existence.) Heidegger's insight
that the roles of both beings (of which man is one type) and
Being must be respected in their relationship will then be
proposed as a valuable corrective to the position of the
'new hermeneutic' theologians. In John Macquarrie's
existential-ontological theology will be seen a position
which strives to maintain the balance of Heidegger's
position. Like Bultmann and the earlier Heidegger,
Macquarrie will be portrayed as respecting the need for an
existential emphasis and like the 'new herraeneutic'
theologians and the later Heidegger his interest in the
initiative of Being or God will also be shown. And
finally his appreciation for the balance of Heidegger's
philosophy will be established as a vital factor in the
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INTRODUCTION
I. Contemporary theological issues
Of the many issues with which theology has
traditionally been concerned, the following would seem to
be dominating the contemporary scene: the doctrine of God,
anthropology, history, hermeneutics, the meaning of
theological language, and the relation of philosophy and
theology. It is by virtue of their views on these issues
that today's theologians are divided into various camps.
Furthermore, the vitality, relevance, and, some would even
say, the very existence of Christianity is seen as dependent
upon the manner in which its supporters resolve the problems
associated with these issues.
In the preface to his book, The Question of God.
Heinz Zahrnt says that the question of God is particularly
representative of the tumultuous times in which we live.
"The question of God is the interior obverse of our century,
a century crowded with outward catastrophes, revolutions and
discoveries: it is the deepest level of the earth-shaking
transition in which we find ourselves." Hence he feels
the crucial theological issue no longer involves such topics
as the virgin birth or the ascension but the very ground of
faith itself, the reality of God.^^ Similarly John
Macquarrie speaks of the stream of books flowing from the
press on this question, ranging from Robinson's Honest to
God to Altizer's and Hamilton's Radical Theology and the
1 Heinz Zahrnt, The Question of God, trans, by R.A. Wilson,
(London: Collins, 1969), p.11.
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Death of God and calls the doctrine of God the "hot issue"
in theology today.
Like many theologians these men have sensed that the
role of God as traditionally understood is being radically
called into question today. Furthermore, Langdon Gilkey
points out that such questioning comes from within the ranks
of the believers as well as without for the foundations of
theology are now also being shaken by concerned Christian
(2)
laymen and clergy.v Hence theology must establish the
reality and relevance of God for today's believer as well
as non-believer.
It is the complexity and range of the God problem
which involves theology in other issues. In light of the
Scriptural understanding of man as made in the likeness or
image of God, one important mode of access to clarifying
God's nature would be through a better understanding of man.
This in turn means concentrating on an analysis of man's
nature or structure of being. Hence theologians are
constantly endeavouring to understand the meaning of man's
special relationship to God and how it affects his relation
to the rest of creation.
To what extent is man a part of creation; should his
primary allegiance be to worldly surroundings or an ultimate
source? What does it mean to be in but not of the world?
1 John Macquarrie, God and Secularity, (London: Lutterworth
Press, 1968), p.19.
2 Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-
Language. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), p.11.
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To what extent is man's relationship with God broken by
his fallen condition? How is the frustration, uncertainty,
and finiteness of existence to be understood? Is death an
inherent part of man's nature, or is it punishment for his
sinful condition? What is it about man's structure which
allows for the reorientation of his life from an allegiance
to his environment to faith in God? Does such decision
involve a radical change in life, or how much continuity and
discontinuity is there between the new man and the old? Is
the reorientation of man's life the result of God's initiative,
man's initiative, or both? These are all questions with
which contemporary theology deals.
Perhaps the one factor which makes the anthropological
concern for today's theologian distinctive (after all the
above questions have always been considered by theology) and
gives it a new sense of urgency stems from a popular belief
that modern man has matured into a more secure and autonomous
position. Bonhoeffer speaks of man "come of age" and
Bishop Robinson feels that man no longer needs a "fill in
the gaps" God to account for the shortcomings in his
knowledge.
Does theology have to make apologetical allowance for
this new man? In making the Gospel relevant how is this
new man to be understood? Has there been a basic change in
man's nature or do his needs, his shortcomings, and all the
ultimate factors in man's existence remain the same? How
correct is Karl Jasper's claim that the modem man's
gullibility for the myths propagated by Nazi Germany
4
indicates a basic similarity between the man of today and
the man of Christ's time?^ Thus the need to understand
the nature of the man in the pew has given real impetus
to contemporary theology's interest in anthropology.
Another issue which has come to the fore in contemporary
theology is history. Not only is man's structure temporal
and historical but God's mode of revelation is Scripturally
associated with historical events. Hence theology must
strive to understand how God works in and through the
historical process. One of the crucial arguments has been
the relation of fact and significance or meaning in history.
Contemporary theologians have interpreted Christ's
actions in terms of their understanding of history and thus
this concern has affected such basic issues as the nature
of the resurrection and the relation between the kerygraatic
Christ and the historical Jesus. Indeed, the quest for the
historical Jesus has once again become a live theological
issue and many theologians also feel that the contemporaneity
of Christ becomes more plausible in light of this approach
to history. The doctrines of creation and eschatology have
also been affected by this approach to history.
Another issue with which twentieth century theology
is involved concerns language. Such titles as God-Talk
(John Macquarrie), God and Word (Gerhard Ebeling), and
1 Karl Jaspers, "Myth and Religion," Kerygma and Myth, ed. by
H.W. Bartsch and trans, by R.H. Fuller, II (London: SPCK,
1962), p.135.
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Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language (Langdon
Gilkey) reflect theology's concern for the lack of vitality
and relevance in its expression of the reality that is God.
Thus it is striving to clarify the manner in which man's
language can legitimately refer to God and claim validity
for its transcendent reference. Furthermore, this language
problem has become closely associated with the crisis in the
question of God. Such concerns have led theologians to
study the structure and nature of language in general. New
emphasis has been placed on the role of this language process
in existence and this in turn has affected the contemporary
approach to Christology and the doctrine of revelation.
A strong interest in hermeneutics is another aspect
of contemporary theology which is closely related to the
concern for language. Theology has always been involved in
interpretation (e.g. in its consideration of Scriptural texts,
past thinkers, and historical events) and contemporary
theologians have made a concerted effort to establish
principles by which this process of interpretation can be
guided. These principles have clarified the relationship
between the subject matter and the interpreter.
What is the common ground that allows for the initial
point of contact between the two? Does the text affect the
interpreter's understanding or does the understanding brought
to the text affect the outcome of the interpretation? What
is an appropriate mode of expression for giving new meaning
to otherwise obscure texts? All these are questions in which
contemporary theologians have shown a strong interest. Since
these hermeneutical principles ultimately contribute to a
6
better understanding of God and His revelation (through
the Scriptures, history and historical figures), we can see
that the God question is also a factor behind this
theological concern.
And finally, another interest which has dominated much
of contemporary theology (and one which is related to the
God question in a less direct manner) concerns the relation
of philosophy and theology. Anthropology, language, history
and hermeneutics are all areas of interest for the philosopher,
and thus the contact between philosophy and theology is
hardly surprising. In his contribution to the series of
books "New Directions in Theology Today", William Hordem
says this area of interest is especially representative of
the present transition and turmoil in theology. He suggests
that while there are still theologians who feel "Jerusalem"
has nothing to do with "Athens", "the real problems arise
when theologians decide to converse with Athens.
The theologians openly employing philosophical in¬
sights, terminology and methods argue that the question
concerning the use of philosophy is not really debatable;
the issue instead is whether the theologian is conscious
and selective in his use of philosophy or whether his
philosophical presuppositions will resemble the naive
philosophy of the "man in the street." How much should
Jerusalem have to do with Athens then? Many theologians
1 William Hordern, Introduction to Theology. (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1968), p.21.
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feel that the main contribution of philosophical interests
lies in the realm of apologetics, giving a better under¬
standing of the secular outlook with which a common ground
for communication must be established and providing a
relevant form of expression for dogmatic content.
The task then becomes the selection of a particular
philosophy or school of philosophy as both compatible with
the Gospel and representative of the secular outlook. In
other words where is the Athens of today; is it the Black
Forest, the Left Bank, Oxford or elsewhere? By what
criteria is a selection to be made? Can only certain aspects
of a philosophy be utilized or does the inclusion of any one
part involve a commitment to the whole? Is there any
danger of the Gospel content being swallowed up in its
philosophical form of expression? These too are questions
frequently encountered in the study of contemporary
theologians.
II. Heidegger and contemporary theology
In considering Heidegger's influence on several
contemporary theologians we will establish that his thinking
has a profound effect on each of these issues listed as
being in the forefront of twentieth century theology. In
light of his interest in the ultimate dimension, or BeiJig,
as it is manifest in man's nature, language and history (all
parallel concerns to those of theology), Heidegger's
influence on theology is not too unexpected. Hence our main
contribution will be not only to establish that Heidegger
influences theology but also to establish how extensive this
8
influence really is. In doing this we should be able to
resolve the confusion which surrounds (a) the
interpretations of this philosopher*s thinking in itself
and (b) its influence on various theologians.
As for the former, one invariably finds Heidegger's
name mentioned in any discussion of existentialism. For
instance, great attention is given his work in such books
as James Collins* The Existentialists, Ronald Grirasley's
Existentialist Thought. Ralph Harper's Existentialism.
D.E. Roberts* Existentialism and Religious Beliefs and many
others. And yet Heidegger himself insists that his thinking
should be understood as ontological and stoutly refuses the
title of existentialist. The very book which is often
hailed as one of the foundations for the existentialist move¬
ment (Being and Time) is full of reminders about its onto¬
logical nature. Further, such prominent commentators on
his work as John Macquarrie, W.J. Richardson, Laszlo
Versenyi, and others agree with Heidegger's portrayal of
his work as ontological.
The result is a fierce debate about the unity of his
work. Are there two Heideggers, an existentialist and
ontologist? If so, are they related and how? Which makes
the greatest contribution? On this last question we find
Marjorie Grene (Heidegger) bitterly denouncing the ontologist
who has deserted his earlier existentialist interests: "the
tragedy of an artist who has destroyed his own work."^^
1 Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger. (London: Bowes and Bowes,
1957), p.125.
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On the other hand, we shall encounter such theologians as
Heinrich Ott, Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs who feel
Heidegger*s greater contributions stem from his later
ontological emphasis. To add to the debate, we will
establish that John Macquarrie and W.J. Richardson believe
Heidegger's existential and ontological contributions can
only be appreciated when their inter-relatedness is under¬
stood.
Not surprisingly this confusion in the interpretation
of Heidegger*s thinking is carried over into the interpretations
of his theological influence as well. The first area in
which there is a basic difference of opinion concerns the
question who influences who? In opposition to those who
emphasize Heidegger's influence on theology, Hans Jonas
believes that in actuality theology has been the dominant
factor in its relation with Heidegger's thought.
As a result, "instead of theology's finding validation
or corroboration for itself in what has been borrowed from
itself, the real case is that philosophy must examine the
philosophical validity of Heidegger's borrowing from
theology.Is Jonas correct in concluding that Heidegger's
debt to an early theological training invalidates his
theological relevance or is Andre Malet correct in seeing
this as merely a contribution to and strengthening of
1 Hans Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology", Review of Metaphysics,
18 (1964-65), p.214.
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Heidegger's relevance for theology.
Another question greatly debated is whether
Heidegger's influence is constructive or harmful for
theology. Is Rudolf Bultmann correct in utilizing this
philosophy to express New Testament insights or is Karl
Barth right in charging that such an approach leads theology
into a regrettable dependence on a secular outlook (the
(2)
"Babylonian captivity" of theology by philosophy.)v
This confusion continues in that even amongst those
theologians who accept Heidegger's relevance there are great
differences of opinion as to which aspect of his thinking
to use. As a result one finds the "post-Bultmannians"
employing Heideggerian insights to move beyond Bultmann's
theology which is itself based on Heideggerian insights.
How is it that one man's influence can lead to such a
variety of results?
We can see then that the task of establishing Heidegger's
influence on contemporary theology must first resolve the
confusion as to the nature of his thinking itself and,
secondly, unravel the knotted threads in the relation between
his thinking and theology. As a result, the first division
of this work will be devoted to an analysis of Heidegger's
philosophy while the second will consider various contemporary
theologians insofar as they are influenced by Heidegger.
1 Andre Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann. trans, by
R. Strachan, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), pp.329-
330 and p.403.
2 Karl Barth, "Rudolf Bultmann. An Attempt to Understand Him",




Our analysis of I-artin Heidegger's philosophy will
stress that his main interest is ontology and that his
pursuit of Being carries him into such diverse areas as
existentialism, language analysis and the consideration of
the thought process as well as discussions of Being itself.
This variety in Heidegger's thinking does not result from any
confusion or instability on his nart but instead reflects the
very nature of that which he seeks, Being itself.
In analyzing Aristotle's statement* "Lq. sm. legeta.i
nollakoswhich he translates at one point as, "The being,
particularly in regard to its Being, will be manifest in a.
multiple way.N and at another as,"Being-being appears in a
manifold way,"* Heidegger says that "in this sentence the
unchanging question of my v/ay of thought is concealed* what
is the overarching single unitary designation for Being of
• •
all its manifold meanings?nl1
Because of its various modes of mani festness, then,
Being must be considered by way of a multi-faceted analysis'.
As we shall see, it is in the balance between the singleness
of his purpose (to pursue Being) and the diversity of his
interests (Dasein, language and thought) that the strength
of Heidegger's thinking lies. As a result any attempt to
aonropriate his insights must avoid fscusing too exclusively
on any one facet of it, thereby losing sight of its balance
and resulting inevitably in a distorted interpretation.
i Martin Heidegger, Was 1st das, die Philosonhie?. (London*
Vision Press Ltd., 1958), P.9?#
ii Martin Heidegger, Preface to W.J.Richardson's Heidegfrer-






1. Outlook and vocabulary
The purpose of this first chapter is to examine
the method and results of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein
and to establish that this analysis is motivated solely by
his interest in Being. John Macquarrie, in his book
Martin Heidegger, expresses the position that shall be
taken in the following pages on Heidegger the
existentialist. He acknowledges that the analysis in
Being and Time is "existentially" based but stresses that
this existential interest is motivated by an ontological
concern. Therefore "...Heidegger is not an existentialist
in the narrow sense of one whose primary interest is in
man...From first to last, the goal toward which Heidegger's
thought is thrusting is the question of the meaning of
Being."^ ^
Before turning to the task ahead, a few remarks
concerning Heidegger's rather difficult, some would even
say obscure, vocabulary are in order. His discontent with
the present status of language is clearly reflected in
Being and Time where he explains that the "awkwardness and
1 John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger. (London: Lutterworth
Press, 1968), p.8.
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inelegance" of his language is due to the fact that for
the task of considering entities in their Being "...we
lack not only most of the words but, above all, the
„(1)grammar."
In his letter to William J. Richardson, which
serves as the preface to the latter's book Heidegger -
Through Phenomenology to Thought, one can see that
Heidegger feels his thought is incompatible not only with
the current status of language but, even more basically,
that it is incompatible with the contemporary frame of
mind. "Every effort to bring what has been thought closer
to prevailing modes of (re) presentation must assimilate
what-is-to-be-thought to those (re) presentations and
(2)
thereby inevitably deform the matter." Therefore,
Heidegger's difficult terminology is due to a basic dis¬
agreement with the current modes of language and thought
and is an integral part of his self-appointed task of
overcoming metaphysics.
Indeed, in "Brief iiber den Humanismus" (19*+?)
Heidegger claims that the project begun in Being and Time
was never completed due to the failure of contemporary
thought and language forms to express his radical insights.
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans, by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (1st English ed.; London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p.63.
2 Martin Heidegger, Preface to W.J. Richardson's Heidegger
- Through Phenomenology to Thought. (The Hague, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962), p.VIII.
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He reveals that a third section to Being and Time entitled
"Time and Being" was abandoned due to the insufficiency of
the traditional language of metaphysics to express his
intentions.
2. A preliminary definition of Dasein
In seeking to understand the Heideggerian concept
Dasein, it is a necessity to begin with Being and Time and
support for our proposal that Heidegger's analysis of
Dasein is subordinate to his over-arching concern for Being
is abundant throughout this major work. Indeed, the first
half of the introduction is devoted solely to the question
of Being. In his preface the author states the purpose of
Being and Time quite clearly. "Our aim in the following
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of
(2)
Being and to do so concretely." In his concluding
remarks he reiterates: "Our aim is to work out the
question of Being in general.
Prom the following discussion in "The Way Back
into the Ground of Metaphysics" it is apparent that
Heidegger's views on the fundamental aim of Being and Time
remained unchanged in later years as well. "To lead our
thinking on the way on which it may find the involvement of
the truth of Being in human nature, to...recall Being
itself in its truth-to do that the thinking attempted in
1 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1967), p.159.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.19.
3 Ibid.. pA87.
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Being and Time is on its way."^ There can be no doubt,
then, that Heidegger's intention in his analysis of Dasein
was to pursue the question of Being. The question to be
considered in the following analysis is whether or not he
successfully conveyed this intention in Being and Time.
Heidegger begins his introduction with the
assertion that the question of Being has been forgotten.
He goes on to summarize the reason for this status in the
form of three major presuppositions in the history of
philosophy: Being is the most universal concept, the con¬
cept of Being is indefinable and this concept is self
(2)
evident. This being the case, he asks, where do we
begin our quest for Being? One starts with the vague
awareness all men have of Being which allows the question
to be asked and which has resulted in the faulty under¬
standing of Being in history. He further insists that this
faulty understanding "...is itself a positive phenomenon
(l)
which needs to be clarified." J
Having begun with this vague awareness of Being,
Heidegger next seeks an object to be interrogated about
1 Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Meta¬
physics", CQJitenjpqrqry PfojUQSPPhAg Prpi&fflnis, ed. and trans,
by Y.H. Krikorian and A. Edel (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1959), p.315.
2 Heidegger, Befag qnd TjLqe, pp.21-23.
3 Ibis*., P.25.
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Being. Being itself is not available; if it were there
would be no problem. Therefore he must seek the entity
or object through which Being might be glimpsed. At this
point, Laszlo Versenyi's analysis of Heidegger's thought in
Heidegger, Bejflg aqfl I'rptft, is most helpful.
Every inquiry has three constitutive moments:
(a) the object of inquiry, i.e. that which is in
question, (b) the subject of the inquiry, i.e.
that which is interrogated, asked about what is
in question and (c) a conceptual framework within
which the answer could be formulated and given...
In this particular investigation, that which is
in question (a) is Being. This seems to present
no immediate problem, for we do have a vague,
preconceptual grasp of the meaning of the term...
But (b) Being is everywhere. Every being
participates in it and can thus be questioned
as to its mode of Being, and this is what makes
our inquiry difficult: it is not by virtue of a
lack of possible directions, a scarcity of beings
to be interrogated that our questioning is
undirected, but rather by their over-abundance.^
At this point Heidegger anticipates the results of
later analyses and asserts that Dasein is the "(b) subject
of the inquiry, i.e. that which is interrogated, asked
about what is in question." This stems from Dasein's
unique nature as a being characterized by an inherent
concern for Being. Because of its ontological nature, the
pursuit of Being is "...nothing other than the radical -
ization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to
Dasein itself - the pre-ontological understanding of Being."
(2)
Since it is a central concept let us pause here
1 Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger. Being and Truth. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1965)> p.2.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.35.
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for a preliminary definition of Dasein which will he
clarified and filled in as our analysis progresses. The
clue to the basic nature of Dasein is seen in the intro¬
duction to Being and Time which stresses that ontology
must be based upon the results of an existential analysis
of Dasein which is called fundamental ontology.^ That
an analysis of Dasein can be referred to as fundamental
ontology is due to its basic characteristic of openness to
and concern for Being. Basically then, Dasein is to be
seen as that entity which is uniquely oriented toward
Being. As Heidegger explains, "...a necessary condition
(2)
for /man's/ Dasein is that he understand Being."
Andre Malet, in a brief but penetrating analysis
of Heidegger's thought in his book, The Thought of Rudolf
Bultmann. supports our interpretation of this concept as
follows: "In his real essence, man can only be openness to
and for Being...Man is merely the presence and locus (the
Da) of Being (Sein): he is Da-sein...Man is himself only
when he is the presence, the disclosure of Being...
We can further clarify the meaning of this concept
by determining its relationship to the meaning of the term
man. Michael Gelven stresses that Dasein and man do not
have exactly the same connotations since there are many
aspects of man besides his concern for Being, or that part
1 Ibid., p.3^.
2 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
by Ralph Manheim, (London: Oxford University Press,1959), p.8*+
3 Andre Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann. trans, by
Richard Strachan, (Ireland' The Irish University Press, 1969),
P.327.
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of him which is called Dasein. He illustrates by saying
that the digestion of food does not involve any under¬
standing of existence. However, if the digestive system
is disrupted, one then might reflect on the fact that
suffering is an inherent part of life and, on this level,
digestion becomes an existential concern and Dasein is
(1)
brought to the fore. As Laszlo Versenyi puts it,
(2)
Dasein is man, "the ontological animal."
3. Methodology
Turning now to the third phase in Versenyi's
outline of the introduction to Being and Time, we shall
consider the (c) conceptual framework used by Heidegger.
The (a) object in question is Being, in so far as it is
vaguely comprehended by all men. The (b) subject to be
questioned about Being is Dasein, by virtue of its unique
concern for Being. Basically we shall see how the
terminology from his approach to the phenomenological
method contributes to the conceptual framework for
Heidegger's analysis.
It should be made clear at the outset that while
greatly indebted in many ways to Edmund Husserl, his
predecessor in the chair at Freiburg, former teacher, and
the man to whom Being and Time was dedicated, his use of
the phenomenological method does not adhere strictly to the
intentions of the method's founder. F.H. Heinemann clearly
1 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and
Time. (New York; Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), p.29.
2 Versenyi, op.cit., p.1*!
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reflects this break between professor and former student.
"...at Freiburg, his /Husserl's7 most original pupil,
Heidegger broke away from him. He told me that he had
taken him most seriously, that he had read his Sein und
Zeit twice, but that he could not discover anything in it."
(1)
Heidegger too recognises this break with his former
teacher. In a letter to W.J. Richardson which serves as a
preface to the latter's book, he stresses that while his
understanding of phenomenology evolved into a position
different from that of Husserl's, it did so out of what he
considered a stricter adherence to the "principle of
phenomenology." Although acknowledging that dialogues with
Husserl provided the original impetus for his thinking about
the phenomenological method, he insists that an even more
important factor was his reflection on the root words logos
(2)(to make manifest) and phainesthai (to show oneself).
Heidegger begins his definition of phenomenology in
Being and Time by cautioning the reader that this term
refers primarily to a "methodological conception." Rather
than describing the "what" of the objects of philosophical
research, it characterizes the "how" of that research.
"It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and acci¬
dental findings; it is opposed to taking over any
conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated, it is
1 F.H. Heinemann, Lxistentialism and the Modern Predicament.
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1953), p«**8.
2 Heidegger, Preface to Richardson's Heidegger. Through
PhenQmenpjLogy fr? fhpugftt, p.X and XIV.
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opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves
as problems. He then proceeds to analyse the Greek
root words of this term, phainomenon. and logos.
He explains that phainomenon stems from the verb
phalnesthai. which means "to show itself." Hence
phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest.
He goes on to say that the way a phenomenon shows itself,
becomes manifest, is by announcing itself simultaneously
with the appearance of entities other than itself. Hence,
a phenomenon always shows itself vaguely or "unthematically".
As he best conveys his meaning at this point by way of an
example, an analysis of his illustration would provide the
clearest insight into an otherwise extremely difficult
section. (The editors themselves provide a very elaborate
scheme or outline of this section in a long and involved
footnote, p.52, which ends rather ambiguously and, if
anything, contributes to the obscurity of the passage.)
If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian
problematic, we can give an illustration of what
is conceived phenomenologically as a "phenomenon"
with reservations as to other differences: for
we may then say that that which already shows
itself in the appearance as prior to the "phen¬
omenon" as ordinarily understood ^phenomenon is
here alone used in its Kantian sense, as that
appearance opposed to an underlying noumenon
which never appears to finite cognition/ and as
accompanying it in every case, can, even though
it shows itself unthematically, be brought
thematically to show itself; and what thus shows
itself in itself (the forms of the intuition)
will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology.^)
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.50.
2 PP.5V-55.
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Therefore space and time, as used in Kant's philosophy,
would be phenomena in Heidegger's understanding of the
term as he has developed it to this point. At this point
Heidegger feels he has a "formal conception of phenomenon"
and will return later to fill in the definition.
He turns now to an analysis of the concept logos.
He begins by noting the many ways in which this word has
been translated or interpreted. He takes as a basic inter¬
pretation, however, logos as discourse and considers
Aristotle's work on this topic. He suggests that logos is
closely associated with deloun. which means "...to make
manifest what one is talking about in one's discourse."
He suggests that Aristotle further explained the function
of discourse as appphainesthai. The logos lets something
be seen (phainesthai) from (at>o) what is said.^
It is not difficult to see the inter-relatedness
of the two terms as defined by Heidegger. Phainesthai
means "to show itself" and logos means that which "lets
something be seen." The end result is that phenomenology
means "... apophainesthai ta. phainomena - to let that which
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which
it shows itself from itself." This, of course, is just
another way of expressing the motto of all phenomenol-
ogists: 'to the things themselves.' He concludes by
stressing that phenomenology is a methodology which does
1 Ibid., p. 56.
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not interfere with a pure perception of the subject matter
studied.^ ^
He then turns his attention to "deformaling" the
formal conception of phenomenon into the finished product
as it will fit into his own scheme of phenomenology. At
this point we need to recall (a) his presupposition that
all men have a vague comprehension of Being in their
comprehension of beings or entities and (b) his formal
definition of a phenomenon as that which shows itself
vaguely, or "unthematically", as itself by announcing
itself simultaneously with the appearance of entities other
than itself.
What is it that can be called a 'phenomenon1 in a
distinctive sense?, he asks. It must be something which
normally does not show itself at all, but lies hidden in
contrast to that which normally does show itself. Never¬
theless at the same time it must be something which is an
inherent part of that which shows itself, something which
is so essential "...as to constitute its meaning and its
(2)
ground." Being is the concept which completely meets
the conditions laid down by this definition of phenomenon
since it appears in such a way that it has been forgotten,
overlooked and misunderstood throughout the history of




and phenomenology Is ontology.
Heidegger further describes phenomenology as
having a hermeneutical character. Remembering Versenyi's
scheme, we know ontology for Heidegger is fundamental
ontology, or the analysis of Dasein. (Being, the object of
inquiry, is pursued through interrogation of Dasein which
is distinctive in its ontological concern.) This being
the case, phenomenology therefore involves interpretation,
it must interpret Dasein's understanding of Being and it is
hermeneutical in nature. There is an apparent contra¬
diction at this point which is frequently noted by
Heidegger's critics.This contradiction stems from a
traditional understanding of hermeneutics, from hermeneuein.
as interpretation. To speak of hermeneutical phenomenology
then would be a contradiction, since the motto "To the
things themselves" indicates a desire to escape any
imposition of meaning on entities as, for instance, where
the facts are interpreted in the light of preconceived
theories.
However, as is often the case, Heidegger here has
devised his own meaning from an analysis of the roots of
the word. The confusion stems from the fact that a
reading of Being and Time alone does not make this clear.
The passage in question reads as follows: "The logos of
the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a
1 Gelven, op.cit»T p.3*+.
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hermeneuein. through which the authentic meaning of Being,
and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein
itself possesses, are made known ^author's itaHc§7 to
Dasein's understanding of Being."^ Although he empha¬
sizes his translation of hermeneuein as "made known" by way
of italics, the distance between the word and its
translation in the text thwarts the author's intention here.
W.J. Richardson, whose commentary is most
comprehensive, picks up this intention through the philo¬
sopher's later writings. Having explained that hermeneuein
means "to make manifest", he explains that hermeneutic as
"the process of letting-be-manifest" and ohalnomena. "that
which manifests itself", together with logos, "to let-be-
manifest", Joined together to such an extent that hermeneutic
(2)
and phenomenology became one for Heidegger. In this way
the contradiction dissolves with a more sensitive awareness
of the term's meaning in their Ileideggerian context.
This concludes our introduction to Heidegger's
Dasein analysis in which we have established his underlying
ontological concern, the extent and reason for his diffi¬
cult terminology, the object of his analysis (Being), the
subject to be interDogated (Dasein) and the methodology
involved (hermeneutical phenomenology). We are ready now
to move into the analysis proper and our approach will
have the same twofold structure as Heidegger's, with its
division into preparatory and primordial analyses.
The former will penetrate beyond the everyday
1 Heidegger, oo.cit.. pp.61-62.
2 Richardson, on.cit.. p.631.
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views of human nature to reveal more basic structures of
existence, culminating in one unitary structure, care.
The primordial analysis will fill out the results of the
preparatory consideration of care and penetrate beyond it
to an even more basic structure, time. We will then note
how this most basic structure of existence is inherently
related to Being and this relation of Being and time will
conclusively support the proposal that Heidegger's concern
here is basically ontological.
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A Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Section One
*f. Preliminary view of analysis
We begin then, with the "Exposition of the Task
of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein" (the title of chapter
one) in which the author clarifies the task of the first
half of his analysis. Again Versenyi's scheme is helpful.
The object to be clarified is Dasein, the subject investi¬
gated is Dasein in its everydayness and the conceptual
framework of the phenomenological method will be oriented
around exlstentials as opposed to categories.
The object under inquiry is Dasein and the essence
of Dasein lies in its existence or its way of Being. In
his book on Kant, Heidegger gives a comprehensive definition
of existence. Of all beings man's alone is such that "...
the being which he is and the being which he is not are
always already manifest to him. We call this mode of
Being existence, and only on the basis of the comprehension
of Being is existence possible."^^ He also stresses that
the term existence refers exclusively to Dasein's mode of
(2)
Being. He further explains that the Being which is an
issue for Dasein in its existence, or way of being, and
toward which Dasein "comports" itself is in every case ray
(
Being and because of the inter-relatedness between Dasein
1 Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik.
(Frankfurt am Mains Vittorio Klostermann, 1951)* p.205.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67.
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and Being, the Dasein under consideration is also my Dasein.
Turning next to the subject to be interrogated
about the object under inquiry, we find Heidegger con¬
forming to the phenomenological method with his insistence
that Dasein be allowed to reveal itself in its everyday
mode of existence. Heidegger feels that this aspect of
existence is one which is being analyzed ontologically for
the first time, having been overlooked in past analyses of
existence.
He feels that because of its familiarity Dasein in
its everydayness "...has again and again been passed over in
explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and
well known, is ontologically farthest and not known at all;
and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked."
He cautions, however, that Dasein even in its everydayness,
"comports" itself toward Being, even if it does so
ineffectively.
We turn now to the conceptual framework in which
Heidegger will couch his phenomenological analysis. He
first suggests the need for a unique framework in dealing
with Dasein, that Being which is always my Being and which
alone can be said to exist.
-A*-1 expllcata to which the analytic of Dasein gives
rise are obtained by considering Ossein1s existence-




are defined in terms of existentiality, we call
them "existentialia." These are to be sharply
distinguished from what we call "categories" -
characteristics of Beihg for entities whose
character is not that of Dasein.
The translators of Sein und Zelt render
Existenzlal as existentiale. or existentialia in the plural.
For our purposes, existential will be used in reference to
matters pertaining to Dasein's structures of existence (e.g.
an existential or structure of existence and an existential
analysis which is open to the basic level of existence
involving existential structures.) Existential (no under¬
lining) will refer to the type of awareness involved in
considering the ontological aspects of any being and not
just Dasein as is the case with an existential awareness
and existentiell will refer to the type of awareness which
approaches beings unaware of their ontological dimensions.
The terminology for describing the structures of Being for
all beings other than Dasein will be category and
categorial.
Heidegger repeatedly stresses that the most
important characteristic of existential structures
(2)(Bxistenzialien) is their a priori nature. Magda King,
in Heidegger's Philosophy, explains this characteristic by
saying that even the simplest comprehension of an entity
involves the disclosure of such phenomena as space, time
and relation. "What already lies there in every experience
1 Ibid.. p.70.
2 Ibid., pp.65, 69, 71, 78.
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as the condition of its possibility is said to be a priori,
"earlier.Heidegger understands it as "fore-going and
going-hand-in-hand-with" experience...^^
To clarify the meaning of the adjectives existential
and existentiell. we shall first show how they involve
different levels of awareness and then how the two levels
are interrelated. Basically, all men are concerned with
their existence, (security, food, shelter, happiness, death,
work, etc.) and these concerns in themselves are existentiell.
However, when considered as a whole, in their inter-relation
with each other and particularly in their ontological
dimension, or insofar as they are related to the basic
determinative factors in existence, these concerns move on
to the more basic level of existential awareness.
For example, the usual thoughts about death, which
occur as regret at the death of another or fear in face of
the personal threat of death, involve an existentiell
attitude. However, when it is considered as an inherent
structure of existence which throws light on Dasein's onto¬
logical structures, then an existential awareness is involved.
Now we can see how these terms involve different levels of
awareness. Bxistentiell refers to the everyday concerns of
existence, while the consideration of existential structures
involves a broader perspective and more basic level of
existential awareness. The two are distinguished not so
much by their objects of concern as by the manner in which
they approach these objects.
1 Magda King, Heidegger's Philosophy. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 196*+), pp»63-6*+.
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Having established the distinction between these
two levels of awareness, we turn next to a consideration of
their inter-relatedness which can be seen (a) in the need
for the existential analysis to be rooted in its
existentiell subject matter and (b) in the need for the
process of the existential analysis itself to be incorpor¬
ated back into existentiell awareness and concerns.
Both of these can be seen in Heidegger's assertion
that the roots of any existential analytic are "ultimately
existentiell" and that only if the "...inquiry of
philosophic research is itself seized upon in an existentiell
manner as a possibility of the Being of each existing Dasein,
does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality
of existence.. • Thus these two approaches are inter¬
dependent even though they operate on distinctive levels.
5. Being-in-the-world
Having explicated the task ahead, the object,
subject and terminology of his phenomenological analysis,
Heidegger proceeds then to consider the broadest and most
general of all existentials. 3eing-in-the-world. He
immediately indicates that the need for hyphenating this
expression stems from the nature of the reality it repre¬
sents. "The compound expression Being-in-the-world
indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands
for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.3^.
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as a whole. However, the different items within this
phenomenon can be analyzed separately and Heidegger here
maps out the remainder of his preparatory analysis of Dasein.
He will consider world and worldhood, the who of the entity
which has Being-in-the-world, inhood as such (In-sein) and
finally a trait which summarizes and unites all the various
(2)
existentlals considered, care.
Before moving into the analysis proper, Heidegger
feels that a brief characterization of Being-in, which will
be analyzed in depth later, might be helpful by "way of
orientation." This orientation is helpful in that it gives
an example of Heidegger's exlstential-categorial distinction
at work. He begins by discussing the use of the word "in"
when applied to entities whose mode of Being is other than
that of Dasein, e.g. water in a glass. In this case, 'in'
refers to the spatial relationship of two entities and such
a relationship would be of the categorial type. Being-in,
however, must be distinguished from an entity "Being in
something." The lack of the hyphen is, of course, crucial
here.
Instead of its normal use in regard to objects
within the world, Heidegger suggests another meaning for
this word "in" when used to denote an existential structure
of Dasein. "'In' is derived from 'innan' - 'to reside',
1 Ibid., p.78.
2 Ibid.. pp.8-9 and pp.78-79*
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'habitare', to dwell.Werner Brock, in the intro¬
duction of Existence and Being, summarizes Heidegger's
analysis of this word by saying that a "thing" can be in
something only in a spatial sense while Dasein is said to
be in something not only in a spatial sense but also in the
sense of dwelling or sojourning. For instance, the way a
match is in a box would have a different connotation from
the way a man is in his home. In the latter case, much
(2)
more Is involved than a simple spatial relationship.
However, this distinction between the spatial
connotations of the word 'in' and its status as a component
within an existential structure is not intended to deny any
sort of spatiality to Dasein. Instead, it merely
distinguishes between the spatiality of things and of Dasein
and also points to the fundamental nature of the existential
3eing-in-the-world. As Heidegger explains, Dasein does
have spatial relationships but these are possible only
because of its primary and basic structure of Being-in-the-
world.^ ^
6. World
We turn now to Heidegger's analysis of a major
component of that existential Being-in-the-world. In the
chapter of Being and Time entitled "The Worldhood of the
World" he states at the beginning that worldhood is an
1 Ibid., p.80.
2 Werner Brock, Introduction to Existence and Being, by
Heidegger, (London: Vision Press Ltd., 19*+9), p.*+2.
3 Heiddgger, Being and Time, p.82.
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ontological concept and is to be seen as an existential*
His analysis continues in the familiar pattern and we see
world and worldhood examined through an interrogation of
Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world. "The theme of our
analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the
very world itself; and these are to be considered within
the horizon of average everydayness - the kind of Being
which is closest to Dasein.
As for his terminology, he lists four separate
meanings for the word "world": (a) world as an ontical
concept indicating the sum of all entities, excluding Dasein,
within the world; (b) world as an ontological term repre¬
senting the Being of that sum of entities; (c) "World can
be understood in another ontical sense - not however, as
those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which
can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that
wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to live.";
(d) world as it can also be used to represent that which
(2)
Heidegger terms worldhood. Heidegger's intention is to
use the word solely as it is defined in (c).
We shall trace Heidegger's analysis beginning
with his examination of the world and follow it through his
understanding of the world as it relates to ontological




everyday world of Dasein its environment and says this
environment consists mainly of objects with which it has
to deal. He begins with these objects within-the-world
by analyzing the Greek word for things, pragmata "...that
which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings.
His own term for such entities is equipment and the
basic trait of equipmentality, or that which makes an
entity equipment, is its pointing beyond itself. It is
always to be seen in terms of its "belonging to" something
else. The "belonging to" of equipment is illustrated by
a list of such inter-related items as inkstand, pen, ink,
paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors,
room. Each piece of equipment then, in its ontological
sense, is an arrow or sign pointing beyond itself.
Another basic trait of equipment as defined by
Heidegger is its practical nature; it is always an "in
order to." For instance, the "In order to" of a hammer
is hammering. Marjorie Greene, in her book Martin
Heidegger,remarks that Heidegger's analysis here is
extremely pragmatic. "Things are for him not Cartesian
res extensae bits just there (vorhanden) in an indifferent
space; they are stuff for use (Zeug). which are at hand
(2)(zuhanden) for our handling." For Heidegger then, the
Being of equipment or useful objects is labelled readiness-
1 Ibid., p.96.




However, there is another basic category of
entities encountered within-the-world. Although we are
first aware of entities ready-at-hand, because of their
usefulness, we also encounter useless entities, or those
merely present-at-hand (vorhanden). Werner Marx,
successor to the chair formerly held by Heidegger and
Husserl, in Heidegger and the Tradition explains that an
entity zuhanden can become an entity vorhanden. Such a
transition occurs for example when the handle of a hammer
breaks in the course of hammering and the 'in order to'
of the tool 'for the sake of' working or hammering is
interrupted. In this way the "referentially meaningful
being handy" 7zuhanden7 changes into the "mere persistence
of being on hand" /vorhanden~7.
Entities zuhanden are closest to us, however, and
consequently are the primary entities within Dasein's
environment. Because of the predominance of the scientific
approach which, according to Heidegger's scheme, considers
entities in their vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand), this
emphasis on the pragmatic view of entities definitely seems
to be against the grain of contemporary thought. However,
Heidegger's approach is generally defended, as seen in
Calvin Schrag's position in Existence and Freedom.
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.98.
2 Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition. (Evanston:
North-Western University Press, 1971J, p.89.
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As physical object Zthis is Schrag's term for
an object present-at-handZ the hammer can be
scientifically analyzed and described in terms
of its primary and secondary qualities. But
this scientific analysis is already at second
remove from the reality of the Umwelt
/environment? as it is immediately encountered.
The heaviness of the hammer is not initially
the heaviness of an object which has the
quantitatively determined weight of 10 pounds;
rather, it is the heaviness of a utensil
which in reference to my practical concerns
renders difficult the act of hammering. The
mode of at-handness /zuhandenheit7 is thus the
primitive mode of man's orientation in the
Umwelt. The mode of on-handness /vorhanden-
heit/ comes later in man's understanding of
his world as a world of tools.
We might recall now that we are considering these
entities encountered within Dasein's immediate environment
in order to grasp the ontological-existential significance
of world. With the consideration of entities which either
have lost their usefulness or never had any from the start
of an encounter with Dasein, we come to a point where the
"pointing beyond itself" nature of entities zuhanden becomes
apparent. Heidegger stresses that "...when an assignment
/usefulnes£7 has been disturbed...then the assignment becomes
(2)
explicit." It is only then that we catch sight of all
that towards which the entity is pointing. Only then does
the world in its wholeness become apparent.
W.J. Richardson reflects this in his explanation
that the ontological structure of any equipment is deter¬
mined by its "insertion into a total purposeful pattern."
1 Calvin 0. Schrag, Existence and Freedom. (Evanston:
North-Western University Press, 1961), pp.31*—35»
2 Heidegger, oo.cit.. pp.121-122.
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This pattern is latent in the sense that it is usually-
taken for granted. However, it becomes apparent and is
brought to the fore whenever the breakdown of some equip¬
ment draws attention to the then disrupted series of
relationships. This totality of relationships is what
Heidegger understands by world.^
Let us turn now to see how the worldhood of this
world becomes an existential of Dasein, a mode of Being for
Dasein. As seen previously, the basic trait of tools,
instruments, or entities ready to hand is their reference
beyond themselves. A chain of reference between such
entities continues until reaching its goal in Dasein. The
chain of references ends with Dasein "...because of its
ontological structure, sc., the Being of instruments is to-
be-destined to another, but the Being of Dasein is to be
concerned with its own Being and cannot therefore be
(2)
referred beyond itself."
In seeking to grasp the connection between Dasein
and world, we need only remember that Dasein serves as the
centre of the matrix of the relations between entities,
indeed is the goal of the chain of references from one
entity to another, e.g. the needle implies the thread,
the garment and finally the sewer. Therefore it is Dasein
which gives meaning and direction to the term worldhood.
1 Richardson, op.cit.. p.9+.
2 Ibid., p.55.
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It then becomes apparent how Heidegger can consider world-
hood an existential of Dasein. Remembering that the
existential 3eing-in-the~world is a unit and that all
entities ready-to-hand refer back to Dasein for their
meaning, we can see how the world as defined by Heidegger
is really an extension of Dasein. "Ontologically, world
is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein
essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein
itself. Therefore, to understand Dasein, one must
consider worldhood as an existential, or mode of Being of
Dasein.
Before moving to a consideration of the next stage
in Heidegger's thinking, let us again stress the ontological
purpose behind this analysis of Dasein's structures of
existence. At the beginning of the chapter "The Worldhood
of the World", Heidegger strongly reminds his readers of
this underlying purpose. "In the disclosure and explic¬
ation of Being entities are in every case our preliminary
and our accompanying theme; but our real theme is Being."
(2)
'When we realize that he is analyzing world in order
to clarify the nature of Dasein, the 'ontological animal',
it is not difficult to see that his interest here is
ontological and thus he is carrying out his earlier
expressed intention.
1 Heidegger, oo.cit.. p.92.
2 Ibid.. p.95»
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7. The "who" of Being-in-the-world
We move now to the next portion of Heidegger's
analysis of the different components of the existential
Being-in-the-world. He here considers "...that entity which
in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it
is. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when
one is asking the question who?"^ This "who" will be
considered in this section along with Being-with and Dasein-
with. His scheme continues to follow the same pattern: an
object of inquiry, the "who"; a subject of inquiry, everyday
Being-in-the-world; and an appropriate terminological frame¬
work for his phenomenological analysis in the unusual
implications he finds in such words as "they", "I" and
"other."
Heidegger first poses and sets the stage for his
question about the "who" of Being-in-the-world. He warns
his readers to beware the obvious answer. We are not to
be misled by his opening statement that Dasein is in each
case mine into correlating "I" and Dasein. On the ontic
level this might seem true. Ontologically his previous
statement is only an "indication", and he refers to this
previous discussion as being only a "rough and ready" one.
While the ontical identity of Dasein and "I" might seem
apparent, "...this must not mislead us into supposing that
the route for an ontological interpretation of what is
1 Ibid., p.79
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given in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed...
It could be that the who of everyday Dasein just is not
the 'I myself'
His first clue for identifying the 'who' of Being-
in-the-world comes by way of a reminder that we must ground
our present analysis in the results already obtained by the
previous analysis of world, the first component in Being-in-
(2)
the-world to be considered. With this in mind we are
reminded of the referential nature of equipment which points
toward a Dasein. John Macquarrie, in An Existentialist
Theology. Illustrates how Heidegger uses this analysis to
show the existence of other Daseins. He explains that any
instrument a person uses points toward the existence of
others. For instance the book a person holds was written
by another, printed by another, bought from another and read
in order to inform yet another of its contents. In this
way Being-in-the-world invariably involves Being-with-others.
(3)
Having established the existence of other Daseins,
Heidegger states that we relate to entities and other
Daseins in two separate ways, Besorgen and Ptirsorgen. (The
translators of Sein und Zeit translate these as concern
and solicitude respectively. They mention their dis¬
satisfaction with these renderings which are unavoidably
1 Ibid., p.150.
2 Ibi
3 John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London:
SGM Press Ltd., 1955), p.89.
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inexact, there being no close English equivalents for them.)
Macquarrie explains Heidegger's use of these words by saying
that one is never related to a person in the same way as to
a thing. "A thing is to me an instrument, and my relation
to it is a practical concern. (Besorgen). But my relation
to a person is personal concern (Fiirsorge) ...Here Heidegger
is distinguishing between the I-it and the I-thou relation¬
ships."^^
In the following Heidegger explains how Being-with
is an existential of Dasein:
...Being-with others belongs to the Being of Dasein
...This must be understood as an existential
statement as to its essence. Even if the partic¬
ular factical Dasein does not turn to Others and
supposes that it has no need of them or manages
to get along without them, it is, in the way of
Being-with, its understanding of Being already
implies the understanding of Others. This under¬
standing. . .is not an acquaintance derived from
knowledge about them, but a primordially
existential kind of Being which, more than any¬
thing else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance
possible.(2)
In this we see reflected both his underlying ontological
concern and the a priori nature of existentials.
Heidegger, having defined Being-with or Dasein-with
as a characteristic of the 'who' of Being-in-the-world,
further clarifies how the 'Other' of this Being-with affects
Dasein. Arne Naess.In Four Modern Philosophers, states
that man is always aware of the difference between himself
1 Ibl£., p.90.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. pp.l60-l6l.
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and other men. For example, Is one behind or ahead of the
other? If behind, one must struggle to catch up and if
ahead struggle to maintain the lead. In this way, Dasein's
actions are constantly affected by others.^
Heidegger proceeds to identify "who" the others
are and to speak of the manner and extent of Dasein's
domination by this other. He first eliminates the common
sense answer as to the Identity of the other. "By Others
we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against
whom the •stands out. They are rather those from whom,
for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those
(2)
among whom one is too." Instead, the "who" of the
Others is called the 'they*, (das Han).
As for the way In which Dasein is dominated by the
'they1, Heidegger illustrates as follows:
In utilizing public means of transport and in making
use of information services such as the newspaper,
every Other is like the rest. This Being-with-one-
another dissolves one's own Dasein completely Into
the kind of Being of the Others, in such a way,
indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and
explicit, vanish more and more. In this...the real
dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take
pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure;
we read, see, and judge about literature and art as
they see and judge; ...we find shocking what they
find shocking. The 'they'...prescribes the kind of
Being of everydayness...the particular Dasein in
its everydayness is disburdened by the they.^^
Heidegger further explains that the 'they' is an existential
1 Arne Naess, Four Modern Philosophers, trans, by Alastair
Hannay, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968),
p. 202.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.151*.
3 Ibid.T pp.16^-165.
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and as such a basic inherent part of existence.
We can also see how the Dasein becomes so immersed
in and controlled by the others, the "they", that in a very
real sense, it becomes 'they' and vice versa. Thus the
everyday self is the they-self and the world becomes under¬
stood in terms of this they-self. He goes on to
distinguish between the they-self and the authentic self,
"...that is from the self which has been taken hold of in
its own (elgens) way."^ The etymological connection is
easily seen between own (eigen) and authentic (eigentlich).
Michael Gelven, in his commentary on Being and
Time, is very sensitive to the subtle new meanings Heidegger
applies to these ordinary terms 'they' and 'others'. "By
"they", he is referring to a characteristic of each
individual, a mode of the self." Therefore, inauthen-
ticity, or existing as a they-self, is each one's personal
responsibility and the word 'they' should never be
understood here as referring to others. Instead, the
'they' refers to one's personal mode of existence while
'others' are relationships one has in both authentic and
(2)
inauthentic existence.
In his conclusion to this section Heidegger answers
the question of the who of everyday Being-in-the-world by
stating that it is the 'they', not the Imyself which
1 Ibid., p.167.
2 Gelven, 00.cit.T p.69.
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constitutes the everyday identity of that entity constituted
by Being-in-the-world.^ Further, it is Dasein's
inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world which colours and
distorts its understanding of all other entities within-
the-world. This is the basic factor overlooked by past
analyses which threw them off the track in ontologically
analyzing Being, Dasein and Being-in-the-world.
He stresses also that because the 'they* is an
existential. "Authentic Being-one's-self does not rest upon
an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that
has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an
existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as
(2)
an essential existential." The difference then between
authentic and inauthentic existence is not the presence or
absence of the 'they' as a determining factor, but rather
how the 'they' is confronted and dealt with in our
existentiell affairs.
He now has analyzed Being-with, Dasein-with, the
•they* and answered his question about the 'who' of Being-
in-the-world. The ontological import of these analyses can
be seen in the fact that without a correct comprehension of
these terms, Dasein in its basic state, Being-in-the-world,
cannot be clearly seen and, as Dasein is the avenue to
comprehending Being, the latter is necessarily thrown out
of focus.




We move now to a consideration of Heidegger's
analysis of another component of Being-in-the-world,
In-sein. or Being-in. We see that he is still operating
within the framework proposed earlier. The object of
interrogation is Being-in, which he characterizes as the
•there' or disclosedness of Dasein. The subject to be
interrogated is still everyday existence and his methodology
continues to be phenomenological. We continue to find
ourselves operating within a conceptual framework built on
such terms as existential, ontological, exlstentiell and
categorial while new terms are constantly being introduced.
Being-in is characterized in the initial stages of
the analysis and thereafter considered as disclosedness.
Heidegger arrives at this characterization by considering
the fact that Dasein, for which Being-in is an existential,
is always 'there', is always Being-in-the-world.
Remembering that this basic existential is a unit, then
Dasein is always 'there' in its world. Further, as the
goal of and centre for the entities which constitute that
world, Dasein also discloses the meaning of that world.
Being-in, as Being-there in the world, discloses the world.
However, this disclosure is simultaneously a disclosure of
Dasein itself, since to disclose one portion of the unit,
composed of world and Dasein, is also to disclose the other.
Hence "Dasein is its disclosedness." He illustrates his
point by thinking of Dasein as a clearing in the forest.
The light coming into this clearing reveals not only the
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clearing itself but also those objects in its immediate
surroundings. Similarly Dasein "lights up" itself and its
world.^ ^
Heidegger's analysis considers three modes of
disclosure: states-of-mind, understanding, and discourse
in both their authentic and "fallen" condition.
Macquarrie's summary of this analysis will serve as an
introduction here:
The analysis has disclosed a three-fold structure
in existence: (a) Dasein is ahead-of-itself - here
belong the phenomena of possibility, projecting,
understanding; (b) Dasein is already-in-a-world -
here belong the phenomena of facticity, thrownness,
affective states /states-of--mind/; (c) Dasein is
close to its world, so close to it that it is
absorbed in it - here belong the phenomena of
falling, the 'they', the scattering of possibilities.^)
We begin with the first mode of disclosure, state-
of-mind, and by a closer look at the German term for
state-of-mind, 3eflndllchkeit. we can again see Heidegger's
tendency to root his analysis in everyday existence. As
the translators of Seln und Zelt point out, the word is
rooted in the common greeting "Wig befinden Sie slch?" or
"How are you?" Further, the word for mood is die Stimmung.
which normally has to do with the tuning of a musical
instrument.^^ Mood, then, refers to how one is in tune
(k)
with the world. Heidegger also stresses that this mode
of disclosure is an existential.
1 Ibid., p.171.
2 Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, p.27.
3 Heidegger, on.cit.. p.172.
Gelven, op.cit., p.80.
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Heidegger distinguishes three important traits of
states-of-raind. First he examines what it is that these
moods reveal. Not only is the entity which has Being-in-
the-world 'there' in its world, but through its moods, it
comes to see that it must be 'there', it is characterized
by "Being-delivered-over-to-the there." Heidegger
continues and says that this is the "...thrownness of this
entity into its there; indeed, it is thrown in such a way
that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the there. The
expression thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of
its being delivered over."^ (This term's origin in
Heidegger's experiences in the trenches of World War 1
(2)
sheds further light on its meaning. )
The second trait of states-of-mind is that they
reveal Being-in-the-world as a whole. Heidegger asserts
that moods, in their ontological aspect, "assail" us and
arise out of our concern for and dealings with our world.
The third and most important trait is simply that states-
of-mind disclose the world to Dasein. It is this basic
disclosure which is prior to and makes possible all exist-
(•>)
entiell comprehension of our world. J In this can be
seen its a priori nature as an existential.
By way of illustration Heidegger devotes a complete
sub-section of Being and Time to fear as an example of a
1 Heidegger, ou.cit.. p.17*+.
2 Macquarrie, Aq ^isftentjalist; Ifreplpsy, p.83.
3 Heidegger, op.cit. p.177.
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state-of-mind. In fear, Dasein feels Itself and its world
threatened. In a real sense, only an entity concerned
about its mode of Being and its world can be threatened or
feel fear. Thus, with fear is disclosed to Dasein its
concern for its mode of Being and its world of relations.
For instance, to be afraid for an acquaintance or for a
possession would still disclose to Dasein its own mode of
Being as well as its world since the particular object which
is threatened ultimately relates or refers back to its centre,
Dasein itself.
We move now to that second important aspect of
disclosedness, understanding. As was the case with moods
or states-of-mind, we must approach this term with an open
mind as it too will be given a distinct Heideggerian meaning.
As moods were concerned with revealing the fact, the
actuality of existence, understanding will reveal the possi¬
bilities of existence. Here we have come across an
extremely important cog in Heidegger's framework and a closer
analysis is needed.
In the context of an earlier discussion in Being
and Time unrelated to the present issue, Heidegger makes
the rather startling, and, until this point in Being and
lime-unexplained statement that: "Higher than actuality
stands possibility."^ He now clarifies this earlier
statement by saying that in reference to an entity present-
at-hand, possibility refers merely to that which is not yet
1 Ibid., p.63.
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actual and is never necessary. In this case it can be
said to be on a lower level than actuality and necessity.
However, as a structure of existence, possibility is the most
"primordial and ultimately positive aspect of Dasein's
ontological characteristics."^
Perhaps the best clue to what Heidegger means by
possibilities comes from his word, Selnkonnen. which means
possibility, potentiality, ways to be or ability-to-be.
Simply stated, Dasein's possibilities are the various ways
to be with which it is confronted and from which it can
choose. When we recall that existence is factical and
thrown we can say further that these possibilities are the
ways Dasein has to be; it cannot choose whether or not to be
confronted by possibilities. Furthermore, as factical,
Dasein is always confronted by a definite world or set of
(2)
possibilities into which it is thrown.
Understanding then is the disclosure to Dasein of
its possibilities in that it is the projection, throwing
forward, of possibilities. The meaning of this term
projection is clearer when we realize that Dasein's world
is not just a neutral set of objects. Instead it is
primarily composed of useful tools, e.g. the door handle is
not a round piece of metal, it is an instrument for opening




colored by the possibilities it presents and upon which
Dasein can project itself. For Heidegger then, Dasein is
its possibilities and is always projecting.^
These exlstentials. possibility and projection,
make Dasein a unique entity which cannot be grasped nor
analyzed as other entities can for it is always more than
it "factually" seems to be. However, it is never more than
it "factically" is for "...to its facticity its potentiality-
for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible...it
is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being,
it is not vet...only because it ij> what it becomes.. .can it
(2)
say to itself 'Become what you are'..." Understanding
as projection thus implies that it is only in projection
towards its own possibilities that Dasein can become "fully
meaningful."^ ^
Because of the uniqueness of the entity whose mode
of Being is to be-in-the-world, Heidegger suggests a par¬
ticular way, or sight, by which this entity can be viewed.
1 Ibid.. p.115* Arland Ussher points out that Heidegger's
understanding of projection is rooted in his study of the
Husserlian concept, intentional!ty, e.g. just as an idea is
related to the world by always being an idea of something,
so also is Dasein related to its world by always projecting
its possibilities onto it. Journey Through Dread. (London:
Darwen Finlayson Ltd., 1955)* p*71* See also Kuhn's
Encounter with Nothingness, pp.138-139.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.T pp.185-186.
3 Ronald Grimsley, Existentialist Thought. (Cardiff:
University of Wales Press, 1955)» p»53*
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As opposed to Umsicht for viewing the world as environment,
and Riicksicht for the world of other Daseins, he chooses
the term transparency, Purchsichtigkeit. for designating
knowledge of the self. By this term he seeks to indicate
that in viewing the self, it is not a case of "...
perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the
•self1, but rather one of seizing upon the full dis-
closedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the
constitutive items which are essential to it..."^
We move now to the third basic mode of disclosed-
ness, that of discourse or talk (Rede). Heidegger begins
his analysis of discourse by saying that it is "existentially
(2)
equiprimordial" with state-of-mind and understanding.
Just as with understanding and state-of-mind, so also with
an analysis of discourse we will come to see how Pasein
discloses te itself its own structures and the inter¬
related structures of its world. Like the other two modes
of disclosure, discourse, or talk, (Rede can be translated
either way, and is in Being and Time) is an existential.
It is related to these other two existentials in that
Dasein's understanding of what it means to be-in-the-world,
an understanding which is accompanied and affected by
(l)
states-of-mind, is expressed as discourse. -J As was also
the case with understanding and states-of-mind, the
existential discourse has an everyday or existent!ell




counterpart in what is normally called language or speaking.
Heidegger further states that •hearing' and 'keeping
silent' are two traits of this basic existential.^J
Let us focus on the former of these two traits and
see how Heidegger's analysis of 'hearing' reveals discourse
as a basic mode of disclosure. Being-with, an important
aspect of existence, is revealed in hearing in that hearing,
as listening to, implies the existence of an entity besides
the hearer or listener. Thus, he states that "Listening to
is Dasein's oxlstential way of Being-open as Being-with for
(2)
Others." Hearing also reveals another basic
existential. Being-in-the-world. He explains that one
never hears simply sound or noises, but that hearing is
always associated with some specific tool or equipment,
e.g. motor-cycles and waggons.
Again, we should stress that Heidegger's analysis
of language is ontological-existential. This means that
language is seen in its primordial state as something
ready-to-hand and its significance can only be understood
in relation to that which gives it meaning, Dasein, as all
entities ready-to-hand can be seen to have significance
only in relation to the central goal or ultimate purpose
toward which they all point. Since Dasein in turn





Heidegger's linguistic analysis can be called ontological.
Further, to correctly understand and analyze language,
grammar, meaning, etc., one must use this approach and
condemn as misguided the approach of many analyses of
language which treat it theoretically as an entity in
itself, or something present-at-hand since this is a
sterile, once-removed side of language.
Thomas Langan, in The Meaning of Heidegger, points
out that Heidegger has divided his analysis of Dasein's
disclosedness into two sections, authentic and inauthentic
disclosing. Remembering that inauthentic existence is
related to Dasein's domination by the "they", we can now
look for an analysis of the modes of existence of Dasein
under the influence of the "they". This will involve, then,
a consideration of Dasein in its everydayness. Nevertheless,
Heidegger cautions that even here his concern is onto¬
logical and is not intended as a "moralizing critique of
(2)
everyday Dasein."
There are three phenomena in everyday existence
which point to this domination by the "they". The first is
idle talk (Gerede. which can also be translated as gossip or
prattle), the inauthentic parallel to discourse. "Idle
talk is the possibility of understanding everything without
(l)
previously making the thing one's own." J This "idle
1 Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p.21*.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.211.
3 Ibid., p.213.
53
talk" fills Dasein's daily existence and each time something
is accepted on the basis of it, as inevitably happens, this
subject becomes "closed off" from any personal examination
and appropriation by Dasein. As he explains: "In no case
is a Dasein untouched and unseduced by this way in which
things have been interpreted, set before the open country of
a world-in-itself so that it just beholds what it encounters."
(1)
The second phenomenon is curiosity, the inauthentic
parallel to understanding. This refers to Dasein's
tendency to dwell on the superficial and insignificant
aspects of existence and indicates a lack of originality and
creativity. Heidegger sees curiosity as a distracted type
of hurrying from one interest to the next, seeking "...the
excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters."
The result of this "not tarrying" is that Dasein never
(2)
"dwells" anywhere and is constantly "uprooting" itself.
The third phenomenon which characterizes Dasein's
everyday existence is ambiguity, the inauthentic parallel
to state-of-mind. (It should be noted here that while all
commentators remark on this parallel between ambiguity and
state-of-mind, it certainly is not as striking as are the
parallels between understanding - curiosity, and discourse
- idle talk.) Heidegger defines this concept as follows:




the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and
about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes
impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine under¬
standing, and what is not." He further explains that such
ambiguity affects not only the world but also Being-with-
one-another and even Dasein's Being toward itself.^
One of the main points Heidegger tries to make in
his discussion of ambiguity is that this inauthentic mode
of existence grows almost naturally out of Dasein's mode
of finite existence. Indeed, finitude is a term which can
be closely associated with the Heideggerian terms
"facticity" and "thrownness." Thus Heidegger claims that
ambiguity is not the result of a conscious effort of Dasein
but is always already implied in Dasein's existence as
(2)
"thrown" existence.
These three phenomena, idle talk, curiosity, and
ambiguity, characterize the mode of disclosure of everyday
Dasein. Together they reveal an inherent part of everyday
existence which is called 'fallenness'. Heidegger stresses
that although an inauthentic mode of existing, fallenness
is an existential and as such is 3ust as prominent and real
as any authentic factors in existence. The terms
authentic and inauthentic must be understood here in their
existential sense, Heidegger cautions. Furthermore, the




Being \^hich is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein main¬
tains itself for the most part."^
It is not a question then, as in the theological
use of the term, of falling from a pristine state into a
lower one. We get some idea of the term's Heideggerian
implications from his explanation that Dasein falls from
itself, as factical Being in the world, into the world,
which is also a part of Dasein's being. To understand
fallenness as an ontical or exlstentlell state beyond which
man progresses would thus be a grave error in Heidegger's
(2)
opinion.
Heidegger distinguishes four traits of "fallenness".
The first is that of temptation. It refers to the fact
that Dasein's structure of existence is such that it
necessarily is constantly tempting itself into falling.
The second, tranquillity, refers to the self-sustaining,
deceptive nature of this state of fallenness. The third,
alienation, indicates that Dasein, in its state of fallen¬
ness, is alienated from and denied access to its real
ground in potentiality-for-Being. The fourth trait is
entanglement. This refers to the fact that Dasein is not
alienated from itself but becomes completely absorbed in
itself (remembering that its world is a part of itself),





Again we should stress the ontological motives
behind the investigation, in this case, of inauthentic,
fallen existence for Heidegger introduces and concludes his
study of fallenness with a discussion of its ontological
relevance. Gelven, in his commentary on Being and Tin^
states that Heidegger is not moralizing in his discussion
of fallenness but is trying to show how "...inauthentic
moments reveal the structure of how one avoids the con¬
frontation of the ontological question. This is done for
the sake of exposing the dimensions of the Being question."
(2)
The analysis of fallenness, or inauthentic
existence, reinforces his analysis of understanding and
state-of-mind, which reveal authentic existence, in that
fallenness reflects and is only possible because of the
structures understanding and state-of-mind. In Being and
Time we read: "Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-
world understand!ngly with a state-of-mind is an issue for
it."(3)
9. Care as the basic, unitary existential
We move next to a crucial chapter of 3eing and
Time in which Heidegger formulates and analyses the concept
•care.' His concern in this chapter is to unite and form
1 Ibid.. pp.221-223.
2 Gelven, op.clt.. p.109.
3 Heidegger, op.clt.. p.22*f.
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a ground for the whole of the other existentials formulated
to this point. He explains that to arrive at an under¬
standing of the whole of Dasein's structure through adding
up all the various elements would be to treat Dasein
inappropriately since such a scheme would "need an
architect's plan." Instead he advises penetrating through
this whole to a "single primordially unitary phenomenon"
which could then serve as the "ontological foundation" for
the whole of Dasein.^
The importance of achieving this task cannot be
over-emphasized, as seen in the following words of Michael
Gelven:
Heidegger is bent on finding a single unitary
existent?.eg, because if tftere wfQ QO mllMZ
existential« there coqld be n& basis lor go in -
bevond tne simple emmeratton oL exiptOhUaJrS* M
th§£e would then b§ qq. ppg^ble link beWeefl
more analysis ol syefydflffleg? the oncological
ground that lies at its foundation. Unless there
was a single unifying existential, one could not
go any further than Division One Z5he preparatory
fundamental analysis of DaseijaZ of Being kid Time:
it provides the possibility of Division Two Za
primordial existential interpretation of DaseinJ7(2)
Heidegger must find, then, one single phenomenon
reflected in or underlying Dasein's everyday mode of exist¬
ence which will also provide access to Dasein's ontological
roots and thus Being itself. He states that for the
analysis of Dasein to retain its identity as fundamental
ontology and lay bare the Being of Dasein, it must look for
1 Ibid., p.226.
2 Gelven, on.cit.f p.112.
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"...one of the most far-reaching and most primordial
possibilities of disclosure - one that lies in Dasein
itself... With what is thus disclosed, the structural
totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in an
elemental way."^"^
He is looking then for a distinctive mode of dis¬
closure (an understanding state-of-mind) in which Dasein
"brings itself before itself." The subject to be
interrogated about this distinctive mode of disclosure will
be Dasein in its everydayness. He suggests anxiety as this
distinctive mode of disclosure and proceeds to consider its
existentiell appearance (or how it is seen in everyday
existence).
In looking at Dasein's everydayness, we have
already noted that "falling" is a basic existential.
Further, this falling is clarified by Heidegger as a fleeing
from one's authentic self into the world and the "they"
self. This fleeing then is basically a "turning away" and
Heidegger suggests we further analyze this "turning away"
as it is manifested on the everyday ontic level in order to
grasp in an existential-ontological way that which is
(2)
"turned away" from. If we might anticipate Heidegger
somewhat, we can say here that what is being turned away
from is authentic Being-in-the-world, which is Dasein's
1 Heidegger, on.cit.. p.226.
2 Ibid., p.229.
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general mode of existence as this is disclosed by anxiety.
He begins by distinguishing between fear and
anxiety as states-of-mind. As he has stressed previously,
fear is always fear "in the face of" some specific entity
in Dasein's world or environment. However, those
experiencing anxiety or dread (different words for the same
concept) can not identify any such specific object "in the
face of" which anxiety is aroused. In "What is Meta¬
physics?" he stresses the difference between fear and dread.
While the former is always associated with some definite
object, the latter is less specific, as he says, 'fear of'
is always 'fear about' something while 'dread of' is also
'dread about' but not about anything specific or concrete.
The object of dread is, in a very real sense,
"nothing and nowhere within-the-world" and this "nothing and
nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon that the
world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.
(2)
Therefore anxiety qualifies as a mode of disclosure
in that it reveals Dasein as Being-in-the-worid. Indeed,
because it is anxiety that reveals to Dasein its
facticity, we can say that anxiety is the state-of-mind
par excellence.
Having seen that which Dasein is anxious in the
face of, Heidegger next considers that "about" which Dasein
1 Heidegger, i^jLqteqpe qnd Being, pp.365-366.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.231.
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is anxious. lie explains that Dasein is anxious about its
Being-in-the-world. In anxiety the world, or that system
of relations between entities ready-to-hand, "sinks away"
and has nothing to offer to Dasein. In this way anxiety
breaks Dasein's tendency to fall into and ground its
existence in the world and instead forces it responsibly to
shoulder its role as an "authentic-potentiality-for-Being-
in-the-world."
In his essay "What Is Metaphysics?" Heidegger gives
a further description of this experience:
In dread, as we say, 'one feels something uncanny.'
What is this 'something' and this 'one'? We are
unable to say what gives 'one' that uncanny feeling.
•One' just feels it generally. All things, and we
with them, sink into a sort of indifference. But
not in the sense that everything simply disappears;
rather, in the very act of withdrawing away from
us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of
what-is-in-totality, which then crowds round us in
dread, this is what oppresses us. There is
nothing to hold on to.
In dread, then, Dasein*s preoccupation with the
world is broken, and it is forced back in upon itself. In
this enforced solitude Dasein is first able to "come to
grips" with itself. Further, this excludes any possibility
of Dasein disclosing itself to itself in terms of an
inauthentic understanding. Therefore, "Anxiety brings
Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity
of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility
(
which it always is."v '
1 Ibid., p.232.
2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.366.
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.232.
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In review, (a) we are looking now for a single
unitary existential which underlies all existentials and
will thus be able to serve as the bridge between a prepara¬
tory analysis of Dasein and the primordial interpretation
which will be even more ontological in nature. (b) We
began by looking for a distinctive mode of disclosure (an
understanding state-of-mind) whereby Dasein sets itself
before itself. Anxiety was suggested as that state-of-
mind which "filled the bill." (c) We then looked at the
"turning away" nature of everyday fallenness to see that
which is "turned away" from, which we anticipated as
authentic Being-in-the-world as disclosed by anxiety.
In Inverse order, we have found that what is
revealed in anxiety Is authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-
the-world. In a very real sense anxiety reverses the
turning away from authentic Being-in-the-world (that "In
the face of" which we are anxious) and forces Dasein into
authentic Being-in-the-world (that "about" which we are
anxious). Thus, the task in (c) is completed.
In order to meet the requirements of (b) we needed
to show that anxiety qualifies as a distinctive mode of
disclosure (an understanding state-of-raind). Because
anxiety discloses the world to Dasein, It Is definitely a
state-of-mind. Further we saw that anxiety discloses to
Dasein its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Remem¬
bering that states-of-mind reveal the actuality, the fact
(facticity) of existence, while understanding deals with
possibility and potentiality, we can see how anxiety Is a
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distinctive mode of disclosure, including both the modes
of understanding and state-of-mind. Therefore the task of
(b) is completed and the stage Is set for the appearance of
that crucial existential sought in the task of (a).
The analysis of anxiety has focused our attention
on Dasein for the first time simply In terms of itself.
We now are examining Dasein as Dasein, not as 3eing-in-the-
world, nor as seen in terms of entities, nor as seen through
the "they" self, nor as seen through Being-with Others.
While all these are basic exlstentials. the existential
constituting Dasein as Dasein will be the basic one.
Remembering Macquarrie's words (p. 4"j ) we can see
how anxiety has revealed three basic modes of Dasein's
disclosure of itself to itself. In answer to his question
concerning the possibility of anxiety revealing the whole of
Dasein's structure, Heidegger summarizes his analysis of
this concept by saying that anxiety is a state-of-mind; "...
that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-
in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our
potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world." He explains that
anxiety thus shows Dasein as factically existing 3elng-in-
the-world, the main characteristics of which are
"existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen."^
He proceeds next to define care based on these
inter-related structures revealed by anxiety. Here again
1 Ibid., p.235.
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it is important to understand Heidegger's language, not in
light of the usual implications such terms might have, but
in light of the meaning assigned them by Heidegger. As he
says in Kant und das Problem der Metaohvsik. if the term
care is considered as an ontic characteristic of man, as
having "ethical-ideological" implications only, "...then
everything falls into confusion and no comprehension of the
problematic which guides the analysis of Dasein is possible."
(1)
Insofar as Dasein is a potentiality-for-Being-in-
the-world, it is composed of possibilities toward which it
can understandingly project itself and is thus Being-ahead-
of-itself. Insofar as Dasein is seen as thrown Being-in-
the-world, it is ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-ln-a-
world. Furthermore, anxiety has revealed Dasein as
inauthentically absorbed and immersed in its world; therefore
it is also Being alongside its world. In summary he defines
care in the following manner: "...the Being of Dasein means
ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-worId.). This
(2)
Being fills in the signification of the term care..."
Here, also, the importance of the hyphens should
not be overlooked. This basic existential is a unit, a
whole. Magda King, in Heidegger's Philosophy stresses how
all three of the existential elements are inter-related,
1 Heidegger, Kant und flas ProbJL^ der Metqphygifr, p.213.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.236-237.
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each shovring the others:
When we say 'Man exists' we are already saying,
though not explicitly expressing it, that he
exists factually (facticity,thrownness), and
that thus factually existing, he is already
falling away from himself to the things he meets
within his world. Similarly, when we speak of
thrownness, we already imply that this thrown
man is in the way of existence, because only in
coming back to himself in the possibilities of
his being can man find himself already thrown
into a world, and not merely occur in it like a
thing. Similarly, when we speak of fallenness,
we are already implying existence and thrownness,
for only a man who under stands by being in a
world can lose himself to the things he meets
within it./-j\
With the appearance of the existential care, all
previously considered existentials have been gathered up
and united into one. Being-in (as dwelling or residing),
Being-in-the-world, worldhood as an existential.. Being-with,
the "they", modes of disclosure, all are united by the
underlying existential care. Just as Soree is included in
^ursorge and Besorgen (concern for others and concern for
entities) so care lies at the base of and is included in
all other modes of 3eing and Dasein.
The task suggested in (a) (to find an underlying
existential which unites all other existentials and can
serve as the bridge between the preparatory analysis and
more basic primordial interpretation) is fulfilled with the
following suggestion by Heidegger concerning the phenomenon
care. In reviewing his analysis of care he feels that in
1 King, op.cit.. pp.51-52.
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regards to this existential, "...we must pursue the
ontological question even further until we can exhibit a
still more primordial phenomenon which provides the
ontological support for the unity and the totality of the
structural raanifoldness of care."^^
With these words Heidegger is pointing toward the
second stage of his analysis when this concept will provide
the structural framework for his definition of time.
(Michael Wyschogrod, in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Jfrq
Ontology of Existence, notes that the structure of care
refers to Dasein's nature as a field or an extension and not
a static point. It is most important to keep this aspect
of care in mind when we move into the next stage of
(2)
Heidegger's analysis. ) Now we have fulfilled the task
set before us in (a).
10. Truth
Before moving on to this second stage, Heidegger
pauses to consider truth, an issue with which any ontology
must deal. He begins by stating that his approach
operates on a more basic level than past approaches and is
concerned with the most essential aspect of truth.
Therefore, he will be able to show how the traditional
understanding of truth has been derived from this more
primordial phenomenon.^
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p. 2*fl.
2 Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The Ontology
of Existence (London: Houtledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 195*+)»
pp.60-62.
3 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.257.
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He begins by referring to the currently pre¬
dominant and also traditional understanding of truth as the
correspondence theory in which the truth is determined by
a correct or incorrect correspondence between a statement
and its object. Such an approach overlooks the real issue
in that before there can be any correspondence, the object
in question must be able to show or "unconceal" itself.
As he explains: "What is to be demonstrated is not an
agreement of knowing with its object...What is to be dem¬
onstrated is solely the Being-uncovered of the entity
itself..."(l)
In his essay "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes",
Heidegger defines truth as follows: "Truth means the nature
of the true. We think this nature in recollecting the
(2)
Greek word aletheia. the unconcealedness of beings."
We should note here that Heidegger is speaking about the
essence of truth while he says other theories of truth only
deal with the "criterion" by which truth is established,
e.g. correspondence.
If we remember that one of the basic existentlals
of Dasein's mode of Being is Being-in as disclosure, it is
not difficult to see that Heidegger is now going to connect
closely truth as aletheia and Dasein as disclosure. He
1 Ibid-, p.261.
2 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1950), P*39»
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states that disclosedness is the basic characteristic of
Dasein "...according to which it is. its 'there'... In so far
as Dasein is^ its disclosedness essentially, and discloses
and uncovers as something disclosed, to this extent it is
essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'.
However, as fallen, Dasein's disclosure is often
distorted by its absorption in the world and the public
'they'. The result is that Dasein is 'equiprimordially' in
(2)
the truth and the untruth. (By way of clarification, we
might recall Heidegger's parallel between Dasein and a
clearing in the woods. Just as the light entering through
the clearing makes visible the clearing itself as well as
its surroundings, so too does Dasein, by its transparency to
Being, make itself and the entities within its world visible.
As Vincent Vycinas says: "Truth is located not in things and
not in man, but in Dasein, the openness of Being itself.
Man can be the source of truth only because Being holds sway
over him."
Not surprisingly, Heidegger states that: "'There
is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein
(If)
is." Now we can see that just as Being is best seen
through an analysis of Dasein, so too does truth find its
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.263.
2 Ibid., p.265.
3 Vincent Vycinas, Barth and Gods: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1961;, p. 26*+-.
"+ Ibid., p.269.
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expression through Dasein and can only be understood in
relation to Dasein. However, he would not want to make
truth completely subjective. Laszlo Versenyi relates how
Heidegger defends his approach against any charges of
subjectivism. His assertion that all truth is relative to
the Being of Dasein does not make truth subjective in the
sense of being arbitrary since Dasein is thrown into its
Being and has no control over it. It is because Dasein is
thrown into its Being, and can have no "arbitrary decision"
about its modes of existence that "the universality of truth
is assured.
We come now to the end of the first stage in
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. We have considered the
broadest and most general existential, Being-in-the-world;
its different components, Being-in as dwelling and as
disclosure, both in authentic and inauthentic modes; Being-
with, worldhood, and finally the existential which underlies,
unites and is included in all the others, care. With this
latter phenomenon established we are prepared to move into
the second stage of the analysis, remembering that the
concept care will provide the continuity between the two
stages.
1 Versenyi, op.clt.. p.^O
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The Primordial Existential Interpretation of Dasein
Section Two
11. Primordial versus preparatory analyses
tfe move next into the primordial existential
interpretation of Dasein. Heidegger begins by reiterating
his overall ontological motive in considering Dasein. He
again explains that as the one being concerned about its
mode of Being, Dasein is a primary area of concern for any
study of Being itself. He then explains that the analysis
to this point cannot claim to be primordial since it "never
included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and.. •
Dasein as less than a whole." ^ ^ ,/While authentic existence
has been a factor in his preparatory analysis, it has not
yet been treated "thematically" as the sole object and
centre of attention^/ In order to be primordial then, the
analysis must consider Dasein in its totality and authen¬
ticity.
Therefore Heidegger will begin his primordial
analysis with a consideration of Being-towards-death, which
will reveal Dasein in its totality, and a consideration of
conscience which will reveal Dasein in its authenticity.
Anticipatory resoluteness will be the concept which
characterizes Dasein's existence in its totality and
authenticity, and in this concept care, as the basic
1 Heidegger, on.cit.. p.276.
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structure of Dasein's mode of existence, will find its
fullest expression. Heidegger will then penetrate beyond
or behind care, as anticipatory resoluteness, to an even
more primordial structure of existence, time.
We will then note how this basic structure serves
as the point of contact between Dasein and Being. In this
way, we will have traced his analysis from its existentiell
beginning to its ontological culmination. We will next
see how he reanalyses several of the existentials revealed
in his preparatory analysis in light of these more basic
insights and, finally, we shall note how in his consideration
of history, which covers Dasein's mode of existence from
beginning to end, he rounds off and completes his funda¬
mental ontology.
12. Being-towards-death and Dasein in its totality
He begins this primordial analysis with a con¬
sideration of death which rounds off and limits Dasein,
thereby revealing its totality or wholeness. Ihis
particular analysis will involve the following steps: (a) a
consideration of problems stemming from the subject of the
analysis, (b) fitting this concept into the framework
established in previous analyses, (c) determining if this
concept is compatible with Dasein's everyday mode of
existence as so far described and, (d) a phenomenological
consideration of everyday existentiell attitudes toward
death, from which will be derived a full existential-
ontological concept, anticipation, which will point toward
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Dasein's wholeness.
Heidegger begins his consideration of death by-
painting himself into a corner, so to speak. Death is a
uniquely difficult concept to grasp because to experience
it is to cease to exist. It is impossible to solve this
difficulty by observing the death of another as this would
be a once-removed experience and thereby not an acceptable
piece of data. Furthermore, to consider the body of the
deceased is also unacceptable as it is now a lifeless
entity in the mode of zuhanden or vorhanden.
Another difficulty enters now to compound the
dilemma. As seen previously, it is an essential part of
Dasein's nature to be ahead of itself, it is always more
than it factually is. Now if we vrere to round out Dasein
as it ends in death, thereby grasping it in its wholeness,
then by virtue of our previous definitions we would no
longer be considering Dasein but rather an entity of some
other nature.
The key to how Heidegger solves his dilemma lies
in his previous assertion that Dasein lj3 its possibilities.
Because death is a possibility, in a very real sense Dasein
is its death. As Heidegger states: "The ending which we
have in view when we speak of death, does not signify
Dasein's Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end...
Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as
1 Ibid., p.289.
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We further resolve the dilemma by recalling that
we are considering the meaning of death, not death in its
physical, biological aspects or death as the end of
entities other than Dasein. Now we can see Dasein in its
totality, its wholeness, if we can manage to face authen¬
tically the meaning of our Being-towards-death, a task which
is rarely accomplished in everyday existence. This
concludes the task set forth in step (a).
Ke next determines if death, as the end of Dasein,
can be fitted into the existential framework of Dasein as
it has been exposed to this point. The basis of this
framework, of course, is care and we see here how Heidegger
insures continuity between the two levels of his analysis.
Recalling his definition of care (which we considered on
p. 63 ) he states that the fundamental characteristics of
Dasein's Being are existence, seen in its ahead-of-itself,
facticity seen in its Being-already-in, and fallenness seen
in its Being-alongside. "If indeed death belongs in a
distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death (or
Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in terms of these
characteristics.
In the very definition of death as a Being-towards.
the aspect of ahead-of-Itself in care becomes apparent.
It is not difficult to see how the two are closely related
since "towards" often refers to something "ahead."
1 Ibid., p.293
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However death is a distinctive mode of disclosure in that
it forces Dasein back into itself. Death as a possibility-
is always ay. possibility and in this way death forces
Dasein to accept its possibilities as its own. In addition,
this particular possibility is the possibility to not be,
and what is called into question here is really Dasein's
own Being-in-the-world. Therefore, the first factor in
the make up of care, potentiality-for-Being, or Dasein's
ahead-of-itself "...has its most primordial concretion in
Being-towards-death."^ ^
As for the other two factors In care, death
reflects facticity in that it is not an avoidable possi¬
bility. In a sense, Dasein Is 'thrown' into a situation
wherein death is the ultimate possibility. Similarly,
fallenness is seen in the universal tendency to flee from
or deny the reality of death. The symptoms of this flight
from death are all too familiar, e.g. the euphemisms for
the word death itself (passed away, at rest) and the fear
people have of cemeteries and funerals. Therefore death
as the end of man which provides a wholeness to Dasein's
existence can be analyzed within the framework of
Heidegger's existentlal-ontologlcal concerns and this
completes step (b).
He turns next to see if this phenomenon, as it
recurs in everyday life, is compatible with everyday
1 l£U., p.29>t.
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existence as he has so far defined it (the ontic-
existentiell and ontological-exlstential levels must always
be kept in mind in their inter-relatedness.) Werner Brock,
in his introduction to Existence and Being, very aptly
summarizes Heidegger's analysis of death as it is commonly
viewed:
In the publicity of the "one like many" death is
known as an event which constantly occurs.../but
which is/ not yet "vorhanden" for the person
concerned and thus of no threatening character.
"People die" (man stirbt). This "man" is "not
just I"; it is "no one". The publicity of the
"one like many" intensifies the temptation of
concealing to oneself one's own "Being-towards-
death"... An indifferent tranquillity is expected
in view of the "fact" that "one" dies. The
development of such "superior" indifference
"estranges" the Dasein from its innermost,
irrelative potentiality of Being.
As we saw previously, temptation, tranquillity, and
estrangement (or alienation) are all traits of fallenness,
which is a common trait of everyday existence as defined
by Heidegger. This completes the task of step (c).
He turns next to the development of a full
existential definition of death. In everyday existence,
the certainty of death, as well as the indefiniteness of
its arrival, is obliterated by the domination of the "they."
In considering a statement which typifies the common
attitude toward death, "Death certainly comes, but not
right away", Heidegger shows that with the "but" of this
1 Werner Brock, "Introduction" to Heidegger's Existence
and Being, pp.72-73-
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sentence, the "..."they" covers up what is peculiar in
death's certainty - that it .is possible at any moment.
Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness
of its 1 when.'"^
He goes on to establish a full existential
definition of death as ..the end of Dasein... Dasein's
ownmost possibility - non relational. Zno one can die for
another7 certain, and as such indefinite, not to be
outstripped ^unavoidable/. Death is. as Dasein's end, in
(2)
the Being of this entity towards its end." In this
context then, death does not refer to an end point but
instead indicates the attitude Dasein bears toward its end
or death.
He further clarifies this attitude by determining
the authentic way to-be-towards-death. A problem is
encountered here when we realise that death is a possibility.
How can one be toward a possibility as a possibility
without annihilating it. Heidegger reminds us that the
proper mode of Being-towards in this case would not be to
actualize this possibility, as this would be to bring
about one's death. Nor does he suggest "dwelling" or
"brooding" over death as one's end. He is not advocating
a negative or pessimistic approach to death.




•anticipation' of it as a possibility. The translators
of Sein und Zeit state that Vorlaufen can also mean
"running ahead." They go on to say that the anticipation
involved in Being-towards-death "...does not consist in
waiting for death or dwelling upon it or actualizing it
before it normally comes; nor does "running ahead into it"
in this sense mean that we 'rush headlong into it.'"^
Heidegger goes on to show how anticipation of
death reveals existence in its totality or wholeness. We
have already noted that Dasein's mode of existence is such
that it cannot be arbitrarily rounded off at one particular
point in time. This would destroy its nature as always
ahead-of-itself. However, it can be rounded off and
viewed in its totality if there is one possibility which
cannot be exceeded by any other.
It is this ultimate type of possibility which
Heidegger sees in Being-towards-death, a possibility which
Heidegger says is "not to be outstripped." Therefore,
anticipation of this possibility, which exceeds all others
and thereby provides a limit or boundary to them,
"includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in
advance Zand of/...existing as a whole potentialitv-for-
(2)
Being."




is a better appreciation of the possibilities from which
one must choose which, in turn, leads to authentic
existence. As he explains, in anticipation "...one is
liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which
may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and...for the
first time one can authentically understand and choose
among the possibilities lying ahead of that possibility
which is not to be outstripped."^ In accepting its
finitude, its limited number of possibilities and limited
time in which to fulfill its potential, Dasein acquires a
better appreciation of its situation and is better able to
focus its energy on the task ahead.
This completes step (d) in that we have now estab¬
lished the nature of that existential-ontological concept,
anticipation, which allows our analysis to consider Dasein
in its wholeness or totality. In addition, we have noted
how this leads inevitably into a discussion of Dasein in
its authentic mode of existence.
13• Conscience and authenticity
His task now is to ground authenticity in Dasein's
structure of existence. He selects the conscience as that
aspect of existence which will provide the bridge between
his concept, authenticity, and the common understanding of
existence. He proceeds by (a) fitting conscience into t'h©
1 Ibid., p.308
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framework already established, (b) grounding this concept
of conscience in what is normally understood as conscience,
(c) moving from an existentiell understanding of conscience
to a more basic, underlying existential structure,
resoluteness, (d) establishing the relation of authenticity
and resoluteness, and (e) explaining a trait of
authenticity which results from resoluteness.
It would be helpful to reiterate at the outset that
Heidegger is looking at conscience in an existenDial-
ontological manner. As Magda King points out, his interest
here is neither psychological, ethical-moral, nor religious.
Instead his task is "...to show how man must a priori be,
i.e. how he must be manifest to himself in his Being so that
in his factual existence he can hear a voice of conscience
at all..."
In order to fit this concept into the framework
established in previous analyses, Heidegger reveals how
conscience is related to disclosure as one aspect of care.
He begins by noting that all definitions of conscience agree
that it reveals, or discloses, something and therefore it
can be considered a mode of disclosure and will be involved
in all four aspects of disclosure: understanding, state-
(2)
of-mind, discourse and fallenness.
In the section "The Character of Conscience as a
1 King, op.clt.. p.16$.
2 Ibid., p.168.
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Call" Heidegger asks to what is the call made, or who is
called? The answer is that Dasein, as it understands
itself in the everyday mode under the domination of the
"they", is what is called. He then asks to what is Dasein
called, where is it directed by this call? His answer is:
"When the they self is appealed to, it gets called to the
Self...to that Self which...is in no other way than Being-
in-the-world."^^ However, the call is one of silence,
"nothing" is discussed or communicated in it. Yet this
nothing has important implications in Heidegger's framework.
As seen previously, it is the experience of "nothing" which
in anxiety focuses Dasein back into its own potentiality
for Being.
Next he considers who it is that calls Dasein and
explains that this caller can be defined in a worldly manner
by "nothing at all." Instead, the caller is Dasein in
its anxious awareness of nothingness, a Dasein which is
"not at-home" in its world. The result is that its voice
is completely alien to the inauthentic Dasein immersed in
its immediate surroundings. As Heidegger explains, what
"...could be more alien to the "they", lost in the manifold
"world" of its concern, than the self which has been
individualized down to itself in uncanniness and has been
it?)
thrown into the "nothing"?
W.J. Richardson quite aptly summarizes how this
1 Heidegger, op.cit.f p.318.
2 Ibid., pp.321-322.
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consideration of conscience leads naturally into and is
grounded in care. He explains that Dasein as fallen is
called to move toward an authentic existence as "...the
anticipatory drive-towards-Being by which it is its own
potentiality." Further, the caller is Dasein in its
"sheer thrownness" as this is revealed in anxiety. And as
we have already noted, existence, facticity, and fallenness
complete the structure of care so that conscience can now
be identified as the call of care and thus the firm
connection between care and conscience is established.^^
As for the relation of conscience and Dasein's
disclosedness, we see manifested in Heidegger's discussion
about the called "who" a consideration of Dasein as it
Understands itself under the fallen domination of the
"they". In his words about the "who" of the caller, we see
Dasein speaking from the authentic and basic state-of-mind,
anxiety. Finally, in his characterization of conscience
as a call, we see its relation to discourse. Therefore he
has grounded conscience in the four modes of disclosure,
understanding, state-of-mind, discourse and fallenness and
in this way has fitted this concept into the framework of
his overall analysis. This completes step (a).
He moves next to establish the continuity between
his understanding of conscience and what is normally under¬
stood as conscience. What is it that one hears in the
call of conscience? Heidegger suggests that nearly all
1 Richardson, op.clt.« p.8l.
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interpretations of this phenomenon see it as somehow
pointing toward guilt. Heidegger goes on to consider a
variety of common definitions of guilt and ther he looks
for a "formalized" notion of guilt which is common to all
such understandings. He finds this in the idea of guilt
as a "lack." However, the idea of a "lack" is inappropriate
in relation to existence because "...as the not-3eing-
present-at-hand of something which ought to be..." it would
be a characteristic of an entity present-at-hand. "In
this sense it is essential that in existence there can be
nothing lacking, not because it would then be perfect, but
because its character of Being remains distinct from any
presence-at-hand."^ ^
If we want to understand how guilt can apply to
Dasein's existence (e.g. Being-guilty) then we have to see
this "formalized" idea of guilt in its existential dimension
as a "not". "...we define the formally existential idea
of the "Guilty" as Being-the-basis for a Being which has
(?)
been defined by a "not"." Can this definition of guilty
be applied to Dasein? Is there anything in Dasein's
structure which would correlate with this existential
version of what is normally understood as the concern of
the conscience?
He answers by revealing how Dasein's basic
structure care (consisting of thrownness, projection and
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.329.
2 Ibid.
82
fallenness), Is permeated with guilt,nullity or a not.
As thrown, Dasein has not laid its own basis; as projecting,
there are numerous rejected possibilities which it has not
chosen; and finally, this nullity in existence is what
drives Dasein into fallen and inauthentlc attempts to
ground its existence, thereby overcoming its guilt or
nullity.^ In this we can see the continuity between
conscience as it is normally understood and conscience as
a structure in Dasein's existence. This completes step
(b).
Again we should stress that this is an understanding
of Being-guilty as an existential and, hence as a priori.
"Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about
it. And only because Dasein is guilty in the basis of its
Being, and closes itself off from itself as something thrown
(2)
and falling, is conscience possible..." Being-guilty
then is prior to any knowledge or awareness of guilt as
ordinarily understood and it is because of this a priori
nature that Dasein can exist day by day unaware of its
Being-guilty (in the existential sense) and this unawareness
is what makes the call of conscience possible.
Heidegger turns next to a description of conscience
on the exlstentiell level, moving then to expose the




a full existential concept, resoluteness. Having
identified the caller, the called, and the content of the
call he next asks how the call is to be understood.
"Understanding the appeal means wanting to have a
conscience."^ Because the caller is Dasein in its
uncanniness or as anxious, and the content of the call is
nothingness (the experience of which prepares Dasein for
an openness to Being), Dasein's wanting to have a conscience
implies a willingness to confront its "ownmost potentiality
(2)
for Being."
The existential roots of this existent!ell desire
for a conscience can be seen in the fact that this is a
mode of disclosure since the authentic side of Dasein is
disclosed in it. Furthermore, this mode of disclosure can
be seen as on the existential level in that it involves
understanding, state-of-mind and discourse.
Since this is a disclosure of a potentiality for
Being, it also involves a possibility, which is the realm of
understanding. We have already noted the relation of the
caller and content of the conscience to nothingness and
uncanniness which, in turn, are closely associated with
anxiety. As anxiety is a principal state-of-mind, we see
how the disclosure involved in wanting to have a conscience




And finally we previously established that "keeping
silent" was one of the basic traits of discourse and since
the content of the conscience's call is nothingness, we
can see how this disclosure can be characterised as dis¬
course as well.^^ He has now moved beyond the
existentiell level to a more basic existential phenomenon
and is ready to describe it as a full existential-
ontological structure. "This distinctive and authentic
disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its
conscience - this reticent self-projection upon one's own-
most Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety - we
(2)
call resoluteness." This completes step (c).
The next step will be to establish that resol¬
uteness reveals Dasein in its authentic mode of existence.
This can be done in two ways. First, in that resoluteness
means facing nothingness, it naturally leads into an
awareness of Being which characterizes authentic existence.
The second more important way of establishing the relation
between resoluteness and authenticity stems from Dasein's
central trait, disclosedness. ("Dasein is its disclosed¬
ness. " ^ ^)
If we recall also how Heidegger grounds truth as
aletheia in Dasein as disclosure, we can see that Dasein





resoluteness. Therefore it is only as resolute that Dasein
can fulfill its primary function of disclosure in an
authentic manner. This completes step (d) and we can
now see how Heidegger has derived this authentic mode of
existence from a phenomenological analysis of the everyday
understanding of conscience.
As Magda King explains, resoluteness is "...merely
an ontological construction and remains worthless unless
man himself, in his ontic existence, confirms that the
disclosure which has been postulated is possible in concrete
(2)
existence." In proceeding from an existential version
of the usual understanding of conscience, step (b), through
the existentiell phenomenon "wanting to have a conscience"
to a full existential structure resoluteness, step (c),
which in turn makes authenticity possible, step (d),
Heidegger has grounded his ontological-existential results
in ontic-existentiell evidence.
Another trait of authentic existence stems from
the fact that just as Dasein and its world are only truly
disclosed in resoluteness, so also does that aspect of
Dasein, Being-in-the-world, assume authentic significance
and meaning only in resoluteness. By resolutely facing
its world, Dasein creates what Heidegger calls a
'situation'. Remembering that the entities (zunanden and
1 lbi£., p.3^3-
2 King, op.clt.T p.167.
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vorhanden) which compose the world only assume meaning
through the centre or goal of their relations, we can see
how a resolute disposition towards Being-in-the-worid might
give the world new significance.
Ronald Grimsley explains that all have the oppor¬
tunity of moulding their environment by "...transforming the
chance events of life into a genuine situation." Unlike
the inauthentic Dasein which exists from day to day under
the influence of das Man,the resolute Dasein sees these
chance events of life as an opportunity for imposing its own
desire and will upon its environment, thus authentically
exercising its own powers, abilities and freedom.^ This
completes step (e).
Heidegger now has established his analysis as
primordial in that Dasein is seen in both its totality and
its authenticity. Since he has carefully grounded
resoluteness and anticipation in his preparatory analysis,
care, as Dasein's basic unitary existential, has now been
revealed on an even deeper, existential level. Further¬
more Being, as the object of his analysis, is coming into
better focus each time the nature of Dasein, the'ontological
animal', is clarified.
1^-. Anticipatory resoluteness
So far in his primordial analysis, Heidegger has
established his definition of anticipation and resoluteness.
1 Grimsley, op.cit.« pp.68-69.
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He asks now whether it is possible to unite these two
phenomena, not in the sense of forcibly coercing them into
union but rather in the sense of allowing them to "show
themselves as they are" in their inter-connectedness. It
is most important that this unity be apparent on the
existentiell level, or as observable in actual experience,
so that the analysis can proceed beyond into that
existential domain where a single underlying structure will
be made visible. This particular existential structure
will have been responsible for allowing the existentiell
union.
Heidegger stresses that this existential structure
must be rooted in observable existentiell phenomena,
otherwise this exercise would assume the appearance of an
"arbitrary construction."^^ Here again, the existential
findings are to be validated by observation of visible
existentiell phenomena. This approach is typical of
Heidegger's method throughout Being and Time. The prep¬
aratory analysis dealt mainly with the everyday,
inauthentic awareness while the later, primordial analysis
is penetrating into data of an authentic and existential-
ontological nature based on guidelines already established
by the earlier analysis.
As we examine how the two phenomena become one in
anticipatory resoluteness, we might recall that both
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.350.
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components in the union are rooted in care as the all-
uniting existential of Dasein. We are still moving toward
that even more basic phenomenon which makes care possible.
Michael Gelven summarizes how Heidegger reveals the
relationship between anticipation and resoluteness by
showing that they are actually contained in each other.
Resoluteness reveals to Dasein that it is guilty "all the
time", that is until it ends. In other words, Dasein is
guilty for as long as it exists and implied in this is an
awareness of death, or Being-towards-death, the authentic
mode of which is anticipation.^ Thus Heidegger explains
that resoluteness can only be itself in an authentic way as
(2)
anticipatory resoluteness. He has shown then how the
two actually are inter-related in an existentiell awareness.
15. A methodological pause
Heidegger pauses at this point in his analysis for
a reconsideration and justification of his overall method¬
ology in light of the new insights gained. He has not
paused earlier for a full consideration of his methodology
since his first task has been to "...go forth towards the
phenomena." However at this point he feels it appropriate
to pause, not for the sake of resting but so that "...we
(0)
may be impelled the more keenly." J
1 Gelven, op.cit.. p.176.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.356.
3 IfcidM p.350.
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He begins by noting that the nature of the subject
under interrogation is such that the investigation
encounters particularly subtle difficulties which often
mislead the inquirer. He is referring to the fact that
inauthenticity is inherent, indeed almost inevitable, given
Dasein's modes of existence. By way of illustration we
need only realise that fallenness, in which one is absorbed
and immersed in the world or environment, is a direct
consequence of the basic existential Being-in-the-worid,
whereby one is always "alongside" entities.
Similarly, living under the domination of the
"they" self stems easily out of another existential. Being-
with. As a result, he explains that Dasein's mode of
existence is such that any analysis of it will have to "...
capture the Being of this entity, in saite of this entity's
own tendency to cover things He also reiterates
that the existential findings must be grounded in an
existent!ell awareness.
Heidegger then defends the necessity of his
"circular method." As mentioned previously, this method
begins with the vague "unthematic" pre-understanding of
Being which all men have. It then proceeds to bring this
pre-ontological awareness into clearer focus. The
circularity stems from the fact that the result is pre¬
supposed in the beginning. However, this approach can now
1 Ibid., P-359.
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be seen to be particularly appropriate in light of certain
new insights into Dasein's mode of existence which is always
ahead-of-itself. As already noted, Dasein constantly
projects itself upon definite possibilities within its
world and, in a pre-ontological manner, it has "...also
projected something like existence and Being.
Because it is so appropriate for fundamental ontology,
rather than avoiding the circular method, Heidegger feels
one must be prepared to "leap" wholeheartedly into it.
16. Time
What is it that makes care possible? Is there
some underlying basic phenomenon behind even this unitary
existential. At the end of the preparatory analysis
Heidegger hinted that there was. (p.£ f ) We began our
analysis by considering a variety of existent!als. We
then saw them united and grounded in care. We progressed
to see how care is reflected totally and authentically in
anticipation and resolution. Finally we saw the unity of
care reinforced with the appearance of anticipatory
resoluteness. If something can be "thematically" brought
into view underlying care then we would certainly be
confronted by a fundamental factor in Dasein's make-up and
would have a valuable clue in the search for Being as it
is manifested through Dasein.
Because of the importance of this particular
analysis in Being and Time we shall first consider it in
Heidegger's own words and then offer our own
1 Ibjfl., p.363.
91
summation of his argument. Again, we need recall that
anticipatory resoluteness is an authentic mode of care.
Anticipatory resoluteness...is Being towards one's
ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being.
This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein
can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost
possibility...This letting-itself-come-towards-
itself...is the primordial phenomenon of the
future as coming towards. If either authentic or
inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's
Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible
only as something futural...Anticipatory
resoluteness understands Dasein in its own
essential Being-guilty. This understanding means
that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it
means being the thrown basis of nullity. But
taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein
authentically it already was.. .As authentically
futural, Dasein is authentically as having been...
Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current
Situation of the "there" in such a way that
existence, in taking action, is circumspectively
concerned with what is factically ready-to-hand
environmentally. Resolute Being alongside what is
ready-to-hand in the Situation - that is to say,
taking action in such a way as to let one encounter
what has presence environmentally - is possible
only by making such an entity present, (-jj
In the above, we can see how an analysis of care
as anticipatory resoluteness yields the three underlying
dimensions of future, past, present. Understanding deals
with possibilities which are associated with projection or
moving in a forward direction. In this forward direction
is seen the futural dimension. However, understanding is
always associated with a state-of-mind, which is related
to Dasein's facticity, its being rooted and limited by the
past. On the basis of its concern for the future in
understanding and its orientation towards the past in state-
1 Ibid., pp.372-37^.
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of-mind, Dasein "falls" into a present association with
the objects of its world and thus falling is primarily
present. In addition each of these three existentlals
necessarily implies the other two and thus temporality
provides the underlying unity of Dasein's care structure.
We should stress here that Heidegger is looking
for the meaning of time in the context of fundamental
ontology. He is not seeking an abstract self-contained
understanding of time in itself. He is looking for what
it means "to be" in time (thus the title Sein und Zeit).
Michael Gelven explains that in order to develop the
existential dimension of time Heidegger deliberately avoids
any metaphysical formulation of time as some sort of
substance or entity. In other words, he avoids an ontical
description of time so that the ontological can be brought
(1)
into focus.
With this in mind, it is understandable that
Heidegger considers the future to be the more important
dimension of temporality. We need only to recall that
Dasein, in understanding itself and its world, is constantly
projecting beyond itself, is always ahead of itself and is
always more than it factually is, to appreciate his
emphasis on this temporal dimension.
Despite the emphasis on the future, the three
1 Gelven, ot>.clt.f p.188.
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dimensions of time can only be seen as a unit. This can
be seen in the term, ecstasis, by which Heidegger
designates each dimension. It is based on the Greek word,
ekstasis. which means "stretching out or extension."^^
The unity of the ecstases is reflected in the fact that
the Dasein "stands out" from itself or extends beyond
itself in different ways, it might even be permissible to say
in different directions. Speaking very loosely and
figuratively, we can say that the Dasein extends forwards
(future), as having alraady extended behind itself (past)
and the Dasein extends out of itself alongside entities in
its environment (present). The unity of the ecstases stems
from the fact that it is always the same Dasein "extending
out" or 'tetretching out" beyond itself.
It was stated aoove that the unity of the ecstases
is reflected in Dasein's ecstatic nature and this is not
to say that this unity is grounded in Dasein's nature.
Just as time cannot be conceived of in an objective manner
so also it cannot be considered in a purely subjective
manner. The nature of time does not grow out of, is not
contingent upon Dasein's nature, rather the relation is
vice versa. Time is the basic, a priori factor underlying
the care structure of Dasein. This care structure was
unfolded in order that the more primordial element might
be exposed.
1 H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon. I,
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925)» p.521.
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Heidegger states: "Temporality temporalizes, and
indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These
make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being
•••M(1) This "temporalizing" is reflected in Dasein's
care structure and makes possible its future, past, and
present. At this point it is necessary to wander far out
on a rather fragile limb and make the assumption that
Heidegger was pointing in this section of Being and Time
to a further section never written entitled "Time and
Being." Here it would have been clear how these two
factors were related. The later section was never released,
however, for reasons already discussed. (We noted earlier
that Heidegger felt contemporary modes of thought and
language forms failed to accommodate his insights which go
against the grain of all previous philosophical insights.)
Fully realizing the inherent danger, we might
attempt to express loosely and broadly what Heidegger inten¬
ded to say in "Time and Being" by stating that Being
"be-ings" in a temporal way. Vincent Vycinas explains
that Being is not a self-contained entity but is constantly
moving out from itself in revelation and openness. "This
coming out of Being from concealment into revelation gives
birth to time: it is time. Being cannot be thought of
as separate from time; time is Being's coming to openness."
(2)
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.377.
2 Vycinas, 0£.£it., p.3.
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We can also say that Being "beings" through the clearing
which is Dasein and since Being "beings" in a temporal
way, Dasein is in time.
We can now see how Heidegger begins with inauth-
entic everyday modes of Dasein's existence, then proceeds
to care as Dasein's basic structure and how he goes from
care to lay bare the structure of time and (although we can
only anticipate the last step, it certainly fills out the
process or completes the picture) finally gains insight
into Being itself through an analysis of Dasein's
temporality. This strongly supports our proposal that
being and Time is the work of an ontologist and that
Heidegger does make his ontological intentions clear even
though his original project was never completed.
To this point, Heidegger has only roughly revealed
the temporal basis of care and he next moves into a detailed
reconsideration of all the basic existentials in which he
painstakingly lays bare the temporal structure of each one.
For our purpose we shall only follow the section in which
he establishes the temporal basis of understanding, state-
of-mind, falling, and discourse, (the following will be
mainly a condensed summation of section 68 in Being and Time
and will only be footnoted where direct quotes are involved.)
He begins by laying bare the temporal structure of
understanding. "If the term "understanding" is taken in a
way which is primordially existential, it means to be
projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake
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of which any Dasein exists.A Dasein is able to
understandingly project because it is ahead of itself and
this "ahead of" toward which Dasein can come is its
"futural" dimension. Remembering that Dasein comes toward
itself (p. 91 ) we can better grasp this movement by
recalling that Dasein is not a point but a field (p. 6T )
and is characterized by extension and standing out (ecstasis).
Thus a Dasein comes toward itself out of or from a
possibility. It comes from itself in a present unrealized
possibility to itself as a "futural" realized possibility.
Further we can see Dasein moving or stretching along this
extended line or field in both a forward and backward
direction.
The primary temporal dimension of understanding is
the future and Heidegger calls authentic understanding in
this dimension anticipation, whereby Dasein comes toward
itself (in a forward direction) in light of its "ownmost
non-relational potentiality-for-Being." Inauthentic
understanding in its future dimension is called awaiting,
whereby a Dasein comes toward itself not under the influence
of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being but in light of its
potentiality-for-Being a3 affected by its relation to and
absorption in the world and "they-self."
This term "awaiting", with its more passive
connotation, also implies that in the inauthentic mode it
1 Heidegger, oo.cit.. p.385*
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is not so much a question of meeting the future, or going
towards the future, as a question of letting the future
come towards oneself. This inauthentic mode is one of
"letting the chips fall where they may." With this
attitude one is completely subject to the happenings and
events of the world, seeking merely to "ride out the storm."
Although primarily futural, understanding would not
be temporal if it did not also have present and past
dimensions. As with the future dimension, each of the
other two will have an authentic and inauthentic mode,
making a total of six modes of understanding. We consider
next understanding in its present dimension. Here we see
Dasein understandingly "alongside" its world or environment.
In its authentic mode this understanding is called
"moment of vision" in which entities are understood and have
meaning in light of their pertinence for future projections
and as instruments for Casein's moving ahead of itself.
The inauthentic mode of understanding in its present
dimension is termed "making present." This refers to
Casein's being "alongside" its world in a more passive way.
Here Casein is not making or creating its environment by
understandingly projecting out on it, instead it is just
"taking the world as it comes."
Understanding also has a past dimension in that
the understanding Casein always is and will be as "having
been." We said previously that the movement along the
extension or field that is Casein as it comes toward itself
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is two directional. Dasein comes toward itself by moving
forward and also by coming back. In coming towards itself
Dasein's "having been" can be seized anew as a possibility
and not just an inert, actualized, once for all past. He
explains that if Dasein understands its past correctly and
if its "Being-as-havlng-been" is authentic, then its
approach to the past is to be called 'repetition1.^
The inauthentic mode of understanding in its past
dimension which parallels authentic repetition is
"forgetting." Here the self towards which Dasein comes
back is not the ownmost self of Dasein's potentiality-for-
Being. This authentic self is forgotten and replaced by
the "they-self" immersed in its world and seen as a once-
for-all.unrepeatable, arid "having been."
We turn next to a reconsideration of the temporal
basis °f state-of-mind. Here the main temporal division,
although not the only one, is the past, or having been.
In his earlier analysis of state-of-mind, Heidegger estab¬
lished the meaning of this phenomenon by considering two
particular moods, fear and anxiety, and in this temporally
oriented reanalysis, these two moods must be shown to have
temporal structures. Further these temporal structures
need to be revealed as having an a priori nature, as being
that which makes possible the state-of-mind. Basically,
Heidegger says that moods always bring us back to ourselves
and their temporal basis is a priori in that without
"having been" there could be no "bringing back to."
1 Ibid., p.388*
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First, we turn to fear which is characterized as
an inauthentic state-of-mind. We might recall that dread
is always fear of some definite threatening entity or event.
Confusion as to which dimension constitutes its temporal
basis can arise from the fact that usually fear involves
being afraid of something in the future. An event or
occurrence which is past is no longer a threat, since past.
Further, it can only become a threat again in repercussions
which might occur later. However, this "later" itself
implies a future dimension.
Under Heidegger's phenomenological scrutiny it
soon becomes apparent that, while what the Dasein is afraid
£f is in the future, what it is afraid for is its own self.
Now it is an accepted fact that in retreating from fear,
one retreats into the security of the certain, the known.
The certain, the familiar, in this case would be Dasein as
"having been" in an actualized manner, since the possible
is not as certain and secure as the actual. Hence a secure
retreat would be Dasein as having been, not in light of its
non-relational ownmost potentiality-for-Being but rather
its actualized "having been" in relation to its world or
environment.
We can see how a phenomenological consideration
of fear reveals its temporal basis in Dasein's having been.
Further, because the self is revealed in fear as "having
been" in a relational, actualized manner, and not in its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, the authentic self is
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"forgotten." The present dimension is also involved here
in that fear results in Dasein "making present" its world.
Under the threat of fear, one is "bewildered"
into acting with little fore-thought or reflection. As
Heidegger illustrates, it is a well known fact that when
a house is being consumed by fire, the occupants often save
the most insignificant articles which just happen to be
closest to hand.^ Fear reveals a future dimension also.
We need only think of the paralysing effect fear often has
on a threatened individual who "freezes" instead of acting.
It is this inactivity, this passive attitude toward the
future, which Heidegger characterizes as awaiting.
Second, Heidegger reconsiders anxiety and seeks to
show its temporal basis as "having been." Further, since
fear as an inauthentic state-of-mind manifested the
inauthentic modes of the three temporal dimensions, anxiety
as an authentic state-of-mind should reveal three authentic
parallels. We can recall that anxiety shows Dasein its
facticity or thrownness, and this facticity has been
established as related to the way Dasein always "has been."
Anxiety reveals repetition in that it brings Dasein
back to the way it has been in its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being. In anxiety, we saw how Dasein has the uncanny
experience of the world slipping away. The nothingness
1 Ibid., p.392.
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which fills the remaining void breaks Dasein's absorption
in and concern for its world and frees it for a con¬
frontation with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.
Anxiety does involve repetition since it brings Dasein back
to its "having been", not as having been in relation to the
world but as "having been" in its non-relational, ownmost
po tentiality-for-Being.
Further, anxiety also reveals the present dimension
in its authentic mode, called "moment of vision", in that
the world is seen through anxiety in its proper perspective.
No longer is Dasein's existence constituted mainly by its
world. Instead the world is grasped as a tool or instru¬
ment, and becomes one of the means with which Dasein itself
constitutes its existence. In anxiety Dasein is alongside
its world in an authentic manner. The future dimension in
its authentic mode, "anticipation", is involved here also.
Anxiety, by isolating Dasein from its world in nothingness
and bringing it face to face with its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being, frees Dasein to face its future authentically.
Heidegger next considers the existential "falling",
which is grounded primarily in being-alongside and the
present. Michael Gelven explains that any interpretation
which centres upon the actual instead of the possible can
provide the "ontological ground for falling." Hence, an
inauthentic understanding sees the present as a situation
involving factual entities while the authentic view (moment
of vision) sees it in terms of possibilities to be
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encountered. Similarly, the past dimension, seen in terms
of falling, is composed of "no-longer-actual events"
(forgetting) rather than still still significant possi¬
bilities (repetition). And the future dimension is seen
as "...not-yet events (waiting) rather than possible
projections of one's ability-to-be (anticipation)."^
Finally Heidegger considers the temporal basis of
language. Since Dasein's fallen, understanding state-of-
mind finds expression in discourse, it is not difficult to
see that discourse, the basis of language, is necessarily
as temporal as those other exlstentials it expresses.
However, the temporal basis of discourse is also seen in
the fact that language has a past, present, and future
tense.^
Heidegger summarizes his reanalysis of the care
structure and basic exlstentials by saying that while under¬
standing is grounded mainly in the future, states-of-mind
in the past, and falling in the present, it is important
to remember that each of these three structures involves
the other temporal dimensions as well as its primary one.
For instance, understanding is always occurring as a present
event which "is in the process of having been." In this
way he stresses the unity of the temporal basis underlying
the care structure.^^
1 Gelven, op.cit.t p.195-
2 Heidegger, op.clt.. p.*f00 and Gelven, op.cit.. p.196.
3 Heidegger, ofi.jsii., p.385.
103
17. History
Heidegger pauses now to remind his readers that his
overall aim in clarifying the structures of Dasein's
existence is to gain a better view of Being. He introduces
his chapter in Being and lime on historicality with the
following words: "All our efforts in the existential
analytic serve the one aim of finding a possibility of
answering the question of the meaning of Being in general."
He goes on to explain that the best means of access to the
meaning of Being is Dasein's understanding of it. As a
result, he says it is only after Dasein's nature has been
"interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial"
that the meaning of Being can come into focus.
Always Heidegger has sought to get at the basic,
the "primordial", structures underlying Dasein's existence.
He asks now if there might not be an even better way of
grasping Dasein as a whole. To this point he has attempted
to round off Dasein by focusing on its ending, death.
However, this is only "one of the ends by which Dasein's
totality is closed round." As well as an ending, there is
a beginning and both of these are determinative factors in
Dasein's makeup. To understand Dasein, then, we must see
it in light of both ends.
We know from previous analyses that Dasein is an
ecstatic standing out and stretching along a line. Dasein's
1 Ibid.. pA2*+.
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stretching along is, furthermore, done between these two
ends. However, these ends are not simply events of the
past and the future; instead they are vital factors in the
makeup of the between. Heidegger explains that understood
existentially, birth is not a factor relegated to the past,
nor is death to be seen only as an event yet to come.
"Factical Daseln exists as born and, as born, it is already
dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death.
Heidegger goes on to say that Dasein's stretching
along between these ends is its "historizing" and this
process is based on temporality. It is by virtue of this
temporal base, which unites Dasein's existence as care, that
there can be a sense of continuity, identity and self-
constancy from beginning to end in Dasein's existence. To
understand Dasein as it historizes, Heidegger says, is to
(2)
understand the historicality of Dasein. We can see now
how Heidegger is about to complete and fill out the picture
of Dasein in its wholeness and in its unity.
Having established a preliminary working definition
of history as historizing, Heidegger goes on to consider
various other understandings of history and he summarizes
all by saying that the common denominator in each is man as
the "subject of events." If man alone is historical, as




pieces of equipment or entities in museums and collections
which are commonly said to be of historical significance
(e.g. the flag of a disbanded regiment and the bed of Mary
Queen of Scots).
Indeed, how can such items be called historical
when they still exist in the present. What is the
difference between the flag or bed then and as they exist
now. They are historical but not yet past. Heidegger
says that what made these entities significant was not some
trait of their own but rather their belonging to the world
of a significant person or group of people. These
historical items are important because once the goal of
their useful or "for the purpose of" nature was a signifi¬
cant Dasein. Although the entities themselves continue,
this world which belonged to a particular Being-in-the-
world no longer exists and their significance, what made
them historical, is in the past. Heidegger states: "We
contend that what is primarily historical is Dasein. That
which is secondarily historical, however, is what we
encounter within-the-world...
Heidegger entitles his next section "The Basic
Constitution of Historicality" and here he analyses
historicality in an attempt to show that it is based upon
Dasein's underlying temporal structure. We might recall
at this point how earlier in his primordial analysis
1 Ibid., p.*+33
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Heidegger revealed the temporal structure of Dasein through
a consideration of anticipatory resoluteness which was
grounded in the comprehensive existential, care. He will
now stress the temporal basis of historicality by basing
it in anticipatory resoluteness.
He reminds the reader that in anticipatory
resoluteness, "...Dasein understands itself with regard to
its potentiality-for-Being, and it does so in such a manner
that it will go right under the eyes of death in order thus
to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is
itself..."^ The question which has not been considered
to this point is the "whence" or "where from" of the
possibilities upon which Dasein projects in anticipatory
resoluteness. Analysing authentic Being-towards-death and
resoluteness only tells us how the Dasein deals with these
possibilities, not from where they arise in the first place.
In answering this question the analysis of historicality
will be further "rounding out the picture" of Dasein's
structure.
We need to remember that Dasein finds itself thrown
into the world (facticity). This Being-in-the-world is
the starting point behind which Heidegger does not go, as
would be the case were he to look for a "thrower" God.
However, Dasein can exist in this world either authentically
or inauthentically. In resoluteness Dasein passes from
1 Ibid.. pA3^K
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an inauthentic Being-in-the-world to an authentic Being-in-
the-world in which for the first time it sees its possi¬
bilities in their correct perspective.
Heidegger answers the question about the whence of
Dasein's possibilities by saying that they come from its
taking over the world authentically in resoluteness. That
which is taken over resolutely he terms heritage. Dasein's
environment, into which it is thrown, becomes a heritage
when it is accepted and confirmed as Dasein's own. "In
one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is
hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that
have come down to one•.•"^
While the Dasein always has possibilities, it does
not always have them authentically as its own possibilities.
When it does have its possibilities authentically they
become its heritage. As Ronald Grimsley explains, by
accepting the possibilities inherited from the past, "...
and by freely choosing to accept them as a being abandoned
to facticity, I remove these possibilities from the sphere
of accidental circumstance and imbue them with a genuine
(2)
existential significance."
Resoluteness is only complete and authentic as
anticipatory resoluteness and this complete phenomenon is




process Heidegger calls fate. In Being-towards-death,
Dasein resolutely takes over as its heritage that into which
it is thrown with a keen awareness of its finitude. This
awareness forces Dasein to choose selectively of the
innumerable possibilities around it and to make the most
of its "situation" (as Heidegger uses the term).
In authentically Being-towards-death Dasein is not
a slave to its world and is not subject to the passing
occurrences of everyday existence. Instead it resolutely
creates a situation out of its Being-in-the-world. In
Being and Time we read: "...fate. This is how we
designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in
authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself
down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it
has inherited and yet has chosen.
Heidegger goes on to say that fate is alone
authentic historical!ty and that fate is only possible in
an entity where death, guilt, conscience, freedom and
(2)
finitude are constitutive factors.v/ Since we can see
all these phenomena in Dasein as anticipatory resoluteness,
we see how historicality itself is possible in Dasein only
on the basis of an underlying temporal structure. As the
connection between temporality and historicality is some¬




historicallty is only authentic as fate. Fate is revealed
as basically anticipatory resoluteness and anticipatory
resoluteness has an underlying temporal structure. This
temporal dimension is even more apparent if we realize
that as anticipatory resoluteness, fate involves the future,
anticipating or looking ahead towards death; the past, as
thrown or abandoned Dasein; and the present, in resolutely
creating a situation out of the entities Dasein is
alongside of.^
Heidegger expands his definition of historicality
with the use of the term destiny, which refers to the fate
of more than one Dasein. He states: "But if fateful
Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-
with-others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is
determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate
(2)
the historizing of the community, of a people."
Heidegger next moves into an analysis of a very
important concept in the makeup of his definition of
historicality. The term involved here, in German, is die
wiederholung and has been translated in various ways.
The translators of Being and Time feel that for Heidegger
it means neither "to fetch again" nor "to repeat" or "do
over again." Instead "...it means rather an attempt to
go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities.
1 Grimsley, oo.clt.. p.77•
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.^36.
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which are thus explicitly handed down or transmitted."^
On the other hand, John Macquarrie, in his book
Martin Heidegger, agrees with W.J.Richardson's translation
b J
of this word as retrievable. It "...is not Just a
mechanical reproducing, but rather a going into the past in
such a way that one fetches back the possibility which it
contains and makes present this possibility in our existence
„ (2)now."
Richardson goes on to point out that Heidegger uses
the word in several different ways, two of which are
important to us. In a very general sense it refers to
"handing over the self to the self." In a more specific
sense it refers to an attempt to "...retrieve a
potentiality-for-Being of a There-being that is gone, with
such success that the full force of Being comes upon him
(q)
as if out of his own future." D
Let us first consider the way Heidegger uses
retrieve in its general sense as a basic part of the hist-
orizing process of Dasein. As we said before, Dasein
resolutely takes over the world into which ifinds itself
thrown, seizes this world and its possibilities anew and
hands them back to itself, thereby making them its own in
a new way. When this happens resoluteness "...then
1 Ibid., p.7.
2 Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, p.38
3 Richardson, op.cit.. p.92.
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becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that
has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly
- that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the
Dasein that has-been-there."^ Therefore nistorizing
necessarily involves retrieve or repetition since in
resoluteness Dasein becomes aware of its past as its
heritage and seizes upon the possibilities of this Dasein
that has been in such a way as to make them meaningful
possibilities for its future and present.
Now we shall consider the second more specific way
in which Heidegger uses the term retrieve. He has his own
term also for the study of history seen as historical!ty.
Historiology is the study of history (historicality), but
not history as a once-for-all, completed, and dead past.
As he says, "...historiology will disclose the quiet force
of the possible \^ith greater penetration the more simply and
the more concretely having-been-in-the-world is understood
(2)
in terms of its possibility, and only presented as such."
Heidegger goes on to say that historiology is only
possible because of Dasein's historicality. This also
would mean that repetition or retrieve in Richardson's
second sense is only possible because of repetition in the
first sense. Were it not for the retrieving structure of
the individual Dasein, as it retrieves its own having-been,
1 Heidegger, op.cit.. pA37«
2 Ibid., p.M+6.
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there would be no possibility of a Dasein retrieving the
possibilities of other Daseins which have been.
Here again we find ourselves involved in a circular
reasoning. We can recall how it is difficult to operate
in the ontologlcal-existential realm because of an unclear
or unthematic awareness of Being on the ontic-existentiell
level. Further, as we gain insights and thematize our
awareness on the former level, this affects our existence
on the ontic-exlstentiell level. Macquarrie points out
that here again the hermeneutical circle is involved.
"It is because we are ourselves historical in our being
that we can take up the study of history; yet in so far as
this study discloses to us what the possibilities of human
existence are, we reach through it an enlarged self-
(1)
understanding."
Perhaps Heidegger's greatest contribution in his
understanding of history is his emphasis that history, as
a study of the past, is not limited to a scholarly,
objective exercise but also has important repercussions
i
for the present and future. Certainly such an approach
would make history seem more alive and attractive than does
the usual understanding of historical studies. The key
to how Heidegger evolves his definition of history as a
living, vital process lies in his concepts "retrieve" and
"possibilities."
1 Macquarrie, op.cit.T p.37
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In an analysis which one commentator observes
"may well become a classic in the philosophy of history,"
^
Heidegger explains that the real theme of history is
neither brute fact nor "some generality that hovers over
them." Instead, the real concern of history is the
factually existent past possibility which:
...can never be repeated, i.e. historically under¬
stood authentically, as long as it is turned into
the paleness of a super-temporal model. Only
factually authentic historicality as resolute
destiny can so reveal past history that in the
repetition the force of the possible gets struck
home into one's factical existence, which is to
say will be allowed to affect its futurity.^)
The common understanding of history Heidegger would
consider inauthentic for two reasons. One is that often
we mistake what is only historical in a secondary manner
for what is truly historical. We saw before that only
Dasein with its world is historical and all entities within
that world can be said to be historical only on the basis
of their receiving significance from a particular Dasein to
which such entities might be related. Often this
secondary type of historicality is considered the only type
with the result that the Dasein which has been is viewed
(3)
in an improper manner. J
Ihe second reason for the inauthenticity of the
common understanding of history is related by Gelven to
1 Langan, op.cit.T pp.62-63.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.M+7.
3 Ibid., p.*4-37.
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the influence of das Man which always looks for false
security in emphasizing brute facts as the sole consern
of history. Such a view of history "...cannot in principle
be significant. To be sure, facts can be learned...can be
analysed scientifically. But that is not history, for
history must be significant."^^
18. Conclusion to Dasein analysis
With our consideration of history we come to tfye
end of the analyses in Being and Time. We have seen that
this work is devoted to an in-depth consideration of Dasein.
Nevertheless only a superficial reading of Being and rime
would lead to it being considered the work of an
existentialist. As stated in the introduction (see p. 11 )
our purpose has been to show that Heidegger's analysis is
motivated solely by ontological goals. Dasein was interro¬
gated not as an end in itself, but only as it pointed towards
Being. Indeed, the selection of Dasein as the subject for
interrogation was made according to ontological criteria.
Dasein's importance for Heidegger stems from its ontological
nature.
We have followed Heidegger as he progressively
exposed the ontological roots of Dasein in his fundamental
ontology. We traced the development of his analysis from
the preparatory, fundamental to the primordial stage,
carefully scrutinizing "care" as the bridge between these
1 Gelven, op.cit.r p.216
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two sections. We have seen his phenomenological method
applied as he progressed from the everyday ontic to the
ontological-existential level and then back again. .11ways
his use of the circular method has brought his ontological-
existential results back into their ontic-existentiell
roots, not only to lend the former credibility but also to
provide new insights into the meaning of phenomena on the
latter level.
Throughout we have noted Heidegger's constant
reminders of his ontological motive. His radical approach
with its distinctive terminology strove, by its freshness
and uniqueness, to burst the bonds of traditional ontology
and to provide a pristine awareness of Being through its
manifestation in Dasein the "ontological animal." There
can be no doubt now as to his ontological intentions in
analysing Dasein and we are justified in considering Being
the sole object of his inquiry.
It is not surprising, in light of his comments
concerning the need for a new terminology and frame of mind
in philosophy, to find Heidegger abandoning Dasein as the
sole concern of his ontological investigation in favour of
such phenomena as language and thought. It is to his
consideration of these that we turn next.
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19. From the earlier to the later Heidegger
In moving from Being and Time to his analyses of
language, thought and Being in itself, we are passing from
what commentators call the earlier Heidegger to the later
Heidegger. The position we are taking is that this refers
only to a chronological development and not to separate
distinct stages in Heidegger's thinking. As stated
earlier, we are treating him as an ontologist who pursues
his interest through the investigation of various fields.
In this view there can be no question of distinct stages.
Nevertheless, because of the interest it has aroused,
we should pause at this point to consider the debate
concerning the earlier and later Heidegger, or some would
even say, the two Heideggers. In this debate the earlier
Heidegger is associated with the existential emphasis of
Being and Time and the later Heidegger refers to his other
attempts to open up the meaning of Being.
Basically the unity of Heidegger's thought has been
assailed by two types of criticism. The first claims that
the earlier Heidegger of Being and Time alone makes a
significant contribution. For these critics the later
Heidegger represents a falling away from and deterioration
of the earlier systematic insights of Being and Time.
Marjorie Grene's appraisal of Heidegger's work is
typical of such criticism. She acknowledges that the
whole of his philosophy exhibits a superficial unity.
However, she feels this unity breaks up under close scrutiny.
117
Between his earlier and later works, "...there is not only
the difference in style; there is a very marked difference
in calibre. The later work is thin, ill-organised, in part
even humdrum and dull. Sein und Zeit, with all its
weaknesses, has true philosophical powers.
The answer to such criticism can only be that the
later Heidegger quite definitely develops out of and is
grounded in the earlier Heidegger. A variety of
commentators, as well as Heidegger himself, have noted that
his later thinking is firmly guided by the insights of his
earlier period, although these later thoughts are
manifested in a different "garb." In the introduction to
his book on Heidegger, Thomas Langan asserts that he will
be able to show the consistency of "the whole range of
Heidegger's thought," the necessity to understand his later
works in light of his earlier insights and "...most
importantly of all, that the basic program proposed in Sein
und Zeit appears...in the pieces and patches of later
(2)
essays."x
Similarly, Werner Marx feels that Heidegger's later
works are firmly grounded in his earlier insights, that
his "method" remains the same throughout his work, and that
the problems and issues of Sein und Zeit continued to
stimulate the later Heidegger. He stresses that even in
1 Grene, op.clt., p.117.
2 Langan, op.cit., p.7.
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Being and Time, Heidegger realized the nature of man could
only be clarified after the nature of "Being in general"
was clarified. As a result, the focus of his later writings
switched from an emphasis on the nature of man to the nature
of Being. "But it seems to us that, in spite of this
"turnabout", Heidegger in the later determinations had
fallen back on the structures which he developed in Being
and Time.
Heidegger himself stresses that his later works
were striving always to develop the same issues as in
Being and Time but from a different perspective. In the
quote to follow, Heidegger notes that the work begun there
would have to be continued in later works. At that ti e
he referred to this later work with the title "Time and
Being." However, he later realized that his earlier mode
of thinking and language was insufficient and abandoned
the approach designated by the rubric of Being and Time -
"Time and Being" for a more suitable one. However this
abandonment did not involve the basic subject matter
itself.
He says:
The thinking of the turn is a change in my thought.
However, this turn does not occur because of an
alteration of standpoint or indeed an abandonment
of the approach in Being and Time. The thinking of
the turn resulted from the fact that I have
remained with that which was considered in Being
and Time, i.e. that I have questioned with regard
1 Marx, op.cit.t pp.105-106.
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to that which already in Being and Time was
indicated by the title "Time and Being".
The second type of criticism concerning the unity
of Heidegger's thought focuses on the extent of the turn
which separates the earlier and later periods. Several
commentators refer to this turn as a radical about-face
which results in a basic split of Heidegger's thinking.
For these critics there are "two Heideggers", so to speak.
Karl Lowith in Heidegger, Denker in Durftiger Zeit refers
to the turn as an umkehr (reversal) and Laszlo Versenyi
(2)
labels it a "conversion."v '
Such interpretations stem from a miscalculation of
the extent of the change of emphasis from the earlier to
the later Heidegger. Indeed, at one time, (from 1943-
1949) it did appear that Heidegger was over-reacting to his
earlier emphasis on Dasein and beings by concentrating too
strongly on Being. Versenyi suggests that his opposition
to the metaphysical preoccupation with beings to the
exclusion of Being blinds him to the opposite danger for
philosophy, "...the exclusive preoccupation with Being as
such that fails to think of beings - human or other - and
of Being as the Being of beings. And this oversight
("5)
proves to be fatal for the last stage of his philosophy."v
1 Heidegger, Preface to Richardson's Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought, p.xvii.
2 Karl Lowith, Heidegger. Denker in Diirftiger Zeit.
(Frankfurt am Main: S.Fischer Verlag,1953), p.l. and
Versenyi, op.cit.. p.165 and lt>5»
3 Versenyi, op.cit., p.167.
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Such an opinion might be justified if expressed
prior to 1949 when, as we shall see later in our
consideration of Being as the "ontological difference,"
Heidegger changed a text expressing that Being can be
without beings to Being can never be without beings. In
this we will see his interest in the "Being of beings"
and that with the consideration of the 'ontological
difference' in his later thought Heidegger maintains the
necessary balance between Being and beings, thereby
avoiding any split or over-reacting in his thinking.
In this way we can refute any charges concerning a
radical split and separation in his thinking. As Andre
Malet notes, the study of Heidegger's later insights
provides for a better understanding of Ms earlier concerns
and this fact "...keeps us clear of the pitfall of
treating his Sein und Zeit as an anthropology...Thus we
spare ourselves the delusion that there are two
Ileideggers, one the man of Sein und Zeit and the other the
man of more recent works.
Heidegger himself reflects on how closely the
periods in Ms thinking are related by saying that a
distinction can be made between his earlier and later works
only if it is kept in mind that "...only by way of what
Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-
be-thought by Heidegger II. But the (thought of)
1 Malet, op.cit., p.326.
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Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in
Heidegger II.
W.J. Richardson takes a position very similar to
that taken in our approach. He suggests that the later
Heidegger is able to "bring-to-expression" that which he
"did not and could not say" in Being and Time. He sees
the later Heidegger as a re-trieve of the earlier
Heidegger. While the insights of the two periods are "not
the same, they are one." In light of this, "...Heidegger
I is a past which still-is-as-having-been which Heidegger
II must recollect. Even for the contemporary Heidegger
then Sein und Zeit must be considered as still in advent
(2)
and still to be retrieved..."v/
In keeping with Heidegger's own view as well as
that of a substantial number of commentators (Macquarrie,
Richardson, Malet, Ott, Marx, Langan and others), our
position is that Heidegger is thoroughly consistent in his
developing thought. The variety of his interests stem
not from any inconsistency or "turns" on his part but from
the nature of Being which manifests itself in various ways.
1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.xxii.





20. A preliminary view of Heidegger's language analysis
As indicated by his decision not to complete the
work of which Being and Time was a portion, Heidegger
abandoned his analysis of Dasein as the most Important mode
of access to Being. One of the principal reasons for this
move was Heidegger's feeling that the language he was using
to express his insights was too tradition-bound and not
flexible enough to accommodate his radical insights. It
is not surprising then to find him turning his attention
even more exclusively to the phenomenon of language itself.
Comments on this topic are to be found throughout his
writings but his thoughts are expressed most comprehensively
in the essays of On the ^ay to Language, a book on which
we shall rely heavily.
Although not always obvious, the language problem
was a constant factor in Heidegger's thoughts and works.
This can be seen in the following conversation between
Heidegger and a visiting professor. /The conversation is
referring to a lecture course delivered by Heidegger in
1921, several years before the appearance of Being and Xlme7
(Visitor) Again and again it was said that your
questions circled around the problem of language
and Being. (Heidegger) In fact, this was not
too difficult to discern, for as early as 1915*
in the title of my dissertation "Duns Scotus'
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Doctrine of Categories and Theory of Meaning",
the two perspectives came into view: Doctrine
of categories is the usual name of the discussion
of the Being of beings: theory of meaning means
the mm&laa SpeciU(*UYa, the metaphysical
reflection on language in its relation to Being
..•I know only one thing.•.reflection on language,
and on Being, has determined my path of thinking
from oarly on...
However, he does recognise that his concern with
language in his earlier years was often indirect and
certainly did not involve a concerted analysis of the
phenomenon. Heidegger apparently feels that at that point
he was being unconsciously guided toward an interest of
which he was then only partially aware. He states, again
in regard to an early lecture course, that the direction in
which his thinking was moving was not then clear to him.
"I knew only the most immediate short-range perspectives
along that path, because they beckoned to me unceasingly,
(?)
while the horizon shifted and darkened more than once."
He does not hesitate to express disapproval of his own
earlier thoughts on language. "...I had only an obscure
if not confused intimation. Such youthful capers easily
(■})
lead to doing injustice." J
It is also pertinent, in view of our concern for
Heidegger's influence on theology, to note that he feels
greatly indebted to his theological training for putting
him onto the right track towards the language problem.
1 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans, by P.O.




In his study of hermeneutics, he was especially interested
in the relation between the word of the Scriptures and the
speculative thinking of theology. "Ihis relation, between
language and Being, was the same one, if you will, only it
was veiled and inaccessible to me...Without this
theological background I should never have come upon the
path of thinking^^
At this point, we should note some of the problems
particular to an analysis of language as Heidegger sees
them. These problems basically stem from two factors.
The first is that most believe one cannot analyse language
without lifting it from context. In this way the subject
under consideration is immediately distorted. In a very
real sense, this is like studying a fish by removing it
from water. The fish can be analysed but not as it
normally exists in its own habitat.
In his conversation with a visiting professor we
find Heidegger touching on this point. "(Heidegger)
Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably
into an object. (Visitor) And then its reality vanishes.
(Heidegger) We have then taken up a position above
(?)
language, instead of hearing from it." In "Ihe Way to
Language" he stresses that any analysis of this phenomenon
must avoid this "dead fish" pitfall. "In order to be who




being of language and can never step out of it and look at
it from somewhere else."^"1"^
The second factor which leads to problems in
linguistic analyses is the result not of a human shortcoming
but the nature of language itself. As we shall see later,
Heidegger sees language as possessing man rather than vice
versa and this situation means that problems encountered
in studying language are to be seen as barriers erected by
language itself. In "The Nature of Language" Heidegger
stresses that the essential nature of language "refuses" to
be expressed in words. Furthermore, such withholding is
an important part of the nature of language. "Thus
language not only holds back when v/e speak it in the
accustomed ways, but this holding back is determined by the
fact that language holds back its own origin and so denies
(?)
its being to our usual notions."v/
We should also note at this point that from which
Heidegger distinguishes his own views of language. In
reference to Aristotle's treatise "On Language," he rejects
the interpretation of language as vocal signs of mental
images.^ At another point he stresses that words and
syntax are merely the "threshold" of language.He also




4 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.31.
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as a tool for or possession of man, e.g. as a means for
giving information.^^
That these mistaken notions about language are so
prevalent is ample evidence that the difficulties mentioned
earlier have proven insurmountable barriers in most
linguistic analyses. Although anticipating later
considerations in which we shall see the close affinity
between language and Being in Heidegger's thought, we should
elaborate further on that trait of language which makes
study of it so difficult. W.J. Richardson points out that
in Heidegger's later thinking, language dominates and
possesses man in such a way that it reveals and conceals
its nature simultaneously. Even while man speaks, by
virtue of a grant from language, the latter conceals and
withholds its essential nature.
"The result is that language will seem to be at
the disposition of there-being, when actually the reverse
is true. There-being will seem to have invented language
by itself when the fact is that it has discovered itself
to)
only in and with language...nv Richardson also
explains that it is because man is completely dominated by
language as it withholds its nature that he is so
susceptible to the tendency of understanding language
inauthentically.v
1 Ibid., p.229.
2 Richardson, op.cit.. p.293.
3 Ibid., p.610.
127
Fyilly aware of the problems involved in the study
of language, we are now prepared to consider Heidegger's
own understanding of language. Our purpose here will
be to show how his basic interest and motivation continues
to be ontological.
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The Greek Understanding of language
Section One
21. Lqkqs.
We begin by looking at a favourite HeideggerJ an
ploy of substantiating his insights and studies witrH
etymological analyses of important Greek words. Such
tactics assume importance in light of his critics* charges
that he fails to provide proper grounds and authoritative
support for many of his results (Walter Kaufmann, in From
Shakespeare to Existentialism, is especially critical of
Heidegger on this point. The early Greek thinkers
have a special fascination for Heidegger as he feels they
were the first to become aware of the ontological problem.
It was to the Greeks that Being originally manifested
itself and in their experience alone is to be found a
pristine awareness of it. All thought since their time
represents a gradual deterioration roughly proportionate
to the time separating later thinkers from their Greek
predecessors.
This process also holds true in the translation of
the Greek experience from their own tongue to other
languages. In An introduction to >etarhvsics Heidegger
explains that the real meaning of the Greek language has
been inevitably distorted in later translations. Further,
this distortion "...is not accidental and harmless* it
1 Walter Kftufmann, From Fhakesreare to existentialism.
(Hew York* Anchor Books, 19^0), p.3^0.
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marks the first stage in the process by which we cut
ourselves off and alienated ourselves from the original
essence of Greek philosophy."^^ In a very real sense
the original Greek experience of Being was imprinted on
and retained in the early Greek language.
As a result Heidegger naturally seeks to determine
what the language originally meant for the Greeks, what
they intended to say by various words, and thereby to
"retrieve" the original experience wherein Being manifested
itself. furthermore, he hopes to be able not only to
experience that which was comprehended by the Greeks but
■%
also any aspects of Being's manifestations which might have
been neglected or overlooked by them. In "A Dialogue on
Language" he asserts that contemporary tninking must
strive to be more Greek than the Greeks in its outlook and
must "...pursue more originally what the Greeks have
thought, to see it in the source of its reality. To see
It so is in its own way Greek and yet in respect of what it
(2)
sees is no longer, is never again, Greek."
For his analysis of language, Heidegger considers
two Greek terms, legeln and logos. which are normally
associated with speaking and language. In /ortrage und
Aufsatze we find in the essay entitled "Logos" that he
seeks to establish the close relation he felt the Greeks
1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.13.
2 Heidegger, On the ,*ay to language, p.39.
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saw between language and Being. He asserts that Logos
must be understood in terms of legein and begins his
analysis by delving into the background of this term, or
retrieving it.^
By way of orientation let us look at his earlier
work, An Introduction to Metaphysics, in which Heidegger
explains that originally logos was not understood as word
or discourse; instead its fundamental meaning, as well as
that of legein, would best be translated as lesen, to
gather, collect, or read. Thus, "...ein Buch lesen ( to
read a book) is only a variant of lesen in the strict sense
which is: to put one thing with another, to bring together,
(2)
in short, to gather.. ."v '
We should not be surprised now to find Heidegger
offering a new, "retrieved'1 meaning for the term legein.
He suggests that when the Greeks thought of speaking, the
process or action they had in mind was not just a
vocalization of sounds but rather a "letting-lie-forth" of
whatever was spoken about. As he explains, "Discourse
and speech are (or live) as (the process of) letting-lie-
forth-in-togetherness everything which comes to presence
(or comes into being) in (or through) being put into
unconcealment."w/
For the Greeks, to speak meant to bring something
1 Martin Heidegger, Vortrage una Aufsatze. (Pfullingen:
Gunther Neske, 1954), p.207.
2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.124.
3 Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze, p.212.
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forth into the open. And to name something meant to let
an entity appear, or manifest itself. "The process of
naming (onoma) is not the expressing of a word's meaning
but is a letting-lie-forth in the light wherein an entity
can take its stand and thereby have a name."^1^ We should
note that legein is not only a letting-lie-forth but also
a letting-lle-forth-ir-togetherness. Thus this process
places something, not just in the open, but in a context
within everything else that has been allowed to lie-forth.
(Here we see shades of Dasein creating a "situation", or
bringing some sort of authentic order into its world which
would otherwise be inauthentically chaotic. Creating a
"situation" and letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness are
parallel phenomena.)
He next considers the term Logos. In considering
several phrases written by Heraclitus, Heidegger suggests
that the phrase hen-panta provides insight into what Logos
(?)
meant for the Greeks for "both are the same."v For
Heidegger, then, Logos refers to a process whereby many
or various beings are unified and gathered into the 'One'.
Not surprisingly in Vortrage und AufsStze he states:
"The word Logos names that which gathers all (beings) into
(Being) and thereby lets (them) lie forth...
In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger pursues





fragments of Heraclitus as well as comments by other Greek
thinkers. He examines the close connection between
Phusis and Logos in the writing of Parmenides and Heraclitus
and suggests that by the term Phusis the Greeks were
referring to Being. "Logos is the steady gathering, the
intrinsic togetherness of the essent i.e. being. Therefore
in Fragment I (Heraclitus') kata ton logon means the same
as kata physin. Phusis and logos are the sarae."^^
We have now seen that legein is translated by
Heidegger into a "letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness" while
Logos implies a gathering together, a One in many as well
as a letting-lie-forth. Furthermore, legein refers to a
human process while Logos indicates a similar process on
another level, the ontological. We are now ready to see
the results of Heidegger's etymological "retrieving" of
the nature of language. Based on the pristine awareness
with which the Greeks thought, Heidegger believes that
language, as saying, is the result of, is caused by, the
experience of the manifestation of Being. As a result
"...the relation between Being and saying...assaults
thinking in such an overpowering manner that it announces
itself in a single word logos...the name for Being and for
saying. «^)
Being careful to restrict our consideration solely
to insights gained from Heidegger's etymological endeavors,
we can now see how language in the dimension touched on by
1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.130.
2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.80.
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the term legein is most as it should be when corresponding
to language on the level referred to by Logos, as it
gathers together and lets-lie-forth. We have already noted
that legein and Logos refer to similar processes on
different levels so it is not difficult to see that
Heidegger's etymological analyses tell us language occurs
when language (legein) corresponds with a more fundamental
language (the process referred to by Logos).
Language now becomes a process whereby man or
Dasein in his speaking or language provides an avenue
through which Being's more fundamental speaking or saying
(Logos) may take place. The emphasis here has clearly
shifted from Dasein to Being. This becomes apparent in
W.J. Richardson's critique of Heidegger's insights into
language. He explains that Dasein is the place, the
"there", where the gathering-process of Logos happens; it
must provide the place for this occurrence to fulfil its
own nature. Dasein "...must lay-out (legein) the very same
(homo) beings that Logos lets lie forth in the Open, and in
the very same way. When this happens, the legein of
the There as a gathering-point 'corresponds' (homologein)
with the legein of the aboriginal Logos." In doing this,
Dasein 'concurs* with the process of Logos and in this
concurrence authentic language takes place.
Just as in fundamental ontology Dasein was the
"ontological" animal and was only authentically itself when
1 Richardson, op.cit., pp.494-495.
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open towards and transparent to Being, so now is man only
completely man when, instead of being the clearing for
Being, he is the voice of Being as Logos. Indeed,
Heidegger now says that it should be logos which speaks,
not man, since "Only where the logos discloses itself
does the phonetic sound become a word."^"^
1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.132
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An Ontologist's View of Poetry
Section Two
22. Poetry and art
We turn now to a consideration of Heidegger's
analysis of that which he defines as poetry. The dis¬
crepancy between his definition and the accepted definition
of poetry results in a certain amount of confusion and
unwarranted criticism from commentators. This is
reflected in Paul Roubiczek's charge that Heidegger,
unable to define Being clearly, quotes several lines from
a poem by Holderlin which "...by their beauty, awaken a
strong feeling and thus cover up the emptiness of the
actual definition...Reliance on poetry in philosophy...
can easily be a way of hiding confusing, unwarranted or
inconclusive assertions."^^
In order to clarify Heidegger's understanding of
poetry we shall consider it in relation to art, language,
thought and Being. As we shall see, poetry in this
context represents a very basic process which is
thoroughly ontological in nature. Support for this
appraisal of Heidegger's interest in poetry can be found
in Thomas Langan's assertion that for Heidegger, a poem is
"...Being that has come to be in words." Therefore, the
study of poetry will reveal"...something about the very
dimension of Being's Lichtung." In this view, poetry is
1 Paul Roubiczek, Existentialism For and Against, (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1964, p.132.
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seen as "...the road of the historical-destiny of Being.
Let us now consider the relation between poetry
and art to see what insight this will yield into
Heidegger's understanding of poetry. In "Der Ursprung des
Kunstwerkes" he attempts to determine the essence of art
by considering one particular art work, Van Gogh's painting
of a peasant's pair of shoes. What can be learned from
this painting, he asks?
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the
shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares
forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the
shoes there is the accummulated tenacity of her
slow trudge through*•.the furrows of the field
swept by a raw rain. On the leather lies the
dampness and richness of the soil. Under the
soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as
evening falls...This equipment is pervaded by
uncomplaining anxiety as to certainty of bread,
the wordless joy of having once more withstood
want, the trembling before the impending childbed
and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. (2)
All of this was revealed, not by the shoes
themselves, nor by their context in the painting, which
includes none of those references mentioned, but solely by
the painting itself which "spoke.•./and7 let us know what
shoes are in truth. Wa begin to see now that the
essence of art is to reveal the truth of the world around
us. In this particular painting the peasant's shoes were
disclosed (or unconcealed) to us. how does this happen?
heidegger states: "In the work of arc the truth of a being
has set itself to work. 'To set' means here: to bring to




a stand. A being, a pair of peasant shoes, comes in the
work to stand in the light of its Being. The Being of
the being comes into the steadiness of its shining."
The nature of art then, is "...the truth of beings setting
itself to work."^ ^
We need recall now the previous definition of
truth as alethela in which Being uncovers itself, reveals
and manifests itself, thereby making truth possible.
This process of unconcealment takes place in various ways,
one of which is in the art work. Art, as "the truth of
beings setting itself to work" is the result of a
confrontation or clash between two movements coming from
opposite directions. It is of the essence of Being to
reveal or unconceal itself to man and it is by virtue of
its being the D§, the place wherein this unconcealment
occurs, that Dasein exists. On the other hand, Ossein's
nature and existence is such that it can project itself
outwards upon the surrounding world by seizing Being in
its unconcealment.
It is when Dasein meets and grasps Being as it
comes forth to Dasein that art occurs. The result of the
clash is that Dasein can "set" or "bring to a stand" the
Being of the beings around it in a work of art. As W.J.
Richardson explains* "...Being advances unto the There
Zpasein7 which has been throvn-forth by Being itself and is




disclosure as the given work of art." '
This process of setting up, or making to stand out,
the truth of some entity is called poetizing by Heidegger
and "all art, as the letting-happen of the arrival of the
(2)
truth of beings is, as such, essentially poetry."
Poetry understood in this sense is certainly a broader and
more inclusive phenomenon than what is normally described
as poetry and not surprisingly, Heidegger designates as
poesy that which is normally considered poetry. He goes
on to explain that poesy, like painting, sculpture and
architecture, "is only one mode of the lighting projection
of truth, i.e. of poetic composition in the wider sense.
By clarifying the relation of art and poetry we
have been able to better understand just how basic a
process poetry is for Heidegger. Although it means
anticipating a later analysis in which Being Is defined as
alethe!a. we can also see that this relation clearly
establishes the ontologlcal nature of poetry in the
following Heideggerian statement! "The nature of art is
poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of
truth. "<S+)
23. Poetry and language
We turn next to the relation between poetry and
1 Richardson, os.clt.. p.M-09.




language; the insights gathered from this analysis will
further clarify Heidegger's understanding of poetry. In
"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", he explains that as
"the inaugural naming of Being and of the essence of all
things", poetry first brings into the open all that with
which everyday language deals. Not only does poetry thus
make language possible, but it also happens that now"...the
essence of language must be understood through the essence
of poetry."
In this we can see Heidegger using the term language
in a dual sense. The term refers not only to the everyday
understanding of language but also to a far more basic
phenomenon which is closely associated with that process
indicated by the term poetry. As was the case with poetry
and poesy then, language has a dual significance. The close
association of essential language and poetry in their
Heideggerian context can be seen in his assertion that the
essence of language could only have arisen from man's
experience of, or departure into, Being. "In this
departure language was Being embodied in the'word; poetry.
Language is the most profound poetry in which a people speaks
(2)
Being."N Because of this close association, we will be
able to understand better the term poetry by clarifying
what Heidegger means by essential language.
In his article "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes",
Heidegger explains that, in its essential form, language
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.307.
2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp.171-172.
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"...by naming beings for the first time, first brings
beings to word and to appearance. This naming first
appoints beings to their Being..." He goes on to explain
how in this naming, "unconcealedness submits and infuses
itself into what is as such."^1^ In its essential form,
then, language is another term for the concept Being in
that it performs the same function as Being (aletheia) which,
as we shall see later, refers to the unconcealing of beings
and the bringing of them into Being. Therefore, by virtue
of its close relation to language, poetry is also another
term for this basic function performed by Being.
The ontological nature of poetry as defined by
Heidegger is coming clearly into focus. However, in light
of his unusual definition of poetry, how does Heidegger
justify his interest in poetry as it is normally defined
(or what he calls poesy)? Heidegger prefers poesy as a
prime object for ontological analysis because it alone, of
all the various modes of poetry (sculpture, painting, etc.),
employs language which, as we have established, is closely
related to poetry through a mutual relationship to Being
as aletheia.
In "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" he says: "...since
language is the happening in which for man beings first
disclose themselves to him...poesy - or poetry in the
narrower sense - is the most original form of poetry in
1 Heidegger, Holzwege. p.60.
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the essential sense. As W.J. Richardson explains, it
"is only because language as such is the primordial
poetizing that poesy, which uses language as its medium,
(2)
enjoys a primacy among other forms of art..."N '
24. Poetry and thought
Having seen poetry in its relation to art and
language, we shall now consider the relation between poetry
and thought in Heidegger's works. We shall see that the
two are basically alike although there are several important
differences. In Was 1st Das - Die Philosophie? we read:
"There holds sway between both thought and poetry a hidden
relationship but, because they are both dedicated to the
service of language, there is also a gulf between the two,
(•*)
for they 'dwell on most widely separated mountains'."v '
Similarly, in "What is Metaphysics?: Postscript"
Heidegger further clarifies the relation of poetry and
thinking. Both are alike in their "care of the word",
but "...since like is like only insofar as difference
allows...the two things are at the same time at opposite
poles in their essence. The thinker utters Being. The
(4)
poet names what is holy."v
We shall consider first how and to what extent
1 Ibid., p.61.
2 Richardson, op.cit., p.410.
3 Martin Heidegger, Was 1st Das - Die Philosophie?. (London:
Vision Press, 1958), p.94.
4 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.391.
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these two are different. Why do the poet and thinker
"dwell on most widely separated mountains?" The clue
seems to lie in the object of their concern, the Holy and
Being. Heidegger's use of the term Holy is certainly
obscure and what he intends to convey by this word can only
«
be learned from its application in context. [This obscurity
is not lost on Heidegger's critics either, be they
sympathetic or not. Thomas Langan, in The Meaning of
Heidegger, offers an explanation of this term radically
different from W.J. Richardson's. The latter's book
generally seems to offer a more comprehensive appraisal of
Heidegger's thought than the former so we shall follow in
the same general direction Richardson takes on this topic.]
Richardson turns to another of Heidegger's works for
help in comprehending the meaning of Holy in the latter's
thought. In "Brief Uber Den Humanismus" he points to
Heidegger's saying that the "...truth of Being first allows
(2)
itself to be thought out of the essence of the Holy."v
Being - aletheia refers to the process in which Being
simultaneously reveals and conceals itself and Richardson
feels that the Holy which is named by the poet is Being
insofar as it reveals itself. As a result, the poet's task
is to name Being in its positive aspect, as unconcealing
and as the Holy, while the thinker's interest is Being in
1 Langan, op.cit., p.115-
2 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1967), pp.181-182.
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its negativity or as concealed.The point here is to
realize that Holy and Being are basically names for the same
concept, although they name different aspects of it. Hence,
the mountains upon which the thinker and poet dwell should
certainly not be seen as too far apart.
Let us turn now to those places where Heidegger
stresses the similarity between thinking and poetry. In
aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, he makes the following
comment: "Singing and thinking are the neighbourly stems
(?)
out of poetry."v ' As branches of the same tree, the
basic unity of singing (or poetry) and thinking is undeniable
even though each plays a distinctive role (or constitutes a
different branch).
In his essay "Remembrance of the Poet" Heidegger
speaks of the poet as the one who first brings Being (as
the most Joyous and the Serene) before the eyes of all his
fellow men. Gradually a few of these, the "deliberating"
or "careful" ones, will become more aware of Being than
before and these come to have a special relation to the poet.
Because they think of that which is written of in the
poem, they are directed with the singer's care towards
the mystery of the reserving proximity [Being],
Through this single turning towards the same object the
careful hearers are related with the care of the
speaker, the others are the kindred of the poet.^)
The thinkers, or deliberating ones, are kin to the
poet in that they preserve the experience which the poet
1 Richardson, op.cit., p.545.
2 Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens,
(Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1954), p.25.
3 Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp.287-266.
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captures in words. The need for this preserving of the
poet's original experience which is captured in his words
stems from the tendency of language to become care-worn and
faded through constant use. "Therefore the poet turns to
the others, so that their remembrance may help towards an
understanding of the poetic word.. The poet and
thinker are thus closely related by their kindred concern
for the finite manifestation of Being in language. Thus it
can be said that in poetry, the poet first brings Being into
words or language while the philosopher follows in his foot¬
steps and through the poet's words experiences Being's
unconcealment and is thereby able to clarify "thermatically"
this elemental power in existence. Because of their mutual
concern, then, the poet and thinker are "ever structured
in their kinship. n^2'
We can now see that in Heidegger's works essential
thought and essential poetizing as well as essential
language are so closely related to the finite revelation
of Being as aletheia that they become almost one in their
subservience to Being. Having established the relation of
poetry to art, language, poesy, and thought we have a much
fuller understanding of Heidegger's ontologically motivated
approach to poetry.
25. Poetry and Being
In conclusion we shall focus our attention on the
1 Ibid.. p.289.
2 Heidegger, On the V.ay to Language, pp.155-156.
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direct relation between poetry and Being in Heidegger's
approach. In his essay on art, Heidegger states: "What
poetry...unfolds of unconcealedness...is the Open which
poetry lets happen and indeed in such a way that, for the
first time, in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings
to light. If poetry provides the opening through
which Being, as the Open, can light up the world and give
entities their Being, then certainly poetry provides the
occasion in which thinkers can be confronted by Being.
Therefore Heidegger's interest in poetry can easily be seen
as ontologically motivated. By focusing on one particular
instance of Heidegger's analysis of poetry we shall see:
one, that his aim here is strikingly similar to his earlier
endeavours in Being and Time which we have already seen as
thoroughly ontological, and two, that Being actually does
reveal something of itself in poetry (poesy).
As for the first, in "Remembrance of the Poet"
Heidegger analyses HBlderlin's "Homecoming to Kindred
Ones." Briefly he sees the poem as telling of how the poet,
growing up in his homeland, has dwelled near the "Source"
(Being) all his life without recognizing it as the Source.
Yearning for proximity to the Source, the poet leaves his
homeland and journeys to distant places. Only in his
journey does he come to realize that the Source is not
distant from his homeland. "That which thou seekest is near,
(2)
and already coming to meet thee."v (a line from HSlderlin's
poem).
1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.60.
2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.279.
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The poet returns in a joyous homecoming and is able
to dwell near the Source, now recognizing it as the Source.
However, the journey was essential for this clearer
perception since without it the poet would never have
achieved this recognition. It is only as a returning
wanderer that the poet could "...experience what the nature
of the Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back
more experienced, as the Seeker.
Indeed, the similarity is striking between the
maturation of the poet and the process by which Dasein is
able to open itself up to Being. In everydayness Dasein
exists with an unthematic awareness of the Being all around
in the beings of its world. It lives inauthentically
absorbed in beings, thereby too distracted for any awareness
of Being, (unable to see the wood for the trees.) However,
in dread Dasein is held out into nothingness, its world
slips away and for the first time Being comes to the fore.
Nov/ Daseln returns to its world but lives authentically in
it, aware of the Being all around it. Here too is a
journey from the homeland (inauthentic Being-in-the-world)
to a distant land (nothingness) and then back to the homeland
(authentic Being-in-the-world). Heidegger's aims and motives
have not changed. He is still rooted in an ontological quest.
As for the second purpose in considering this essay,
we find Heidegger learning a great deal about Being as he
1 Ibid.
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"listens" to the poem. We might also say that we are not
attempting to defend or criticise Heidegger's method of
interpretation, we are only interested in showing that his
interests and findings in the study of poetry are ontological.
We see throughout the essay that Being always has the
initiative in its unconcealment. This can be seen in the
line from the poem that says: "That which thou seekest is
near, and already coming to meet thee." It is a question
then of Being coming to the poet, and not a process of the
poet searching out and seizing Being. "The now dominating
proximity makes the Near be near and yet at the same time
makes it the sought-after and therefore not near.
The fact that the poet in his early years fails to
recognize the Source for what it is results not so much
from his own blindness as from Being's natural mode of
revelation, concealing and revealing simultaneously. As
Heidegger says: "In the essence of proximity a clandestine
process of reservation takes place. The fact that proximity
to the Most Joyous reserves the Near, is the mystery of
(?)
proximity.' Thus the mature poet knows that "...we
never get to know the mystery by unveiling or analysing it,
we only get to know it by carefully guarding the mystery as
(-5)
mystery."w/ To yield to Being's revelation does not mean





the poem). Instead, the poet learns to guard Being in
its mystery and to make others aware of the mystery as
the mystery.
We have seen now that Heidegger's interest in poetry
does not represent an about-face from the earlier concerns
of Being and Time but that he continues to be thoroughly
ontologically oriented. We have seen a slight shift of
initiative with the result that Being itself has become the
dominant: partner in the Being-man relationship. One
result of this shift which becomes more explicit in
Heidegger's later essays on poetry is especially relevant
for our theological orientation. Because It is always the
same Source (Being) to which the poet harkens in his poems,
all his works will have a certain unity due to their under¬
lying Source. The greater the poet and the more sensitive
he is to this Source, the greater will be the compactness
and unity in his poems.
In his essay "Language in the Poem" Heidegger states:
"Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic
statement only. ...The poet's statement remains unspoken.
None of his individual poems, nor their totality, says it all.
Nonetheless, every poem speaks from the whole of the one
single statement, and in each instance says that statement."
The result is that to understand the one Poem or poetic
statement of the poet, one must consider each of his poems.
Having grasped to a greater or lesser degree the one Poem,
1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.160.
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one then returns to the individual poems to find new
meaning in them. The process progressively repeats itself.
This completes our analysis of Heidegger's views
on poetry in which we have determined his definition of
poetry by seeing it in relation to art, language, poesy,





To this point we have considered Heidegger's analysis
of language in its relation to poetry and to the GreeK
understanding and use of language. We shall now consider
Heidegger's views on language as language, and again stress
the ontologlcal motif running throughout his linguistic
concerns. That an ontological awareness is important for
the study and use of language can be seen in his belief
that currently language is misunderstood in its nature,
"worn out and used up"; the reason for this being "...the
destroyed relation to Being as such."^^
26. Essential language as Saying
We begin then with the essence of language which
Heidegger defines as "Saying", Sagen. He explains that
poetry and thinking are actually modes of saying and that
in this concept can be seen the essential nature of language.
"'To say', related to the Old Norse saga, means to show, to
make appear, set free, that is to offer and extend what we
call world, lighting and concealing it. This lighting
and hiding proffer of the world is the essential Being of
(2)
Saying."v Thus we can see that essential thinking,
poetizing in its basic sense, and language in its essence
1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.51*
2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.93*
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are practically one in their functions of letting Being
manifest itself.
As he has done with other terms Heidegger uses
language in a way that differs from its ordinary meaning.
Saying as speaking is not what he has in mind when he
speaks of essential language. "To say and to speak are
not identical. A man may speak, speak endlessly, and all
the time say nothing. Another man may remain silent, not
speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great
deal."^' We shall gain insight into what Heidegger
means by this term through considering essential language,
or saying, as showing, as listening, and as Appropriation.
Heidegger arrives at his definition of saying as
showing by pointing out that speaking to someone often
(2)
means "showing"something to them.x Of saying as
listening he says:
It is the custom to put speaking and listening in
opposition: one man speaks, the other listens. But
listening accompanies and surrounds not only speaking
such as takes place in conversation. The simultaneous-
ness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning.
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is
listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is
f listening not while but before we are speaking. (3)Heid gger is using speaking here as an authe tic mode
of saying.]
To what does one listen before speaking? To language





for Mm, it is more accurate to say language speaks,
rather than man speaks. As opposed to the accepted view
that man uses language, Heidegger suggests that language
uses man, it "...puts man to use for its own sake."
Furthermore, it is only as the tool for language that man
can exist authentically.^^ Now we can better see how he
describes saying or speaking as a listening. Man listens
to the voice of language wMch will then be expressed
through Ms own speaking.
Here we see Heidegger closely associating language
and Being. Indeed it now appears that language is one
more term for Being in one of its many aspects. Just as
Being gives entities their Being by lighting them up, making
them appear as present, so too does language "show" entities
for what they are. Consider Heidegger's words on language
as showing: "Language speaks in that it, as showing, reacMng
into all regions or presences, summons them from whatever is
present to appear and to fade."^^ [Notice also the parallel
between appearing-fading and Being's revelation as a revealing-
concealing process.]
John Macquarrie makes the observation of language in
Heidegger's later thought that it "...increasingly takes
over the character and functions once assigned to Being
1 Versenyi, op.cit.. pp.133-134.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.124.
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itself. V.J. Richardson reinforces this comment when
he notes Heidegger's belief that the everyday understanding
of language is the result of Being's negativity as it with¬
draws itself. Authentic language is now seen as the
result of Language (Being) showing itself while everyday
language results from Language (Being) withdrawing itself
(2)
from man.v ' We should also note that Language (as Being)
clearly has the initiative over man who is now seen as a
message bearer, or perhaps loudspeaker, for Language as it
speaks (shows).
We need to consider how the Saying of Language
becomes the speaking of man. To indicate this process,
Heidegger uses the term Appropriation. Man is "...made
appropriate for Saying" and this "...releases human nature
into its own, but only in order that man as he who speaks,
(3)
that is he who says, may encounter and answer Saying... "w/
Thus "Appropriation appropriates man to its own usage...
and...is the way-making for Saying to come into language.
We have now defined language as Saying through a consideration
of language as showing, listening, and appropriation. We
have also established how language becomes another term for
the process normally referred to as Being.
1 John Macquarrie, Existentialism. (London: Hutchinson and
Co., 1972), p.115.
2 Richardson, op.cit.. p.610.
3 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.129.
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27# Language as another term for Being
Heidegger's ontological emphasis comes out also in
the essays "The Nature of Language" and "Words" in which he
contemplates the following line from a poem by Stefan George:
"When word breaks off no tiling may be." He interprets it
very literally. He defines "thing" as anything which has
Being and says that the word is "...what brings that given
thing, as the being that is, into this "is"....the word is
what holds the thing there and relates it and so to speak
provides its maintenance with which to be a thing. In a
very real sense the word gives a being its Being and Heidegger
(2)
calls this process "bethinging".v '
In Heidegger's insistence that there can be true
speaking and hearing only if they are directed in advance
toward Being, the Logos, and in his assertion that only
"where the logos discloses itself does the phonetic sound
become a word",w/ we can see how language is used in
reference to one aspect or function of Being. He goes on
to stress the importance of a comprehension of Being, how¬
ever vague or "unthematic", for the very possibility of
language by saying that if there were no awareness or under¬
standing of Being at all, it would not mean merely the loss
of a noun and a verb in our vocabulary. Instead, there
"would be no language at all.
1 Ibid.. p.82.
2 Ibid.. p.151.
3 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.132.
4 Ibid., p.82.
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Having established the close association between
Being and language in Heidegger's works, we are now ready to
consider his well known phrase, "Language is the house of
Being." In his "Brief Dber den Humanismus" he says:
Thinking fulfills the relation of Being to the essence
of man...[since] in thinking Being comes to language.
Language is the house of Being. Man lives in the house
of language. Thinking and poetry are the guardians of
this house. Their watchfulness is the fulfillment of
the manifestness of Being, insofar as they bring it to
language through their language and preserve it in
language.^j
We can see here two things. The first is that
Heidegger sees the relation of Being, thought, and language
in a new perspective and the second is that he assigns
language a most important role in the ontological make-up
of all entities including Dasein. As for the first,
Heidegger reverses our normal consideration of language as
subservient to thought. According to him, most think of a
process in which the mind formulates a thought and then
utilizes language to reproduce and express it. Here
priority definitely lies with thinking.
However, Heidegger stands in sharp disagreement with
this view. In actual fact, he claims that Being comes to
fruition in thought after having passed through language and
therefore language is the more Important of the two. For
him it is only when man speaks that he thinks and not the
(2)
other way around as is commonly thoughts ' As a result,
1 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.145.
2 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans, by J.C.
Churchill (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1954), p.16.
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"thinking... stands in service to language.
As for the second implication of Heidegger's phrase,
"Language is the house of Being", we need to realize that he
is here making an extremely radical assertion. This comment
is made by way of prefacing what is to follow since it often
happens that when one hears a radically new viewpoint, there
is a natural tendency to level it off by fitting it force¬
fully into the usual perspective, thereby depriving it of
its essential force. In "The Nature of Language" we find:
"The Being of anything that is, resides in the word. There¬
fore this statement holds true: Language is the house of
Being.
The Being of an entity resides not in that entity
itself but in the word for it. In W.J. Richardson's opinion,
by this statement Heideggei means that "...since Being makes
beings accessible, we cannot gain access to beings except by
passing through the house of language. Being "dwells" in
(■*)
the words by which beings are named. . .nW/
Y/e can now say that Heidegger is identifying language
and Being and that it has become indispensable for an analysis
of his insights into the nature of language to understand his
views on Being. We have already noted this to some extent
1 Heidegger, Was 1st Das Die-Philosophie?. p.92.
2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.63.
3 Richardson, op.cit.. p.528.
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in seeing that the everyday understanding of language is
the result of Being in its negativity (withdrawal). We
saw it also as we came to understand language as "showing" and
in its relation to Being as bringing to presence or
lighting up. Also we have seen that we cannot understand
his analysis of poetry without some grasp of the Being
process, e.g., Mystery is Being in its negativity.
28. Heidegger's hermeneutics
We shall conclude our consideration of Heidegger's
approach to language by tracing the evolution of
hermeneutics in his thinking. As we noted in the discussion
on Being and Time, hermeneutics there referred to the inter¬
pretation of Dasein and its structures of existence which
led in turn to a clarification of Being. However, this
approach proved inadequate due to the failure of traditional
language to express his intentions.
As a result his hermeneutical understanding became
more and more historical in the sense that he focused on
Being's manifestations to great thinkers and poets. We
have already noted this approach in his interest in
Holderlin's poetry and the various Greek philosophers. With
this development Heidegger's approach became more like
hermeneutics as it is normally defined in that he was inter¬
preting literary works instead of existential structures.
However, he interpreted such works in a very
distinctive manner. Rather than concentrating on the
written lines, his interest was more in the subject matter
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"between the lines" so to speak. In What Is Called Thinking?
he explains that every interpretation is a dialogue with the
"saying" in any work and such dialogue demands involvement
both in what is said and in the "unspoken", or that which
is revealed 'between the lines*.
James Robinson explains Heidegger's distinctive
approach to hermeneutics by saying that the interpreter,
rather than presenting a technically correct exegesis of
the text, should instead approach it as a means of access to
the underlying subject matter about which the text speaks.
The issue in interpretation is not related to the exegesis -
eisegesis question but concerns the interpreter's ability to
become involved in the matter which called forth the
(2)
language of the text.v '
Although this approach moves away from that of Being
and Time due to the different subject matter for inter¬
pretation, both are characterized by a certain amount of
passivity on the part of the interpreter. In a phenomenolo-
gical interpretation, the phenomena are allowed to reveal
themselves as they are, rather than being forced into the
framework of some preconceived plan. By the same token,
his later, more historical, approach involves a hearing of
1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.173.
2 James Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later
Heidegger and Theology, ed. by J. Robinson and J.B. Cobb,
(London: Harper and Row, 19b3)» p.51.
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Being's call to the interpreter through the text.
This passivity becomes even more predominant in the
final development of hermeneutics in Heidegger's thinking.
Now the interpreter becomes the "mouthpiece" or the
messenger for the text. In "A Dialogue on Language" we
find the source for this latest insight into hermeneutics.
There he relates hermeneutics to the Greek noun hermeneus.
which in turn stems from the name of the Greek god Hermes,
the divine messenger who brings the "message of cbstiny."
Hermeneus now refers to an exposition which not only
interprets but also involves a more passive hearing of
messages and tidings from the gods (or Being). The real
importance of this process is now seen as 'bringing out the
Being of beings.*
We can see here that the interpreter is now
completely subservient to the call of Being and his primary
duty is to give expression to this manifestation of Being
through his own language. Another important consequence
of this new development is that hermeneutics is no longer
confined to the interpretation of texts. W.J. Richardson
notes that hermeneutics now means "the entire effort to let
(?)
Being be manifest..."v '
In light of what we have already seen about how
broadly he defines poetry (as opposed to poesy). it is not
1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp.29,30.
2 Richardson, op.cit., p.631.
160
difficult to see how Heidegger can consider painting,
sculpture and other subject matter as objects for inter¬
pretation. As it is now defined, hermeneutics refers to
the whole of Heidegger's philosophical endeavour in its
ranging from Dasein to Poetry, other thinkers, and thought
itself in an attempt to let Being manifest itself.
This concludes our analysis of Heidegger's views
on language in which we have considered his interpretation
of the early Greek philosophers' views on language, his
interest in poetry, his understanding of language as a term
for Being, and his hermeneutics. We have established
conclusively that his interest in language is ontological
and we can now see how he considers language to be one mode
of access to Being Just as Dasein was in Being and Time.
V/hile the object to be interrogated has changed from Dasein
to language, the subject of his investigation remains
unchanged, Being.
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ANALYSIS OF THE THOUGH! PROCESS
CHAPTER THREE
Introduction
29* A preliminary view of Heidegger's analysis of thought
We turn now to the nature of thought as understood
by Heidegger. Thinking for him is not just one of several
activities in which man can engage but is the activity of
man which determines his unique character. As James
Robinson states: "If man Is the being where Being itself
dawns on the beings, then this basic clearing of Being,
which constitutes man's nature, is synonymous with thinking
about Being. Thus the act most fundamentally related to
man's nature is the act of thinking."^
To understand the nature of thinking then is of
vital importance in understanding the nature of man himself.
Heidegger even goes so far as to say that man's failure to
understand and "perform" thinking is more of a threat to
humanity than the all too possible outbreak of nuclear war.
In Discourse on Thinking he explains that the great danger
in our age is not nuclear energy but the possibility that
the technological revolution, with Its emphasis on
"calculative thinking", might breed Indifference toward
essential, meditative thinking. "Then man would have
denied and thrown away his own special nature - that he is
1 Robinson, oa.clt.. pp.H3-M+.
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a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of
man's essential nature.^
Not unexpectedly, Heidegger's views on thinking
are radically different from those commonly accepted.
Because of his radical approach, we need to "ease" into
our analysis of his thoughts, being careful not to consider
too much too quickly. (This might be compared to "easing"
into the cold water when one goes swimming. To enter the
water gradually at first lessens the shock of immersion
later. In this way, one feels "at home" or comfortable
in the water much quicker.) We shall "ease" into his
views first by a glance at the general structure of
Heidegger's thinking about thinking and then by a consid¬
eration of what essential, or authentic, thinking is not.
Heidegger's mode of thinking is often
characterized as a path or trail To understand the path,
one must walk it. Furthermore, some of the paths might
dwindle down into dead ends, necessitating a retracing of
one's steps. One learns of this only by trying the path,
however. In walking these paths, there can be no question
of forsaking or rejecting one for another; each must be
tried. By way of illustration we can say that the earlier
path experienced in Being and Time is not rejected in
Heidegger's later thinking, even though he no longer walks
1 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans, by J.M.
Anderson and E.H. Freund, (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1966), pp.55-56.
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it exactly as before. In a later essay he says that his
position in Bein& and Time was merely a •way-station' (or
one point along an ever changing way or V.'eg). That he
moved beyond that particular point in his thinking does not
indicate a denial of its validity but is simply due to an
a-ilegiance to the more important'way'itself; for the
"lasting element in thinking is the way upon which one can
move backward and forward." ("only the way back will lead us
forward.")
Indeed, it is quite possible to say that his later
thoughts are merely re-hashing from a new perspective the
insights expressed in Being and Time. The themes remain the
same throughout his career, Dasein, Being, beings, language,
thinking, hermeneutics, truth, existence and others. It is
then quite permissible to say that Heidegger in his later
thinking is re-tracing the paths of his earlier thoughts.
The important point here is to realize that we can
only understand thinking by being involved in it. In what
Is Called Thinking? Heidegger states: "Thinking itself is
a way. ¥e respond to tee way only by remaining underway...
Only when we walk it and in no other fashion, only, that is,
(2)
by thoughtful questioning, are we on the move on the way."v
Wre can also "ease" into Heidegger's views on thinking
by considering what he terms inauthentic or non-essential
1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.12.
2 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp.168-169.
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modes of thinking. As he says, it is important to realize
and identify such types of thinking in order to avoid the
pitfalls thereof. "Especially we moderns can learn only
if we unlearn at the same time. Applied to the matter
"before us: We can learn thinking only if we radically
unlearn what thinking has been traditionally."^1^
Basically Heidegger sees inauthentic thought
dominating metaphysics as well as what he calls scientific-
technological-calculative thinking. The latter would he
the predominant type of thinking in the modern world. As
we shall see, the theme running throughout all his
criticisms is that thinking is so preoccupied with beings,
or entities, that it fails to be aware of Being. In
regard to the common mode of thinking in metaphysics, he
states in his essay "The Way Back into the Ground of
Metaphysics" that, despite its claims to do so, metaphysics
fails to ask the question of Being because "...it thinks of
Being only by representing beings as beings." From its
beginning to its completion, the propositions of meta¬
physics have been strangely involved in a persistent
confusion of beings and Being. Because of this flaw, he
portrays metaphysics as an actual "barrier to maris awareness
of Being.
He is also very critical of scientific-calculative-
1 Ibid., p.8.
2 Heidegger, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics",
Contemporary Philosophic Problems, pp.313-31^*
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technological thinking. At one point he makes the rather
blunt statement that "Science does not think."^1^ He
further claims that science does not seek "truth in itself."
Instead, it seeks to objectivize and dominate the beings
with which it deals and by concentrating on beings, overlooks
Being entirely.
In non-essential thought, then, Being is completely
overlooked since the thinker deals solely with the beings of
his environment. He is particularly insensitive to the
unconcealing of Being since Ms tMnking involves an
aggressive attempt to dominate and control everything in Ms
world. The result is that any factor wMch does not conform
to Ms scheme is ruled out as un-real. Hot surprisingly,
such tMnking can be characterized as an "attack upon
reality" wMch completely closes the door to any revelation
of Being.
We should note that inauthentic thought is so en¬
trenched, and indeed inevitable, because of the very structure
of thinking itself. (We can recall a parallel phenomenon
in the inherent tendency of inauthentic immersion in the
world to grow out of DaseiMs structure as Being-in-the
world.) In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens Heidegger says:
"The evil and therefore sharpest danger is tMnking itself.
(A)
It must tMnk against itself, which it only seldom does."x
1 Heidegger, What Is Called TMnking?. p.8.
2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.318.
3 Robinson, op.cit.. pp.28-29.
4 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Penkens, p.15.
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¥•J. Richardson explains that thinking must think against
itself because the nature of thought involves a "drag"
toward inessential thinking. This "drag" results from
the necessity of thinking Being only as it is revealed
through beings. Hence, thinking must always resist its
inherent tendency to become bogged down in beings.
This completes our introduction to Heidegger's
views on the nature of thinking in which we have glanced
at the general structure of his thinking about thinking
and considered his views on the nature of inauthentic
thinking.
1 Richardson, op.cit.. p.556.
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The Earlier Heidegger and Essential Thought
Section One
We turn now to a consideration of Heidegger's
understanding of essential or authentic thinking. Our
analysis will correspond generally to the chronological
development of Heidegger's views. His thinking about
thinking developed such that Being became more and more
dominant in the thought process. In his earlier writings,
which we shall consider first, man or Dasein holds the
initiative in this process. However, this gradually
evolves into a later position in which Being itself is the
dominant factor.
here also we shall see that an understanding of
Heidegger's views on Being is essential for grasping his
thinking about thinking, which itself is ontologically
oriented. As was the case with his analyses of language,
Heidegger's interest in the nature of thinking only became
apparent after his interest in fundamental ontology waned.
Indeed discussions of thinking as such are non-existent in
Being and Time and are only partially developed in his
other earlier writings.
30. Thought a3 resolve
We turn our attention first to his essay "On the
Essence of Truth" in which we find only a few remarks on
thinking reflecting an interest which has not yet come to
the fore. The clue in this essay to Heidegger's view of
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thinking lies in the terra resolve which, as we shall see,
assumes a meaning somewhat different than in Being and Time.
By way of introduction we should say that Heidegger
considers the "essence of truth" to be freedom. As might be
expected, he has his own definition of freedom. It means
to let-be, in the sense of not interfering-with, and is
part of the process whereby Dasein lights up beings in
their Being.
Truth, as aletheia, enters the picture in that when
Dasein lets-be entities (beings), it allows them to reveal,
or un-conceal, themselves as they actually are. This, as
we have seen previously, is the process of truth and
Dasein's mode of Being, existence, now becomes ex-sistence
or ek-sistence, standing out into the truth of what-is.
"Ex-sistence, grounded in truth as freedom, is nothing
less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is-
as-such."
Further, truth and untruth always occur together in
that letting-be is normally oriented around a particular
being and, by virtue of this orientation, conceals Being
behind the being. (In this essay he closely refers to
Being as beings-ih-the-totality.) By its interest in the
one being, letting-be conceals being-in-the-totality.
"Precisely because letting-be always...lets each thing be in
its proper relationships and thus reveals it, it immediately
conceals what is in totality. Letting things be is at once
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp.335-336.
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a concealment." This concealed being-in-the-totality
Heidegger refers to as mystery. Living in forgetfulness
of the mystery he calls "error" and man's tendency towards
this state he refers to as in-sistence. "As ex-sistent,
Dasein is in-sistent."
In this context authentic thought is referred to as
"open resolve" in which Dasein becomes aware of its in¬
sistent nature, faces its "error" and becomes sensitive to
the "mystery", realizing that there is Being behind the
beings but not what the Being is, thereby respecting its
nature as mystery:
...because the complete essence of truth also includes
its dis-essence [concealment] and because it functions
primarily as dissimulation [die Verbergung might be
better translated as simply "coneealment"J, philosophy,
regarded as the quest for this truth, has a two-fold
nature. Its meditations have the calm dignity of
gentleness, not denying the dissimulation of what-is
in totality. At the same time they have the "open
resolve" of hardness which, while not shattering the
dissimulation, forces its essence whole and intact
into the open, into our understanding and so to reveal
its own truth.
We should note here that the two-fold nature of
philosophy reveals the that while respecting the what of
Being. We might also note that the initiative clearly lies
with Dasein as it "forces" the mystery into the open. We
can also see that in order to understand thinking we must
better understand the nature of Being which functions as





31. The Greek understanding of the thought process
In An Introduction to Metaphysics composed five years
after "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger returns to the
Greeks to consider their understanding of the thinking process.
In his analysis he considers the Parmenidean fragment $<5):
to gar auto noein estin te kai einai. "The crude translation
prescribed by a long tradition runs: Thinking and Being are
the same - a mis-interpretation no .less un-Greek than the
falsification of the Heraclitean doctrine of the logos.
[which he has previously refuted.
To understand this fragment Heidegger says we need
to know the correct meaning of to auto, of noein, and of
einai. We begin with the latter which he asserts has already
been sufficiently clarified by his analysis of the term phusis.
The meaning of this terra was derived from a consideration of
the Heraclitean fragment (^5) which Heidegger translates as
follows: "Conflict is for all (that is present) the creator
that causes to emerge but (also) for all the dominant preserver.
For it makes some to appear as gods, others as men: it
(?)
creates (shows) some as slaves, others as freemen."v
In commenting on this fragment, Heidegger says that
in the polemos mentioned, the power (of the creator and
preserver) that is phusis was first confronted by man and
(3)
brought to a stand, thereby giving beings their Being.v-




He goes on to equate phusis with logos (the gathering
together of all entities which gives them order) and dike
(which he translates as Fug, a term rarely used today which
can be translated as organization, arrangement and dis¬
position). Heidegger states: "Being, phusis. as the
dominating Power, is original collectedness: logos; (and
likewise it) is organization that organizes: dike.
We turn now to how Heidegger understands noein.
He translates it as Vernehmung or "apprehending." It
signifies "...taking a receptive attitude toward that which
shows itself. When troops prepare to receive the enemy,
it is in the hope of stopping him, at the very least, of
bringing him to a stand. This receptive bringing-to-stand
(2)
is meant in noein."^ '
As for to auto, the same, he says it must be under¬
stood in light of the word en as Parmenides used it. "Wre
know that this unity is never simply empty indifference: it
is not sameness in the sense of mere equivalence. Unity is
the belonging together of antagonisms. This is original one¬
ness. (Here again we see overtones of the polemos
mentioned earlier.)
Where are these two factors, thinking and Being, at
1 Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, as quoted by
Richardson, op.cit., p.263»
2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.138.
3 Ibid.
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one then? In man he answers, for in thinking man collects
(logos), makes to stand (noein), and organizes (dike) the
power of Being (phusls) into the beings around him, thereby-
bringing them into Being. Thinking here has a very broad
connotation: it is the essential trait of man and reflects
the close relation between Being, man and beings.
W.J. Richardson explains that Heidegger sees in this
word noein a process of "receptive containment" by which
Being as phusis is "forced" into disclosure. At this point
in his thinking, man still retains a certain amount of
initiative in relation to Being's disclosure of itself.
Furthermore, thinking for the Greeks is seen as the essential
function of human existence. Thinking is described now as
the "coming to pass of the there of Being." To exist as
Dasein then is to think.
Heidegger also determined from his analysis of Greek
thinking that they viewed the thought process as a decision.
Thought has this nature by virtue of its goal, Being. As
alethela Being reveals and conceals Itself simultaneously
and it was this concealing of Being which the Greeks felt
accounted for appearance or seeming-to-be. They saw
appearance as an inherent part of Being's revelation and
therefore as "...no less a power than Being as unconcealment."
Indeed for the Greeks appearance is now seen as closely
associated with Being in its negativity, its withdrawal. In
1 Ibid.. pp.146-150.
2 Richardson, op.cit., p.282.
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light of this, the purpose of thinking is to "...rescue
Being from its plight of being submerged in appearance, to
differentiate Being from appearance.
Heidegger notes that in this thinking, the Greeks
necessarily encountered non-Being, and all of their
philosophy became oriented around three paths to Being.
"If [man] is to take over Being-there (Basein) in the
radiance of Being, he must bring Being to stand, he must
endure it in appearance and against appearance, and he must
wrest both appearance and Being from the abyss of non-
(2)
Being.Heidegger finds support for these three paths
in Greek thinking from his analysis of Parmenidean philosophy.
He translates fragment 4 as follows: "Come, I will tell you:
heed well the words that you hear as to which ways of inquiry
are alone to be considered. The one: how it is (how it,
Being is), and how also non-Being is impossible."
The first path to Being Heidegger sees in this
fragment is, of course, an openness toward Being itself.
This path is unavoidable since openness toward Being is
what constitutes there-being*s nature. The second path is
the recognition of non-Being as inaccessible. Since thought
deals only with beings, or precisely that which non-Being is
not, then it necessarily cannot attain to non-Being. However,
it is important that this fact be recognized. Heidegger




says that the third path, appearance, is the one most
travelled and most misleading for "...on it men lose them¬
selves entirely." However, the time thinker must travel
this path, not ignorant of its nature, but well aware that
Being exposes itself negatively and that this negativity
must be experienced (and recognized as negativity or mystery)
before one arrives at Being. "The true thinker must travel
the path of Being and of non-Being, as well as take upon
himself the third way, the arduous path of appearance."
We can now understand how the Greeks, who have a
privileged position in the history of thought and are
authoritative by virtue of their proximity to the original
manifestation of Being, considered thinking as a type of
decision. "The thinking and being there [Dasein] of the
Greeks were a struggle for a decision between the great
(2)
powers of Being and becoming, Being and appearance."v Here
again we see man playing an active role in the process of
thought, he makes a decision. We might also note the close
relation between resolve as the acceptance and recognition
of Being in its negativity, with the resultant finitude of
thinking about Being, and decision, which in taking
cognizance of Being, non-Being and appearance also recognizes
the inevitability of only a partial glimpse of Being in
thinking. Therefore, we can say that in Heidegger's out¬
look, decision is a form of resolve.
1 Ibid., p.lll.
2 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.115.
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32. Thought as questioning
In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger sees
inquiry or questioning as another form of resolve. He also
treats questioning as a basic trait of authentic or essential
thinking and in this we find a concept, questioning, which
occurs in both his earlier and later works. In its meta¬
morphosis we have a bridge between these two periods that
will give us some insight into the shift of initiative
from Dasein to Being which occurs in Heidegger's development
as a thinker about thinking.
We can begin by noting the way he connects resolve
and questioning. True questioning, he says, as opposed to
an idle and shallow quest, results from an intense desire or
will to know. In this deliberate willing man has to
confront and take into account his finite nature. In con¬
sidering the reason for this he becomes aware of the
negativity of Being. The actual process by which man "wills
to know" is questioning of beings about Being and whoever
"wills to know" through questioning is said to be 'resolved'.
He defines the essence of resolve as "the coming-out-of-
cover of human being-there [Dasein] into the clearing of
Being...
Heidegger further asserts that there is one particular
fundamental question which sets the tone for all questioning.
In a discussion entitled "The Fundamental Question" he
1 Ibid.. pp.20-21.
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considers what it is that makes the following question so
fundamental: "Why are there essents [beings] rather than
nothing?" Basically he gives two reasons. The first is
that this question focuses on beings in general, not any
particular eesent or being. By focusing on beings, it
raises the question of and brings to the fore beings as a
whole (remember that at this time he was closely associating
Being with beings-in-the-totality) and for this reason the
act of questioning is "privileged." Hence from the basic
question of metaphysics "Why are there essents rather than
nothing?" he has separated the crucial question, "How does
it stand with Being?"
The second reason this question is to be considered
fundamental lies in its historical overtones. Heidegger
believes that the initial posing of this question heralded
the beginning of history itself for it was not until man
opened up to Being in questioning it that Being was able to
find a "there." With the appearance of a there for Being,
Dasein came into existence and this marked the beginning of
history. "Only where Being discloses Itself in questioning
does history happen and with it the Being of man...The
asking of this question is historical in the fundamental
(2)
sense that this questioning first created history."x/
Thinking then is a questioning of beings as a whole,




continually "questing" for it keeps it in the open. Just
as was the case with thought as resolve and as understood
by the Greeks, so also with thinking as questioning the
initiative lies with Dasein, man, the questioner. We
have now seen that in the earlier Heidegger thinking is
oriented primarily around the thinker.
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The Later Heidegger and Essential Thought
Section Two
33. Thought as questioning
As we noted previously, Heidegger's views on
thinking as questioning undergo somewhat of a change in
his later works. The concept of questioning thought is
retained but the initiative shifts from the questioner to
the questioned. Heidegger concludes the essay "Die Frage
Nach der Technik" with the words: "questioning is the piety
of thought.
We can observe the shift in his thinking on this
subject in these later interpretative comments from On the
..ay to Language.
Inquiry and investigation...require the prior grant
of v/hatever it is they approach and pursue with
their queries...the authentic attitude of thinking
is not a putting of questions - rather, it is a
listening to the grant...At the close of a lecture
...some time ago, I said: "Questioning is the piety
of thinking." Piety is meant here in the ancient
sense; obedient or submissive, and in this case
submitting to what thinking has to think about.
Hence questioning, the activity of a thinking
man, is only possible due to a prior opening up of
the questioned. It is only after attending to or
hearing this opening up that the questioner can pursue his
quest. This is a side to thinking as questioning that
1 Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze. p.44.
2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.71.
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Heidegger has not previously explored and here attention is
focused squarely on the questioned, not the questioner.
In Was Heisst Denken these later views come to
fruition. Now Being is referred to as the Question-able
and the Thought-worthy - "What gives itself (as thought-
worthy) is the gift of the eminently Question-able."^ And
at a later point he says: "...thinking would be a thanks¬
giving to the Thought-worthy...which would guard the Thought-
(2)
worthy inviolable in its questionableness..."v
In referring to Being as the Question-able Heidegger
is saying that the answer to the questions man poses about
Being is to continue questioning, since it is only through
this questioning attitude of man that Being reveals itself.
To seek Being then is to be ever "on the way." As
W.J. Richardson notes, "...what is desirable is not to
absolve the questioning by an answer but simply to achieve
(5)
by it a deeper fidelity to Being-as-questionable."
With our consideration of the development in
Heidegger's views on thinking as questioning we have now
traced the evolution of his approach to the nature of thought.
t
We have noted how he moves from an understanding in which
man the questioner retains the initiative in thinking to a
position wherein questioning becomes a passive hearkening
1 Heidegger, Was Heiszt Denken, as quoted by Richardson,
op.cit., p.6l5«
2 Ibid.
3 Richardson, op.cit.. pp.615-616.
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to Being*s self-disclosure. In considering his later
views on thinking in general we shall see that here Being
has an undeniable priority in the thought process.
34. Various modes of essential thought
We shall proceed by considering several of the
different approaches and terms Heidegger employs in his
later analyses of thinking. In the first thinking is
referred to as the result of a correlation between the wants
or needs of Being and man for each other. We have noted in
our earlier analyses that Dasein needs Being in order to
exist as Dasein. We stressed that as the bntological
animal*, Dasein only becomes completely itself and exists
authentically by deliberately hearkening to its inherent,
unthematic tendency towards Being. We find a parallel to
this in his later works when Heidegger says that thinking
results from a need, inclination, or want (mogen) of man
for Being as the thought-worthy. "Only when we want what
is in itself thought-worthy do we have the power for
thought.
However, we are told in his later writings that this
need works both ways. In Discourse on Thinking (Gelassenheit),
where Being is referred to as that-which-regions, we find:
"Evidently the nature of man is released to that-which-regions
because this belongs to it so essentially that without man
that-which-regions can not be a coming forth of all
natures..." He goes on to suggest that if the word truth
1 Ibid., p.600
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replaces the phrase "that-which-regions", then one can say
of the relation between human nature and Being (or truth or
that-which-regions) that "...human nature is given over to
truth because truth needs raan."^1^ In this context, thinking
is determined by Being's need of it as the process in man's
makeup through which Being fulfils itself. Thinking, then,
results from the needs of Being and man corresponding with
each other.
In his later works Heidegger also considers thinking
in terms of giving thanks. His original insight into the
relation between these two seemingly disparate words stems
from a consideration of such "root" words as the "Old English"
verbs thencan, to think, thaneian, to thank and the noun
thane. a thought. He connects the significance of these
words by saying that the most appropriate way of giving thanks
for the gift of being able to think would be to give thought
to the 'most thought-provoking* or Being. Thoughtlessness
is then seen as thanklessness and "pure thanks is...that we
simply think."^ 2 ^
In his essay "Conversation on a Country Path" Heidegger
refers to thinking in yet another way as a non-willing in which
one waits (for Being to disclose Itself). He refers to what
makes this type of thinking possible in the following manner:
"As a matter of fact [thought-as-] waiting, provided it be
1 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp.83-84.
2 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.143.
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foundational, that is, a thoroughly decisive waiting, is
grounded in the fact that we [already] belong to that for
which we wait."^"'"/
These words reflect a theme that has run throughout
Heidegger's writings. Man is able to think because it is
part of his essential nature to do so. He is able to turn
toward Being deliberately in thought because he is inherently
oriented toward Being. In its broad sense thinking is
existence in that it is the intensification of a latent
tendency in existence.
With this designation of thought as a non-willing
waiting Heidegger is attempting to overcome "representational"
thought which seizes its object and maintains control over
it (as seen in the will-to-will culminating in technology).
The difficulty in comprehending this type of thinking stems
from one's tendency to approach it through that very type of
thinking which it is intended to over-throw. In the
following Heidegger is replying to someone's complaint that
he "cannot represent to (himself)" this type of thinking:
"Precisely because this will of yours and your mode of
(2)
thinking as re-presenting prevent it."^ '
Heidegger refers to thinking in the narrow sense
(as opposed to thinking as existence) as waiting and
clarifies this term by contrasting it with awaiting.
1 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p.74.
2 Ibid., p.62.
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Waiting...but never awaiting, for awaiting already
links itself with re-presenting...Waiting, however
...lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really
has no object. Yet if we wait we always wait for
something...Certainly, but as soon as we represent
to ourselves and fix upon that for which we wait,
we really wait no longer...In waiting we leave open
what we wait for.
With his characterization of thinking as "waiting"
we can see Heidegger stressing the passive role man plays in
this process. This in turn implies that Being now has the
initiative as it discloses itself to man in his thinking.
However, we find in a closer consideration of the term "non-
willing" as it refers to thinking, that this process still
demands some effort on man's part since"non-willing" thought
(2)
requires on man's part a "trace of willing."v
Although this trace vanishes later as "non-willing
waiting"develops into completely authentic thinking, it is
undeniable that the whole process was begun by a conscious
effort on man's part. Thus in his essay "Nietzsche's Wort
'Gott ist tot*" thought is considered as preparation for
Being's disclosure; its task is "...to light up the domain
within which Being can seize...man in terms of his essence.
('*>)
To be preparational is the essence of such thought.»'w/
This nullifies several critics* charges that the
later Heidegger over-reacts to the Dasein-oriented earlier
Heidegger by positing Dasein as a completely passive medium
for Being's unconcealment. In actual fact there is far more
1 Ibid.. p.68.
2 Ibid.. p.80.
3 Heidegger, Holzwege. p.194.
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equilibrium throughout his development than these critics
realise. This trace of willing required for non-willing
would certainly support a refutation of such criticism in
that it reflects a certain amount of responsibility in
man's role in the thought process.
35. Thought and Being
As was the case with language, we shall now see that
thinking is so closely associated with Being in Heidegger's
philosophy that it can be considered as another term for the
process in which Being reveals itself. In "What is Meta¬
physics?" he refers to authentic thought as an 'occurrence'
of Being.Thinking then is the process in which Being
unconceals itself and finds a place for itself, (a Da), in
the clearing provided by thinking.
In "Brief Ober den Humanismus" we find the phrase
"thought of Being" interpreted in such a way as to stress
the very close relation between Being and thought. Thought,
he explains, is essentially thought of Being. "The genitive
speaks in a two-fold way. Thought is of Being insofar as
it occurs from Being and belongs to Being. Thought is at
the same time, thought of Being insofar as it, belonging to
(2)
Being, hearkens to Being."v 7 This phrase, thought of Being,
does not refer to man thinking Being but rather to Being as
affecting the beginning of the thinking process and then
commandeering this process for its own revelation.
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.387.
2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp.147-148.
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In a similar vein Heidegger refers to Being as the
"element" of thought in the sense that water is the element
for fish. Without this element thinking could not occur.
"Element is that by virtue of which thinking is able to be
thinking. As Richardson explains, "Element is here
understood as that which renders something possible, there¬
fore enables a presence to emerge, or, if one will, an
essencing to take place...Being has the primacy over thought
(2)
simply because it gives rise to it.v '
The close relation between thinking and Being means
that for thought to be authentic it must strictly adhere
and attend to Being in its revelation. Paradoxically this
same strict adherence also condemns thinking to finiteness
and error. The blame for the finiteness of thinking lies
not with the thinker but the thought-about, according to
Heidegger. Here again we have to consider Being in order
to grasp another concept, in this case thought, of Heidegger's
philosophy. We can recall that Being as aletheia reveals
and conceals itself simultaneously. It is this process
which accounts for the nature of thought. In What is Called
Thinking? Heidegger refers to thought as influenced by the
withdrawal (concealment) of Being in the following manner:
"What withdraws from us, draws us along by its very with¬
drawal, whether or not we become aware of it immediately,
or at all. Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are
1 ^Id.. p. 147.
2 Richardson, op.cit., p.542.
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drawing toward what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal."
This being-drawn-with by the withdrawing is thinking
and this process is positive in that it attracts and induces
thinking. However, it is negative in that it inevitably
produces error in thought. In Aug der Brfahrung des Denkens
(2)
we find: "Whoever thinks greatly must err greatly."v ' In
Vortrage und AufsStze he says of essential thought: "The
(^5)
possibility of error is greatest with this type of thought. «w/
In a paradoxical way then, essential thinking's greatest
strength, adherence and openness to Being, is also its great
weakness. Because Being conceals as well as reveals itself,
essential thought is prone to be led away from its object.
36. Retrieving the unthought
Another result of Being's withdrawal is the
"unthought" that lurks in the thinking of all great thinkers.
With the appearance of this concept we encounter a most
important trait of Heidegger's own mode of thinking since
the unthought is the subject matter for retrieving thought.
What was called repetition in Being and Time recurs through¬
out his subsequent works as retrieving or backtracking
thought and we shall now focus our attention on this subject
which we have briefly considered at several previous points
e.g. thinking more Greek than the Greeks.
1 Heidegger, Vhat Is Called Thinking?, pp.8-9.
2 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. p.17.
3 Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze, p.183.
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In What Is Called Thinking? we find the following
comments on the "unthought": "To acknowledge and respect
consists in letting every thinker's thought come to us as
something In each case unique, never to be repeated,
inexhaustible - and being shaken to the depths by what is
unthought in his thought." He asserts that the most original
thought always has the greatest amount of unthought and
respect for such original thinking involves a "...readiness
to let our own attempts at thinking be over-turned, again
and again, by what is unthought in the thinker's thought.
The unthought then is the result of Being's concealing
itself while it is exposed to thought. In studying insights
of past thinkers, one should now be open not only to the
overt contributions they made but also to that element
implied in their thinking which they were unable to compre¬
hend and develop fully. This underlying element, the result
of Being's self-concealment, Is the unthought.
Furthermore there is unthought in every great
thinker's thoughts, and the more he adhered to Being as
aletheia the greater will be the unthought available through
an analysis of his insights. The following excerpt from
Vortrage und Aufsatze. provides a description of the actual
process by which Being reveals-conceals itself.' "...in the
beginning...of thought, the essence of language was lit up
in the iight of Being... However, that flash was quickly
forgotten. No man comprehended its ray /its impact^ and
the nearness of that which it lit up."v
1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp.76-77.
2 Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze, p.229.
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We see here that the flash of inspiration provided
by the aletheia process is so brief as to be insufficient
for a really clear insight into Being. The process of
simultaneous concealment-revealment as described here is
comparable to the sighting of an iceberg. The visible
element represents a very small part of the complete iceberg.
The real significance of the iceberg tip stems from the fact
that it points to and reveals the bulk of the submerged
iceberg. In a similar way past flashes of insight into
Being as aletheia are significant in that they point toward
the less visible but very significant unconcealed portion of
Being which can be approached through the "unthought"
portions of past thinkers.
This process of aletheia accounts for Heidegger's
distinctive approach in studying past thinkers. For him
it is not sufficient merely to revive and rethink (erneuem)
their insights since these were necessarily limited by
Being's partial disclosure.We can see that, because
of their failure to appreciate the Being - aletheia process,
the insights of past thinkers can only be appreciated by
penetrating beyond their expressed views into this under¬
lying realm of the unthought. This type of approach
Heidegger refers to as retrieving.
To retrieve thinking, then, is not to repeat past
thinking, but is actually to "leap" into the Being process
itself through those brief flashes of past insights resulting
from Being's unconcealedness. This type of thinking is a
back-tracking (der Schrltt zurtick). Heidegger says:
1 Heidegger, Holzwege. pp.39-40.
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"...the back track reveals the realm thus far skipped on
the basis of which the essence of truth becomes for the
first time worthy to be thought...back tracking...leads us
...out of what has up to now been thought in philosophy.
A frequently heard criticism of Heidegger's
philosophy stems from this concept retrieving. Many
critics feel that Heidegger ignores, or at best fails to
appreciate, the insights of past thinkers. However, in
"Brief Uber den Humanismus" he explains that retrieving is
an important aspect of essential thinking. Of authentic
thought, he says: "This thinking...is nothing else but the
(2)
recalling of Being."v ' The very fact that essential
thinking involves retrieving or recalling Being as it was
exposed to past thinking shows that Heidegger does take
past insights very seriously in his own thinking.
The real problem arises when we consider how he
interprets and incorporates the insights of past thinkers.
Of his thinking at this point, critics make accusations of
gross distortions, arbitrariness, and violent assaults on
fx)
the insights of other thinkers. Such criticisms stem
from the fact that Heidegger actually describes his approach
1 Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference,
trans, by K.P. Leidecker, (New York: Philosophical Library
Inc., I960), pp.42-43«
2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.188.
3 Grene, op.cit.. p.100, and Karl Lowith, Heidegger? Denker
in Diirftiger Zeit, (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag,
1953), pp.84-85.
190
to past thinkers as violent and destructive. However, the
meaning he assigns to these descriptive terms and his
motives for such an approach effectively nullify such
criticisms of him.
In Was 1st Das - Die Philosophie? Heidegger explains
that while his thinking does involve a certain amount of
Destruktion. this does not imply a breaking with history or
denial of its importance. It is instead an "...appropriation
and transformation of tradition." Destruktion does not
refer to destruction but to a "...dismantling...of... state¬
ments about the history of philosophy. Destruktion means
to open our ears and to be free for that which grants itself
to us in tradition as Being of beings.
We can now see that Heidegger uses the term
Destruktion in a positive rather than negative sense to
describe his approach to tradition and past thinkers. His
attitude is very appropriate in light of the fact that
tradition can become a barrier which stifles creativity and
cuts off later generations from the spontaneous and vital
process which forms its roots. Werner Marx notes that in
this situation Heidegger's Destruktion can play a positive
role in that it "de-structures the hardened sedimentation
of tradition in order to explicitly retrieve the original
(2)
experiences concealed in it."v
In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik Heidegger
1 Heidegger, Was 1st Das - Die Philosophie?. pp.70-72.
2 Marx, op.cit.. pp.XX-XXI.
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explains that while violent, his interpretation of past
thinkers is not arbitrary in the least. He states that
any interpretation which seeks to "wrest" from the actual
words what they intended to say must be violent. However,
such interpreting is not arbitrary since it is always guided
by the "power of an illuminative idea." It is because of
this adherence to a "guiding idea" that an interpretation
can "...risk that which is always audacious, namely,
entrusting itself to the hidden inner passion [or light] of
a work, in order to...get through to the unsaid and to
(1)
attempt to express it."v
Criticisms of Heidegger*s interpretations miss the
point when they focus on the actual manner in which he deals
with individual texts. To really criticize his retrieving,
critics must deal with the "illuminative idea" that guides
and motivates his interpretations. This idea, of course,
is the understanding of Being as aletheia.
We have now seen what Heidegger considers to be
authentic and essential thinking. In our analysis we
noted again and again the close relation between Being as
aletheia and the thought process. Thus it can be said that
thinking is one more cog in the structure of Heideggerian
ontology. It is ontological in a dual sense. First, we
cannot comprehend this process without understanding the
Being process of concealing-revealing disclosure. Second,
thought has been seen as another name for Being*s disclosure
1 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. p.183.
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of itself. It is through the thinking of man, as
ek-sistent standing-out into the truth of Being, that
Being finds the da, the place, where its unveiling can
occur.
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THE ANALYSIS OF BEING IN ITSELF
CHAPTER FOUR
Introduction
37. Guidelines for analysis
We come now to a consideration of Being itself in
Heidegger's philosophy. We have seen that this was what
motivated his examinations of Dasein, language and thinking
and the very fact that he considered these other areas
provides a clue about his thinking of Being: it is extremely
difficult to comprehend and can never be considered directly
or as itself. In previous analyses we have learned that
Being is not a concept to be "grasped" in an objective
manner. Being is not at our disposal, rather we are at
Being's disposal and we can only become sensitive to txiis
phenomenon by passively listening to its various revelations.
We should not approach Heidegger's work on Being too
ambitiously or with great expectations of a definitive, once
and for all conceptualization of Being in itself. Instead,
we should be cautioned by Heidegger's insight that to view
Being itself is parallel to gazing directly at the sun. The
very light which enables us to see the world can also, when
viewed at its source , blind us. In "Remembrance of the
Poet" he analyses a line from Holderlin's poetry, "To grasp
him, our joy is scarcely large enough.", as follows: "To
grasp means to name the High One himself, the very sorrowing
joy itself will not suffice...[for] 'Holy names are lacking',
1 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics",
P.315.
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Along the same lines, he suggests that Holderlin,
who died insane, feared that his insights into the truth of
reality might be more than he could bear. In the following
words of HSlderlin Heidegger sees the fear that true insight
into the nature of Being might be disastrous. "I used to
be able to exult over a new truth, a better insight into
that which is above and around us, now I am frightened lest
in the end it should happen with me as with Tantalus of old,
who received more from the gods than he was able to digest.n
For Heidegger then, Being can be neither viewed nor named
in a direct manner.
Then what can be known of and said about that to
which the term Being is applied? First, we should note,
as we have done, the fact that this topic is not to be
seized directly and thereby avoid blindly fumbling about
for something which is inaccessible. This too has been
touched on in prior analyses of Dasein, thinking and
language. Further, we can consider the insights of others
into this problem, note the strengths and weaknesses of
their analyses and incorporate them into our own approach.
This too has been done with our considerations of both
philosophical and poetical contributions of past thinkers.
Keeping these guidelines in mind, we can then look at
those aspects of the Being process which can be compre¬
hended, even if only in a finite manner.




38. Being as a revealing-concealing process
We will begin our analysis by concentrating on
Heidegger's consideration of those traits of Being which
make it so inaccessible. Although he refers to Being by
various terms, one of the more prevalent names for it is
truth, or aletheia. In "Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysikl"
he says: "The meaning of Being and the truth of Being say
the same thing. And in An Introduction to Metaphysics
he clearly identifies the two: "Truth as unconcealment is
not an appendage to Being. Truth is inherent in the
(2)
essence of Being."x '
Now we can turn to what Heidegger says about Being
as it reveals or manifests itself as truth. Anything
learned about the nature of this truth will provide some
clue as to the character of Being itself, as seen in the
following from "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics":
...metaphysics does not induce Being itself to speak,
for metaphysics does not recall Being in its truth,
nor does it recall the nature of unconcealedness...
aletheia might be the word that offers a hitherto
unnoticed hint concerning the nature of "esse" which
has not yet been recalled...What is [now] wanted is
...some regard for the arrival of the hitherto unexpressed
nature of unconcealedness, for it is in this form that
Being has announced itself.^)
1 Heidegger, Wegmarken. p.206.
2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.102.
3 Heidegger, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics",
p. 313.
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From the above, we see that the meaning of truth
for Heidegger is oriented around "unconcealedness" which
he derives from the Greek term aletheia. James Robinson
explains that as the term is composed of the root verb
lethfl or lanthano (to escape notice) and the negating alpha
prefix, it can be interpreted as 'no longer escaping notice'
or 'unveiling' or 'unconcealed'.^ To understand what
this term means for Heidegger we must thus consider the term
'unconcealedness'. Let us attempt this understanding next,
remembering that we clarify unconcealedness to understand
better truth, hence to comprehend better Being, our ultimate
concern here. Just as the Greek term for truth is based
on the Greek term for concealedness, so also is unconcealed¬
ness (truth) closely associated with concealedness in
Heidegger's thinking.
In the essay "Logos" he says that "... self-reveal-
ment not only never puts aside concealment but needs it in
(2)
order to come-to-presence as itself, as revealment..."
In Holzwege Heidegger establishes beyond doubt that
unconcealedness and concealedness are inter-related,
simultaneous processes. /In the following Heidegger
refers to Being as a clearing and a lighting^ He
explains that all beings can be only by standing within "what
is lighted in this clearing." Furthermore, it is only
this clearing which allows man to comprehend the beings
1 Robinson, op.cit.. p.22.
2 Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufs&tze. pp.271-272.
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around him. "Thanks to this clearing, beings are
unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet a being
can be concealed too, only within the sphere of what is
lighted. Each being...keeps to this curious opposition
(- \
of presence."^'
In this process of truth, it does not happen that
unconcealedness completely eliminates its opposite,
concealedness. Instead the two are constantly in tension,
balancing each other out. As Werner Marx notes, the
distinctive aspect of this approach is that it considers
"...the "realms of darkness" [concealedness] and the "realm
of light" [unconcealedness] as equal partners in the
occurrence of Being and...conceives of their relationship
to each other as a strife which keeps the character of
(2)
the occurrence...radically creative."N '
When we realize that untruth is equated with
concealment, just as truth is equated with unconcealment,
our analysis of unconcealment has revealed that truth and
untruth also are not opposing factions; the appearance of
one does not rule out the appearance of the other for they
are inter-related and occur simultaneously. Heidegger
stresses this by saying that truth "in its essence is
untruth.
In this nature of truth we can now find valuable
1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.42.
2 Marx, op.cit.. p.147.
3 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.345*
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insights into the nature of Being which manifests itself
in the truth process. In Being as truth we can see why-
it is impossible to grasp Being in itself since Being never
completely reveals itself. Instead its revealing is always
a simultaneous concealing. We have already had occasion
to touch on this aspect of Being when we spoke of Being
withdrawing itself and drawing-with it man* s thinking of
Being. Also we spoke of how Being (as beings-in-their-
totality) was overlooked due to concern for particular
beings through which Being necessarily manifests itself.
The insight we have gained about Being from
considering Being as truth is that it simultaneously
reveals and conceals itself, thereby denying direct access
to itself. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger
reaffirms this aspect of Being when he translates and
interprets a Heraclitean Fragment (if 123) as follows:
"Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to
self-concealment. Since Being means emerging appearing,
to issue forth from concealment - concealment, its origin
in concealment, belongs to it essentially."^^
This same trait of Being is referred to by
Heidegger's characterization of Being as light. He asserts
that it is the "light of Being" which enables metaphysics
to see and deal with beings and yet the "light itself... does
(2)
not come within the range of metaphysical thinking.' From
this characterization of Being as light we can gain further
1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.114.
2 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics",
pp.310-311.
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insight into Heidegger's -understanding of Being's
concealing-revealing nature. Just as we must rely on
light to make entities around us visible, so also are beings
dependent on Being for their standing-out into Being.
However, the very light which enables us to see our
surroundings is itself invisible. Similarly Being also
hides or conceals itself as it lights up beings.
Here then, as in Being as truth, we see how Being
reveals and conceals itself simultaneously. That Heidegger
refers to Being as truth so frequently (indeed Versenyi
entitles his book Heidegger, Being and Truth) tells us that
this particular mode of revelation is an extremely important
aspect of Being for him.
39. Being as history
Another manner in which Being manifests itself,
and one that is closely related to Being as truth, is through
history. In "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger states
that the existence of historical man began when the .first
thinker posed the question of Being for with this question
"unconcealment and revealment are experienced for the first
time.
We can now see that Being as truth occurs as history.
These three concepts are interrelated in Heidegger's thinking.
As Richardson notes: "It is the mittence of Being in its
(2)
truth that constitutes the process of history."v Further,
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.335.
2 Richardson, oq.cit., p.533.
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the history in which Being manifests itself, the history
thus caused by the Being process, can be associated with
history as normally understood. Although Heidegger
generally refers to the history of thought or metaphysics
when he discusses this issue (an understandable approach
in light of the close association between Being and thought),
most commentators are quick to point out that history in
its narrow Heideggerian sense (history of thought) determines
history in the general sense.
In discussing the relation of truth to man, Being,
and beings, Thomas Langan says: "The history of this truth
relationship is the key to all history, for all men's
comportment in any epoch is mediated by the contemporary
conception of his place amidst the totality of the things-
that-are [which in turn is determined by the current under¬
standing of Being. ]."^^ Because his understanding of
Being affects all of man's "comportment" or relation to his
surroundings and self, the history of thought (of Being) wall
likewise affect and determine history as a whole.
The key terms in Heidegger*s discussion of Being as
history are "epoch" and "mittence." The meaning of the
latter, in German Geschick. can be seen in its verbal root,
schicken (to send, ordain). Thus the nature of history is
determined by the manner in which Being 'sends'itself to
thought. In this way thought's 'fate' is determined by the
(?)
way Being is manifested to it.v '
1 Langan, op.cit., p.133*
2 Robinson, op.cit., p.26.
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Epochs then are the different periods in history
distinguished by the various mittences or modes of Being's
manifestations. Heidegger generally terms each epoch
according to the predominant way in whicn Being was thought
in it. In Identity and Difference he mentions the various
ways in which Being has historically revealed itself in some
"fate enmeshed formulation": phusis. logos, en, idea, energela,
substantiality, objectivity, subjectivity, Will, Will to
Power and Will to Will.^1^ These terms identify various
epochs which have each been determined by a particular
mittence (Geschick) of Being. Recalling that Being as
aletheia is a simultaneous revealing-concealing, we can also
understand how each epoch is only based on a partial glimpse
of Being's truth and this is simultaneously an 'epoch of
(?)
error'. In this we can see that the revealing-concealing
process is common to Being as history and Being as truth.
This mode of Being's revelation has several important
repercussions for a correct understanding of history. First
of all, as already noted, each epoch of history does have only
a partial understanding of Being and is characterized by
untruth as well as truth. Second, we must realize that
there is no single expression of truth which forms an under¬
lying theme throughout all history which need only be rooted
out and analyzed by the historians. This is not possible
1 Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference.
P. 59.
2 Heidegger, Holzwege. p.311.
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because Being occurs differently in different times
revealing different aspects of itself while concealing
others.
Third, we can say, however, that there is something
resembling a theme underlying all the epochs in history and
this provides the necessary continuity between these various
periods. Being in its forgottenness appears in all of them.
In this we find the common bond. Werner Marx (who was
appointed to the chair formerly occupied by Husserl and
Heidegger on the merit of his book Heidegger and the
Tradition ) states in regard to these various epochs:
"They all therefore manifest the degree to which they in
various ways are based upon the withdrawal of this idea of
Being...and thus upon the dominion of the oblivion of Being.
(
Herein lies what is common to all of them..."w/
Heidegger gives his definition of Being as history
a new twist when he says that Being as manifest in history
is eschatological. As we might expect eschatology is used
in a unique way here. In Heidegger's consideration of
eschatology it is not only the ending which is important
but also the beginning because: "The beginning already
contains in a hidden way the end. The real beginning
indeed never has the beginning nature of the primitive...
[which]...is able to set free nothing other than that in
1 Langan, op.cit., pp.133-134.
2 Marx, op.cit., p.XVII.
3 Ibid., p.169.
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which it is enclosed.
In Heidegger's eschatological history of thought,
the Greeks mark the beginning of history and, because of
their pristine glimpses into Being, lend that beginning a
special significance. However, and most important,
contained within this beginning was the failure to recognize
Being's veil, its concealment as well as revealment. There¬
fore Western thought was doomed from the start and this
early error has been compounded by later generations of
thinkers.
For further clarification we can turn to a passage
in Holzwege where Heidegger states that "Being itself...is
eschatological." He explains that we live in the "evening-
land" of an age that began with the Greek insights into
Being. Furthermore, the "Being of beings gathers itself
up...in the last moment of its destiny. The essence of
Being that has lasted until now perishes in its still
(p)
obscure truth."v/
Here Heidegger is referring to the ending of the
present age with his use of the term evening. All of
history is thought of in terms of a full day. Our present
age belongs to the "evening-land" and this would indicate
that a new age is soon to dawn. In this age there would
possibly be a new "essence of Being" to replace the one that
1 Heidegger, Holzwege. p.63.
2 Heidegger, Holzwege. pp.301-302.
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"perished" (untergehen) completely in the night of the last
age, having never been fully comprehended. This new age,
however, will not be completely shut off from the prior one
as it too will be ushered in by an awareness of Being, just
as the old age began with the Greeks awareness of Being.
The same sun (Being) rises in the morning of each new day.
Furthermore, Heidegger sees his role in this
eschatological process as not only a prophet of the forth¬
coming end of the present age but also the herald whose
announcements will usher in the new age. We can now see
the full implication of his efforts to "overcome metaphysics",
for traditionally such thinking has been rooted in an epoch
of Being's withdrawal. Metaphysics errs because it is pre¬
destined to do so by the withdrawing mittence of Being.
Therefore metaphysics must be abandoned.
Because the history of thought (metaphysics) is the
key to history as a whole, Heidegger's efforts at "overcoming
metaphysics", thereby bringing in a new epoch, will have
repercussions on all aspects of the future age to come.
Warner Marx explains that Heidegger feels he can overcome
the old and help bring in the new age because of his thought
"...being "granted" the possibility of explicating the
initially incipient sense of Being in its basic traits as well
as the history of Being based upon this sense."
He goes on to explain that the historical process
which is Being functions by "commissioning" different epochs
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being. p.382.
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or "missions". One epoch passes into another when thinking
is able to see "the initially incipient creative sense of
Being" beneath the contemporary understanding of beings.
"Once this has been experienced and thought, then the basic
traits of the other beginning of Eeing are "commissioned" to
thinking and the "deliverance" takes place.In this way,
thinking about Being makes possible the transition from one
age, epoch, or mission to another.
Heidegger is able to usher in a new mittence or age
because Being grants to his thinking its withdrawing or
concealing nature, as well as its revealing character. When
this has been granted, a new epoch has begun. However, this
culmination (evening) of the present epoch is closely
associated with the beginning of the new age because the
grant to Heidegger's thought came through meditation on the
Greek origins (the "morning") of present day thinking. The
insights gained from the analysis of present day thought (in
our epoch characterized as technology) as the culmination of
trends inherent in Greek thought serve as the basis for the
"commission" which forms the new epoch.
In this wray the new age will come from Heidegger's
efforts to grasp the essence of "technology" (which he
strives to do in his essay "Die Frage nach der Technik" in
Vortrage und Aufsatze). Inherent In the essence of
technology is its roots in the aletheia problem of the Greek
founders of Western thought and its subsequent epochs. To
1 Marx, op.cit., p.174.
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understand technology in its essence is to he granted Being
in its withdrawal.^ In this way, then, Heidegger can
usher in the new epoch by proclaiming the shortcomings of
the old.
With our consideration of Heidegger's eschatology
we conclude the analysis of his thoughts on history which,






40, Nothingness as Being
We turn next to yet another mode of Being's
revelation as Heidegger sees it. His essay "What Is
Metaphysics?" is devoted largely to a consideration of non-
Being or Nothingness. He quotes the .Hegelian statement
"Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the same" and
explains his agreement with the insight expressed therein
as follows: "Being and Nothing hang together, hut not
because the two things...are one in their indefiniteness
and immediateness, but because Being itself is finite in
essence and is only revealed in the Transcendence of Dasein
as projected into Nothing. Nothingness therefore
serves as another mode of Being's revelation of itself. We
have already noted that dread, angst. reveals Nothingness
to us and we see now that this basic mood has far-reaching
ontological consequences for Nothingness is now portrayed
as the 'veil of Being'.
Heidegger explains that the greatest barrier to an
awareness of Being is man's natural orientation towards
beings in his ontological investigations. As Being is not
a being nor has any qualities of particular beings, man's
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.377.
2 Ibid., p.392.
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being-centered approach must be broken and it is the
confrontation with non-Being or Nothingness which performs
this task. As the purely "Other" than everything that
'is*, as das Nicht Seiende, Nothingness prepares one for the
experience of Being. As Heidegger explains, in Nothingness
one experiences "the vastness of that which gives every
being the warrant to be. That is Being itself.
It is not surprising, in light of Being*s revelation
through Nothingness, to find that the latter often performs
the same functions as the former. We have already noted
that Being, like the sun's light, makes beings appear or
allows them to be. Now we find that Nothingness also lets
beings appear. Basically this happens in two ways, which
we shall call appearance by way of "appreciation" and by way
of "contrast".
As to the first, "appreciation", Heidegger says that
having experienced Nothingness, one realizes that beings
could possibly not be and thus one returns from such an
encounter with a new "appreciation" for and awareness of
beings. "Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is
what-is as such revealed in all its original overtness
(Qffenheit); that it "is" and is not Nothing...The essence
of Nothing as original nihilation lies in this: that it
(2)
alone brings Dasein face to face with what-is as such."v '




appear is by "contrast". This mode, somewhat more involved
than the first, is basically a process in which beings
"stand out" by contrast with the "dark" background of
Nothingness. As he explains, Dasein is always being
"projected into Nothing," and this places it beyond "what
is". This being beyond what-is he calls transcendence.
"Were Dasein not, in its essential basis, transcendent,
that is to say, were it not projected from the start into
Nothing, it could never relate to what-is...
The above insights are expressed in brief fashion in
"What Is Metaphysics?". However, in his Kant book Heidegger
gives a more detailed explanation of the role Nothingness
plays in letting beings appear. In analyzing Kant's
thoughts on the epistemological process, Heidegger stresses
that man's role in "knowing" is both active and passive. He
is acii.e in this process in so far as he must orient him¬
self toward an object. However, man is finite and does not
create the objects of his experience; they come to him.
Insofar as he must await the object's coming toward him he
is passive.
All finite beings must have this basic ability, which
can be described as a turning-toward which lets [some¬
thing] stand in opposition Las an object]. In this
primordial act of orientation, the finite being first
proposes to itself a free space within which something
can correspond to it. To hold oneself in advance in
such a free-space and to form it originally is nothing
other than transcendence...^)
The way to orient or turn towards an object is to
1 Ibid., p.370.
2 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. pp.69-70.
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transcend into Nothingness, which now assumes the character
of an "open domain" or horizon within and against which
objects can appear. Further the process wherein such a
being "holds before itself" an "open domain" is a parallel
phenomenon to "projecting into Nothing." Hence we can
see that this "open domain" serves the same purpose as
Nothingness and can equate the two.
Thus Nothingness lets beings appear by serving as
the horizon or open domain which man holds out before him
(or, as in the parallel process, projects into) and in
which entities can stand out and come toward the knower.
Nothingness, as this horizon-domain, is like a dark pro¬
jection screen against which figures stand out. Further,
we should also note that the idea of contrast runs through¬
out this process.
To this point it has been established that Nothingness
is one mode whereby Being manifests itself (the veil of Being)
and that these two perform similar functions in letting beings
appear. With his assertion that dread is always present in
Dasein, but usually in a repressed way, we find a final
parallel between Being and Nothingness which stresses how
closely the two are associated in Heidegger*s thought. We
can recall how Dasein, the *ontological animal', is always
aware of Being but in an unthematic, pre-ontological manner.
Hence Heidegger*s circular method is aimed at "thematizing"
this vague awareness, or bringing it clearly to the fore.
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Authentic dread, which is only rarely e:xperienced
(as exemplified by the fact that most exist inauthentically
in the "everyday" mode), is similarly present in an
"unthematic" manner when it is repressed. Since dread is
the experience of Nothingness and Dasein's "unthematic"
awareness is of Being, we can see how in the following quote
Heidegger is speaking of Nothingness just as he speaks of
Being. Having stressed the "permeation of Dasein" by dread,
he explains that "...dread is generally repressed in Dasein.
Dread is there, but sleeping. All Dasein quivers with its
breathing...




41. The relation of Being and beings
In what is surely one of the most exhaustive analyses
of Heidegger*s writings, W.J. Richardson asserts that the
underlying theme of this philosopher's thought is Being as
the 'ontological difference*. This commentary is alone in
stressing the significance of this concept in Heidegger's
works, but because of its stature the claim must be taken
seriously. Our position will be that while Being as the
'ontological difference' is a central theme, it is not the
central theme since Being in its various manifestations, not
just as the #ontological difference*, would be more
appropriate as the central theme. Nevertheless, Being as
the 'ontological difference' does play an increasingly
important role in Heidegger's maturing thought and also
reflects many of his insights into Being as a revealing-
concealing process and Being as Nothingness.
Andre Malet points out that Heidegger's insights
concerning the 'ontological difference' are extremely
difficult to grasp unless one is prepared to think in a
Heideggerian manner. Representational thought is unable to
grasp the significance of this concept because it deals
only with objective reality and "...ontological reality does
not exist in the objective mode. In representational
thought, Being no sooner appears on the scene than it is
foundering. That kind of thought invariably levels down
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the 'ontological difference1 in favour of objects.
What exactly does Heidegger mean by this term?
Basically it refers to the fact that Being can not be compre¬
hended solely through an analysis of Being as Being, nor
can it be understood through examining the beings through
which it manifests itself, or Being as beings. The proper
perspective would be to see Being and beings in their inter-
relatedness; identical yet different (as in his essay
"Identity and Difference").
In "Einleitung Zu: Was 1st Metaphysik?" he says:
"What remains more of a riddle, the fact that beings are,
or the fact that Being is? Or does even such a reflection
as this still fail to bring us close to the riddle that has
(2)
come to pass with the Being of beings?"v ' Here he is
saying that to concentrate on either beings or Being fails
to solve the riddle of the process referred to by the term
"Being of beings."
Malet explains this term does not mean that on the
one hand there is a being and on the other hand there is
Being which differs from the being. "Being "is" itself the
difference from a being, it does not "have" the difference.
The basis of something does not stand apart from what is
based, and therefore can have no relation to it: the basis
is identical with what is based, and yet remains different. "w/
1 Malet, op.clt.. p.323#
2 Heidegger, Wegmarken. p.211.
3 Malet, loc.cit.
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Richardson says of this concept in Heidegger's thought:
"It seems quite clear that Heidegger here is thinking Being
and beings in terms of their mutual dependence on each
other, therefore the 'ontological difference' as such.
This is the clearest explanation of the term and we shall
continue to think of the 'ontological difference* as
referring to Being and being in their inter-dependence or
need for each other.
Perhaps the most difficult of all Heideggerian in¬
sights to comprehend is that Being is the difference between
beings and Being. It was perhaps to aid his readers over
the barrier posed by representational thought (which asks
how Being can be the difference between itself and beings,
thereby encountering the problem of the same concept playing
two distinct roles in this triangular relationship) that
Heidegger in his later writings (especially Aus der Erfahrung
des Denkens) refers to Being, the 'ontological difference',
as das Seyn. In a later annotation to "On the Essence of
Truth", he refers to "das Sevn as the difference between
(?)
Being and beings."v
As was the case with Being as Nothingness, the
'ontological difference' assumes many of the functions
associated with Being itself and what was previously said in
reference to Being is also said in reference to the
1 Richardson, op.cit., p.563.
2 Heidegger, Wegmarken. p.96.
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'ontological difference'. Thus in an annotation to
Holzwege he states: "The forgottenness of Being is the
forgottenness of the difference of Being and beings.
As for the similarity of functions, in his essay
"A Dialogue on Language" he refers to Being, the 'ontological
difference', as the two-fold and this two-fold is then seen
to function in the same manner as Being. Like Being it
determines the essential nature of man who must bear witness
to it by responding to its call. Similarly, just as Dasein
is authentically itself only when consciously turned toward
Being, thereby providing its da, so also is man "really as
man [only] when needed and used by...what calls on man to
preserve the two-fold." The similarity is further seen
in his reference to the two-fold as a 'clearing', a term
(2)
previously mentioned in describing Being.N ' In this way
we can see that the 'ontological difference' is yet another
mode of Being's revelation.
As usual, Heidegger supports his insight into the
'ontological difference' with an analysis of Greek thinking
and language. In one of his later works, 'What Is Called
Thinking?, he notes that this 'ontological difference' stems
from the dual nature of the participle, Being, in Greek.
He notes that all participles have a verbal as well as
nominal (nounal) association. The participle Being is
especially subject to the confusion resulting from this
1 Heidegger, Holzwege. p.336.
2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp.30, 32 and 33.
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duality for when understood as a noun, it refers to a being.
When seen as a verbal form, it refers to the process by
which a being *is' or Being itself. Thus in the participle
eon can be seen the 'ontological difference* itself: "a
being has its being in Being, and Being persists as the
Being of a being.
In the dual nature of participles, then, we see a
reflection of the *ontological difference* between being and
Being. The duality of this participle is grounded in the
ontological necessity that Being "is" (or "Beings") only
through beings and that beings "are" only through Being.
This process was revealed-concealed to the Greek in the
experience referred to by the term eon.
With our consideration of Being as the 'ontological
difference* we come to the solution of a problem posed by
a Heideggerian about-face. In the quotes to follow, the
first is from "What Is Metaphysics?" as it appeared in 1943-
The second comes from a later edition of the same work.
"...it is of the truth of Being that Being may be without
(2)
what-is (beings), but never what-is without Being."v
"Being never Beings [or is] without beings...beings are at
no time [or can never be] without Being.
The earlier statement undoubtedly stems from a time
when Heidegger's consideration of Being as the 'ontological
1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.221.
2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.385.
3 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.102.
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difference* had not fully crystallized. Earlier it was said
that the 'ontological difference* refers to the mutual
dependence of Being and beings. Thus the statement of 1943
expressed only one portion of this *ontological difference'
and this necessitated the redaction of the essay in the
later edition.
With this stress on the mutual dependence of Being
and beings we can also better understand Heidegger's claim
that "...Being itself is finite in essence... Being *s
dependence on beings through which it must reveal itself
means that its finiteness will stem from the finite nature
of these beings.
42. The unity of Being
To this point in our analysis of Heidegger's under*-
standing of Being we have basically dealt with Being in
three modes of manifestation; as aletheia or unconcealment,
as Nothingness, and as the 'ontological difference' [the
discussion of Being as history hinges upon an understanding
of Being as aletheia1. By way of summary, we shall see
that Being as the 'ontological difference' is inherently
grounded in and closely related to Being as aletheia and as
Nothingness. By revealing this inter-relatedness we will
be establishing the unity underlying all the various mani¬
festations of Being in Heideggerian thought.
On the relation between Being as the 'ontological
difference' and as Nothingness, we need recall that it is
the experience of Nothingness that prepares for the awareness
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.377
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of Being as not like beings but vastly different from them.
In the foreword to the third edition of "Vom Wesen des Grundes"
Heidegger identifies the not in Nothingness (Being is not
beings) with the not in the 'ontological difference1 (Being
is not beings although the two are mutually dependent).
"[The] negating not of Nothingness and...[the] negating not
of the 'ontological difference* are...the same in the sense
that in the essencing [or coming-to-presence] of the Being
of beings they belong together.
Having seen that Being as the 'ontological difference*
and Being as Nothingness are the same, we turn next to Being
as unconcealedness (aletheia) and as the 'ontological
difference'. In the following Heidegger attributes the fact
that truth as unconcealedness can be considered on two levels,
the ontic and ontological, to the process in which Being
unconceals itself necessarily in beings and vice versa. (This
names the mutual dependence of the two and therefore the
* ontological difference'•)
The unconcealedness of Being is always the truth of the
Being of beings...On the other hand, in the unconcealed¬
ness of being lies a prior unconcealedness of its Being.
Each after its own fashion, ontical and ontological truth
concern being in its Being and the Being of being. They
belong togetner essentially by reason of their relation¬
ship to the difference between Being and being, the
'ontological difference'. The essence of truth, which is
and must be bifurcated ontically and ontologically, is
only possible given this difference.^)
We have now established that Heidegger is dealing
with one process, Being, in its various aspects and in this
lies the unity and cohesiveness of his ontological pursuit.
1 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.21.
2 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1969), p.26.
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Conclusion To Division One
V3. Heidegger the ontologist
We should recall that our purpose in examining the
various interests reflected in Heidegger's philosophy was
to reveal the unchanging theme of his thought, Being. In
analyzing Daseln's mode of existence we noted how he
proceeded from the existentlell. superficial features of
life to the more basic existential structures. We followed
as he uncovered the basic unitary structure care, in both
its totality and authentic mode, and we then observed how
time was revealed as the even more basic, underlying factor
which made care possible. We noted that time as a
structure of existence is actually one mode of Being's
raanifestness, hence the title of his book, Being and Time.
There can be no doubt now as to the ontological motive and
interest of Heidegger's Dasein analysis and, as if to
emphasize this even further, we can recall how this analysis
was labelled "fundamental ontology."
Heidegger's insistence on this point remained
unchanged in later writings as wellj typical of these is
the following from "The Way Back into the Ground of
Metaphysics": "to lead our thinking on the way on which it
may recall Being Itself in its truth - to do that the
thinking attempted in Being and Time is "on the way"."^
1 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics",
p.315.
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We moved next to Heidegger's language analysis and
observed how he abandoned the Dasein analysis as an avenue
to Being due to the inadequacy of traditional language to
express his insights. His interest in the writings of
early Greek thinkers was seen to stem from a belief that
Being had revealed itself most clearly to these thinkers
and had left its imprint on and been retained in their
language.
Similarly we saw that his interest in poetry -
poesie stemmed from the belief that poetry in the broad
sense referred to that process in which Being provided the
ground and basis for beings. Poesie. or poetry in the
strict sense of the word, was also seen to be the result of
Being revealing-concealing itself to particular thinkers.
We also noted in his assertions that language uses
man and speaks through him, that language is the "house of
Being" and that the Being of entities resides in the words
for them, how Heidegger came to identify language as
another term for the Being process itself. Thus in his
language analysis it was very apparent that Heidegger's
interest was ontological. Certainly there can be no question
as to a basic shift in position involved in his move from
Dasein to language analysis since Being continues to be the
central theme.
Just as his quest for Being led him to consider
language, it was also inevitable that he have to consider
the thought process as well since this too was involved in
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any consideration of Being. We noted how in his earlier
works thinking was closely related to Being even though it
was then seen basically as an activity of man, a human
process.
however, as his thinking evolved and matured we
observed a gradual shift in emphasis until thinking came to
be seen as a process instigated by Being in which man no
longer held the initiative. Prom man the questioner we
moved to Being the questionable which granted thinking to
man. In such concepts as aletheia. the unthought, and
retrieving we saw Heidegger's insistence that thinking is
another mode of Being's manifestation of itself. Mow the
thinker plays a far more passive role as Being expresses
itself and Beings through his thoughts. Here, too, we
established that Heidegger's interest and motivation was
ontological from first to last.
We concluded our consideration of Heidegger's
philosophy by noting how the results of his investigations
into various fields were reflected in his understanding of
Being itself. We noted how Being - aletheia indicated a
simultaneous revealing-concealing in Being's revelation.
This process was also seen as the ground of history, which
began with Being's initial exposure of itself to the Greeks
and included subsequent epochs characterized by the various
ways in which Being was recognized.
We also saw how Nothingness was another term for
the Being process and we finished with a consideration of
Being as the'ontological difference" In his insistence on
the mutual dependence of Being and being and their need for
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each other, we saw a clear reflection of the balance in
Heidegger's thinking. This concept, the "ontological
difference',' protected his anthropological and ontological
flanks in that it nullified any criticism of an over¬
emphasis on one to the exclusion of the other.
Furthermore, we can see this concept lurking
unthematically in the background of all his analyses, the
nature of Dasein, the ontological animal, reaches its
fulfillment in an awareness of its dependence upon Being
which in turn depends on Dasein for its its there, its
place amongst beings. Hy the same token language and
thinking are only authentic and essential when they are open
to and reflect the Being process which in turn depends on
them for revealing itself and grounding beings.
In this way we again are directed to this idea of
balance as the key trait which lends such strength to
Heidegger's varied pursuit of Being. As a consequence of
this, we have an important standard by which to gauge the
effectiveness of the various theologians' use of Heideggerian
insights. Just as we were able to comprehend and
appreciate his philosophy only through an awareness of his
overall balanced position, so too any attempt to utilize
his insights theologically should avoid any tendency to focus
on one phase to the exclusion of the rest. Such an
approach would inevitably distort his approach by losing




THE EARLIER HEIDEGGER AND BULTMANN'S THEOLOGY
CHAPTER FIVE
Introduction
¥+. A preliminary view of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann
By way of introducing the following analysis of
Martin Heidegger's influence on the theology of Rudolf
Bultmann, we might establish severed basic points. First
we shall show the importance of Bultmann's contributions
to contemporary theology. Next we shall establish the
fact that he is influenced by Heidegger. Then we shall
outline the general approach and subject matter to be
covered in this study, with particular note of the main
thesis as well as several sub-theses to be proven.
Of Bultmann's importance for the contemporary
theological scene there can be no doubt. As James M.
Robinson in his book A New Quest of the Historical Jesus
says: "Germany is just as nearly Bultraannian today as it was
Barthian a generation ago, Ritschlian half a century or
more ago, and Hegelian still earlier; and Bultmann's works
and ideas have become Germany's dominant theological export
throughout the world.
In speaking about his overall aim of continuing
in the tradition of both "liberal" and "dialectical"
theology, Bultmann openly acknowledges his dependence on
Heidegger's approach to existentialism. In carrying out
1 James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus.
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), p.11.
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his aim, he says, "...the work of existential philosophy,
which I came to know through my discussions with Martin
Heidegger, became of decisive significance for me."^
More particularly, in his article "Milestones in Books",
Bultmann acknowledges that from an examination of
Heidegger's Being and Time, he gained both a deeper under¬
standing of the nature of human existence as well as a
conceptual framework for giving contemporary expression to
(2)
his theological insights.
Basically our consideration of Bultmann's theology
will be oriented toward four of his particular interests,
the relation of philosophy and theology, his reaction to
the subject-object pattern in thinking, his concern for
hermeneutics and his interest in history. In our consid¬
eration of these various interests, we will substantiate
our main thesis that Bultmann is influenced to a great
extent by Heidegger's philosophy in the basic direction and
structure of his theology as a whole as well as in many
particular components of it. In addition we will also
support the following assertions: first, that Bultmann's
understanding and adaptation of Heidegger is generally
oriented toward his earlier contributions and second, that
the later Heidegger is relevant for Bultmann since the
adaptation of certain later Heideggerisn insights could
1 Xegley, op.cit.. p.XXIV
2 Rudolf Bultmann, "Milestones in Books", The Expository
Times. Vol.70 (1958), p.125.
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greatly strengthen Bultmann's position.
Finally, we should state at the outset that we
will only be considering those aspects of Bultmann's
theology in which a Heideggerian influence is apparent.
Therefore, our analysis of him will be somewhat restricted.
However, because of the extent of Heidegger's influence,
we will still get a fairly comprehensive view of
Bultmann's theology.
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The Relation of Philosophy and Theology
Section One
*f5» Bultmann and existentialism
Before considering some of the specific appli¬
cations of philosophical insights in Bultmann's theology,
we shall first note several of his more general observations
on the need of theology to relate itself to philosophy.
One such need, which stands within a tradition dating back
centuries, would be related to the apologetic aim of
theology. As Paul fillich notes, theology has two
purposes; "the statement of the truth of the Christian
message and the interpretation of this truth for every new
generation. Theology moves back and forth between two
poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal
situation in which the eternal truth must be received."^^
Certainly one of the central thrusts in Bultmann's theology
is tils concern to make the Word of God intelligible and
relevant for his contemporaries. This concern partially
explains his selection of a contemporary philosopher's
insights as a vehicle for expressing an "eternal truth" to
a particular "situation."
Bultmann also justifies the need for relating
theology and philosophy by noting their shared interest in
man; both consider man and develop an anthropology to some
extent. Although alike in their concern for man, the two
1 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I (London: Nisbet, 1951)»
P-3-
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disciplines are distinguished by the manner in which they
approach this object. In his essay "The Historicity of
Man and Faith" Bultmann very clearly establishes the borders
between philosophy and theology by pointing out where they
share interests and where they part ways. He explains that
while they have the same object, man, they approach it in
different ways, philosophy by considering the formal
ontological aspects of existence and theology by speaking
of the concrete, existentiell aspects of everyday
existence.^ Bultmann further justifies this relation
between theology and philosophy by saying that "...theology
as a science can make fruitful use of the philosophical
analysis of human existence. For the man of faith is in
any case a man, just as the proclamation out of which faith
(2)
arises encounters him as a human word."
In a less general vein, Bultmann selects one
school of philosophy, existentialism, as particularly rele¬
vant for contemporary theology. In An Exis tentiallst
Theology John Macquarrie says this selection is justified
because of the special affinity between the Scriptural and
existential understanding of human nature. He supports
tiiis thesis by noting the similarity of the distinctions
made by Biblical writers between man, the image of God, and
nature and the existentialists between entities whose mode
1 Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, trans, by Schubert
Ogden, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), p.9^.
2 Ibid.
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of Being is Gxistenz and Vorhandenheit. He goes on to
substantiate this similarity with a comparison of the main
themes in the Biblical and existential understandings of
man. Such Biblical interests as individual responsibility
before God, man's fall from his true destiny into concern
for the world, guilt, the call for decision, the fleeting
nature of man's temporal existence and its termination by
death are very similar to such existentialist themes as
responsibility of the individual in regards to fulfilling
his potential or losing it, fallenness, guilt, resolve,
temporality and death. That these two approaches are
closely related in their understanding of human nature thus
seems undeniable.^
Now we need to consider what it is about one
existentialist in particular, Martin Heidegger, which causes
Bultmann to rely so heavily upon him. Macquarrie points
out that theology, of necessity, utilizes much of the same
language and concepts as secular disciplines and if theology
is to be rigorous and respectable it must not employ such
language and concepts naively. Instead it should carefully
analyse its presuppositions since these inevitably have a
bearing on the outcome of theological analyses.
In considering a "theological" statement such as
"Man is related to God", Macquarrie points out that even
here certain philosophical presuppositions are implied;
1 John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.18.
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e.g. what is it about the Being of man that he can be
related, does not the word "is" itself also have certain
ontological connotations, etc. In this way he establishes
the possibility of a "pre-theological" inquiry into the
nature of the entities with which theology must deal.
Although such an inquiry would be ontological in nature,
its inherent relationship to theology stems from the fact
that it considers the very foundation upon which any par¬
ticular theology would he built. ^ 'Nhen we recall
Heidegger's insistence that ontology lays the foundation
from which all particular disciplines must move, it is not
surprising that Bultmann selects his philosophy, with its
existential as well as ontological slant, as a guide for
his "pre-theological" inquiry.
Bultmann's preference for Heidegger's philosophy
can also be explained by this philosopher's inherent debt
to an early theological training which gave a peculiar
religious flavour to all his "secular" insights. Andre
Malet notes that Heidegger "has a profounder knowledge of
the New Testament than do many exegetes and theologians..!'
and he lists as formative influences on Heidegger's thought
(2)
such great theologians as Augustine and Luther.
Bultmann carefully points to this aspect of
Heidegger's philosophy as being a factor in his relevance
1 Ibid., pp.6-7.
2 Andre Malet, the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans, by
Richard Strachan, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969),
p.330.
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for theology. In the essay "New Testament and Mythology"
Bultmann says of Heidegger's concern for the decision
between an inauthentic life immersed in the world and
trapped by past deeds and the authentic life of commitment
to and freedom for the future; "Is not that exactly the
New Testament understanding of human life?"^
We have now traced why Bultmann relates his
theology to philosophy in general, why to one particular
school of philosophy, existentialism, and why to one
particular representative of that school, Heidegger. Later
we shall see that actually he even limits himself to the
earlier views of this one particular philosopher. We shall
now consider how Bultmann incorporates Heidegger's insights
into his theology.
1 Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma
and Myth. I, ed. by H.W. Bartsch, trans, by R.H. Puller,
(London: SPCK, 1953), pp.2*f-25.
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The Subject-Object Pattern in Thinking
Section Tyro
*+6. Bultmann and talk about God
A basic thrust in Heidegger's philosophy sterns
from his rejection of the subject-object pattern in
thinking which he feels leads to the modern technological
outlook in which man, the subject, dominates the world
around him. What does not conform to his outlook cannot
be considered a part of reality. In place of this subject-
object scheme, Heidegger offers the ontological notion of
Being as aletheia. in which reality un-conceals, unfolds
itself to man, who is more receptive than dominant.
This insight is to some extent incorporated
throughout Bultmann's theology and would certainly qualify
as a part of Macquarrie's "pre-theological inquiry."
Walter Schmithals, a former student of Bultmann whose
lectures commemorating his professor's eightieth birthday
appear in book form as An Introduction to the theology of
Hudolf Bultmann. notes that Bultmann has carried
Heidegger's attack on the subject-object pattern into
*
theological concerns. As a modern form of thought, the
subject-object pattern is seen as alien to the Biblical
outlook which could never understand God and the world as
objects standing over against man the subject. Indeed,
the thought of God as an object for man's comprehension
and thus at his disposal is completely foreign to the
Scriptural frame of mind. Thus theology's task is to
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break down this barrier to a sympathetic interpretation
of the Scriptural approach to the relationship between
man, world and God.^
Many Bultmannians feel that much of the criticism
directed at Bultmann would be avoided were this aspect of
his thought better understood. As we shall see, his
views on the subject-object pattern of thinking underlie
many aspects of his theology and, because of the difficulty
in following his thinking on this topic, (Heidegger also
despaired at times of ever being understood in his attempts
at overcoming metaphysics) it seems plausible that this is
a factor in the confusion and misunderstandings which have
repeatedly followed the spread of Bultmann's thought in
(2)
Germany and elsewhere. Thus we will be touching on
this theme by implication throughout our analysis of
Bultmann's theology. However, at this point it would be
helpful to consider several specific examples of this theme
as well as several specific criticisms resulting from a
lack of insight into it.
In his essay "What Does It Mean to Speak of God?",
Bultmann rejects all talk about God. In making God an
object of thought or discussion, he feels theology inevit¬
ably loses touch with the reality it is seeking. God as
the "wholly Other" can never be at the disposal of man's
1 Walter Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of
Rudolf Bultmann. trans, by John Bowden, (London: SCM Press,
Ltd., 1967), p.29.
2 Schubert Ogden, Christ Without Myth. (London: Collins, 1962),
p.22.
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thought and God as the "Almighty" who determines, guides,
and indeed creates man's existence is wholly lost when man
seeks to reverse the situation, and manipulate God through
an idea or concept of Him. He explains that when
regarded as an object of thought toward which one can be
either neutral, positive or negative, the reality of God
the Almighty is completely lost.^^ Here then we see
Bultmann adapting Heidegger's criticism of the subject-
object pattern in thinking in his rejection of all thinking
and speaking about God which seeks to "grasp" or mani¬
pulate Him.
Next we need to consider how Bultmann adapts the
positive alternative Heidegger offers to this defective
type of speaking and thinking. Basically this alternative
is developed in two stages. In the earlier Heidegger,
Being is grasped solely through a consideration of its place
or there (c|&) in the world, Dasein. As a result, Being and
lime is devoted exclusively to fundamental ontology, or
analysis of Dasein. In the later Heidegger, attention is
still focused on Dasein but with less emphasis. Now Being
as aletheia plays the dominant role in the revelation of
itself through Dasein's language and thinking. Here Being
is active and dominant, Dasein is passive and receptive.
Bultmann is directly influenced by the earlier
stage in Heidegger's thinking in his formulation of the
1 Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, trans, by
Louise P. Smith, (London: 8CM Press, Ltd., I960), p.$9.
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concept of self-understanding. Just as for Heidegger
Being is understood through analysis of Dasein, so for
Bultmann God is understood through analysis of the man of
faith. How do we know God? Bultmann would reply that
God as the Almighty who determines and grounds man's
existence can only be understood as He is experienced.
To know God is to experience God through His actions upon
us. Now we can understand Bultmann's contention that "...
when the question is raised of how any speaking of God can
be possible, the answer must be, it is only possible as
talk of ourselves."^^
We can see then how Bultraann's adaptation of
Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object pattern in
thinking leads to the formulation of his concept self-
understanding. In its stress that an understanding of God
always involves an understanding of the self, this concept
clearly reflects one of the hallmarks of Bultmann's
theology, a close association of theology and anthropology.
In the following we shall see how extensive a role this
concept does play in his theology as a whole.
In his interpretation of Old Testament material
this concept is apparent in the assertion that affirmation
of God the creator does not deal with information about the
nature of a creator God. "The affirmation can only be a
personal confession that I understand myself to be a
1. Ibid., p.61
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creature which owes its existence to God. It cannot be
made as a neutral statement, but only as thanksgiving and
surrender.
This same concern is also reflected in his
interpretation of New Testament material. He insists that
Pauline theology should not be treated as a speculative
system since it deals not with God in Himself but only as
He is significant for man. Now every statement about God
is to be understood simultaneously as a statement about
man and vice versa. Thus Paul's theology "is at the same
(2)
time anthropology." Similarly, his views on the
significance of Christ, that He is to be understood through
His effect on our self-understanding, cause Karl Barth to
make the accusation that Bultmann's Christology is wholly
absorbed into his soteriology.^ Hence by virtue of its
relation to self-understanding, a cornerstone concept,
the influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Bultmann's
theology is extensive.
To this point in his solution to the problem of
speaking and thinking about God, Bultmann has followed a
1 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology. (London: SCM
Press Ltd., I960), p.69.
2 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament.I.trans, by
Kendrick Grobel, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965)> p.190.
3 Karl Barth, "Rudolf Bultmann - An Attempt to Understand
Him"; Kerygma and Myth. II, p.96.
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course parallel to that of the earlier Heidegger. However,
the later Heidegger saw the weaknesses of limiting ontology
to a Dasein analysis and, as his thinking matured, he
modified the direction taken in regards to the pursuit of
Being. As stated earlier, his emphasis shifted to a
consideration of Being as manifested in such various modes
as language, thought, nothingness and the 'ontological
difference.1 However, Bultraann failed to follow this
shift and continued even further on a path deeper and
deeper into the nature of existence. As a result he con¬
tinues to insist that speaking and thinking of God be
limited to existence as the arena of the experience of
God's revelation.
The issue is still not resolved for Bultmann since
he also asserts that it is impossible to speak 'about'
existence. This too would necessarily involve subjection
to the subject-object pattern. In "What Does It Mean to
Speak of God?" he states: "We thus find ourselves in the
same astonishing predicament in relation to our existence
as in relation to God. We cannot really talk about either;
we have no power over either.
He explains that talk about existence inevitably
succumbs to the subject-object pattern of thought since to
view one's self as an object necessarily distorts the
nature of existence, confusing the self with "an object of
1 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p.58.
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scientific investigation." Nor is the problem solved by-
labelling the self as subject over against all else as
objects for "man is seen from outside even when he is
designated subject." He concludes, therefore, that "...
the distinction between subject and object must be kept
separate from the question of our own existence.
What then is the solution to this predicament into
which Bultmann has placed theology. He rejects the
solution of quietism since this too involves the same
pattern of thought. (To decide for quietism "...would be
making the old mistake, that is...regarding the idea of God
as something in respect of which a specific attitude is
(2)
possible or appropriate." )
We can now see that Bultmann has posed an apparently
insoluble problem for theology. He has said on the one
hand that thinking and speaking of God, which must always be
of ourselves as well, is impossible since we cannot think
and speak of our own existence without utilizing the
defective subject-object pattern of thinking. On the other
hand, it is equally wrong not to speak and think about God.
Bultmann's solution to this dilemma is that
obedience to God's revelation requires us to speak and




inevitably involves. This can be done because God grace¬
fully forgives and justifies our necessarily sinful
attempts to comprehend and communicate His revelation.
As a result, "all our acts and words are freed from the
curse of dividing us from God."Walter Schmithals
suggests that here we clearly see the dialectical note in
Bultmann's theology since it speaks of God as that about
which man cannot speak but nevertheless proceeds in faith
to speak about Him. "That is its dialectic, in which it
must persevere if it is not to fall into either objecti-
(2)
fication of its subject or silence."
Unlike Schmithals, we would suggest that at this
point Bultmann's position borders on being contradictory,
the tension seems too great to be dialectically maintained
Bultmann admits he is speaking of God even when saying it
is impossible to do so. His attempt to resolve the
dilemma by speaking of a "forgiven" and justified God-talk
certainly does not resolve the problem. Instead he does
not completely escape the subject-object pattern since he
asserts that any thinking or speaking of God necessarily
objectivizes Him and is therefore sinful. However,
Heidegger's later philosophy does provide insights into a
type of language and thought which would respect the
status of God the Almighty and nevertheless allow for real
speaking and thinking of Him.
1 Ibid.T p.6*f.
2 Schmithals, op.cit.. pA5»
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It is only fair to note here that Bultmann's
failure to utilize fully this Heideggerian insight resulted
from the fact that it was only partially developed in
Being and lime and did not become a central issue until
heidegger's thinking developed further. We will discuss
the relevance of these later developments for Bultmann's
theology in a subsequent analysis. Suffice it to say now
that Bultmann's answer to the possibility of speaking and
thinking about God was motivated directly, as we have shown,
by the earlier Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object
pattern in thinking.
With our consideration of Bultmann's adaptation of
these Keideggerian insights into the subject-object pattern
of thought we have begun to see the extent of Heidegger's
influence in such critical issues as God talk and self-
understanding. 'We turn now to several of the more popular
criticisms of Bultmann's approach which his supporters feel
would be nullified by a better understanding of him on this
point.
One of the most frequently encountered criticisms
of Bultmann is that he 'tends to be subjective. Friedrich
Gogarten in Demythologizing and History offers a detailed
rebuttal of this charge. As we have already seen, Bultmann
declares that to know God is to experience His effects on
one's existence through an encounter with Him. The result
of this eicouaater is a new self-understanding since one sees
oneself in a new light following such an experience.
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Now, if considered in light of the subject-
object scheme which is very alien to Bultmann's thinking,
this concept of self-understanding inevitably smacks of
subjectivism since the "objective" pole (God in this case)
in the experience is not dealt with over against the
subjective pole (man). As Gogarten notes, such criticisms
stem from the failure of Bultmann's opponents as well as
supporters to free their thinking of the subject-object
pattern. As a result it follows "...with the logical
necessity which thought conducted within the subject-
object pattern cannot avoid, that this self-understanding
is transformed into an 'immanent content of consciousness'
or some sort of 'subjective validity and interpretation'..."
(1)
Another of the charges frequently made against
Bultmann's approach is that he dispels the "real" figure of
Jesus and the "actual" Easter event. Gogarten is quick to
point out that these criticisms also stem from a point of
view labouring under the subject-object dilemma and
therefore alien to Bultmann's approach. lo seek an
objective Jesus and resurrection typifies the need to make
history into an object over against the historian as
subject. This separation destroys the necessary involve¬
ment of the historian in his work. Gogarten believes that
those seeking an 'objective revelational reality' are
1 Friedrich Gogarten, Dernvthologizing and History, trans,
by Neville H. Smith, (London: SCM Press Ltd., I960), pp.51*-
55.
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hopelessly mired in the "...'Babylonian captivity'
imposed on them by a scientific concept which is
essentially alien to theology.To seek an objective
reality in historical revelation is simply another way of
insuring man's supremacy as the 'subject' over against
God's revelation as the 'object' of comprehension.
We have now seen several specific implications
resulting from Bultmann's application of Heidegger's attack
on the subject-object pattern of thought and have also
noted how a sound understanding of this aspect of
Bultmannian theology nullifies certain criticisms frequently
made against it. We should keep in mind as we proceed that
this same issue will continue to affect indirectly other






If one were to look for a central thrust to
Bultmann's diverse theological interests, the most plausible
selection would be his interest in hermeneutics. For our
purpose, we shall first consider Bultmann's hermeneutical
principles as they are reflected in his views on exegesis.
We will then see how the hermeneutical circle runs through
his theology and finally we will observe his hermeneutical
principles at work in his interpretation of Pauline theology.
In each instance we will carefully note the influence of
Heidegger's philosophy.
First we turn to exegesis. Bultmann firmly
insists that exegesis in not an independent discipline but
is closely related to other fields, especially philosophy,
both for its terminology and presuppositions. In Kerygma
and Myth I, he labels as a fallacy the belief that an
exegete can work without the use of secular terminology
since every exegete is "...dependent upon a terminology
which has come down to him by tradition, though it is
accepted uncritically and without reflection, and every
traditional terminology is one way or another dependent
upon a particular philosophy."^^
1 Rudolf Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics",
Kerygma and Ryth I, p.193.
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Andre Malet (whose book on Bultmann was highly-
praised and appreciated in a review by Bultraann himself
stresses that, despite his protests, even the most
conservative exegete has philosophical presuppositions
since as a human being he is subject to certain influences
and factors which necessarily influence his judgment and
comprehension. The less aware one is of these factors,
the more dependent one is upon them for this indicates a
dependence upon "the philosophy of the man in the street."
(2)
However, Bultmann carefully stresses that his
presuppositions are confined to the method and not results
of exegetical endeavours. In Jesus Christ and Mythology,
he explains that rather than presupposing the meaning of a
text, "we must learn from it." An exegesis which seeks to
coerce its results into conforming with a pre-conceived
dogmatic statement is of course faulty. "There is,
however, a difference in principle between presuppositions
in respect of results and presuppositions in respect of
method."
We can grasp the essentials of Bui tularin's
exegetical presuppositions by considering two of his inter¬
related hermeneutical concepts, life-relation and
preunderstanding. All exegesis is possible only if the
exegete and document share a relationship to the matter
1 Malet, op.cit., p.l.
2 Ibid., p.192.
3 Bultraann, Jesus Christ and Mythology. p.M-9.
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involved in the document. On a crass level, this is
illustrated by the necessity that both text and exegete
share a common language. By the same token, they must
also share common concepts and, further, common basic
understandings of the subject matter. Bultmann illustrates
this point by saying one can only understand a text dealing
with music based on a prior experience with music, or a
text discussing math based on a prior relationship to
mathematics.^
"The resulting...presupposition of exegesis is that
you do have a relation to the subject matter...about which
you interrogate a given text. I call this relation the
(2)
life-relation." Such a relation is only valid,
furthermore, when it concerns issues of vital importance
and real interest to the exegete. This means that the
subject matter in the text is never approached with an
("O
abstract, disinterested frame of mind. J
In addition, this life-relation to the subject
matter of the text means that the exegete also has a certain
amount of understanding of the matter prior to examining
the text. Hence, the life-relation necessarily involves a
preunderstanding. As he explains: "In this (life-relation)
you have a certain understanding of the matter in question,
1 Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, trans, by James G.G. Greig,
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955)* pp.pJ+B-PV}.
2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.50.
3 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 29*+.
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...Without such a relation and such previous understanding
/Vorversbandnis or preunderstanding it is impossible to
understand any text."^ This preunderstanding influences
the interpretation of a text in that it determines the
standpoint from which the text will be approached. After
all the formulation of a question about a subject matter
presupposes at least a vague awareness of what is involved
therein. Complete ignorance necessarily nullifies any
(2)
questioning.
John Macquarrie explains the influence of the
preunderstanding with the term Fragestellung. which means
"the putting of the question" or the way in which a
question is asked. The attitude with which the text is
approached or questioned does have some bearing on the
answer given, e.g. a man desperately searching for
spiritual guidance and meaning in his life will "put the
question" of God's existence to a text in a radically
different way than a philosopher who is searching for a
ground or basis to the universe. Both may decide that
there is a God but their opinion of this God's nature will
differ considerably and this difference is the direct
result of the way in which the question was put. ^
In this way, the preunderstanding indirectly influences
the outcome of the interpretation. Is this then a weakness
1 iultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.50.
2 Bultmann, Essays. p.239«
3 Macquarrie, op.clt.. p.11.
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leading inevitably to subjectively distorted interpretation?
Not at all, says Bultmann, for it is only when the
interpreter approaches the text fully aware of his own
needs (or life-relation) and questions that the text becomes
meaningful for him. Real comprehension of a text"presupposes
the utmost liveness of the comprehending subject and the
richest possible unfolding of his individuality...The 'most
subjective' interpretation is in this case the 'most
objective.'"^^
A closer analysis of the concept, preunderstanding,
will dispel many of the criticisms which might be raised
against it. For instance, several of Bultmann's critics
question the wisdom of employing this hermeneutical concept
in relation to the Bible as they fear it would not respect
the uniqueness of God's revelation. However, Bultmann
replies that even God's word must share something in common
with man's mode of comprehension or else the two could not
meet without one destroying the identity of the other.
In his essay "Revelation in the New Testament"
Bultmann explains that our pre-understanding of revelation
is a peculiar "not-knowing knowledge." He illustrates by
saying that just as a person can know what love and
friendship are without having fallen in love or made friends,
so can one know about revelation without experiencing it.
1 Bultmann, Essays, p.256.
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On the other hand such a person does not really understand
revelation for "...the person who is friendless and unloved
only really knows what friendship and love are when he finds
a friend and is given love."^
We have now seen how Bultmann asserts the necessity
of philosophical presuppositions for the methods but not
results of exegesis and we have analyzed his exegetical
presuppositions through a consideration of the inter¬
related concepts "pre-understanding" and "life-relation."
We can next consider how he adopts one particular philosophy
as the correct source of presupposition for Biblical
exegesis.
What is our life-relation to the content of the
Scriptures? With what pre-understanding do we approach
them? Bultmann stresses that there must be some continuity
or point of contact between our comprehension and God's Word
or otherwise there could be no revelation. However,
respect for the otherness of God's Word requires that this
continuity not be too extensive. In Jesus Christ and
.Mythology he states that man "...has a relation to God in
his search for God, conscious or unconscious. Man's life
is moved by the search for God because it is always moved,
consciously or unconsciously, by the question about his own
(2)
personal existence."
1 Bultmann, 4x:lstence and Faith, p.62.
2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp.52-53*
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wliat the Bible shares with its interpreter is
the concern for existence. "The tradition and the
preaching of the Church tells us that we are to hear in
the Bible authoritative words about our existence."^
The pre-understanding which determines our approach to the
Scriptures is concern for our existence. Therefore it
becomes our responsibility to clarify and elucidate this
pre-understanding so that we can approach the Scriptures
with the most pertinent questions and have a clear under¬
standing of existence in which to incorporate the
understanding revealed by revelation. "If it is true that
the right questions are concerned with the possibilities of
understanding human existence, then it is necessary to
discover the adequate conceptions by which such understanding
is to be expressed. To discover those conceptions is the
(2)
task of philosophy."
As John Macquarrie explains, any inquiry needs a
terminology and corresponding complex of ideas appropriate
for its subject matter. These he refers to with the term
Begrifflichkeit. or terminology, which is the system of
basic concepts any inquiry employs in comprehending its
subject matter, e.g. biology, mathematics and history all
(l)
have their own Begriffllchkeit. °
What then is the proper terminology for an
interpretation of the Scriptures. As we have already seen,
1 Ibid., p.53.
2 Ibid.. p.5^.
3 Macquarrie, op.cit.. p.13.
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the shared life relation of the text and exegete here is
concern for personal existence. Further, the preunder-
standing we bring to the text, the perspective from which
we question it, is also concern for our existence.
Therefore we need to find a philosophy which has developed
a suitable terminology for existential analysis and will
also respect the uniqueness and otherness of revelation.
Heidegger's philosophy, with its existentiell-
existential distinction in the analysis of existence,
uniquely fills the bill as Bultmann's "right philosophy."
Because it remains on the existential level, clarifying
the boundaries and scope of the various groups of
possibilities without infringing on the ontic-existentiell
level, the realm of theology, this philosophy provides a
neutral, formal foundation and framework into which
theology's existentiell ontic concerns can be fitted. (We
might recall that an existential analysis deals with the
basic underlying aspects of existence while the
existentiell analysis describes daily concrete concerns.)
Bultmann is very careful to stress the neutral
formal nature of the existential-ontological analysis so
as to avoid any criticism of allowing his philosophical
foundation to swallow up his theological concerns. The
philosophical analysis merely prepares man for the
existentiell encounter of faith with its demand for a
decision "here and now " In Jesus Christ and Mythology
he explains:
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...does the existentialist understanding...already
include a decision in favor of a particular
understanding? Certainly such a decision is
included, but what decision? Precisely the
decision..."You must exist." Without this
decision, without the readiness to be a human
being, a person who in responsibility takes it
upon himself to be, no one can understand a
single word of the Bible as speaking to his own
personal existence.q^
Hence, even the decision which is clarified by
the existential analysis is not in any way theologically
biased. Instead, it merely prepares for the existent!ell
decision resulting from an encounter with God's Word.
Ihe existential basis provided by philosophy does not
conflict with the existent!ell insights filled in by
theological analysis since the two operate on different
levels. For instance, the existential analysis might
provide the formal understanding of an "encounter" while
theology speaks of one particular encounter in the "here
and now" which involves a specific decision, the formal
structure of which had been analyzed existentially. We
can now see how Heidegger's existentialist analysis can
provide a preunderstanding of existence which is still open
to the uniqueness of God's revelation. Here the
dialectical tension between the continuity and dis¬
continuity of man's comprehension and revelational content
is maintained.
We can further appreciate Bultmann's unique
1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.57
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approach to exegesis with a consideration of his terms
Sscnexegese (exegesis of the subject matter) and Sachkritik
(criticism of the subject matter). As he is also heavily
indebted to Heideggerian insights at this point, a brief
review would be helpful. As we saw in the section on
language in Heidegger's philosophy, he felt that Being's
revelation of itself to man in a process of simultaneous
concealment and unconcealment (aletheia) left an imprint
on the words resulting from such a disclosure.
Hence, the later interpreter should use the text
as a means of standing within this past disclosure of
Being alongside the ancient author, so that another aspect
of Being's revelation might be revealed to him which the
original participant failed to appreciate. Such a process
was referred to as a retrieve. Through this retrieve, a
later interpreter might be able to understand the subject
matter before the original author even better than the
author himself. As Heidegger noted, he might be even more
Greek than the Greeks.
We can now establish the meaning Bultmann assigns
to the terms Sachexegese (exegesis of the subject matter)
and Gachkritik (criticism of the subject matter) and then
be able to point out Heidegger's influence at this point.
In his essay "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the
New Testament," he refers to theological exegesis as
Sachexegese. which deals not just with what the text
actually says but rather with the "matter" about which it
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speaks. In his assertion that such an approach "focuses
on the light which shines through from beyond the
surface", we can see that Bultmann is attempting to
penetrate to a reality or "matter" beneath the obvious
expression of the text which is not necessarily apparent
in the words of the text itself.^
tie goes on to explain that Sachkritik is a
criticism "which distinguishes between what is said and
what is meant and measures what is said by what is meant."
( 2 ) «
In another article, "Karl Berth's Romerbrief", he
further describes Sachkritik as "understanding the text in
(■})
light of the subject matter." J The subject matter
behind the words of the text now becomes the standard by
which the text is judged as to its effectiveness in
expressing adequately its concern.
Sachkritik. then, is the methodology Bultraann
recommends for theological exegesis, or Sachexegese. in
1 Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis
of the New Testament", quoted by James D. Smart, The Divided
kind of Modern Theology (Philadelphia; The Westminster
Press, 1967)* p.137.
2 Bultmann, "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the
New Testament", quoted by Schmithals, on.cit. T p.2*f5.
3 Rudolf Bultmann, "Karl Barth's Romerbrief", quoted by
Schmithals, p.21+5«
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which the exegete penetrates beyond the words or surface
of the text to the subject matter with which the author
was concerned. This subject matter is then used to
determine how effective the author was in expressing his
concern, for no author, Scriptural or otherwise, "always
speaks only about the matter in hand." ^
The influence of Heidegger's approach at this
point is quite apparent. For both men, the immediate text
serves as a juraplng-off point from which the underlying
subject matter can be reached. There is the assumption
in both approaches that the text does not necessarily
express the subject matter adequately, and this explains
how the exegete can penetrate beyond the author's words and
and understand his intention even better than he was able
to express it.
M-8. The hermeneutical circle
To this point we have been seeking to understand
Bultraann's hermeneutics through examining the reflection
of his hermeneutical principles in his approach to exegesis.
We now turn to a direct discussion of these principles
themselves. The theme which runs throughout his
hermeneutics,and therefore his theology as well, is the
hermeneutical circle. This concept has also been
encountered in the analysis of Heidegger's thought so we
shall first consider Bultmann's use of it and then
1 Ibid
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establish the relation with Heidegger's use.
We have already encountered the idea of a pre-
understanding in hermeneutics which was seen to be a vague
not-knowing knowledge which can nevertheless give
direction to an inquiry. Illustrations of such knowledge
would be a blind man's understanding of sight and a
friendless person's knowledge of friendship. Such pre-
understanding, by acting as a guide for any inquiry, leads
to the understanding resulting from such an inquiry.
To understand the relation between the two, we now
must consider Bultmann's views on understanding. There
are three key traits in understanding as defined by
Bultmann. The first is that it involves practical, not
theoretical, knowledge; that is, knowledge as experienced
and not just known in the abstract. John Macquarrie
stresses that Bultmann is directly indebted to Heidegger
for the insight that understanding is primarily practical
and is theoretical or abstract only in a secondary sense.
This order of priorities stems from the fact that
science treats objects as vorhanden (present-at-hand)
whereas Dasein is primarily related in its daily existence
to objects zuhanden (ready-at-hand). Hence, practical
knowledge, which Macquarrie labels existential knowledge,
is of primary importance and in this category should fall
theological awareness of God. In this way Bultmann's
claim that knowledge of God is always existential and never
theoretical or abstract can be seen as derived from
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Heidegger's analysis of knowledge. We have already
seen one result of this approach in the discussion concerning
the impossibility of an abstract knowledge about God.
The second trait of understanding as defined by
Bultmann is its openendedness. Understanding is never
definitely achieved in a once-for-all manner. Instead it
is open toward the future when new understandings will
develop. In contact with new experiences and new decisions
existential understanding and knowledge constantly adapts
and grows. As Schmithals explains, "existential under¬
standing is per definitionem always new understandings it is
never knowledge possessed, because it is a decision to be
(2)
made on each several occasion."
The third trait of understanding as defined by
Bultmann is that it is always self-understanding. To
understand something is to understand oneself anew in light
of it. If the object of understanding does not affect
the self-understanding it remains on the secondary abstract
level of theoretical understanding. Only when it is
experienced is it primarily understood and then it has
become a part of the self-understanding. Thus the
acquisition of a new friend does not so much affect one's
knowledge of the concept friendship as it changes one's
self image. With a new friend what "more I know is this:
1 Macquarrie, op.cit.. pp.56-58.
2 Schmithals, op.cit.. p.2Mf.
256
I know my friend and I know myself in a new way, because
my understanding of the friend gives my concrete life in
work and joy, in struggle and grief, a new quality."^^
Having defined understanding and pre-understanding
we can now establish how the relation between the two forms
the hermeneutical circle. Basically this circle results
from the interdependence and interaction of these two
concepts. Understanding always presupposes and depends on
pre-understanding since any answer which gives new under¬
standing is determined to a certain extent by the question
asked, which in turn is governed by the pre-understanding.
On the other hand, as the answer, understanding always
corrects and improves upon the status of the question, or
pre-understanding.
/
Andre Malet explains the relation between these
two components of the hermeneutical circle by stressing the
element of discontinuity and continuity in their relation.
To those who assert that pre-understanding implies a
natural knowledge of God and abolishes the need for special
revelation, he describes pre-understanding as a lack of under¬
standing, it indicates that understanding has not yet
occurred. "To have Vorverstaadnis of the other is to be
the lack of that other. To.say that man has only a
Vorverstandnis...of God...means that he is not God, he is
(2)
an absence of God."
1 Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und der
Glauche", quoted by Malet, L'he Thought of Rudolf Bultmann.
pp .1^-15.
1 Malet, op.cit.« p.16.
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Malet goes on to describe the discontinuity between
these components in the hermeneutical circle by distinguishing
between the Was and the Pass of an object of comprehension.
Pre-understanding is related only to the essence or Was of
an entity - its basic reality. "...selfhood, irreducibility,
uniqueness, transcendence, advent and event, altogether eludes
7orverstandnis. Reason can win through to the idea of the
other but not to the other itself. In other words, the
concept of another entity, its Was, is available to pre-
understanding which would then provide knowledge "about" it.
The entity itself, however, in all its uniqueness and
concreteness, is only experienced through self-understanding.
Malet is careful to preserve the identity of the
lisrmeneutical circle by stressing the continuity between
these two levels or modes of understanding. Thus in
actual friendship the Vorverstandnis of friendship is
deepened and widened in the new Verstandnis gained from the
experience. It is never the case that the understanding
(2)
obscures or obliterates the pre-understanding.v/ Hence,
the hermeneutical circle is formed by this relation of pre-
understanding and understanding. While distinctive the two
are nevertheless rigorously connected by the circle. Pre-
understanding indicates a lack of understanding but never¬
theless the former inevitably points toward and is bound to
the latter. The Was of pre-understanding is epistemologi-





Before we review Heidegger's views on the
hermeneutical circle and compare its use with Bultmann's,
we should also note that this circle has previously appeared
in our discussion of the subject-object pattern of thinking.
There we noticed Bultmann's assertion that knowledge of God
must be self-understanding, since it is only when the
experience of God's word is incorporated into and changes
our self-understanding that we can truly have knowledge of
God. As a result it can be said that Bultmann's theology
is anthropology and his Christology is soteriology. Further¬
more, he holds that the reverse of this is true, that know¬
ledge of ourselves is knowledge of God to some extent. As
he explains, exlstentiell knowledge of God is always present
in human existence "...in the form of the inquiry about
happiness, salvation, the meaning of the world and of history;
and in the inquiry into the real nature of each person's
particular Being (or existence). Here too, then, the
hermeneutical circle is present. Knowledge of ourselves
is a type of preunderstanding of God which directs the inquiry
which prepares for a better understanding of ourselves in
light of God's revelation.
Now let us briefly review the hermeneutical circle
in Heidegger's thought. He also stresses that some knowledge
of the object of inquiry is presupposed, otherwise there
could be no direction for the inquiry. Such knowledge is
referred to as a vague awareness. As we saw, this was
existentiell knowledge which was gradually deepened and
1 Bultmann, Essays, p.257.
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clarified until this unthematic awareness led to a
thematic, existential or ontological awareness.
Dasein was selected as the object of Heidegger's
ontological quest because of its nature as the "ontological
animal", the existence of which was inevitably motivated
by a concern for Being, whether consciously or unconsciously.
Because of this Heidegger can refer to existential analyses
as "fundamental ontology." Because of Casein1s inherent
ontological concern, existentialism, or anthropology,
becomes ontology.
We can now establish how the influence here of
Heidegger's insights into the hermeneutical circle results
in close parallels in the thinking of both men. Just as
anthropology is theology in Bultmann, so also is existentialism,
as one approach to anthropology, fundamental ontology in
Heidegger. To identify man as the "ontological animal" whose
existence is motivated by a continual quest for Being is
parallel to stating that man is constantly motivated by the
need for God in his search for happiness and security, and
in his concern about his existence. Similarly, to under¬
stand Being, one must understand Dasein; to understand God
man must understand himself.
Further, we have seen that the not-knowing knowledge
of pre-understanding is enriched and deepened in the self-
understanding resulting from the inquiry guided and
motivated by pre-understanding. By the same token, the
unthematic knowledge of the existent!ell level is clarified
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thematically as one proceeds toward knowledge on the
existential level. In both instances there is the
dialectical tension of distinction and identity, continuity
and discontinuity.
Just as the theology of Bultmann is motivated by
his hermeneutical concerns, so also is the ontology of the
early Heidegger concerned mainly with the hermeneutical task
of interpreting the existence of the •ontological animal.*
(Fundamental ontology, as we saw in an earlier discussion of
Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics, was closely
associated with a hermeneutical task.) So far then, our
analysis of one of the basic themes of Bultmann's theology
has borne out our contention that he is heavily indebted
to the insights of Martin Heidegger's philosophy.
49. Demythologizing.
Having considered Bultmann's hermeneutics through an
examination of his views on exegesis and his use of the
hermeneutical circle, we can now move into a third area of
interest which reflects his hermeneutical principles,
demythologizing. This is one of the most controversial
and widely known aspects of Bultmann's theology. Not
surprisingly then we shall treat it in light of both his
hermeneutical principles and his other area of interest
previously discussed, the subject-object pattern of thinking.
That both of these broad issues are involved in demytholo-
gizing emphasizes the centrality of this concern in Bultmann's
theology. Because of our particular interest we will limit
our analysis of this concept as much as possible to those
aspects of it related to Heidegger's insights.
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Bultmann is careful to stress that demythologizing
does not mean the elimination, but rather the interpretation —
of myths in the Scriptures. As he states in Jesus Christ
and Mythology, the aim of this interpretation is to
penetrate to the meaning behind or intention of mythological
expression. As L. Malevez notes, the discrepancy
between the intention and form of mythology stems from its
intention of revealing the role of an ultimate dimension
(2)
in existence with the use of 1this-worldly' terminology.v '
In a rather paradoxical way then, demythologizing
is motivated by a respect for the meaning of mythology. As
for the repeated criticisms that he is "watering down" the
kerygma to make it more easily digestible for modern man,
Bultmann replies that his intention is rather to eliminate
any unnecessary stumbling blocks in understanding the
Scriptures so that the real skandalon of the Gospel can be
(3)
exposed in all its force and radicalness.w/
These false stumbling blocks are related to the fact
that the kerygma, as revealed in the New Testament, is
closely tied to a particular world-view. Bultmann is
opposed to such a relation for two reasons. The first is
that the particular world-view expressed in the New Testament
1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.18.
2 L. Malevez, The Christian Message and Myth, trans, by
Olive Wyon, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1958), pp.25-26.
3 Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologizing", Kerygma and
Myths. II, pp.182-183.
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is obsolete. Bultmann asserts that man no longer lives
according to an understanding of the world as a three-
storeyed structure of heaven, earth and hell, populated by
angels, demons and evil spirits. He feels that this part
of the kerygma, its expression, "is incredible to modern
man for he is convinced that the mythical view of the world
is obsolete.
However, Bultmann objects to the kerygma being tied
to a worid-view, indeed any world-view, for a second and
equally important reason. World-views inevitably result
from man's inherent drive to master his environment, to
comprehend its structure and thereby have control over it.
Whenever he encounters something new, it is fitted into this
established pattern or worid-view. Thus, the formation of
a world-view represents man's rather desperate grasp for
security in a world which can never be completely controlled.
As Bultmann explains, despite all the progress made down
through the years, there are "encounters and destinies which
man cannot master...His life is fleeting and its end is
death. History goes on and pulls down all the towers of
Babel. There is no real, definitive security." This is
particularly true of the contemporary scientific world view,
he feels, which tempts man to think of himself as master of
(2)
his world and his own fate. '
1 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth,
I, p.3.
2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.39.
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It is in this second reason for opposing the use of
a worid-view in expressing the kerygma that Bultmann is
closely related to insights of Martin Heidegger. Here, too,
our previous discussion of the subject-object pattern of
thought is pertinent. In Bemythologizing and History, a
rebuke of Bultmann's critics, Friedrich Gogarten explains
that Heidegger also sees the subject-object pattern of
thought culminating in the modern scientific-technological
world-view.In Gogarten's attempt to defend and explain
Bultmann's views on this matter by clarifying Heidegger's
thought on the modern world-view can be seen the influence
of this philosopher on Bultmann's opposition to world-views.
The criticism often made at this point that Bultmann
is merely replacing the world-view of the New Testament with
the more contemporary world view of existentialism can be
refuted on two bases. The first, which we have already
considered, is that Heidegger's fundamental ontology deals
strictly with issues on the ontological-exlstential level
and does not provide an existentiell-ontic guide, or world-
view, for man's understanding of himself and his concrete
actions in relation to his environment.
Secondly, rather than providing a world-view on which
man can rely for security in his relations to his world,
existentialism places the responsibility squarely on his
shoulders. In defending against this charge Bultmann
explains that because existentialism operates on the
existential level and avoids any specific recommendations
1 Gogarten, op.cit.. p.65.
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about concrete, day-to-day affairs, the realm of ontic-
existentiell concerns, it cannot be seen as providing a
secure haven for retreat from existence in the world.
Existentialism says only, "you ought to exist" and explains
that existence means accepting responsibility for one's own
being. "So far from relieving us of our personal
responsibility, it actually lays it upon us."^^
Thus it is that Bultmann opposes myth and its
tendency to objectivize for the same reason that Heidegger
opposes world-views. Both are seen as stemming from the
subject-object pattern in thinking which culminates in man's
domination of his world. Bultmann states: "Myth objectifies
the other world in terms of this world and thereby makes it a
(?)
controllable thing."v ' And in Jesus Christ and Mythology
he explains that world views stem from the human tendency
to deny the element of risk in personal existence in favour
of the security of a world view through which the environment
and existence can be controlled. It is for this reason
that the nevertheless and "in spite of" involved in faith
is so frequently overlooked. He goes on to describe de-
mythologizing as the radical application of the doctrine of
justification by faith to the sphere of thought and knowledge.
"Like the doctrine of justification it destroys every longing
for security. There is no difference between security based
1 Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics", Kerygma and
Myth. I., p.197.
2 Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologizing", Kerygma and Myth.
II, p.184.
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on good works and security built on objectifying knowledge."^
As stated previously demythologizing is closely
related to the two main themes so far dealt with in Bui tularin'
theology. We have now considered its relation to the
subject-object pattern of thought and will next turn to its
relation to hermeneutics. The reason for considering de¬
laythologizing in our discussion of Bultmann's hermeneutics
is related to its underlying meaning or intention. As we
have already seen, mythology's purpose is to be distinguished
from its form of expression. The latter must be interpreted
to arrive at the former; hence demythologizing comes under
the heading of hermeneutics. Of demythologizing Bultmann
says: "Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological state¬
ments but to interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics
Because of the difference in the purpose and the form of
mythology Bultmann feels that "...myth contains elements
("3)
which demand its own criticism.
In the following, we see What Bultmann considers to
be the nature of the underlying intention or purpose of
mythology: "Mythology expresses a certain understanding
of human existence.At another point he explains that
since the "real purpose" of myth is to express man's under¬
standing of existence in the world and not a scientific
1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp.83-84.
2 Ibid., p.18.
3 Bultmann, "hew Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth.
I, p.11.
4. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology. p.l9«
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description of the world in itself, it "should be interpreted
not cosmologically, but anthropologically or better still,
existent!ally.
Having established the discrepancy between the
intention and expression of mythology, and having determined
the nature of its underlying intention as existential, his
selection of Heidegger's philosophical framework and
terminology as a form of expression compatible with the
underlying intention of mythological material is hardly
surprising. This completes our analysis of the demytholo-
gizing issue in Bultmann's thought. In its relation to two
basic themes in his theology, the subject-object pattern in
thinking and herroeneutics, the centrality of this concern
can be seen.
50. Pauline theology and Heideggerian existentlals
Having seen how Bultmann's hermeneutics are closely
related to Heidegger's existentialism, we shall next consider
the practical application of these hermeneutical principles
in his interpretation of the New Testament, in particular,
the Pauline epistles. As might be expected, Bultmann sees
Paul's thought coming to its fullest expression when it is
interpreted and expressed in an existential Begrlfflichkeit.
or terminology, instead of the vehicles of expression
available to Paul, e.g. the language of gnosticism and
mystery religions. In his formulation of Pauline theology,
"what" Bultmann says will be influenced by Pauline insights
and "how" he says it by Heideggerian insights.
1 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth.
I., p.10.
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Bultmann justifies his approach to Pauline theology
by the fact that Paul's theological position has a basic
affinity with the principles he has adapted from Heidegger's
philosophy. As he explains, Paul's theology is not
speculative, it deals only with the significance of God
for man, and not His nature in itself.
Correspondingly, it does not deal with the world and
man as they are in themselves, but constantly sees
the world and man in their relation to God. Every
assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion
about man and vice versa. For this reason, and in
this sense, Paul's theology is, at the same time,
anthropology.(1)
In this evaluation of Pauline theology, we can already hear
echoes of Bultmann's views on the nature of existential
understanding, self-understanding and theoretical specu¬
lation about God, for all of which he is indebted to
Heidegger's thought.
Furthermore, because of its particular anthropological
twist, Paul's theology "...can best be treated as his
doctrine of man: first, of man prior to the revelation of
(2)
faith, and second, of man under faith...nv/ Here we
begin to see the very strong influence of Heidegger's
philosophy on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline theology.
In both, the analysis proceeds from inauthentic existence.
We shall also see that Bultmann's analysis aims primarily
at exposing the formal, neutral existential level in Pauline
thought, as was also the case with Heidegger's analysis of
Dasein.
1 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament. I., pp.190-191.
2 Ibid.. p.191.
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The first aspect of Pauline anthropology to be
considered is his use of the terra soma. He begins by
stating that the soma "belongs inseparably, constitutively,
to human existence." Therefore Paul cannot conceive of
a life after death which is not somatic since it would
then not be existence at all and defends the resurrection
of the body in I Corinthians 15. Bultraann refutes the
common sense understanding of this term as the exclusive
interpretation of its Pauline use. "...it is clear that
the soma is not a something that outwardly clings to a man's
real self...but belongs to its very essence, so that we can
say man does not have a soma: he is, soma... (Bultmann
does acknowledge that the word is also used in the ordinary
sense by Paxil, but we shall limit our examination to what he
sees as the distinctive Pauline use of the word).
He defines Paul's distinctive use of this term as
follows: "Man is called soma in respect to his being able
to make himself the object of his own action or to experience
himself as the subject to whom something happens. He can be
called soma, that is, as having a relationship to himself."
He goes on to explain that an important implication of
somatic existence is that man is constantly confronted by
two possibilities. He can either be at one with himself or
estranged from himself. These possibilities of finding or





Now the connection "between this rather theoretical
explanation and actual Scriptural usage is not apparent.
However, if Bultmann's interpretation is to retain its
/
respectability this connection must be clearly seen. Andre
Malet establishes the link by pointing to such passages as:
"he (man) pommels himself and subdues himself" (I Cor. 9:27),
"he delivers himself to be burned" (I Cor. 13:3), "he yields
himself as an instrument to sin or to God" (Rom. 6:12, 12:1),
"he spends himself for Christ" (Phil. 1:20) and "2 Cor. 5:10
declares that everyone will receive 'good or evil according
to what he has done in the soma* - in other words according
to his deeds, according to what he has made of himself by
them."^^ In each of these instances we see a clear
reflection of an understanding of man which assumes an
ability to act upon himself. Here man is seen not as a
material substance but as a relation of self to self.
As Bultmann intends this Pauline concept to be under¬
stood as an existential, he is at pains to stress that the
concept is a neutral, formal one. He explains that because
man can be an object to himself, he can either control his
existence or find it controlled by powers greater than his
own. If the latter occurs, one of two eventualities follows:
this controlling power can make his self estrangement the
permanent factor in his existence or it can give him back to
himself. "That man is soma is in itself neither good nor
bad. But only because he is soma does the possibility exist
( p)
for him to be good or evil...,|V ' In this way he gives to
1 Malet, op.clt., p.34.
2 Bultmann, op.cit., p.196.
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somatic existence the a priori, formal nature of an
existential.
We have, then, seen how Bultmann protects both his
Scriptural flank and philosophical flank from criticism.
We are prepared now to trace more closely how his inter*-
pretation of Pauline anthropology is related to Heidegger's
fundamental ontology. We can recall that the first and
most general existential considered by Heidegger was Being-
in-the-world. Macquarrie summarizes Bultmann's definition
of somatic existence in a threefold manner; existence is
always somatic, man always has a relation to himself, and
therefore he can either be at one with or estranged from
himself. He then points out the striking similarity to
Heidegger's interpretation of existence: man is always
Being-in-the-world, his existence involves a relation of
himself to himself and his existence can be either authentic
or inauthentic.In this comparison Heidegger's
influence becomes quite apparent.
Bultmann next turns to the consideration of several
other Pauline anthropological concepts. In contrast with
soma these terms all refer to man as the subject, not object,
of his own actions. Again we shall only be considering
what Bultmann sees as the distinctive Pauline use of these
terms which does not always coincide with their use in the
more normal sense.
The first term, psyche, is used in a distinctively
1 Macquarrie, op.cit.. p.43*
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Pauline manner in opposition to the more popular Greek
usage as referring to the seat or power of the mental life
in man's make-up. Rather than being the "principle of
animal life" which animates the fleshly body, psyche "...is
that specifically human state of being alive which inheres
in man as a striving, willing, purposing self."^
A closely related concept is referred to as the
pneuma. This too refers to man "in the orientation of his
will," although it also sometimes denotes man in his self-
awareness. Bultmann goes on to summarize Paul's anthropology
as revealed so far: "...man is a living unity. He is a
person v/ho can become an object to himself...He is a person
who lives in his intentional!ty, his pursuit of some purpose,
his willing and knowing (psyche, pneuma).v With his
assertion that these traits are inherent to man's nature
and in themselves are "neither good nor bad", we can again
see his desire to underline their nature as existentials.
He reinforces his summary of the above insights by
analyzing the terra zoe as Paul uses it. In his analysis
of the verbal form of this word, he states:
(Paul)...understands it ("to live" zen) as the life a
man leads in his concrete existence, the intentional!ty
of human existence...zoe...means the life that a man
lives as the subject of his own actions, his living
self (i.e. his striving, willing self) and...he factually
lives only by constantly moving on, as it were, from
himself, by projecting himself into a possibility that
lies before him. He sees himself confronted with the
future, facing the possibilities in which he can gain
his self or lose it. (3)




In Bultmann's analysis of the terms zoe, pneuma
and psyche, we can as easily see the influence of
Heideggerian insights as we did in the case of soma.
Heidegger's portrayal of Dasein as constantly "projecting"
into future "possibilities", as always ahead-of-itself, and
as only being its self authentically by projecting toward
such possibilities, all of these traits are reflected in the
Bultmannian analyses as outlined above. When we recognise
that all of these terms are still being presented as on a
neutral, formal (or existential) level, we again see the
extent to which Bultmann is indebted to Heidegger's funda¬
mental ontology for giving form to his understanding of
Pauline thought.
We turn next to the final group of Pauline concepts
which Bultmann considers as existentials. The term nous
does not mean simply the mind or intellect but implies "the
taking of a stand, a conscious or unconscious volition; it
is an understanding intention, a planning..." He explains
that in Paul's exhortation of Romans 12:2: "Be transformed
by the renewal of your mind", it is obvious that "...what
is meant is not a theoretical re-learning, but the renewal
of the will."^
Macquarrie exposes Bultmann's Heideggerian roots at
this point by stressing that Paul's use of the word nous
in Romans 12:2 clearly substantiates Bultmann's claim that
Heidegger's definition of understanding as primarily practical
1 Ibid., p.211.
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and closely connected with willing and doing is compatible
with Paul's intention and can therefore serve as a
contemporary vehicle for re-expressing Pauline theology.^
Of suneidesis, Bultmann says it "is a man's knowledge
(2)
of his conduct as his own."^ ' The relation of this
definition to Heidegger's understanding of the conscience as
that which calls man back to his true self is significant
enough to be noted. However, even more illuminating for
our purpose is Bultmann's interpretation of Romans 2. The
statement that even the heathen know the law is seen as
indicative of Paul's portrayal of the conscience as a
universal structure in man's nature. In this we can see
Bultmann establishing the existential nature of this inter-
( x)
pretation of the conscience. '
Next we come to Bultmann's analysis of the Pauline
use of kardia. He associates this word very closely with
nous as they are used almost interchangeably by Paul. How¬
ever, there is a subtle but important difference which stems
from the fact that "the element of knowing which is contained
in mind and can be prominently present is not emphasized in
heart, in which the dominant element is striving and will and
(L)
also the state of being moved by feelings."v ' Here we are
reminded of Heidegger's distinction between understanding and
1 Macquarrie, op.cit.. p.65.




moods. Both are modes of disclosure but in distinctive
ways.
51. Pauline theology and Heidegger's existentiell analysis
At the beginning of his next section, Bultmann
explains that he has previously been interested in exposing
the existentlal-ontological level in Pauline anthropology.
Now he proposes to move onto the ontic-exlstent!ell level of
the concrete. "If, up to this point, the ontological
structure of human existence, as Paul sees it, has been
clarified, this, nevertheless only affords the presuppositions
for his ontic statements about man in which his real interest
lies."^^ Therefore he will now move out from the neutral,
formal sphere into the ontic sphere and here also his analysis
will be guided by the direction of the fundamental ontology
of Being and Time. Like Heidegger, Bultmann's ontic
analysis will proceed from the inauthentic to the authentic
level.
In his broad definition of sin, which introduces a
more detailed analysis of sin in Pauline literature, we can
see a basic affinity with Heidegger's understanding of
inauthentic existence. In his philosophy, inauthenticity
enters when Dasein, the 'ontological animal', denies its
true nature by seeking to ground and direct its existence
in a self reliance which Involves a turning away from Being.
Similarly, Bultmann says that the ultimate sin is "...the
false assumption of receiving life not as the gift of the
1 Ibid., p.227.
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Creator but procuring it by one's own power, of living
from one's self rather than from God. In both cases,
the relation to the ultimate dimension, God in one and Being
in the other, is the determining factor for sin or in-
authentic existence.
Heidegger's influence can also be seen in Bultmarm's
assessment of the extent of sin or inauthentic existence.
In Heidegger we find that inauthentic existence "...has to
be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to
Dasein and in which Basein maintains itself for the most
(2)
part#"v In Theology of the New Testament, Bultmann says
that the power of sin can be seen in the fact that it not
only "...completely dominates the man who has become its
victim, but also in the fact that it forces all men without
exception into slavery: "for all have sinned" (Rom. 3:23)"^^
Here}too, can be seen in the similarity of their views the
strong influence of Heidegger on Bultmann's interpretation
of Pauline thought.
We can move next into the particulars of Buitularin's
interpretation of the Pauline understanding of sin and
further see the very strong influence of Heidegger's
philosophy on it. By way of review we need to recall the
four traits Heidegger ascribes to fallenness, which is an
ontological, not ontic, term. The traits are: temptation,
1 Ibid.. p.232.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.220.
3 Bultmarin, op.clt.. p.249«
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"Dasein's structure of existence is such that Dasein is
constantly tempting itself into falling"; tranquillity,
which refers to the "self-sustaining, deceptive nature of
this state of fallenness"; alienation, which refers to
Dasein's being "alienated from and denied access to its
real ground" or self; and entanglement, which indicates
that Dasein in its fallenness, "becomes completely absorbed
in itself" and its world which is a part of itself.
We might elaborate on the first of these traits by
saying that fallenness is an inevitable consequence of
existence as Being-in-the-world. From Dasein's structural
orientation in its world and its neutral concern for worldly
affairs it is only a short step toward inauthentic
absorption in and orientation toward its world. We can
detect this same approach in Bultmann's interpretation of
the Pauline phrases, "in the flesh" and "according to the
flesh."
In the Pauline usage of the phrase "in the flesh"
that interests us, Bultmann asserts that a man's nature
is determined by the sphere within which he moves, the
sphere which marks out the horizon or the possibilities
of what he does and experiences..."to live" or "to walk
in the flesh" means nothing else than simply "to lead
one's life as a man", an idea which in itself does not
involve any ethical or theological judgment but simply
takes note of a fact; not a norm but a field or sphere
is indicated by "in the flesh." (2)
Thus this phrase is a neutral formal one and can be
closely associated with the existential Being-in-the-world.
1 See previously, p. ftf.
2 Ibid*« PP* 235-23
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However, by virtue of its being the antithesis to life
"in the Spirit" or life "in faith" or life "in Christ",
it does have some faint overtone of sinful existence,
just as Being-in-the-world carries within it and is
coloured by the seeds of inauthentic existence.
In the phrase "according to the flesh" this
inevitable fall into sin is more apparent and predominant.
"It stamps an existence or an attitude not as natural-human,
(?)
but as sinful."v ' This phrase is not neutral but
describes man's state when he has succumbed to his existence
"in the flesh" and has allowed his existence to be solely
oriented around this aspect of it.
Bultmann is careful to point out that the term
"flesh" has the same meaning in both phrases which are
rather to be distinguished by the fact that each indicates
a different attitude toward this aspect of existence. As
Macquarrie notes, "...whereas en sarki means usually no more
than to exist in the earthly environment, to be kata sarka
means that man has already decided for the earthly and the
natural, and has rejected God and with God his own authentic
being.
For Heidegger temptation indicates that fallenness
inevitably follows from Being-in-the-world and therefore
inauthenticity is predominant in existence. On the side
of Bultmann we see that he interprets Paul as stressing
1 Ibid., p.23.
2 Ibid.. p.237.
3 Bultmann, op.cit.. p.249.
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that life "in the flesh" inevitably leads to life
"according to the flesh." It is evidently Paul's opinion
"...[that] in man - because his substance is flesh - sin
slumbers from the beginning. Must it necessarily awaken?
Yes..."^ In this way Heidegger's concept of temptation
is clearly reflected in Bultmann's interpretation of the
Pauline understanding of sin. Here again he grounds his
interpretation in Pauline insights and expresses it in
Heideggerian form.
The second trait of Heideggerian fallenness is
tranquillity and we find its Bultmannian parallel in his
interpretation of Paul's phrase "putting one's confidence in
the flesh." (Philippians 3:3-4). Bultman says of this:
"..."confidence in the flesh" is the supposed security which
man achieves out of that which is worldly and apparent, that
(2)
which he can control and deal with.,,v ' The influence of
Heidegger's concept tranquillity (the •deceptive' nature
of fallenness) can easily be seen in Bultmann's words
"supposed security."
The third trait of Heideggerian fallneness is
alien^ation of the authentic from the inauthentic self.
At this point the influence of Heideggerian insights on this
interpretation of Pauline thought is most striking. In
Being and Time we read how Dasein can fall away from itself.
1 Bultmann, op.cit.. p.249.
2 Ibid., p.243.
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"In falling, Dasein itself as factical Being-in-the-world,
is something from which it has already fallen away. .
Similarly, Bultmann states: "...to "be innerly divided, or
not to be at one with one's self, is the essence of human
(2)
existence under sin."v
The influence here continues in that both feel the
possibility of sin or fallermess results from the
structural possibility of man being an issue for himself.
Consider the striking similarity of the following statements.
"Casein can fall only because Belng-in-the-world under-
(3)
standingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. "w/
(Being and Time) "In the fact that man is a self-that
he is a being to whom what matters and should matter is
his life, his self - lies the possibility of sin.
(Theology of the Mew Testament I)
The final trait of fallenness is entanglement,
wherein Dasein becomes ever more absorbed in itself (we should
remember that the world is a part of Dasein's existence).
In entanglement, Dasein's normal orientation to the world
and its existence has becone inauthentically predominant.
We can see this trait in Bultraann's analysis of Pauline
criticism of salvation through observance of the Law. To
trust in strict observance of the Law (which, in its pipper
1 Heidegger op.cit.. p.220.
2 Bultmann, op.cit.. p.245.
3 Heidegger, op.cit.. p.224.
4 Bultmann, op.cit.. p.246.
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perspective, is a constructive aspect of existence) is
merely another mode of insuring salvation by confidence
in the flesh or one's own effort and this "...living out
of "flesh" is the self-reliant attitude of the man who
puts his trust in his own strength and in that which is
controllable by him."^1^
This same trait is also reflected in the Hellenistic
concern for wisdom and pride in knowledge. "The "wise in
the flesh" (I Cor. 1:26) are the wise who trust in themselves,
who are not willing to smash their wisdom before God and
let it become foolishness."^2^ Similarly, "...a life
"after the flesh" is a life of desire - a life of self-
(l)
reliant pursuit of one's own ends."w In this we have
seen that Heidegger's understanding of fallenness, in all
its aspects, is clearly reflected in Bultmann's inter¬
pretation of the Pauline understanding of sin.
Next we shall consider Bultmann's interpretation of
the concept "world" in Pauline thought and see how this too
reflects the influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We can
recall that for Heidegger the world refers to the area of
Dasein's interests, concerns and projects. It is an
existential of Dssein, a part of its existence, and each
world is oriented around a particular Dasein. The world





In Theology of the New Testament I, we find: "...kosmos
does not always mean earth as the mere stage for man's life
and living, but often denotes the quintessence of earthly
conditions of life and earthly possibilities...accordingly,
human life in its worldly aspects, in its hustle and bustle,
in its weal and woe, is a "dealing with the world" (I Cor.
7:31).
However, this term also has another use in referring
to the sphere which is the antithesis to the realm of the
Lord. Here kosmos refers to the world not in its neutral
sense but as a power over man. This aspect of the term
bears a similarity to the sphere of the flesh discussed
previously and, indeed, Bultmann claims that these two terms
are used synonymously. As we saw before in the case of
flesh, kosmos can be a neutral concept, as can Being-in-the-
world, but it can also become a pejorative one, just as
fallenness stems from Being-in-the-world. Hence kosmos can
indicate the fact that "...the world of men, constituted by
that which the individual does and upon which he bestows his
(2)
care, itself gains the upper hand over the individual."v/
And finally we can see in Bultmann's interpretation
of this term a reflection of the Heideggerian concept das
Man. As noted earlier, this terra refers to the power
wielded by the mass media in radio, television and press
which completely stamps out any individuality and provides




authentic resolve and decision. According to Bultmann,
by kosmos Paul is referring to the fact that "...In modern
terms, the "spirit of the world" is the atmosphere to whose
compelling influence every man contributes but to which he
is always subject."^'
We turn next to Bultraann's consideration of Pauline
terms related to authentic existence. His relation to
Heidegger at this point will be understandably less than in
prior analyses since they basically disagree on the forces
responsible for the transition from inauthentic to authentic
existence, or from life "according to the flesh" to life in
faith. For the philosopher, the resolute Dasein is able
to approach authenticity by its own efforts; for the
theologian, such a transition is only possible due to the
aid of an ultimate power. Nevertheless, there are certain
aspects of the Pauline understanding of the Christian life
which Bultmann feels can find contemporary expression in
Heidegger's terminology since there are some points of
agreement between the two on this issue of Christian or
authentic existence.
In his understanding of faith, Bultmann sees Paul as
employing several concepts similar to existential insights.
For Paul, one aspect of faith is knowledge and; "Ultimately
'faith' and 'knowledge1 are identical as a new understanding




understanding with its indebtedness to Heideggerian insights
has already been established, (see p.2) One example of
Bultraann's Scriptural support for this interpretation would
be Romans 12:2; "be transformed by the renewal of your mind
that you may prove what is the will of God..." After
analysing other texts he states: "...it becomes clear that
knowledge in all its forms and degrees besides being an
understanding of its object is simultaneously an existential
understanding of one's self in faith.
Another trait of the Pauline treatment of faith is
that, as obedience, it is a decision. "Faith...is the free
deed of obedience in which the new self constitutes itself
in place of the old. As this sort of decision, it is a
deed in the true sense: In a true deed the doer himself is
inseparable from it, while in a "work" he stands side by
(2)
side with what he does."v '
Here we can see the influence of the "decision" by
the authentic resolute Dasein to accept what is revealed in
the call of the conscience and thereby enter into authentic
existence. Thus, there is this element of decision in both.
Further, the Bultmannian distinction between "true deed"
and "work" brings to mind Heidegger's understanding of
authentic actions as projections wherein Dasein creates its
own "situation", and makes its world its own by putting its
personal stamp or impression on it. In both instances then,





Bultmann also sees in the Pauline understanding of
faith an element of hope which points the believer toward
the future. "This hope is the freedom for the future and
the openness toward it which the man of faith has because
he has turned over Ms anxiety about Mmself and Ms future
to God in obedience. As we saw previously, Heidegger
also considers an orientation to and openness for the
future an essential aspect of authentic existence.
Another "indispensable constitutive element in faith"
is fear. Fear is a factor in that faith is based on the
grace of a God who is also a Judge. For faith fear has not
only the negative function of breaking down "false security
and directing the believer's attention away from Mmself
towards God's grace wMch alone supports Mm. ..but also the
positive purpose of making man conscious of Ms responsibility
(2)..."v ' We can see the influence of Heidegger on Bultmann's
interpretation of Pauline tMnking here by recalling that in
anxiety man experiences the futility of his efforts at self
sufficiency, breaks Ms over involvement with Ms world and
is thereby prepared for a reorientation toward Being. Although
these concepts bear different titles, there can be little
doubt as to the similarity of their functions and roles.
Here, too, Bultmann finds in Heidegger's philosophy a
contemporary outlook which, due to its compatibility with





Another Pauline concept concerning the life of faith,
or authentic existence, is freedom. In Bultmann's treatment
of this concept we can see further evidence of his
indebtedness to Heideggerian insights. Basically he inter¬
prets Paul's view of sin as the surrender of man's old self-
understanding "in which he lives unto himself, tries to
achieve life by his own strength, and by that very fact
falls victim to the powers of sin and death and loses himself."
In the new self-understanding of faith, man gains freedom
from these powers and is able to find himself and life.
"This freedom arises from the very fact that the believer...
no longer 'belongs to himself' (I Cor. 6:19), no longer bears
the care for himself...but lets care go, yielding himself
entirely to the grace of God. In Heidegger's under¬
standing of fallenness as entanglement of Basein, in which
it becomes totally absorbed in itself, and in the under¬
standing of authentic existence as re-orientation out of
the self toward Being we can see the source of the
Bultmannian re-ejipression of Paul on this point.
Another aspect of the Pauline approach to freedom
as noted by Bultmann is that it is "...freedom from all
(p)
human conventions and norms of value."v Here again we
see close ties with Heidegger's understanding of authentic





And finally we see that freedom for Paul meant
freedom from enslavement to the world. "Free from the
world's care which binds one to perishing things...[man]
faces the world free, as one who...participates in the
tumult of the world but does so with an inner aloofness -
'as if (he did it) not'..."^"^ Here too we can see
reflections of Heidegger's understanding of authentic
existence in which Dasein deals with its world in a
constructive manner without succumbing to the temptation of
grounding its existence in worldly concerns. The relation
between the two is quite apparent here as well as in the
previous instances.
Another theme of Pauline thought, which is also
found in the Gospel of John, is the role of the indicative
versus the imperative in the Christian life. We might add
that this is a constantly recurring theme in Bultmann's
thinking. In History and Bschatology he explains that the
life of faith can never be seen as a possession. "As for
Paul, so for John, the life of the believer is not a static
state but a dynamic movement in the dialectic of Indicative
versus imperative. The believer must still become what he
(2)
already is, and he is already what he shall become."N As
a result of this dialectic it can be said that in regard to
the Christian life the phrase "...'Become what thou artJ*
1 Ibid., p.351.
2 Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology. (Edinburgh:
The University Press, 1957), p.48.
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is valid.
We can see the strength of Heidegger's influence on
Bui tularin's interpretation of Pauline thought at this point
by noting the follov/ing statement from Being and Timet "...
Dasein is constantly more than it factually is...as Being-
possible. . .it ijs existentially that which, in its potentiality-
for-Being, it is not yet...only because it is what it
(2)
becomes...can it say to itself 'Become what you are'..."v
Hence in Bultmann's understanding of the Christian
life as a process of constant renewal and striving we can
again see how such Heideggerian structures as Being-ahead-of,
possibility, and projection, traits which are related to
Dasein's constant realization of its authentic existence
by continually projecting out onto ever new possibilities,
provide the necessary terminology for giving new form to
Scriptural insights.
We have now considered the relevant aspects of
Bultmann's interpretation and re-expression of Pauline
theology and have noted how, both in its overall structure
(e.g. he employs the exlstentiell-existential distinction and
moves in his consideration from inauthentic to authentic
existence), and in its details it is strongly influenced
by Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. This further substantiates
our thesis that Bultmann's hermeneutics, the backbone of
his theology as a whole, is indebted to Heideggerian thought
1 Rudolf Bultraann, Theology of the New Testament. I, p.332.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.185-186.
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not only for its basic principles and structure but also
for its actual form of expression.
It should be noted that Macquarrie's An Existentialist
Theology has also dealt with the influence of Heidegger*s
philosophy on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline theology.
While our analysis has covered much of the same ground as
Macquarrie's, it has done so in light of implications in
Heidegger's thinking which were not yet apparent when
Macquarrie's work was published. As we shall see in a
subsequent chapter, however, Macquarrie has analysed the new
implications of these later developments in Heidegger's
thinking for theology in a subsequent work.
This also brings to a conclusion our analysis of
Bultmann's hermeneutics as a whole. In looking at his
hermeneutics by way of evaluating such topics as exegesis,
the hermeneutical circle, demythologizing, and his inter¬
pretation of Pauline theology we have repeatedly established
how closely Bultmann is influenced by the philosophy of
Martin Heidegger in this central theme of his theology. The
very length of this analysis in comparison with that of the
relation between philosophy and theology, the subject-object
pattern of thinking and the following discussion of history
bears out our earlier contention that Bultmann's hermeneutical





52. History and Possibilities
Having seen the subject-object pattern of thinking
as an underlying theme in Bultmann's thought and hermeneutics
as one of his main interests, we turn now to a third general
area of thought which has challenged Bultmann throughout his
career, the field of history. Heinrich Ott estimates the
importance of this concern for Bultmann as follows: "As a
historian, as a man, and as a Christian, Bultmann is concerned
with the problem of history. Perhaps we may say that it is
the one great theme which claims his thought. (This
does not contradict our previous assertion concerning the
importance of hermeneutics in Bultmann's theology, since
hermeneutics involves history as one of several fields to
be interpreted.)
Again we need to recall that our analysis of Bultmann's
thought is restricted to those areas influenced by the
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. We will be required to
proceed with the utmost caution in the following discussion
due to the fact that Bultmann's philosophy of history is
rooted in the insights developed by numerous other thinkers.
Further, many of these other thinkers are indebted to each
other and therefore a clear line of influence is not always
1 Heinrich Ott, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History",
The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. ed. by Charles Kegley,
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), p.51.
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discernible. For instance, both Heidegger and Bultmann
have studied the approach of Wilhelm Bilthey and it cannot
be ascertained exactly which of the Heideggerian insights
Bultmann employs are uniquely Heidegger's and which result
from his study of Dilthey's work or Indeed any number of
other thinkers also familiar to Bultmann.
Despite these difficulties, we shall be able to show
that Bultraann is heavily indebted to Heidegger in his
approach to history. First we shall listen to several
different commentators, as well as Bultmann himself, as they
express their evaluation of Heidegger's influence on
Bultmann's understanding of history. Walter Schmlthals
states: "The concepts of historicity, temporality and
futurity are therefore not expressions developed ad hoc by
Bultmann; he takes them over directly from Heidegger.
Macquarrie, in analysing Bultmann's book History and
Eschatology, says that in spite of his repeated interest in
Collingvood's theory of history and only one "passing
reference to Heidegger's teaching on history...It would
seem that the major influence with Bultmann is still that
of Heidegger.
Bultmann's indebtedness is to be seen not only in
secondary sources but is openly acknowledged by the
theologian himself. "My view of the historicity of human
life is oriented to the scheme of the ontological structure
1 Schmithals, op.cit.t p.311.
2 John Macquarrie, The Bcope of Demythologizing, (London:
SCM Press, Ltd., I960), p.89.
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of human being as the analysis of existence, especially
Heidegger's, has traced it out. More specifically,
he says of his analysis of human existence as historical:
"...I use the concepts of authentic and inauthentic
existence and of history and historicity developed by
(?)
Heidegger in his Being and Time."v '
Basically our discussion of Bultmann's approach to
history will be structured around three topics, history as
the realm of possibility, history and man's structure as
historical, and eschatology. In all three we will note
the influence of Heidegger's philosophy.
Before we see Bultmann's understanding of history
as the realm of possibilities, we should recall Heidegger's
views on this same subject. Not only does he see history
as primarily the realm of possibilities rather than just a
sourcebook of completed actions and past facts, but he also
stresses that the possibilities found in history are
factical in nature. They are not completely open-ended
and oriented only toward future actions but are grounded and
determined by the past from which they arose. Hence the
interest in futural possibilities does not exclude a concern
for historical roots or past events.
With our knowledge that Heidegger considers history
1 Bultmann, "Reply", The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed.
by Charles Kegley, p.279«
2 Ibid., p. 274.
293
to be primarily the realm of the possible, if we can
establish that Bultmann approaches it with a similar concern
for possibilities, then we will have shown a substantial
relation between the two. In Jesus Christ and Mythology
he explains that his motive for studying history is to
"gain an understanding of the possibilities of human life
and thereby of the possibilities of my own life. The
ultimate reason for studying history is to become conscious
of the possibilities of human existence.
Similarly, in "The Significance of Dialectical
Theology" Bultmann says that because of the dialectical
theologians* understanding of human existence, any historical
source is approached with the presupposition that "in it a
possibility of human existence has been grasped and expressed.
We shall therefore achieve a final understanding of the
text only when we reach final clarity on the possibilities
of human existence."v Thus we can clearly establish
that Bultmann shares Heidegger's interest in history as the
realm of possibilities and at this point is directly
influenced by Heidegger's views.
Our review of Heidegger's understanding of
possibilities noted that the range of possibilities
encountered by the historian is limited by his facticity or
relation to the past. This stems from the fact that Dasein's
1 Bultraann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.53.
2 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p.150.
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possibilities are inherited, it is thrown into a situation
not of its own choice (although it can resolutely accept it.)
In the discussion of history in Being and Time. Heidegger
labels as "heritage" those possibilities inherited from the
past which Dasein can resolutely accept as its own. For him
then, future projections are grounded in these possibilities
inherited from the past.
Similarly, Bultmann explains that man's real relation
to history stems from the fact that "...the history from
which we come gives us in advance the possibilities for our
action in the present, with regard to the tasks which the
future has in store for us. That is, we receive from our
history an inheritance which is binding on us in the
present.
Further, in History and Eschatology he says: "The
concrete possibilities for human actions are, of course,
(2)
limited by the situation arising from the past."v ' There¬
fore, in his discussion of history as the realm of possibilities
and in his more specific discussions of the nature of these
possibilities we can clearly see the influence of Heidegger's
philosophy of history with its interest in possibilities
and heritage.
Before moving to our next area of interest, we might
note that one of the repercussions of Bultmann's emphasis on
1 Bultmann, Essays, p.104.
2 Bultraann, History and Eschatology. p.141.
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possibilities in history is his concern for deraythologizing.
Macquarrie suggests that the task of demythologizing can be
discussed not only in terms of separating mythical form
from underlying intention but also in terms of separating
what is primarily historical (or related to a being whose
mode of Being is existence) from what is secondarily historical
(or an entity whose being is described as ready-at-hand or
present-to-hand). The primary historical element would be
the realm of retrievable possibilities. "What Bultmann is
striving to do is to spotlight this essential primary
historical in the New Testament, to separate it from the
now meaningless secondary historical, and so make it a real
possibility of decision for man today."
53* History and man's structure
The second of our three divisions in this analysis
is concerned with the peculiar inter-relationship of history
and man's structure in Bultraann and Heidegger. That these
two factors are closely related for Heidegger can be seen
in his inclusion of an analysis of history in Being and Time,
which is devoted exclusively to fundamental ontology. Hence,
his discussion of history forms one chapter in his analysis
of man's structures of existence.
More specifically we can recall that man can retrieve
possibilities through historical awareness only because his
structure is one which resolutely takes over its heritage
or the possibilities into which Dasein has been thrown. For
Heidegger then, we can be historians only because we are
1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.165.
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fundamentally historical by nature. Finally that history
and man's structure are inter-related for Heidegger can be
established by the fact that possibilities play a key role
in both.
Here also, if we can ascertain that Bultmann closely
relates history and man's nature in the same way as Heidegger
does, then we can show that he is influenced by this
philosopher. First, we shall establish that the twro are
closely inter-related for Bultmann. In History and
Eschatology Bultmann says that man's historical nature stems
not from the fact that he is "an individual who passes through
history, who experiences history, who meets with history.
No, man is nothing but history...
In his essay "Christianity as a Religion of East and
West" he says of his own approach to history: "... it becomes
clear...that with the view we have of history is connected a
conception of human existence as such. The inquiry into
the meaning of history is dependent on that which inquires
(2)
into the meaning of human existence."v And at another
point he asks the rhetorical question: "Must not a
theological understanding of history start from an under¬
standing of the historical character of man (as of that
which belongs to the nature of man's being), not however,
from the understanding of history as of a connected series
(l)
of occurrences of the past?"w/ Hence, we have established
1 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p.11.
2 Bultmann, Essays, pp.223-224.
3 Bultmann, "The Bible Today und die Eschatologie", quoted
in Kegley's, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. p.167.
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that for Bultmann, history is to he understood in light of
man's structure and that consequently historical studies
are only possible due to man's historical nature. In both
instances we can see his relation to Heidegger's views as
we reviewed them earlier.
We can see a further relation to Heidegger in
Bultraann's insistence that the study of history, if done
properly, is not an "objective" abstract pursuit but one
which deepens and directs one's own existence. We might
here recall Heidegger's oft quoted statement on history
that "only factually authentic historicality as resolute
destiny can so reveal past history that in the repetition
the force of the possible gets struck home into one's
factical existence, which is to say will be allowed to
affect its futurity." (see p.115 )
Bultmann reflects this in the following manner:
...history can...be understood as the range of
possibilities for human self-understanding, which
range is disclosed precisely in man's decisions.
Through them, one can see that man not only stands
within a historical course of events but is himself
historical. It is then a question of the extent to
which he is conscious of his own historicity, that is,
how far he is conscious of being able in history to
gain or lose his authentic existence...^)
5^. Eschatology
Just as we previously analysed Bultmann*s under¬
standing of hermeneutics by considering his actual
application of hermeneutical principles in the inter-
pretation of Pauline theology, so also we can better
comprehend his understanding of history and historical
1 Bultmann, "Reply", p.267.
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existence by observing the application of these insights
into what he calls the eschatological event.
Edwin Good, in his essay "The Meaning of
Demythologizing", stresses just bow broad a meaning this
terra has for Bultmann. The adjective •eschatological' is
applied to all aspects of existence in faith as well as
referring to Christ's death and resurrection as an event
to be constantly appropriated into the lives of subsequent
Christian generations. In a very real sense , he says, these
eschatological events continually recur in the present through
the proclamation of the Word and the celebration of the
sacraments. As a result, the Christian life of faith,
hope and love is constantly involved in and determined by
the eschatological event. Furthermore, the apostles and
all subsequent believers "belong to the one eschatological
event.
Hence we can see that Bultmann*s definition of
eschatology and eschatological event is rather distinctive
in its scope. For our part we shall consider of the
components mentioned above the once-for-allness of the
eschatological event, its relation to the cross, resurrection,
and proclamation of the Word, and finally eschatological
existence.
We should first note that demythologizing is also
involved here. In Jesus Christ and Mythology Bultmann
1 Edwin Good, "The Meaning of Demythologizing", The Theology
of Rudolf Bultmann. ed. by Charles Kegley, p.74.
299
says that the real issue for demythologizing is whether
the understanding of Christ as the "...eschatological event
is inextricably bound up with the conceptions of cosmological
eschatology as it is in the New Testament... The
intention of the myth, then, is to be separated from its
expression in the contemporary forms of apocalypticism.
In order to facilitate our understanding of this
distinctive approach to eschatology, we should note that it
is no longer solely concerned with matters of the future or
end-time. Instead it significantly bears on present as
well as future matters. In Primitive Christianity in its
Contemporary Setting Bultmann describes Jesus' eschatological
message by saying that His "...word invites men to decide
for the reign of God now breaking in. Now is the last hour.
Now it is Eithen-Or. Now the question is: Do men really
(2)
want God's reign? Or is it the world they want?"v As
confronting man with a decision to be made in the present,
we can see how a future event can break into the present
dimension and how eschatological concerns are related to the
present as well as future dimension.
Having established that the eschatological event
does not refer merely to some future matter, we are better
able to follow Bultmann's characterization of this as a
1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.81.
2 Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary
Betting, trans, by R.H. Fuller, (London: Thames and Hudson,
1956), p.90.
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once-for-all event. In Kerygraa and j/Iyth,I. he explains
that the New Testament reference to the Christ event as
ephapaz "...teaches us in a high degree of paradox to
believe that just such an event of the past is the once-and-
for-all eschatological event, which is continually re-enacted
(1)
in the world of proclamation."v '
Thus for Bultmann an eschatological event has a
once-for-all nature not in the sense of happening once and
never again but in the sense of happening once-for-all ages.
The once-for-allness of a past event stems from the fact that
it can have repercussions in the lives of subsequent
generations. What happened in the past can determine events
in the present and this is what Bultmann refers to as a
once-for-all eschatological event.
Buitularin's debt to Heideggerian insights is easily
seen in the fact that this concept, eschatological event, is
very close in its meaning to Heidegger's "repeatable
authentic possibility" which has previously been defined
as an event "which can be repeated so that the power of the
possible is felt in present existence." Similarly, in the
eschatological event the power of divine grace and the
possibility it offers to man, first actualized in the person
of Christ, is felt again whenever the V/ord is proclaimed and
heard.
Let us now look at two components we would expect to
1 Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics", Kerygma and
Myth. 2, p.209.
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find in the eschatological event and a third which is more
uniquely Bultmannian. The first two are the cross and
resurrection. To believe in the cross, he explains, does
not involve any concern for an "objective event turned to
our advantage by God" but instead means "to make the cross
of Christ our own, to undergo crucifixion with Him."^^
Hence, the significance of the cross only becomes apparent
for those who are willing to die to the concerns of this
world and be raised anew into a life with Christ. The
crucifixion now becomes an opportunity or possibility which
is repeatedly offered to men whenever the Gospel is pro¬
claimed. It is as an eschatological event and not just a
past historical fact that the cross is significant.
As for his understanding of the resurrection, we
need recall that our analysis is concerned only with
Bultmann's thought that is influenced by Heidegger's philosophy.
Therefore we will not be engaging in the controversy
concerning Bultmann's appraisal of the resurrection as an
event of significance solely in the realm of Geschichte as
against Historie. Nor will we analyse in detail his close
association of the cross and resurrection. Suffice it to
say that the cross can only be seen in light of the
resurrection for the tv/o "form a single, indivisible cosmic
event which brings judgment to the world and opens up for
(2)
men the possibility of authentic life..."v
1 Bultraann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth,
I, p.36.
2 Ibid., pp.39 and 41.
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Of the real significance of the resurrection,
Bultmann says that just as all men die to their old
selves with Christ on the cross, so through His
resurrection all receive new life. "Paul does not only
say: 'In Christ shall all he made alive'; he can also
speak of rising again with Christ in the present tense,
just as he speaks of our dying with Him..."'"^ As in
his understanding of the cross, Bultmann feels that the real
meaning of the resurrection stems not from its miraculous
form hut rather from the possibilities it offers for
subsequent generations. It is to he seen as a present
option for a believer's life and not as an objective, past
event.
Having repeatedly noted that the cross and resurrection,
by virtue of their eschatological status, offer possibilities
significant for present existence, we come now to the
consideration of a third, more unique, component of the
eschatological event. This component, proclamation of the
Word, is responsible for the past act of Christ becoming
significant for later generations of believers. It is the
avenue across history by virtue of which the Christ event
remains ever contemporaneous.
We need to realize, as Good noted earlier, that
preaching is equally a part of the eschatological event
along with the cross and resurrection. They are all parts
of a unit for Bultmann. In Existence and Faith he says:
1 P*40*
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"...the preaching itself belongs to the fact of salvation
In "New Testament and Mythology" Bultmann explains
that proclamation of the word following the events of
Easter is actually an extension of that occurrence.
This word supplements the cross and makes its saving
efficacy intelligible by demanding faith and confronting
men with the question whether they are willing to under¬
stand themselves as men who are crucified and risen with
Christ. Through the word of preaching the cross and
the resurrection are made present: the eschatological
"now" is here...
We have already noted how the structure of the
eschatological event, with its emphasis on the significance
of the cross and resurrection for present existence, is
oriented toward the Heideggerian concept of possibilities
and with a consideration of preaching as another component
of the eschatological event we shall see a further relation
to Heidegger*s philosophy. At this point we need to recall
how in his discussion of history in Being and Time. Heidegger
employed the term wiederholen or retrieve.
We previously described retrieving as "...an attempt
to go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities
which are thus explicitly handed down or trai smitted."
Further on it is explained as a "going into the past in such
a way that one fetches back the possibility which it contains
(3)
and makes present this possibility in our existence now.nv '
Hence, in Bultmann*s concept of preaching as a making present
1 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p.79.
2 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygraa and Myth,
I, p.42.
3 See previously, p. 109
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of the Easter event we can see the influence of this
Heideggerian concept.
As we noted in Edwin Good's analysis which served
as our introduction to Bultmann's eschatology, Christian
existence is also included in this broad concept. Bultmann
himself notes in Jesus Christ and Mythology that "to live in
faith is to live an eschatological existence.This
transferring of eschatology's significance from the
cosmological to the historical - existential realm is most
apparent throughout his discussion of eschatological
existence. Instead of dealing with the cataclysmic end
times he deals with the end of the old man and the beginning
of the new in the transition from inauthentic to authentic
existence. In this way eschatology becomes highly
individualized.
As Bultmann explains, the real significance of
mythological statements about the end of the age becomes
clear when one recognizes that the old age or past is
"...not only a cosmic situation...but rather my particular
past, in which I was a sinner, and the future for which I
(2)
am freed is likewise my future."v 7 In this interpretation,
then, eschatology is "wholly realised and wholly
individualized.
We can now consider several specific traits of this
eschatological existence and observe their relation to
Heidegger's philosophy. Both Schubert Ogden in his
1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.81.
2 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, pp.254-255.
3 H.P. Owen, Revelation and Existence, (Cardiff: University
of Wales Press, 1957), p.45.
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Introduction to Existence and Faith and H.P. Owen in
Revelation and Existence refer to the frequency with which
Bultmann cites the Pauline passage of I Cor 7:29-31*
It is this passage which Bultmann feels reflects the
Christian's authentic relation to the world.
R.H. Fuller in his book The New Testament in Current
Study says that for Bultmann this passage, with its description
of Christians as "those who deal with the world as though
they had no dealings with it," reflects the nature of true
(2)
eschatological existence. In his essay "The Understanding
of Man" Bultmann prefaces his quote of this Pauline passage
by saying that belief means the "taking of man out of the
world, and his ingrafting into eschatological existence. In
this way it gives to the man of faith a peculiar detachment
from the world. .
In his Theology of the New Testament, I, Bultmann
stresses that this "as though not" of eschatological
existence does not imply a complete withdrawal from the
world but only an avoidance of inauthentic immersion in
worldly affairs. Because the Christian is free from a total
involvement in worldly co cerns "...he faces the world free,
as one who rejoices with those who rejoice and weeps with
those who weep (Rom. 12:15), one who participates in the
1 Ibid.. p.46, and Schubert Ogden, "Introduction" to
Bultmann's Existence and Faith, p.20.
2 R.H. Fuller, The New Testament in Current Study. (London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.15.
3 Bultmann, Essays, p.86.
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tumult of the world but does so with an inner aloofness -
"as if (he did it) not"..."^
In Bultmann's stress on the "as though not" of the
Christians relation to the world we see the influence of
Heidegger's views on authentic Being-in-the-world wherein
Dasein maintains the dialectical tension between Being-in-
the-world and being immersed inauthentically in it. Like
Heidegger, Bultmann recognizes the need to have dealings
with the world, but he feels that in eschatological
existence man should be "in" but not "of" the world.
We can see another basic Heideggerian influence on
Bultmann's understanding of eschatological existence by-
considering its temporal structure. Basically we shall see
that Bultmann follows Heidegger in associating an openness
for the future with authentic existence and an orientation
toward the past with inauthenticity. Like Heidegger's
views on the past dimension and inauthentic existence,
Bultmann says: "To live on the basis of...the past is what
/ p)
is called sin. ' The influence continues with Bultmann's
description of the past as something to which man "clings"
in fleeing the responsibility of deciding for the future.
This clearly reflects Heidegger's portrayal of the past or
'Basein as having been' as a "secure retreat.
Of the future and the life of faith, Bultmann says
1 Bultmann, Theology of the Hew Testament. I, p.351.
2 Bultmann, Essays, p.81.
3 Ibid., p.80.
4 See previously, p. 9
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that to live "on the hasis of the future is called living
in dependence on God. As Schmithals notes, faith for
(2)
Bultmann is "simple openness for the future."v ' This too
clearly reflects Heidegger's association of authenticity
with a readiness to face the future of new possibilities
and decisions. Thus we can see that Bultmann's portrayal
of the temporal dimension underlying eschatological existence
is strongly influenced by Heidegger's understanding of
Dasein's temporal nature.
With this we conclude our consideration of the nature
of eschatological existence. As we have seen, eschatolo¬
gical existence was Just one component of the eschatological
event, a concept with an unusually broad meaning in its
Bultraannian context. Other components were the once-for-
all nature of this event, the cross, resurrection and
proclamation of the Word. As we examined each of these we
noted their reflection of Heideggerian concepts.
And finally, to provide a broader perspective of our
present position, we might recall that our consideration of
Bultmann's eschatology brings to an end our analysis of his
understanding of history. The other components in this
discussion were history as the realm of possibilities and
history in its relation to the historical structure of human
existence. In each of these cases also we clearly
established Heidegger's influence.
1 Bultmann, Essays, p.81.
2 Schmithals, op.cit.. p.101.
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The Later Heidegger and Bultmann
Section Five
55« A critical appraisal of Bultmann
Having traced Heidegger*s influence on various
aspects of Bultmann*s theology, e.g. his views on the
subject-object pattern of thinking, his views on
hermeneutics and his understanding of history, we are now
prepared to note that we have been dealing mainly with the
early Heidegger. In the following we shall point out
the consequences of Bultmann*s disproportionate interest
in the earlier Heidegger and make several suggestions
concerning the fruitfulness of Heidegger's later thought
for Bultmann*s theology.
As wre saw in our previous analysis of Being and Time,
Heidegger repeatedly stressed that his interest in Dasein
was merely a means to an end. Indeed, his description of
the Dasein analysis as fundamental ontology very pointedly
reminded readers of his underlying ontological aim. Despite
these repeated reminders in Being and Time. Bultmann never¬
theless treats the analysis of Dasein as an end in itself.
In doing so he fails to appreciate Heidegger's expressed
ontolc-gical intentions.
This fact has not been lost on other thinkers familiar
with the work of both men. Heinrich Ott, in his work
Denken und Sein, states that because of his misinterpretation
of Heidegger as an existentialist, "...Bultmann may
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legitimately appeal to Heidegger only to a very limited
extent.Indeed Ott's book has been seen as highly
critical of the way Bultmann uses Heidegger's insights. It
is his contention that because Heidegger's motive in Being
and Time was ontological, Bultmann's existential adaptation
(2)
of it is inappropriate and somewhat distorting.x
Against such criticism of Bultmann's use of
Heidegger's philosophy, we have to balance the following
information provided in Andre Malet's very favourable
analysis of Bultmann's theology. "In a letter of 30
November 1954, Heidegger approves unreservedly of using his
analysis of existence for interpreting the New Testament
and states that Bultmann has 'made no mistake whatever'
about his thought."^ ^
Several points need be noted by way of reconciling
these seemingly opposing interpretations. First, we need
to recognize the extremely sympathetic position Malet takes
and his constant defence of Bultmann's position. (As noted
previously, Bultmann himself wrote the preface to the book
in which he highly praises its position.) Next, we can
agree that Bultmann is correct in his use of Heidegger's
philosophy so far as he goes -with it. Thus, in the
1 Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein. (Switzerland: Evangelischer
Verlag Ag. Zollikon, 1959), p.8.
2 James Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later
Heidegger and Theology, ed. by J. Robinson and J.B. Cobb, p.17.
3 Malet, op.cit., p.326.
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influences noted previously there was no criticism of
Bultmann's adaptation of Heidegger's philosophy, and it
is agreed that Bultmann's use of Heidegger's philosophy
in interpreting the New Testament is correct.
Where we must disagree with Malet, however, is in
our assertion that Bultmann is not appreciative of later
developments in Heidegger's thinking and fails to take
account of these in his own thinking. As we saw earlier,
Heidegger himself acknowledges that he abandoned the
terminology and perspective of his earlier position, as
epitomized in Being and Time, in favour of another standpoint
toward which his earlier thinking was 'on the way.' The
standpoint adapted by Bultraann represents Heidegger's
participation in a mode of thinking which was to be over¬
come by his later thinking. Therefore we can say with
Malet that Bultmann is correct in so far as he goes and with
Ott that he does not continue to appreciate Heidegger's
thoughts as they later develop.
Having established our position that Bultmann does
not sufficiently follow Heidegger in his later thinking, we
can next take note of the consequences this has for his
theological position. Basically we can see that, Just as
the early Heidegger was criticized for being too Dasein
oriented or anthropocentric in his approach, so also has
Bultmann been subjected to parallel criticism. liis failure
to appreciate the later developments which corrected and
provided balance in Heidegger's philosophy resulted in
Bultraann's susceptibility to critics' charges of an
anthropocentric bias.
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Karl Barth reflects the feelings of many critics
when he claims that Bultmann's position harbors a "pre-
Copernican attitude" wherein the understanding of God is
subordinated to the understanding of man. The danger here
is that theology will lose the initiative in its relation
to philosophy and fall into an "Egyptian bondage" with its
results being dictated by philosophical insights.In
this same essay Barth also refers "to the younger Heidegger
(2)
in his anthropological strait - jacketl"v ' Hence, by
implication, he supports our contention that the consequence
of Bultmann's exclusive reliance on the earlier Heidegger is
susceptibility to charges of anthropological bias.
In addition we can note Macquarrie's similar
appraisal of Bultmann's use of Heidegger's philosophy. He
approves of this theologian's concern for the existential
element in theology, a concern often neglected and yet very
important for a relevant approach. On the other hand, he
takes Bultmann to task for downplaying the transcendent
element in his theology. He recommends that just as
Heidegger always intended to proceed beyond a Dasein
analysis to a consideration of Being's varied revelations
of itself, "...so theology cannot rest in existential
statements, but must go on to speak of God and the
transcendent - though in both cases the question of man's
existence certainly appears...to be the right starting-point
1 Barth, "Bultmann - An Attempt to Understand Him", Kerygma




Hence we have established that Bultmann disproportion¬
ately relies on the early Heidegger and that this consequently
leaves him open to charges of an anthropological bias. Next
we can consider how the work of the later Heidegger might be
constructively employed in strengthening Bultmann's
theology against such criticisms.
56. The relevance of the later Heidegger
We have already touched on one such use, namely that
Bultmann might have profited from his theology taking a
parallel course to Heidegger's philosophy as it developed
away from an anthropological - existentialist orientation
toward a greater emphasis on the realm of the ontological-
transcendent. Had Bultmann charted his course in the
direction of these later Heideggerian developments, his
theology might have found a balance similar to that of
Heidegger's philosophy and been less susceptible to the
criticism mentioned previously.
Another way Heidegger's later philosophy might be
constructively employed in Bultmann's theology is related
to the fact that a great number of the charges made
against Bultmann's theology concern his understanding or
misunderstanding of the nature of modern man. His critics
feel that Bultmann unjustifiably portrays modern man as
totally closed against and insensitive toward any intrusion
into a self-contained world from a transcendent realm.
1 Macquarrie, op.cit.. pp.244-245.
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These criticisms are directly related to another
set of charges that there is a basic inconsistency in
Bultmann's theology. He aims his existential interpretation
at a modern man portrayed as impervious to any transcendent
intrusion and yet fails to demythologize out what would be
an objectionable intrusion in the form of God's unique action
in Jesus Christ. We shall examine these two weaknesses,
the misunderstanding of modern man and the resulting
inconsistency of a limited demythologizing, in further depth
and then see how an appreciation of Heidegger's later thought
might constructively be employed in resolving both.
First of all, we should establish that Bultmann's
views of modern man as the target for his existential inter¬
pretation do not stem from any Heideggerian influence. His
failure to follow through in his adaptation of Heidegger's
concepts here represents an inconsistency which culminates
in serious problems in his theology. John Macquarrie
stresses in his review of Bultmann on this topic that
"...at this point we perceive in Bultmann's thought not
the influence of existentialism but the hangover of a some¬
what old fashioned liberal modernism.
Karl Jaspers in his essay "Myth and Religion"
explains that Bultmann understands the modern view of the
world as based on a "self-contained causality" which
excludes the possibility of any miraculous interventions.
In criticism of this interpretation, Jaspers says that
1 Ibid., p.168.
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certain aspects of human nature never change and the
openness for mythological intervention from supernatural
powers is one such aspect. "The absurd faiths of the
modern era, ranging from astrology to theosophy, and from
National Socialism to Bolshevism, suggest that superstition
has no less power over the human mind today that it had
formerly.
Jaspers then refutes Buitularin* s claim that scientific
insights have contributed to the modern world-view of a
closed universe by saying that, one, very few of the masses
today really understand the significance and meaning of
scientific insights, and, two, if they did they would realize
that science makes no pretence of providing "...a total
(?)
world view, because it recognizes that this is impossible."v
Support for this view of contemporary man can also be seen
in the modern penchant for the myth of the beauty pageant
queen and the contemporary interest in faith healing and
glossolalia. Hence, it can be said that Bultmann has failed
to evaluate properly the target for his demythologizing and
existential interpretation. Further, because his under¬
standing of modern man is not derived from an appropriate and
contemporary anthropology, it lacks the authority given his
existential interpretation by its being grounded in a
recognized philosophical scheme.
How then can Heidegger*s later insights be fruitfully




adapted at this point in Bui tularin's thinking? L. Malevez
points the way for us here when he examines Heidegger's
thought in the Epilogue to "Was ist Metaphysik?" He
stresses that essential thought for Heidegger is openness
toward and reception of the revelation of Being. He
believes the direct equation of Heidegger's Being with God
is inappropriate but he does feel that the portrayal of
Casein as constantly open and transparent to Being "prepares
(1)
us for the revelation of the true God."v
We can see, then, that the view of modern man
contained in Heidegger's later thought is one which is open
to, and indeed oriented toward, intrusion from a power beyond
its immediate world, a power in control of him and not at
his control. Such a conception of man, if adapted by
Bultmarm, would be less susceptible to the criticisms we
reviewed and certainly more in keeping with what we have
seen to be the nature of modern man.
As stated previously, the charge of a basic in¬
consistency in Bultmarm's theology can be related to the
criticisms concerning his views on the nature of modern man.
In addition, the solution to the weakness leading to one
criticism is pertinent to the solution of the other. The
charge of inconsistency, while voiced by several commentators,
is levelled most vigorously by Schubert Ogden in his book
Christ Without Myth as well as at several other points.
In his essay, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of
History", Ogden says that one of the few points on which
1 Malevez, op.cit., p.146.
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Bultmann's critics agree is that his''demand for radical
demythologizing and existentialist interpretation is
fundamentally inconsistent with his claim that authentic
human existence is factually possible solely in consequence
of God's act in Jesus Christ.
In his book he further explains how these two
concerns are contradictory.
If....Christian faith is to be interpreted solely in
existential terms as man's original possibility of
authentic self-understanding, then it demonstrably
follows that it must be independent of any particular
historical occurrence. On the other hand, if...
Christian faith has a necessary connection with a
particular historical event, then clearly it may not
be interpreted without remainder as man's original
possibility of authentic historicity.^)
First of all, we should stress that Ogden has put
his finger on a real discrepancy in Bultmann's program of
demythologizing. In his essay "New Testament and Mythology",
Bultmann insists that demythologizing must be pursued
rigorously to the end for "we cannot save the kerygma by
selecting some of its features and subtracting others,
and thus reduce the amount of mythology in it..." And
yet, only a few pages later he speaks of a unique act of
God in Jesus Christ. "The New Testament speaks and faith
knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable
of self-commitment, capable of faith and love, of his
(■x)
authentic life."v For Ogden, this amounts to speaking of
1 Schubert Ogden, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History",
The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles Kegley,
pp. 120-121.
2 Ogden, op.cit., p.137.
3 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth,
I, p.9 and p.33.
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an intrusion of the transcendent into man's immanent world,
and this therefore involves mythology.
Bultmann almost seems to anticipate such criticism.
Immediately following the sentence quoted above he asks:
"Have we carried our demythologizing far enough?" and a
few sentences later makes what must seem to Ogden a rather
flimsy attempt at avoiding the issue: "Anyone who asserts
that to speak of an act of God at all is mythological
language is bound to regard the idea of an act of God in
Christ as a myth. But, let us ignore this question for a
(1)
moment."v 7 He returns to the issue in his conclusion to
make a rather ambiguous statement that some language about
an act of God can be mythological but not in the same way
as the mythological language associated with the world view
of the New Testament. He fails, however, to clarify the
(2)
nature of any alternative at this point.v y (It should
be noted that he does seek to rectify this problem later
by supplementing his demythologizing with the use of
analogical language. Since this does not involve any direct
Heideggerian influence, we shall not discuss it here.)
This discrepancy in Bui tularin* s thought results from
his contradictory concerns to (1) stress the transition from
inauthentic existence to authentic existence, or life in
faith, in terms of an existential framework; and (2) to
preserve the uniqueness of God's act in Christ which makes
1 Ibid.. pp.33-34
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this transition possible. The two concerns are contra¬
dictory in that man understood in terms of the existential-
ontological framework of the earlier Heidegger needs no
assistance from a unique act by a transcendent power in
order to effect the transition to authentic existence.
Herein lies the key to this discrepancy and were
Bultmann able to understand man as portrayed by the later
Heidegger or man who is open and receptive to the
transcendent realm, then his understanding of man within
8111 existential framework would be compatible with his stress
on God's unique act in Jesus Christ which makes possible
the transition in man's life. This is not to say that
Heidegger's thinking provides a detailed model for
describing how a transcendent God might break into and
influence existence.
However, a better awareness of the later Heidegger's
treatment of Casein as an entity open to the powers of a
transcendent force would open up Bultmann's theology for
this possibility. Once this occurred, he could go on
to offer an interpretation of the cross and resurrection
which might be less objectionable to more conservative
theologians. Hence we can see how the thought of the
later Heidegger could be utilized to strengthen two
points at which Bultmann's theology is most susceptible to
criticism.
We have already touched on another aspect of the
later Heidegger's thinking which can be constructively
)
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applied to Bultmannian thought in our discussion of the
subject-object pattern in thinking and speaking of God.
There we noted that Bultmann failed to follow through in
his adaptation of Heidegger's views on this problem.
We also suggested that the reason for this was
Heidegger's lack of emphasis on this issue until later
developments in his thinking. With his concern for the
earlier Heidegger of Being and Time. Bultmann was unable to
comprehend fully Heidegger's view point. However, other
Bultmannian's have done so, as we noted in our consideration
of Gogarten's defence of Bultmann in Demythologizing and
History.
Heinrich Ott also has suggested the usefulness of
Heidegger for Bultmann on this point. As we noted
previously, Bultraann does not completely escape the subject-
object dilemma in his thinking and speaking of God. We
saw how he felt any such thinking or talking was necessarily
sinful, although it could be justified by God's forgiveness.
At another point we can see him very clearly denying the
possibility of any non-objectifying thinking about God.
In replying to an essay by Schubert Ogden, Bultraann deals
with the criticism that he can only speak indirectly about
God since he restricts knowledge of God to knowledge of the
self. He defends himself by insisting that it is
impossible to speak directly of God and his actions without
objectifying Him.For Bultmann, then, any thinking or
speaking about God in Himself is necessarily objectifying.
1 Bultmann, "Reply", p.267.
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How then can the later Heidegger* s thinking be
applied at this point? Heinrich Ott, in his books Denken
und Sein and Theology and Preaching suggests that Heidegger's
understanding of essential thinking and language would
resolve Bultmann's dilemma concerning thinking and speaking
of God. Briefly we can recall howr in our own analysis of
the later Heidegger Being took the initiative in both
language and essential thought. Dasein assumed a more
passive role and merely became the place, or da. where
Being's disclosure through word or thought occurred. Indeed,
it is this event which grounded and justified Dasein's
existence.
Let us now see how Ott applies this to Bultmann's
situation. In Denken und Sein. after reviewing Heidegger's
views on essential thinking, he suggests how theology might
be freed of the subject-object pattern of thinking which
inevitably results in objectifying God. By understanding
itself "...as an element of encounter, as encounter with
what is to be thought, which shows itself, "unveils" itself
to thought and thus determines thought...", theology's
dealing with God would not be "about" God, or objectifying,
but could be seen as coming from within the encounter of
faith itself.^
Hence we can see that Ott, utilizing the later
Heidegger's insights, objects to Bultmann's implied
distinction betv/een faith as primary existential encounter
and theology as a secondary objectifying appendage to this
1 Ott, op.cit.. pp.173-174.
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experience. Instead, he feels that thinking in theology
also stems from an encounter with its subject matter which
unveils (aletheia) itself to the thinker.
Clearly^then, Bultmann does remain trapped in some
left-overs of the subject-object pattern of thinking which
were fully removed only in the later thinking of Heidegger,
a thinking which Bultmann has not sufficiently utilized.
However, others such as Ott have done so and quite
constructively, since the result is an approach more
coherent and less susceptible to critics' charges.
In this section, then, we have noted that Bultmann's
understanding of Heidegger's philosophy is oriented toward
the earlier insights expressed mainly in Being and Time.
We have also established that the charges of an anthropo-
centric bias in Bultmann's theology is directly related to
his failure to follow the developments in Heidegger's
thinking toward an ontological orientation. The result is
that while Heidegger's overall philosophical position
maintains a balance between immediate and ultimate or
immanent and transcendent concerns, Bultmann's theology
suffers from an unbalanced emphasis on only the one dimension.
We further noted how the insights of the later
Heidegger might be effectively employed in strengthening
Bultmann's theology against several other criticisms, e.g.
his misunderstanding of the nature of modern man, the
inconsistency of his proposals for radical demythologizing
and retention of God's actions through Jesus Christ, and
finally, his unnecessary distinction between the experience
322
of faith and theological thought. In this we have
established that Bultmann's theology, despite his
preference for the earlier Heidegger, could definitely
be strengthened through a better understanding and
utilization of the later Heidegger's philosophy.
323
Conclusion
57. Heidegger's influence on Bultmann's theology
By way of conclusion let us recall our main thesis
as proposed in the introduction to this analysis which
asserted that Bultmann was influenced to a great extent by
Heidegger's philosophy in both the basic direction and
structure of his theology as well as in many particular
components of it. Let us review our analysis section by
section to summarize the support of this assertion.
On the relation of philosophy and theology we noted
that Bultmann concurs with Heidegger's belief that ontology
lays the foundation for all other disciplines. He thus
adapts the Heideggerian scheme by joining theological
insights on the "here and now" existentiell level into the
broader, neutral structure composed of Heideggerian
exlstentials.
As for the section on Bultmann*s reaction to the
subject-object pattern of thinking, we observed how closely
he followed Heidegger's philosophical reaction against such
thinking. However, we also established that Buitularin's
lack of appreciation of Heidegger's later thinking resulted
in a failure to grasp completely the significance of this
insight which only came to fruition in Heidegger's later
works.
On the other hand, we saw how others (especially
Gogarten) used these later Heideggerian insights in defending
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Bultmann against his critics. Therefore this section as
well as the previous one strongly supported our assertion
concerning the influence of Heidegger*s philosophy. In
addition this section also supported our contention that
Bultmann is influenced mostly by the earlier Heidegger and
as a result his understanding of Heidegger is most accurate
in regard to these earlier works.
The third section of our analysis dealt with
Bultmann*s hermeneutics. We first considered this as
reflected in his views on exegesis. With his concept of
pre-understanding we noted the influence of Heidegger's
belief that all inquiries and analyses are guided by some
sort of vague, ontic awareness which provides a clue as to
the general direction of the analysis. We then observed
how Bultmann directly adapted Heidegger's existential-
existentiell concepts for his own exegetical Begriff1ichkeit
or terminology.
Further, in the Bultmannian concepts Sachexegese
(exegesis of the subject matter) and Sachkritlk (criticism
of the subject matter) we could see the influence of such
Heideggerian concepts as "retrieve" and "Being - aletheia".
We should point out here that these latter two concepts are
found in the later Heidegger so that our contention regarding
the extent of Bultmann's dependence on the earlier Heidegger
could not be phrased too strictly. Thus we qualified it
by saying that Bultmann's adaptation and understanding of
Heidegger is generally (but not exclusively) oriented
toward the earlier Heidegger.
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Our analysis of Bultmann's hermeneutics continued
with a discussion of the concept, "hermeneutical circle."
Here v/e saw how for Bultmann pre-understanding leads to
self-understanding, in which the latter enriches and
deepens the scope of the former in a manner similar to the
relation between an ontic, vague awareness and a deeper
ontological understanding in Heidegger's fundamental ontology.
It further developed that Bultmann's concept of self-under-
standing, as a type of existential knowledge, stemmed from
the Heideggerian distinction between objects vorhanden
(present-at-hand) and zuhanden (ready-to-hand). And
finally it became apparent that Bultmann's claim for an
inherent knowledge of God in all men stemmed from the
Heideggerian understanding of man as the "ontological
animal."
As one form of interpretation, demythologizing v/as
also considered in the section on hermeneutics. This
concept, by virtue of its centrality in Bultmann's theology,
was also related to the previous consideration of the subject-
object dilemma in thinking. Mythology, due to existential
intention being expressed in an objectivizing form (nence
its relation to the problem of subject-object patterned
thinking) necessarily invites interpretation (hence its
relation to hermeneutics). In this way we established that
Bultmann's concept of demythologizing was also influenced by
Heidegger's philosophy through its involvement in these two
basic Bultmannian concerns.
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In the final section concerned with Bultmann's
hermeneutics, we traced Heidegger's influence in the
Bultmannian interpretation of Paul's theology. We clearly
brought out Heidegger's influence in the direction of the
analysis from inauthentic to authentic existence, in the
existential-exlstentiell distinctions and also in the way
Heideggerian concepts were used to give contemporary expression
to Pauline anthropology.
The next general area analysed was Bultmann's
interest in history and the evidence for our thesis here was
three-fold. First, Heidegger's influence was seen in
Bultmann's characterization of history as essentially the
realm of "possibilities." Secondly, further support for
our main thesis was garnered from Bultmann's tendency to
study history in the light of man's historical structure.
And finally, we saw reflected in the Bultmannian concept,
eschatological event, Heidegger's understanding of
possibilities, in the Bultmannian "proclamation", the
Heideggerian "retrieve", and in the Bultmannian "Christian
existence", Heidegger's "authentic Being-in-the-world" and
temporal nature of existence.
In our final section the discussion moved away from
the influence of the earlier Heidegger's philosophy (the
concern of our main thesis and first assertion in the
introduction) to a consideration of the later Heidegger's
relevance for Bultmannian theology (the concern of our
second assertion in the introduction). In particular the
later Heidegger was shown to be relevant for Bultmann's
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(mis-)understanding of the nature of modem man, for the
basic inconsistency between his concern for demythologizing
and his concern to retain the uniqueness of God's act in
the Christ event, and for his dilemma in thinking about God.
Most importantly, however, Bultmann's failure to
follow a course parallel to that taken by the later
Heidegger was shown to result in a lack of overall balance
in his theology between the transcendent-immanent, or the
ultimate-immediate dimensions. As we noted previously,
Heidegger's great strength lies in the fact that his later
emphasis on the role of Being compensated for his earlier
emphasis on Dasein. This allowed his philosophy to
maintain the dialectical tension between these two
inseparable yet distinct poles and gave it a balance lacking
in Bultmann's theology.
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With our consideration of Bultmann's theology we
have been dealing mainly with the influence of the earlier
Heidegger as seen in his Dasein analysis and to a less
extent, his analysis of thinking. We move now into a
consideration of the post-Bultmannian theologians, Ernst
Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling and Heinrich Ott.^ Although we
shall be touching on several theological issues, our
analysis will be devoted mainly to the role of language in
theology and this topic is distinctive of one particular
school of thinkers, popularly known as the "new hermeneutic"
theologians.
Paul Achtemeier, in his article "How Adequate is
1 In his article "The Post-Bultmannian Trend", John B. Cobb
says that while the term post-Bultmannian is generally
associated with those who have gone beyond Bultmann's
position in regards to a new quest for the historical Jesus,
"...the increasing use of Heidegger in continental theology
should /also/ be included under the heading of post-
Bultmannian. " He specifically mentions Fuchs, Ebeling and
Ott as key figures in this movement. The Journal of Bible
and Religion. Vol.30(1962), pp.8-9.
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the New Hermeneutic?" provides an excellent introductory
definition of this new approach. He states that theology
is always involved in hermeneutics to some extent since its
purpose is to "explicate the meaning of God's act in Christ."
This involves the two-fold task of understanding ancient
thinking and giving this understanding appropriate
expression in contemporary form. This involves both an
analysis of understanding as such and of language.
He goes on to say, "It is the insight of the so-
called "new" hermeneutic that these two questions really
ask the same thing, and that they may both be approached in
terms of the nature of language. The central issue for
the new hermeneutic theologians then is language.
Our approach to this topic will take the following
form. We shall first consider the basic issues touched on
by the "new hermeneutic" theologians. This will involve
only a cursory examination of their basic position and will
serve as an introduction to later detailed analyses. This
introduction is necessitated by the radical and unique
nature of their insights and hopefully it will facilitate
the re-orientation required in understanding these new
approaches to traditional topics. Following the intro¬
duction we shall engage in more detailed analyses of those
aspects of the theology of Fuchs, Ebeling and Ott which are
influenced by Heidegger.
1 P.J. Achtemeier, "How Adequate Is the New Hermeneutic?",
Theology Today, vol. 23(1966-67)j pp.101-102.
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Our thesis will be that these theologians are
influenced mainly, but not exclusively, by the later
Heidegger, especially his analysis of language. In addition
to the evidence we are about to consider in the following
analyses of these theologians, we can also find direct
support for our thesis. As seen in the following comments
most commentators agree on the relation of the new
hermeneutic to Heidegger's philosophy.
Carl Braaten, in his book History and Hermeneutlcs.
stresses how Fuchs and Ebeling progressed beyond the
position of Bultmann tinder the influence of the later
Heidegger. He explains that their interest moved away from
Bultmann's concern for the existential understanding behind
the text to the actual language of the text. Braaten sees
this shift of interest as parallel to the turn in
Heideggerian philosophy from "...an existentialist analysis
of Dasein...to an understanding of man whose language is
the primal, non-objectifying voice of Being.
Similarly, in his essay "Jesus' Parables as God
Happening" James Robinson suggests that the new hermeneutic
"...has shifted its orientation from an 'understanding of
existence' derived from the Bultmannian interpretation of
the earlier Heidegger, to an understanding of language,
(2)
derived from the later Heidegger."
1 Carl Braaten, nistory and Hermeneutics. (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1968), pp.138-139.
2 J.M. Robinson, "Jesus'Parables as God Happening", Jesus
and the nistorian. ed. by F. Thomas Trotter (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1968), p.l^-O.
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We can also recall neidegger's words expressing,
in turn, the influence of theology on his own approach to
hermeneutics. "The term, hermeneutics, was familiar to me
from my theological studies...Without this theological
background I should never have come upon the path of
thinking." (see page 1 2 4 ) Hence, this philosopher's
influence on the new hermeneutie theology seems less
inappropriate than might normally be the case.
We can turn now to our introductory remarks
concerning the general traits of this new theological move¬
ment. James Robinson, in The New hermeneutic. states that
the theological approach instituted by the work of Fuchs and
Ebeling can be considered a school of theology in itself "...
just as were dialectic theology and Ritschlianism before it."
^
Indeed, it is this book which first provided a label
for this movement and also limited the title mainly to the
work of Fuchs and Ebeling.
In opposition to this, Carl Braaten wrote a rather
stinging analysis of the book in which he suggested, one,
that nothing in theology is really new and, two, that other
theologians, Heinrich Ott in particular, have as much right
to credit for the "new" movement as do those suggested by
(2)
Robinson. Like Braaten, we shall extend the limits of
membership in the new hermeneutic and consider Ott as a
1 J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", The New
Hermeneutic. ed. by J.M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (London:
Harper and Row Publishers, 196*+), p.67.
Carl Braaten, "How New Is the New Hermeneutic?", Theology
Today, vol. 22(1965-66), pp.218-220.
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valuable contributor.
Perhaps the most distinctive point made by this
new approach is its broad definition of the term herraeneutics.-—
In distinction to the common understanding of hermeneutics
as the "theory of the exposition of texts" Ebeling suggests
that "...the basic meaning of hermeneuein 'to bring to
understanding', which combines the various meanings 'state',
'expound' and 'translate', accords very well with the real
sense of hermeneutics.
James Robinson continues along these same lines
when he suggests that the English terra hermeneutic has a
narrower connotation than the Greek term hermeneia. which
"...meant interpretation so broadly that it could be applied
to whatever activity was involved in bringing the unclear
to clarity." Employing an etymological argument
reminiscent of Heidegger's approach, he traces the origin
of the Greek term to the name of the divine herald of the
gods, Hermes, who interpreted or made clear the will of the
gods through his pronouncements. Therefore, his words
themselves were a form of interpretation. "Here language
is itself interpretation, not just the object of
(2)
interpretation."
He goes on to explain this broader understanding
of "interpretation" by referring to an actors or musician's
1 Gerhard Ebeling, .vord .and Palth, trans, by J .to'. Leitch,
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.321.
2 J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", pp.1-2.
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use of interpretation which "refers to his rendition or
performance of the work of art, rather than to a commentary
on the work of art."^^ In these words of Robinson and
Ebeling we can see that hermeneutics means not just a
particular, and rather limited, area of theology but rather
interpretation in general.
Now there is less discrepancy between the Greek
and contemporary understanding of hermeneutics. In addition,
by virtue of its relation to Hermes, language is understood
in hermeneutics not as the object of interpretation but
rather as one means of interpretation, or bringing to
understanding. Language as itself interpretation and
hermeneutics in the broad sense of the word are two of the
distinguishing traits of this new theological movement.
As a result of this broad definition of hermeneutics,
Ebeling can say: "The question of hermeneutic forms the
(2)
focal point of the theological problem today." (The term
hermeneutic is used to distinguish this movement's new
understanding of hermeneutics). He goes on to elaborate
on this claim in relation to various theological disciplines.
He dismisses as obvious the need for hermeneutics
in studying the Old and New Testaments. In relation to
church history, he says interpretation is used in dealing
1 Ibid., p.2.
2 Ebeling, op.cit.. p.27
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with source material and is even more directly involved in
that "...the process of exposition of Scripture that goes
on in the history of the church presents the hermeneutical
problem in its full compass..." Also, dogmatics, with its
"task of bringing the church's teaching into contact and
discussion with contemporary principles of thought"
necessarily involves hermeneutics. He similarly grounds
practical theology and missions in hermeneutics. In all
areas of theology then, "the hermeneutical problem proves
to be of fundamental significance."^"' This ability to
unify all the various fields of theology under this one
hermeneutic theme is certainly a key characteristic of the
new hermeneutic approach.
It is not difficult to see that in the thinking of
these post-3ultmannians theology is taking a course parallel
to that of the later Heidegger's philosophy. As stated
previously (see pagel^ ) herraeneutics in the later
Heidegger refers to "the entire effort to let Being be
manifest." In both cases, then, hermeneutics assumes a
broad role and is related to, as well as relates, more
specialized fields of investigation.
Having established something of the basic direction
and scope of the new hermeneutic school of theology, we
can next briefly consider several of the key aspects of this
approach. We begin by noting that, like any responsible
analysis of language, it strives to avoid an abstract
1 Ibid.
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analysis in which its object is separated from its normal
situation or environment and then mechanically examined.
In 'ord and Fa 3 th. Ebling states* "For hermeneutics
is of course not a departure from the linguistic realm in
order to understand language, but a deeoer penetration into
the linguistic realm in order to understand by means of
language. Similarly, Fuchs speaks of this same issue
in the following* "Exegesis is always subject to the failing
that through its very handling of the text it ties the text
down and reduces it to silence, whereas the text ought really
to come to light in the exnosition.,.toe want rather to catch
,.(2)live fish."
That these men are taking an approach very similar
to Heidegger's can be seen from the following quotes* /from
a conversation between Heidegger and a visiting professor/
"(Heidegger) Speaking about language turns language almost
inevitably into an object, (Visitor) And then its reality
vanishes. (Heidegger) We have then taken up a position
above language, instead of hearing from it." And also,
"In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed
to and within the being of language and can never step out
of it and look at it from somewhere else."
In analyzing these statements, the illustration
was used of studying a fish by removing it from the water.
1 Tbid.. P.319
2 Ernst Fuchs, Q-femUsfi of thfi ;iistorical trans, by Andrew
Scobie, (London* SCM Press Ltd., 19^), p. 1-88
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Neither language nor the fish in their actual nature can
be seen out of their natural context. (For quotes and
analysis see pagel^1)) Hence, these post-Bultmannians can
be seen as taking the cue from the later Heidegger for their
approach to language analysis.
It is his failure to consider language "in its
natural context" that causes these theologians to progress
beyond Bultmann's approach to language toward the direction
of the later Heidegger's approach. Other theologians agree
with this move away from Bultmann as can be seen in their
analysis of the shortcomings of demythologizing, a result
of its being based on a faulty understanding of the relation
of language and thinking. As one notes, language for
Bultmann is a secondary objectification of the thinking it
expresses. The result is that language often distorts
what it expresses and interpretation involves getting behind
or through the language to the "reality to which it points,
so that that reality may find more adequate expression in
different language.
For these post-Bultmannians, however, one cannot
separate language and thinking. Instead, as we saw in our
discussion of hermeneuein and Hermes, language is a vital
part of the process of "bringing to understanding." It is
one of the means through which understanding occurs. Thus,
Bultmann's demythologizing under-estimates the value and
role of language with the result that it is separated from
its natural context.
1 Achtemeier, op.cit.. p.103.
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Here too, the influence of the later Heidegger's
thinking is most apparent. It was stated previously that
Heidegger reverses our normal consideration of language as
subservient to thought. In What Is Galled Thinking? he
says: "Only when man speaks, does he think, not the other
way around." (see page 1 TP Now it can be seen that in the
approach of both Heidegger and the theologians of the new
hermeneutic, language assumes a central role in understanding
and in relation to the thought process.
Another key aspect of this new movement's thinking
might be called the linguisticality of existence. P.J.
Achtemeier explains that language consists of two elements,
call, (Anruf) and response (Zuruf). As a result, "Man
exists therefore between call and answer. He is called by
language and he answers by language, and thus man is
essentially "linguistic" in his existence."^
Similarly, Heidegger says that authentic language
consists of both a listening to language as Being and a
subsequent speaking in response to it. He says that
listening occurs not only in normal conversations but that
the "simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger
meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is
listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a
listening not while but before we are speaking." For
Heidegger also, the language process has these two aspects
of listening to the call of language and then responding to
1 Ibid., p.108.
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it with language. He goes on to say that "the essence of
man is brought into its own through language in order that
it serve the essence of language." (both quotes from On the
Way to Language, see page 15"!) Now we can see how the new
hermeneutic's understanding of existence as basically
determined by man's ability to speak stems from the later
Heidegger's work.
We have now completed our introductory analysis of
the new hermeneutic wherein we established something of its
nature, its key figures, its basic scope, and its key
components. Throughout our attempt at orientation to this
new approach we have been able to establish the strong





We begin our examination of theologians within the
new hermeneutic approach with Ernst Fuchs, since he seems
to typify all the movement represents and is also heavily
influenced by Heidegger. Our analysis of Fuch's thinking
will begin with a consideration of his basic concepts and
presuppositions, e.g. his understanding of such matters as
language, Being, thinking, time, and reality, and will then
move into a consideration of such basic theological concerns
as his hermeneutical principle and anthropology. From
there our analysis will move into a brief consideration of
more narrowly theological concerns such as the cross, the
resurrection, Christology, revelation and faith. Throughout
the influence of the later, and occasionally the earlier,
Heidegger will be noted. We will conclude with a critical
appraisal of Fuch's thinking in light of Heidegger's
influence on him.
As we saw from our introductory remarks, language
is a central concept for these theologians, so we shall
begin by examining Fuch's understanding of it. For him,
language is more than just speaking in the ordinary sense.
In Hermeneutik he explains that language is not just talk
or speaking but is in a more basic sense a "...showing or
letting be seen, an indication in the active senses I
intimate to you or instruct you what you yourself should
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perceive (take notice of or watch out for) ...That can take
place through a simple movement, even by turning away from
another.Thus for Fuchs, language can be acts as well
as words, e.g., a sunrise can be language as well as the
(2)
event of a cow licking her calf.
In the above, two approaches to language are
assumed. One is the ordinary everyday understanding and
the other is what Fuchs would see as the deeper, more
meaningful aspect of language. Of the former, he says:
"Language does not consist of the verbal reporting of meaning
content.J.C. Weber notes that for Fuchs, "...language
does not simply name things as they are so that a
correspondence between subject and object can be established.
(L)
Language is not just a conceptual tool of man."
In his rejection of the common understanding of
language, Fuchs is directly following in Heidegger's foot¬
steps. Consider the following in which Heidegger makes a
similar appraisal of the ordinary understanding of language.
"Language is his Zman's7 own property...Language serves to
give information...it is a possession. But the essence of
language does not consist entirely in being a means of
giving information. This definition does not touch its




*4- J.C. Weber, "Language-Event and Christian Faith", Theology
Max* vol. 21 (196*4—65), p.^9.
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essential essence.
Of language in its essence, language on the
deeper level, Fuchs says in "What is a Language-Event?":
"What does language do? It justifies Being. How does it
do this? It permits Being to be present in time; it makes
(2)
Being into an event." To distinguish this understanding
of language from the ordinary approach, Fuchs coins a new
phrase for it, language-event (Sprachereignis). Hence it
should be noted that by language-event, ^chs is referring
to the language of man in which Being comes to expression.
The result is that language is now the main aspect of
existence where Being is to be encountered.
In Fuchs' understanding of language as language-
event there is a direct reflection of Heidegger's
understanding of language as Being; as we proceed with our
examination of this concept we will note the many points of
contact it has with Heidegger's philosophy. As observed
in our original definition, language-event permits Being
"to be present in time." It should be pointed out that
the term translated here as 'be' is anwesen. "a term for
Being revived by Heidegger to accentuate the event
character of Being.
This idea of language as letting Being be recurs
1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.229.
2 Fuchs, Etudles of the Historical Jesus, p.207.
3 Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.58.
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frequently in Puchs' analyses. In "Das Problem der Theolo-
gischen Hermeneutik" he says: "Where an intelligible word is,
there Being takes place; and what is shows itself."^ And
in another essay he states: "When language states what 'is',
it does not merely state, but rather it brings existence for
(2)
the first time to its Being." He next establishes the
close relation between language and Being: "...without
language Being also is nothing" and "without Being, language
(l)
is without a basis, absurd, chimerical, glossolalia." J
The influence of Heidegger's philosophy is most
apparent in this key aspect of Fuchs' definition of language-
event. In his analysis of logos Heidegger closely
associates Being and language and explains how this Greek
word reflects language as letting be. "The oldest word...
for Saying is logos. Saying which, in showing lets beings
appear...The same word, however...is also the word for
(I4.)
Being, that is, the presencing of beings."
Puchs elaborates on the meaning of essential
language as follows: "Language assumes the essential
characteristic of Being - that is, that it gathers together.
And the assembling of Being needs language, in order to be."
1 Ernst Puchs, "Das Problem der Theologischen Hermeneutik",
as quoted by Gerald 0'Collins, "Reality as Language: Ernst
Puchs' Theology of Revelation", Theological Studies, vol.28
(1967), p.90.
2 Puchs, "Was 1st Existentiale Interpretation?", as quoted
by 0'Collins, p.90.
3 Fuchs, "Das Problem der Theologischen Hermeneutik", as
quoted by 0'Collins, p.90.
L- Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 155.
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He then applies this Christologically by speaking of Christ
the oroclaimer as the one "who gathers us." Further, the
Christian community makes Christ "present" through its own
proclamation. The Christian community "has its being, its*
togetherness" in performing this language function of
proclamation. *^
Here too, we see the influence of Heidegger's later
philosophy. In analysing the Creek conception of language,
Heidegger says » '"The word Logos names that which gathers
all (beings) into (Being) and thereby lets (them) lie
forth..." (see page Hi ). In both cases, language and Being
function interchangeably as a. process of "gathering".
In his analysis of the relation of language to
rea.litv, we can further see how closely Fuchs adapts
Heidegger's understanding of language as performing the role
of Being. The following will be a careful analysis of the
section in iierneneutlk entitled "Ca.s Problem der »«'irkli chkeit
und die Sprache". He begins by saying that "reality is
based on being present" and something can become present
only when "its presence corresponds with my presence."
Therefore something can only be real if it is present and
it can become present only through a person.
On the individual's part, this requires that he
"adapt" himself to reslity and "be able to sav how, where
1 Fuchs, 'Hufljeg Of tne '--ifitprical p.208.
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and in what manner Zhe7confronts it." As a result, "the
real is only that which can become present as language...
Thus reality has not yet been fully defined when we locate
it only in the context of beings, but rather as a category
it is even more basically built into the nature of another
realm, that of language." Furthermore, "an eternal silence
would be the abolition of reality." The function of
language now is seen as the "releasing" of reality through
the expression of it.^^ Here we see language performing
the role normally assigned to Being in relation to reality.
Fuchs explains this rather difficult idea with the
following illustration concerning a brother in Christ. In
Studies of the Historical Jesus he states:
The other person is not simply called a brother
because he is; he would not be a brother if I did
not so call him. Through my calling him brother
I certainly do not make him into one, but I admit
him as a brother among us by myself entering this
community with him. This event is the very
happening with which language is concerned. The
concrete word is what first raises Being...admits
gathering as gathering and therefore also allows it.^2)
R.C. Oudersleys illustrates Fuchs' assessment of
the power of language in relation to reality by speaking of
a prisoner who has been released from jail. The opening
of the cell doors does not guarantee the prisoner's freedom
for he could spend the rest of his life a hunted fugitive
in fearful apprehension of capture. "Before freedom is
1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik. pp.128, 130, 132.
2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.209.
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his, a word must reach him; acquitted, pardoned, .
Here we can see how language alone insures the reality of
freedom for this man and we can better understand how, for
Fuchs, language assumes the role of Being in relation to
reality.
In our analysis of Heidegger's later views on
language, we encountered the concept, "bethinging" (die
Bedingnis) which was derived from the following line of a
poem - "Where word breaks off no thing may be." Heidegger
explained this concept as the process wherein "the word...
is what brings /a/given thing, as a being that is, into this
"is"..." The comment on this explanation was "...the word
gives a being its Being." (see page 15^). We can begin to
see now how closely Fuchs follows Heidegger in his language
analysis. In both it is language that brings a being into
reality and lets it be, and for both, where language ceases,
reality and Being are no more. Fuchs1 words "Being
(2)
without language is nothing" strongly reflect the line of
poetry mentioned above.
In the Heideggerian phrase "Language is the house
of Being" (see page 175" ) we see a further relation between
this theologian and philosopher. It was this phrase which
showed how closely Being and language were associated for
Heidegger. In Heidegger's statement that the "Being of
1 R.C. Oudersleys, "Some Reflections on the New Hermeneutic",
The Reformed Review, vol. 21 (1968), p.*+6.
2 loc.cit.
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anything that is, resides in the word", we can see the
source of Fuchs' belief that an entity's reality lies in
the realm of language. In Puchs' understanding of language
and reality we can now see the strong influence of
Heidegger's later thoughts on Being, being and language.
60. Jesus' Parables
We can continue to trace the influence of Heidegger's
philosophy by considering Fuchs' analysis of Jesus' parables
as examples of language-event or language in its essence.
For him, the parables typify Jesus' language at its best.
As he says in "The Essence of the Language-Event and
Christology": "I understand Jesus' proclamation as language-
event...It is his parables which are typical of Jesus.
In our discussion of Fuchs on parables we will encounter
Heidegger's influence at three points, in Fuchs' under¬
standing of world, of language as the realm of the possible
and as the "ontological difference."
Fuchs sees the parables functioning as language-
event in that they grasp the hearer deep down and cause a
basic re-orientation in his existence. Of the parables he
says: "What is meant is that one must allow oneself to be
laid hold of. This can happen in no other way than that
the man who is addressed understands himself anew...This is
the decisive achievement of the parables of Jesus: whoever
understands...moves already in a new context, in being
1 Ernst Fuchs, "Proclamation and Language Event", Theology
Today, vol. 19 (1962-63), p.3^7.
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before God."^
We need to consider how the parable manages to
affect the hearer so deeply. In iiermeneutlk. Fuchs closely
associates man with his "world". He states that "out
there, as world, is to be decided what is to be worked out
inside, in man, as Dasein." Furthermore, "We either meet
(2)
in the world our own Being or we lose it there." This
world is to be understood, not as "nature", but as the realm
of historical significance (Geschichte) which receives its
(l)
meaning through language. J
As James Robinson explains: "...man's location in
a given historical tradition means that he hears reality in
terms of a certain 'world', a context of meaning that he
(*+)
simply takes over from his culture in its language."
Therefore, to re-orient a man's existence would be to place
him in a new world. Here we see striking overtones of
Heidegger's existential Being-in-the-world which stresses
the unity of man and world: they cannot be viewed as two
separate entities si tee Dasein is its world. Indeed,
"worldhood" becomes an existential of Dasein (see page 37 ).
We see from this not only the influence of Heidegger but
also a case of where Fuchs relies on the earlier Heidegger's
work in Being and Time. (Hence the need for our thesis to
1 Fuchs, studies of the Historical Jesus, pp.220-221.




state that the new hermeneutic theologians are influenced
mainly but not exclusively by the later Heidegger,)
Thus, to affect deeply their hearers* existence,
the parables need to affect the worlds in which they
function. A,C.Thiselton, in his article "The Parables
as Language-Eventstresses that Fuchs sees Jesus using the
images of his parables to portray a scene or world into
which the hearer is drawn. In the story of the householder
who nays both early and late comers the same wages, Fuchs
says' "...the last are paid first, so that we, too, share
the inevitable reaction of the first" and, "the
circumstances surrounding the hire of the labourers, the
minute attention to detail,..singles out the individual and
(t)
grasps him deep down." To understand the parables, then,
he feels one must "be able inwardly to adhere to the parable
(p)
and participate in it,"
'The parable can be explained by saying that through
the use of familiar images it engages the listener's
attention and then involves him in its plot. However,
when the events in the parable "...fail to take a predictable
and familiar course,.., the hearer finds himself exposed
and put on trial in a strange world. Conventional values
' (8)
and...criteria are transcended and perhaps even reversed."
Now we can see how parables as language-events deeply
1 Fuchs, c-tuflieg of thg Historical Jf?gus. pp.33-35.
2 Ibid., p,l40.
8 A.C. Thiselton, "The Parables as Language-Event", Scottish
Journal of Theology, vol. 23 (1970), p.442.
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affect and change the hearer's existence through questioning
the world in which he functions. Furthermore, in the close
association between man and world which allows language to
function so essentially we can see the definite influence
of Heidegger's philosophy.
We turn next to see how Fuchs is influenced by the
Heideggerian concept of possibilities in his interpretation
of the parables as language-event. In Hermeneutik we find
the following explanation of the relation of language and
the realm of the possible. "Language helps reality to its
truth. In faith's view it is the possible that helps the
real linguistically to its truth and thus expresses itself
as itself.
For Fuchs then, reality comes into its own through
language which is understood as the realm of possibilities,
one of which is selected and actualized. As a result the
reality of one's existence can receive new meaning by the
actualization of a new linguistic possibility. Just as
Heidegger understands the realm of the possible as the
field from which Dasein must choose, thereby resolutely
creating its world, so Fuchs sees language as this realm of
possibilities, one of which is chosen to be the means
whereby reality is gathered and admitted into its being.
(For Heidegger on 'possibilities' see pages °r 7~ ^8.)
1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik. p.211.
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Finally, we can see in Fuchs' discussion of
parables a reflection of Heidegger's insights into Being as
the "ontological difference." For Fuchs, what is
distinctive about the parable is that its analogous
language is particularly suited for establishing the
relation between the Kingdom of God and the world. This
can be seen in an analysis of Eberhard Jungel's Paulus und
Jesus in which the parables are examined. This book can
be taken as representative of Fuchs' position since Jungel
was a student of his and since he has reacted very favour¬
ably to the results of Jungel's analysis.
In analysing Jesus' use of parables, Jungel stresses
that through parables Jesus was able to bring "the
(2)
difference between God and the world to language." In
this problem of expressing the relation of God and the
world, how they are related and yet different, can be seen
the theological parallel to Heidegger's problem of relating
beings and Being, the solution to which is the "ontological
difference" (beings and Being are both identical and
different.) Therefore, idolatry is the theological
parallel to mistaking a being for Being.
In the parables especially, Jesus is trying to
1 Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical
Problem", The New liermeneutic. ed. by J.M. Robinson and
John B. Cobb (London: Harper and Row,publisher5,196^), p.119.
2 Eberhard Jungel, Paulus und Jesus. (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1962), p.128.
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establish the relation of the Kingdom of God with this world.
By interpreting the parables as language-events, Fuchs and
Jungel feel they can give contemporary expression to Jesus*
understanding of the Kingdom of God. As they understand
Him the Kingdom of God is a real possibility within the
world of reality, which should be re-oriented toward
actualizing this possibility through language-events,
Indeed, the Kingdom of God is the authentic possibility for
reality, wherein reality can become fully realized. Now
the Kingdom is seen as ushered in by Jesus* language.
Further, the kingdom is best seen in its proper
relation to the world as a possibility within iti a
possibility toward which the v/orld must be re-oriented. let
is not totally identified with the world. As James
Kobinson explains' "Between the presumption of the
Establishment that identifies reality with God and the
fanaticism of dther-worldliness that separates reality from
God...lies the event of Jesus* language in which God's reign
happens as reality*s true possibility."^^
In the analogous language of the parables, the
possible (the Kingdom of God) is identified by using
language normally employed in describing the world. Die
re-oriented language of the parable points toward the
possible while remaining grounded in reality. In this way
the two are connected without denying their "difference".
1 Kobinson, "Jesus* Parables as God Happening", p.1^5.
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In this, then, can he seen the influence of Heidegger's
"ontological difference" on Fuchs' interpretation of the
parables. However, this was only done indirectly through
a consideration of another's (Jungel) position which Fuchs
supports.
We turn now to further evidence supporting
Heidegger's influence here which is taken directly from
Fuchs' own writing. In his essay "What is a Language-
Event?" he states: "Language certainly has man as its object
...But conversely...man Zhas7 language as ZRi§7 object."^1
(We need to recall that, as for Heidegger, language is here
functioning as Being.) Now we can see that language (as
Being) and man are closely dependent on each other for Fuchs.
Similarly, in our previous analysis of Heidegger's
philosophy, we saw that the "ontological difference"
referred to the "inter-relatedness" of Being and beings,
(see page ?12 ).
Therefore we can support our contention that
Fuchs' understanding of language is influenced by Heidegger's
concept of Being as the "ontological difference" by
reference to his support for Jungel's insights as well as by
evidence gathered from his own definition of language. In
our consideration of Fuchs' definition of Jesus' parables
as language-events we have also established the influence
of such Heideggerian concepts as world and possibilities.
1 Fuchs, Studies of the historical Jesus, p.209.
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Two of these concepts are from the earlier Heidegger and
since Fuchs' position has grown out of Bultmann's it is
not surprising to find traces of the earlier Heidegger's
influence on Bultmann in Fuchs' thinking.
61. The nature of time and of thought
We turn now to another basic concept in Fuchs1
thinking and in our analysis of his understanding of time,
we shall be able to see the influence of Heidegger's
philosophy on yet another key aspect of his theology. In
his essay "The New Testament and the/vProblem" Fuchs states
that the "trait of language which in general composes its
essential feature" is time. He goes on to explain that
"time is always time only as a given time, as time for this
or for that." Therefore time is always to be seen in its
practical relation to individuals' activities: "as time to
get up, to eat, to work, to play, to go to sleep, etc."
This use of the term, Fuchs believes, "is not a figurative
secondary usage, but rather the primary and genuine usage."
(1)
In that time is always "time for" some activity of
man, we can see how Fuchs' definition is anthropocentric.
By the same token we can recall how in Heidegger's analysis
time was derived from his examination of care as a basic
structure of Dasein (see page^ 2 and page 52 Here, we
can see a structural similarity in the approach of both men.
However, the similarity goes further.




In "What Is a Language-Event?" Fuchs explains: "What
does language do? It justifies Being. How does it do
this? It permits Being to be present in time; it makes
Being into an event. Indeed, It is this very relation
to time which accounts for the language-event' s status as
an event. It is an event in the sense that through it
(2)
Being can break into time.
In the same analysis of Heidegger's understanding
of time referred to previously, it was established that he
was aiming toward a very close association of Being and time.
As it was noted then; "Being is...constantly coming out of
itself into revelation or openness. This...gives birth to
time: it is time. Being cannot be thought of as separate
from time; time is Being's coming to openness." (see page
14"). Now we can see how Fuchs clearly follows Heidegger
in understanding time as oriented toward man, as always
"time for", and as closely related to Being.
In the introduction to this analysis we touched on
the relation of thinking and language as one of the
distinctive traits of the new hermeneutic school of theology.
At this point we shall go into this very important topic in
more detail. Because it reverses the normal understanding
of the thinking-speaking process, Fuchs' approach requires
a conscious re-orientation and openness on the part of those
1 Fuchs, Studies of the historical Jesus, p.207.
2 Robert Kysar, "Demythologizing the New Hermeneutic",
Journal of the American, Academy of Heligign, vol.37(1969),
p.218.
355
studying it. A clear understanding of him on this point
certainly should contribute toward a better comprehension of
his theology in general. Not surprisingly, here too the
influence of the later Heidegger is prominent.
Jn q£ -fchQ historical JC5US Fuchs declares'
"Language is not the abbreviation of thought' thought is the
abbreviation of language."^ In this, the traditional
emphasis on thinking as primary to language is reversed.
In his essay "Jesus* Understanding of Lime", Fuchs elaborates
on this approach with a most stimulating illustration'
"...the thought is just the medium for the word, not its
end, in the same way that the wood of a tree serves the
interests of the bark and not the bark the interests of the
wood, even though the forester could rightly say that his
(2)
wood, has grown particularly well thanks to the bark.
Therefore, language is no longer the instrument
for expressing the insights of the thought process.
Instead, thinking is the medium for language, the primary
factor in the process of comprehension, Because this idea
initially seems strange, another practical illustration
would be helpful. It sometimes happens that a student is
told his work is unsatisfactory due to an inability to
communicate or express himself. It then happens that the
student can take heart at this and rationalize away his
1 Fuchs, op.cit.. p.210.
2 Ibid., p.129.
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shortcomings by saying "Nevertheless, I do understand and
have thought through the material."
This is unfortunate since an inability to communi¬
cate often indicates a flaw in the thought process itself.
The student's attitude is based on a misunderstanding of the
relation of thought and expression. The thought process is
only complete when one is able to express and communicate
adequately. By the same token, one occasionally experiences
sudden moments of insight and clarification in trying to
explain and clarify verbally a particularly difficult idea
or concept. In this we can better see how for Fuchs the
language process is just as creative and important as the
thought process.
Having clarified this relation of thinking and
language, we are now better able to understand the signif¬
icant role assigned to language in Fuchs's theology.
Furthermore, we also have a better understanding of language
in its essence, or language as event, which Fuchs opposes
to the shallower, everyday understanding of it. In
addition, we can establish Heidegger's influence at this
point by recalling his words "...only when man speaks, does
he think - not the other way around, as metaphysics still
believes." (see page MO.
To this point we have been considering the basic
building block concepts of Fuchs' theology. One might
refer to them as pre-theological, and more philosophical,
presuppositions. Such matters as language, Being, thinking,
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time, reality, all of these are also encountered in
philosophy. We are prepared now to turn to the more
specifically theological applications of these basic
concepts in Fuchs' thinking.
62. The hermeneutical principle
As a contributor to a radically new approach to
hermeneutics, Fuchs offers his own "hermeneutical principle".
As we saw previously, Bultmann was able to make the first
step toward interpreting a text by virtue of his concept of
pre-understanding which insured at least a minimal contact
between translator and text. Fuchs sees Bultmann's starting
point as inadequate and replaces it with his "hermeneutical
principle".
He sees Bultmann's pre-understanding as insufficient
in that it requires one to approach the text already having
faith, which is the content of texts in the New Testament.
As he states in ilermeneutik; "...a hermeneutical principle
which presupposed faith in us would be of no help to us:
indeed we would not even need it."^^ If we already
understand faith, we need no assistance in understanding the
New Testament.
P.J. Achtemeier agrees with this objection to
Bultmann's approach. He quotes Bultmann's statement: "to
understand reports about events as acts of God presupposes
Fuchs, Hermeneut'ik. p.'li|>.
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a pre-understanding of what acts of God can mean in the
first place" (from Glauben und Verstehen II, page 2 31) and
asks "...how does one know what an act of God is except
through faith? Surely not as an objective event in the
world of sense-perceptioni To argue this is to speak
'mythologically1. One can therefore apply the logic of
Bultmann's approach to hermeneutics to argue for the
necessity of faith as the pre-condition for interpreting
the New Testament."^ (This argument shows a shallow grasp
of Bultmann's definition of pre-understanding as indicating
a lack of something, e.g. to pre-understand God shows a
lack of God. Nevertheless, the criticism does indicate a
certain obscurity in Bultmann's presentation on this point
and so is useful to us in that it sets the stage for Fuchs'
alternative proposal.)
Of his alternative to Bultmann's approach, Fuchs
explains that the hermeneutical principle does not clarify
the content of understanding, "...instead it only speaks of
how the...event of understanding gets under way. It
asserts...that there is the possibility of a device (Barth
would call it, not very humorously, a "trick") which sets
(2)
the event of understanding in motion." In other words,
the hermeneutical principle is what causes understanding
to occur.
He goes on to explain this principle by stating
1 Achtemeier, on.cit.« p. 10*+.
2 Fuchs, on.cit., p.109.
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that if one wants to learn about a cat, one puts it in the
presence of a mouse and the resulting action identifies the
cat's nature. The hermeneutical principle is what allows
something "to show itself, as it is."^1^ What is it then,
that we can set before, or bring to, the New Testament that
will let it show itself and be understood? Basically, the
hermeneutical principle that we set before the text is our
own existence with its self-concern and questionableness.
In Heraeneutik we find: "Which neutrality of understanding
does the New Testament demand for its declaration
/exposition/? Answer: it demands the neutrality of
(2)
understanding in the question concerning our own selves."
Hence, the hermeneutical principle is neutral in
regards to faith. To be able to understand the New
Testament we need only come to it with full awareness of the
questionableness of our existence. Armed with this
awareness, we are perfectly capable of comprehending the
message of the texts; we need no particular pre-understanding
of their content, "for nothing more is said of us (or
existence) in Christ than we can understand in the question
concerning...our existence."^^
What does happen when the mouse, our questionable
existence, is placed before the cat, the New Testament?





Zthen7...the teaching /or content7 of the text
says that...which places the man so in question,
that he must himself be questioned if he hears.
Then the natural man is able, without further ado,
to confess the truth of the text. Consequently
he understands. Certainly, therefore, he will
only be able to avoid the claim of the text by
force of will, qj
Here we see a radical reverse in the normal
direction of the interpretation process. We do not question
the text, it questions us. Instead of the text being the
object of interpretation, it becomes the means whereby we,
the object, are able to be interpreted anew. Fuchs
illustrates this by saying that the object of demytnol-
ogizing can no longer be God, Jesus, the world or language
but instead is "man caught in a distorted relation to
(2)
himself..."
In Studies of the Historical Jesus he also says
that it is no longer the past but "it is really the present
that is interpreted with the help of the text."^ And in
"Translation and Proclamation" he declares that "the
translator encounters not a passivity on the part of the
text...but the text's own activity. Indeed, the activity
of the text obliges the translator to play the role of
passive participant: that is to say, the translator is
(M-)
involved in the activity of the text." Now we can see
just how radically the function of hermeneutics has been
1 Ibid., p.12*+.
2 Ernst Fuchs, "Erganzungsheft" to hermeneutik. as quoted
by J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.53*
3 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.212.
Ibid. r p.193-
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changed; its direction is reversed to a movement from text
to translator and its scope is broadened in that its object
is not a text but man himself.
In the following from Gesammelte Aufsatze I, we
s e that the hermeneutical circle is involved in this new
relation of text and interpreter: "...it is not only the
text which is illuminated by the understanding but also the
understanding by the text."^ Unlike Heidegger's and
Bultmann's use of this concept, Fuchs stresses mainly that
half of the circle which moves from the text toward the
interpreter. For him, understanding occurs, not when the
text is comprehended, but when the interpreter sees himself
anew with the aid of the language of the text. This
occurrence would then be a language-event in its true sense.
Now we can see how for Fuchs language has man for
its object and not vice versa. No longer is it a tool to
be manipulated. Along similar lines he says of truth: "...
it is not dependent on our good pleasure to know the truth,
(2)
insofar as the truth has us ourselves as its object."
In this reversal of the relation of man and language in
Fuchs' reorientation of heraeneutics, we can see the
influence of the later Heidegger's philosophy on a crucial
aspect of this new theological development.
For the same emphasis on the activity of language
1 Lrnst Fuchs, Zum Hermeneutischen Problem as quoted by .Amos
Wilder, "New Testament Hermeneutics Today", Current Issues in
New Testament Interpretation, ed. by William Klassen and G.F.
Snyder (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p.V3.
2 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Herraeneutical Problem",
p. l*+3.
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itself in relation to man, and even the use of the word
"event" in relation to the activity of language, consider
the following taken from our previous analysis of
Heidegger's understanding of language. "Man does not use
language, language uses man. The event and advent of
Being in and through language, word, and saying 'puts man
to use for its own sake'." (see p.152). With this we can
clearly see the influence of the later Heidegger on this
basic part of Fuchs' theology.
63. Anthropology
We move next into how Fuchs theologically applies
his basic insights into an understanding of authentic and
inauthentic existence, or life within and without faith.
For him, the decisive standard for distinguishing authentic
existence from inauthentic is the use of language. In
Hermeneutik we find the following example of this: "That man
then has made language a means of usurped existence merely
proves that man is accustomed to exist in daily life having
missed the mark."^ To understand better how language
determines the authenticity of existence, we must consider
further its relation to man's structures of existence.
For Fuchs, the determinative factor in man's
existence is his relation to language. It is man's
linguisticality which makes him distinctive, for it is not
1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik. p.63.
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only that "our Being...expresses itself only in the event
of language", but rather the "language-event is our Being."
Furthermore, man must see his relation to language in
its proper perspective. Instead of the normal understanding
of language as a tool or possession, man must realize that
priority in the relationship lies with language itself.
"For it is not true that man has given birth to language.
(2)
Rather man is born out of language."
Here again we can see Fuchs reversing the normal
approach to a subject in that the initiative lies with
language, not man, in their relationship. Now man is
determined by language. In Hermeneutik he relates how
this happens:
Man exists linguistically between call and answer.
In this relation language advances him what he may
really Tlet be'. Reality certifies for him only
that which has been linguistically advanced to him.
His behaviour towards reality is the mirror of the
answer which he has given to the call of language
which went out to him.
Thus we can see that man functions linguistically
only in response or answer to the call of language. In
"Was 1st Existentiale Interpretation?", he says that man
is "not only a doer but always also a hearer...related to
(l+)
language." Therefore, man's existence is determined by
his linguisticality, or the call of language to him and his
response to it.
1 Ern-st Fuchs, "Alte und Neue Hermeneutik", as quoted by
0'Collins, p.77.
2 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.63.
3 Ibid., p.133.
*+ Fuchs, "Was 1st Existentiale Interpretation?", as quoted
by 0'Collins, p.77-
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At this point, let us pause and establish the
rather strong influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We have
already stated that, for Heidegger, language holds the
initiative in its relation to man. However, more particu¬
larly, we can also find in Heidegger's thinking the source
of Fuchs' definition of man as determined by the call of
and answer to language. As Heidegger stated previously,
(see page 1^1 ) language involves both speaking and listening.
"Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening
to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening
not while but before we are speaking." In this we can see
the source of Fuchs' assertion that man's linguisticality
stems from his hearing and answering the call of language.
Having established the influence of the later
Heidegger on Fuchs' understanding of existence up to this
point, we can proceed with the discussion of how language
is the criterion by which authenticity or inauthenticity of
existence is decided. We have already seen how existence,
as the realm of the call of and answer to language, is
basically linguistic and we are prepared now to see how
Fuchs closely associates language, understood as an active
determinative element, with Being.
In Gesammelte Aufsatze I he says: "Being emerges
from language when language directs us into the dimension
of our existence determinative for our life."^1^
1 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsatze I, as quoted by Robinson,
"Hermeneutic Since Barth", p. 55.
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Here we see that language in Its essence, or as language-
event, refers directly back to Being. Similarly, in our
analysis of the later Heidegger's consideration of language,
we repeatedly stressed that "language is one more term for
Being in one of its many aspects." (see page ). Again,
we have established his influence on Fuchs* approach.
We are well aware of Heidegger's insistence that
the authenticity of existence is determined by an openness
toward Being and we have now seen how Fuchs follows
Heidegger in closely associating language and Being. It
logically follows, then, that for Fuchs authentic existence,
or the life of faith, would be determined by an openness
toward language as language-event and this is exactly what
happens. In Hermeneutik he associates inauthentic
existence with an insensitivity toward language as language-
event and he sees Jesus' language of love as an avenue to
authentic existence.
Because Fuchs moves away from Heidegger's analysis
in focusing on Jesus' language of love, we will not be
concerned with this aspect of his analysis. Suffice it to
say that Jesus' language alone "lets man be" authentically.
While this final step in establishing language as the
criterion for authentic existence does not reflect
Heidegger's influence, the base or foundation on which it
was laid does indicate how strongly Fuchs is indebted to
1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik. pp.63* and 78*
366
the later Heidegger's philosophy.
61*. Traditional theological concerns
We shall turn now to a consideration of how Fuchs
applies his insights into the nature of language to such
topics as faith, the cross and resurrection, the relation
of the historical Jesus to the kerygmatic Christ, the
relation of Jesus Christ to God and the relation of Jesus
Christ to later generations of believers. In comparison
with the previous discussions of his hermeneutical principle
and anthropology, these topics about to be considered are
even more exclusively theological issues in that they would
rarely, if ever, come under the scrutiny of philosophers.
As a result Fuchs' relation to Heidegger at this
point will mostly be indirect in the sense that he is here
indebted only for his basic direction and underlying
principles. Our purpose for considering these aspects of
Fuchs' theology is merely to sense some of the flavour of
his approach and consider the final outcome of a theology
using Heideggerian insights for its guidelines.
Not surprisingly, Fuchs sees Jesus' language (in
its broad sense) as his most important contribution and we
hear that "...What Jesus said is precisely the kernel of
his procedure. This statement becomes more plausible
when we better understand how Fuchs sees the cross and
1 Fuchs, "Glaube und Geschichte", as quoted by O'Collins, p.85-
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resurrection, normally thought of as two of Jesus' greatest
acts, as language-events. We need to remember that, for
Fuchs, deed or acts speak just as clearly as words.
Of the cross, Fuchs says: "...the crucified one
himself transforms Himself into the words of the cross, into
the permission for all men to believe." And at another
point: "Where everything seemed to be over it was precisely
then that God was not silent. He made himself heard out
(2)
of the mouth of the Christ." Thus, tnrough the cross
Jesus spoke to the world of His love for it and His faith in
God.
Furthermore, when we hearken to this word spoken
out of the cross, then "...the message thrusts us right into
the 'nothingness' of our existence, in order to declare God
(o )
as the sole saving power." J (Here we can see the direct
influence of Heidegger in that he, too, saw the experience
of 'nothingness' as a prelude to better awareness of Being.)
Similarly he says that the reality of the
resurrection depended on whether or not the witnesses to the
resurrected Lord "...were moved through their experiences to
that definitive language which spoke in the mouth of men
definitively of God's presence. In actual fact, there were
(k)
obviously no such experiences without confession..."
1 Fuchs, "Zum Hermeneutischen Problem in der Theologie", as
quoted by Achtemeier, p.110.
2 Fuchs, Hermeneutik. p.l3*f.
3 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsatze III, as quoted by 0'Collins,
b Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.216.
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To put it simply, one might say that, while for
Bultmann the resurrection was the result of viewing the
cross through the eyes of faith as a victory over death by
God, for Fuchs the resurrection consists of the cross being
proclaimed, in place of believed, as God's victory over
death. This recurring proclamation, a language-event,
assures the continuity of this victory into later generations.
We should also mention here one of the better known
aspects of Fuchs' theology, his renewal of the quest for the
historical Jesus. This too is motivated by his concern
for language as language-event. Because the significance
of Jesus lies in His words, and not Just the kerygmatic
reflection of them, Fuchs feels the historical person of
Jesus is significant. As he explains: "This is why I have
in my own way renewed the question of the historical Jesus.
Jesus himself had been God's word to which all clung, for
Jesus did not want to be,or to be understood as, anything
other than God's word..."^ Thus it is because Jesus'
person was uniquely the place where God's word was revealed
that the quest for the historical Jesus assumes new
importance.
As for how subsequent generations of believers can
become "contemporaries" of Christ, or can feel personally
related to Hira, Fuchs sees language as the solution here
also. For him, the believer makes Christ his own,
1 Fuchs,"The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem",
p.136.
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appropriates Him into his life, through proclaiming Him as
Lord. This appropriation occurs when the believer hears
God's word, makes it his own, and then reproclaims it in
light of his faith.
As Fuchs explains in "The Essence of the Language-
Event and Christology", in the proclaimed word the hearer
is addressed by a question. He is not requested simply to
accept and pass on a "list of doctrinal points." Instead
what he is asked is "if he will, through his own decision,
give precision to the proclamation."^^ In giving
precision to God's word, the proclaimer makes God's word
his own and this provides the occasion whereby God's
language-event re-occurs.' Now we can see that it is
through the continuously re-occurring language-event of
Christ that later generations of believers can become
contemporaneous with Him.
Likewise we can see how language is the key aspect
of Fuchs' solution to how God makes Himself known in our
He rmefJe^t ics-l
lives. In "The New Testament and theAProblem" Fuchs
states: "...I can rejoice...since Jesus has made God present
for me. And how has He done that? Through His words,
(2)
which now lie like Christmas presents on the table."
If we recall that reality can only come into Being through
language, then we can see that it was the language of Jesus
through which the reality of God's presence came into Being.
1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.21*f.
2 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem",
p.130.
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In particular, Fuchs explains that Jesus "...
brought to language what God in his - Jesus' - presence not
merely wished, but also did" and "with His preaching as
event He made known also that God Himself wished in the word
of man to come definitively to language and did come to
language."^1' Thus it is because of Jesus' language
that all men now have the possibility of experiencing God's
presence as it comes about through their own words.
We can continue to see how central a role language
plays in Fuchs' theology by considering his definition of
faith. "To believe", he declares, "means now very simply
(2)
to listen to something which can only be said to us."
In this we can see how faith here depends on language. In
comparing his approach to Bultmann's, Fuchs explains: "Like
Bultmann, I deny that a person has faith 'at his disposal'.
But the reason does not reside in the actuality of sin, but
prior to that in dependence of faith on word, God's word." J
For Fuchs, having faith in God depends on having
heard His word in and through Jesus. "Faith, in the New
Testament sense, therefore means that God finally, once and
(Ll)
for all, makes Himself heard in Jesus." As a result of
this relation between faith and language, Fuchs sees the
New Testament as a lesson in language. "Ihe New Testament
1 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsatze III, as quoted by 0'Collins, p.78.
2 Ibid., p.85.
3 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.211.
*+ Ibid., p.85.
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is itself a textbook in hermeneutic. It teaches the
hermeneutic of faith - in brief, the language of faith -
and it encourages us to try out this language ourselves, so
that we may become familiar with - God."^ Just as is
the case with all reality, faith can only come into being
through language and the New Testament provides the
appropriate language whereby faith comes into being.
By the same token, a believer's faith is confirmed
and strengthened by a new command of language; "...faith is
established in the hearer...", Puchs claims, "...when...he
is wholly struck by what he himself is then able to say.
He recognizes this by his ability to describe to others
what has struck home to him in such a way that they can
(2)
likewise find it striking them." Here too, as was the
case in previous instances, a key aspect of Puchs' theology
is based on his understanding of language.
65* A critical appraisal
In review, we have been trying to sense the flavour
of Puchs' theology through an examination of his approach
to several traditional theological problems. Invariably
we noted that this approach was very dependent upon his
definition of language as language-event. We can now see
that Puchs operates, in all of his thinking, in the realm
of linguisticality. Reality is admitted through language
1 Puchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem",
p.l*fl.
2 Puchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.198.
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into Being and the authenticity of existence is determined
by its relation to language.
Operating within this scheme, Fuchs sees Christ as
the language-event which enables man to approach language
correctly, thereby admitting reality into its true,
undistorted Being and insuring that his own world and
existence is whole, at one with itself, or authentic. For
him, then, Christ's contributions must be seen as basically
linguistic and God's presence can only be possible through
language.
in Hermeneutik he states: "But faith follows the
inner tendency of language itself, to understand the truth
in that new Word /of God7, which demands...of fallen man
(1)
that he become himself. This demand is grace." When
it functions essentially then, language assumes the role of
grace since it is through language alone that God makes His
presence known to the believer in such a way "that he is no
(2)
longer divided."
We have now concluded our cursory examination of
Fuchs' treatment of traditional theological issues which
has provided something of the flavour of his theology.
Invariably we have noted that, in each case, his treatment
of these issues was based on his understanding of language.
1 "Fuchs, Hermeneutik. p.265.
2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.198.
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Having previously established the direct influence of the
later Heidegger's philosophy on Puchs' approach to language,
we have also established an indirect influence on his
approach to these theological issues.
As in the analysis of Bultmann's thinking, we shall
end our consideration of Puchs' approach by noting the most
common criticisms of his work and seeing how his position
might be strengthened in light of a better appreciation of
Heideggerian insights. A common criticism is voiced by
P.J. Achtemeier, in his article "How Adequate Is the New
Hermeneutic?", when he points out that Puchs provides no
criterion for determining when language is revealing reality
clearly and when it is distorting reality.^^(J.C. Weber's
article "Language-Event and Christian Faith" makes this same
(2)
criticism as well. )
Fuchs' problem seems to be that in stressing the
role of language as that which lets reality into its Being,
he failed to account for the rather obvious problem of
illusion, distortion, or, theologically speaking, sin which
abounds in each man's world. A ready-made pattern for
strengthening his position on this point is to be found in
Heidegger's conception of language as Being (aletheia)
which simultaneously reveals - conceals itself and the
reality it lets be.
1 Achtemeier, op.cit.. pp.118-119.
2 Weber, op.cit.. p.*+55.
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As Heidegger notes in his analysis of language as
"showing", "Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching
into all regions oi» presences, summons from them whatever
is present to appear and to fade." Here we see how
language, as causing both appearance and fading, parallels
Being - aletheia as a revealing - concealing, (see page 1^2)
Utilizing the form or pattern of this insight, Fuchs would
be better able to account for the fact of illusion,
distortion and sin, thereby strengthening his position
against such criticisms as those of Achtemeier and Weber.
Another point on which Fuchs is criticized is his
understanding of the relation of thinking and language. As
we noted earlier, Fuchs does pick up the later Heidegger's
stress on language as more than just the mouthpiece for the
important insights provided by thinking. However, in his
emphasis on the primacy of language he apparently slips
over into the Bultmannian position of regarding thinking as
an objectifying process once-removed from the vibrant sphere
of linguistic reality (or in Bultmann's case faith).
In a review of Heinrich Ott's book Denken und Sein.
Fuchs states: "When will the thinker finally give up
thinking about Being? If he has experienced that Being
speaks, then he will understand why I pose my question this
way."^^ From this it is but a short step to relegating
the thought process to an entirely subordinate role.
1 Ernst Fuchs, "Denken und Sein", Philosoohlsche Rundschau,
vol.VIII (1961), p.108.
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Therefore, the criticism of Fuchs on this point, made by-
James Robinson, Heinrick Ott and Helmut Franz (in his
article "Das Denken Heideggers und die Theologie") is that
he fails to appreciate the role of the thought process in
the relation between man and God.^
Fuchs' position here would also be strengthened
by a better grasp of the later Heidegger's insights into
the relation of thinking and language in the revelation of
Being. In a previous summary of Heidegger's thinking on
this same issue (see pagel^^) the following comment was
made: "...in Heidegger's works essential thought and
essential poetizing as well as essential language are so
closely related to the finite revelation of Being that they
become almost one in their subservience to Being."
Heinrich Ott is a theologian who has utilized
Heidegger's insights on this point and he compares his own
position with that of Fuchs as follows: "Both Zword and
thought/ belong very close together, as I have emphasized
(2)
over against Ernst Fuchs." In regards to Fuchs'
approach, Ott declares that "he in no way takes into
consideration what Heidegger has already thought with regard
to the structural connection of word and thought." He
then makes a recommendation which fits in with our own
approach that "theology would be better advised to think
1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later
Heidegger", p.70, and Heinrich Ott, "Response to the American
Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, pp.200 and 211.
2 Ibid., pp.211-212.
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further along with Heidegger rather than, as does Fuchs,
to bring immediately into play the law-gospel antithesis."
equivalent to the gospel, language is to be relied
upon to the exclusion of thinking, the equivalent to the
law and works righteousness.^1 ^
With this we come to the conclusion of our con¬
sideration of Fuchs' theology. We began by considering
his basic principles and presuppositions in which we noted
the direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We then
observed briefly how he applied these basic insights to
strictly theological Issues, thus establishing an indirect
influence of Heideggerian insights. And finally, we
established how Heidegger's philosophy might have been
further employed in strengthening Fuchs' position in light
of frequently voiced criticisms. Throughout we have
supported our thesis that Fuchs' theology is influenced
mainly, but not exclusively, by the insights of the later
Heidegger. We are prepared now to move into a discussion






66. Language as word.—event
The close association of Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst
Fuchs in the new hermeneutic school of theology is generally
acknowledged by commentators. Indeed, the two are
considered co-founders of this movement. James Robinson
says of them: "When Puchs...and Ebeling...were together at
the University of Tubingen just after World War II, there
grew up not only a unique personal friendship but also a
material unity of position that has made of the new
hermeneutic a single school of thought with a shared leader¬
ship.
Similarly, Robinson points out that the basic term
of each man, language-event for Fuchs and word-event
(Wortgeschehen) for Ebeling, are synonyms and can be used
(2)
interchangeably. Therefore, we shall not need to spend
as much time in our analysis of Ebeling's theology as we
have already covered his position by virtue of our previous
consideration of Fuchs.
Our brevity in this analysis is also justified by
the fact that Ebeling falls less under the influence of
Heidegger than does Fuchs. Although a decisive factor at
1 Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.65.
2 Ibid., p.57»
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many points in Ebeling's theology, Heidegger is certainly
no more influential on Ebeling than the thinking of Martin
Luther and Dietrich Bonho^ffer,^^ Nevertheless,
Heidegger's thinking, especially on language, certainly
plays a formative role in the development of Ebeling's
theological position and thus our analysis of his theology
will continue to bear out our thesis that this new
hermeneutic school of theology is definitely influenced by
the later Heidegger's philosophy.
So as to avoid repetition, where Ebeling is related
to Heidegger in the same way and for the same insight as
Euchs, this will be merely noted, thereby eliminating a
detailed explanation of the relation. However, where the
Heideggerian influence is distinctive, or results in a
different insight, this relation will be given the same
attention as it was with the Euchs analysis. (As was the
case with Euchs, we shall begin by considering Ebeling's
philosophical presuppositions and his basic insights and
then move into his applications of these to traditional
theological issues.)
Just as Euchs did, Ebeling associates reality
with the realm of language. Thus in "Word of God
and Hermeneutic" he declares« "Eor in that hermeneutic
addresses itself directly to the word, it addresses
itself directly to the reality that comes to understanding
(2)
through the word." For him, reality can only have
1 Ibid.. pp.36 and 67.
2 Gerhard Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", Jhe i<ew
Hermeneutic. trans, by James W, Leitch, p.96.
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significance through language. It is language as word-
event which makes anything understandable and this means
that hermeneutics deals not just with wo-ds but also with
"the thing that is to be brought to understanding by means
of the word-event. Here Ebeling shares the same debt
to Heidegger as does Fuchs (see page "3 4*0.
As was also the case with Fuchs, for Ebeling
language as word-event plays the crucial and predominant role
in the process of understanding. "The primary phenomenon
in the realm of understanding", he says, "is not
understanding &f language, but understanding through
language." Therefore, the word is not the object of
understanding but is the means of, an aid in, understanding.
(2)
"The word itself has a hermeneutical function."
Rather than our pre-understanding being something
we bring to the text in order to understand it better, the
text, when it is approached correctly and allowed to happen
or occur as word-event, aids in interpreting our own
understanding. As Ebeling explains in Theology and
Proclamation: "In dealing with a text there is a transition
from an exposition of the text to an exposition by the text
(i.e. that one is concerned to be taught the truth about
(1)
oneself by the text)." J Here language is emphasized over
against thinking in the process of understanding which now
1 Ibid., p.95.
2 Ibid.. pp.93-9*+.
3 Gerhard Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, trans, by John
Riches, (London: William Collins Sons & Co.Ltd.,1966), p.28.
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occurs through language as word-event.
In his article "Verantworten des Glaubens in
Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", Ebeling suggests
that Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysical thinking is
relevant for theology in that it opens the way for a new
emphasis on the role of language. Theology should ask of
Heidegger's philosophy "if it is not precisely by the
overcoming of representational Zmetaphysical7 thinking that
freedom for the correct use of...language will be disclosed
/since.7 language, especially the traditional language of
faith...has been misused...by representational thinking."
^ In this way Ebeling picks up on Heidegger's overcoming
of metaphysical thinking in a basically negative way by
severely delimiting the role of thinking in favour of the
language process.
We move next into Ebeling's understanding of
existence, or his anthropology. One of the fundamental
traits of existence for Ebeling is its "questionableness",
by which he means a tendency to constantly question its own
purpose, origin, and meaning. In /ford and Faith, he says:
"The task of a comprehensive analysis of reality...would
now be: to observe the radical questionableness of reality."
He further describes the "common ground of every man's
experience" as "the questionableness that encounters us in
1 Gerhard Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung
mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", Zeitschrlft fur Theologie
und Kirche. Beiheft II (1961), pp.123-12*1-.
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the reality that encounters us."^
Another basic trait of existence he calls the
"experience of passivity" which "underlies all human activity
...In his existence between birth and death man is also
exposed to passivity in various ways as one who is involved,
(2)
called, challenged, questioned." In Theology and
Proclamation he refers to this same aspect by sayings "It
is still of course true that man's relation to his own
particular historical circumstances may best be characterised
as Geworfenheit (thrownness).
In these two traits of existence we can see the
direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy. In the latter,
passivity, we can easily identify this influence through
Ebeling's use of the Heideggerian term "thrownness". As
for the former, the questionableness of existence, we need
only recall our reference to Heidegger's portrayal of man
as the ontological animal' to realize that Dasein's nature
consists of an inherent tendency to question its own nature
and ground of existence. Man as constantly questioning
and man as the'ontological animal are one and the same and
now we can see the direct influence of Heidegger on
Ebeling's anthropology.
As was the case with Fuchs, here too we see the
influence of the earlier Heidegger in Ebeling's use of the
1 Ebeling, iVord and Faith. pp.31+8-3lf9*
2 IbM., p.350.
3 Ebeling, Theplogy ajqd Pyocl^ms^tlo.q, p.l6.
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term Gevorfenheit and the concept, questionableness. With
Ebeling as well as Fuchs then, we must refer to the
Heideggerian influence as coming mainly, but not exclusively,
from his later insights.
Another basic trait of existence is, or course, its
linguisticality. Like Fuchs, Ebeling asserts that man can
only come into his own through his relation to language.
He explains that "...the precise purpose which the word is
meant to serve is that man shows himself as man. For that
is his destiny. And for that reason word is absolutely
necessary to man as man." At a later point we find: "...
existence is existence through word and in word."^ And
therefore authentic existence would be determined by its
relation to language. "Where word happens rightly,
(2)
existence is illumined..." In his understanding of
existence and language, Ebeling bears the same relation to
the later Heidegger as does Fuchs (see previously pagej^).
Another point at which Ebeling is influenced by
the later Heidegger concerns his method of approaching and
interpreting the insights of past thinkers. As we saw in
our discussion of Heidegger's concept, "retrieve", he did
not feel bound to the traditional approach to past
thinkers, but instead attempted to penetrate beyond their
writings to the subject matter revealed - concealed to them,
1 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", pp.10^ and 109.
2 Ibid.. p.lOlf.
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thereby becoming a partner in their creative thinking and
becoming "more Greek than the Greeks."
Similarly, in attempting to comprehend the
significance of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's concept, "non-religious
interpretation of biblical concepts", Ebeling declares that
one should "Certainly not Approach him/ without seeking to
discover Bonhoeffer's own opinion from what statements of
his we have, yet for all that making /one's/ own efforts to
think his thoughts for him, think over them and think them
further, until in the end /one/ loses all interest in
Bonhoeffer as compared with the subject itself...
67• Traditional theological concerns
We are prepared now to move into a consideration
of Ebeling's position in regard to traditional theological
issues. Here we shall see how he applies the presuppositions
and basic concepts of his thinking as we have so far analysed
them. The stage is set for the entry of a transcendent
factor in that existence has been portrayed as constantly
pointing beyond itself. Further, the means whereby the
transcendent factor can make its entrance is also established
in that existence and reality are basically linguistic.
Based on what we have already established, reality
and authentic existence depend entirely on the appearance
of language in its undistorted, essential form. Ebeling
also believes that language in its most essential form is
1 Ebeling, Word and faith, p.105.
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language functioning as the Word of God. God's word is
language which avoids distortion of reality, and lets man
exist authentically in relation to his world, other men
and himself. In opposition to those who contrast God's
Word and man's word, or language, he sees the former as
having basically the same nature and structure as the
latter.
God's Word is what man's word should be. Between
these, libeling says:
...the point of contrast is whether the word-event
is one that is misused and corrupted by man, or
whether it is one that is sound, pure, and fully
realized - which is meant to be the destiny, and
indeed the natural destiny, of words in human
society. And that implies at the same time a
contrast in what the word produces: whether it is
a destructive and deadly word or one that brings
wholeness and gives life.
(1)
Hence when language is essential and fulfills its function,
it becomes Word of God which reveals reality in its truth
and allows authentic existence.
This position has important repercussions on
Ebeling's treatment of other theological issues. Most
immediately, it allows him to resolve what he considers to
be a crucial problem in contemporary theology. Basically
he sees the Barthian and Bultmannian schools of theology
differing in their assessment of the relation between
hermeneutics and God's Word. "On the one side, the passion
for the Word of God tends toward disparagement of the
1 libeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", pp.10*+ and 109.
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hermeneutical problem* on the other side, the interest in
the hermeneutical oroblem appears to jeopardize what is
said of the word of God."^^
By closely associating God's Word and man's word,
and by reversing the relation between man and word which
underlies the positions of these two contemporary
approaches (language interprets man, he believes, not vice
versa as others formerly assumed), Ebeling provides an
alternative to the Barthian and Bultmannian approaches.
Ho longer is word or text an object to be analyzed and
interpreted, instead it acts on and through man.
Hermeneutics now becomes a "doctrine of the word of God."
Furthermore, theology as a whole is hermeneutical in that
it is the process through which God's word-event occurs and
brings the interpreter into his true existence. Here then
is a radically new solution to the problem previously solved
in mutually exclusive ways in contemporary theology. No
longer is hermeneutics to be either av-oided as antagonistic
to God's Word (Barthian) or else applied at the risk of
endangering or swallowing up God's Word (Bultmannian).
Instead it is seen as the avenue through which God's Word comes
to fullest expression.
Another repercussion of Ebeling's close association
of Word of God and man's language can be seen in his
understanding of the process of proclaiming God's Word.
1 Ibid., p.83.
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He sees the minister's task in the pulpit as letting the
word-event which resulted in the text happen anew.
Therefore, word-event is the text's origin and future.
The text, he explains, always serves the purpose of the
word-event, "For the word that once happened and in
happening became the text must again become word with the
help of the text and thus happen as interpreting word."^1^
i ,
In the sermon then, God's Word re-occurs through man's
language in a word-event.
We have now seen the repercussions of Ebeling's
close association of God's Word and man's word in his treat¬
ment of several theological issues. We might remind
ourselves that we are looking at how Ebeling applies his
basic insights, which are influenced mainly by the later
Heidegger's philosophy, to traditional theological issues.
Althoxigh we are not pausing to point out each particular
Heideggerian influence, since this has already been
established in the Fuchs* analysis, we can still see it here
by realizing that Heidegger's insights result in Ebeling's
basic position that language uses man, not vice versa, and
we are continually seeing this reflected in his theological
views.
We have already said that when language functions
essentially it is God's Word and we can now see how this
stresses the relevance of God's Word for man and his relation
to reality. Hather than the believer being out of touch
t Ebeling, 'ideology gnd prPClgFigi;jiQn, p. 28.
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with reality and the world, Ebeling's position means that
it is the believer, not the unbeliever, who is most in touch
with reality by virtue of his relation to God's Word.
In his essay "Faith and Unbelief in Conflict about
Reality", he declares:
Faith does not flee reality, but stands up to it...
faith is never in conflict with reality...but only
...with unbelief about reality...Unbelief declares
that faith is ignorant of reality and hostile to it.
It is not a sign of faith to meet this with a bad
conscience and a fifty-fifty mixture of admission
and excuse. But faith's reaction is a decided 'KOI'
'Unbelief is ignorant of reality and hostile to it.'
Just as it is the believer who sees things as they
really are, so it is also the believer who, by virtue of his
relation to God's Word, exists authentically. It is
language which "...as an event...can touch and change our
(2)
very life..."; and since essential language is God's Word,
the believer alone experiences authentic existence, he only
is fully human. "For God's Word is...but one single thing
- the word that makes man human by making him a believer..."
^ Hence, it is language as God's Word which reveals
reality as it is and also makes authentic existence possible.
As a result of this understanding of the relation
of reality and God's "Word, Ebeling rejects those criticisms
of contemporary sermons which demand less talk of God and
faith and more stress on action in the world. These, he
1 Ebeling, lord -and Faith, p.381.
2 Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of ?aith. trans, by Ronald G.
Smith, (London: William Collins' Sons & Co.Ltd.,1961), p.l86.
3 Ebeling, "word and Faith, p.328.
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feels, are based on a false dichotomy of reality and God's
Word. The sermon will not become more relevant by merely
inserting "more practical illustrations or...topical...
digressions into contemporary history." Appeals to action
and attempts at modernizing the gospel are ineffective in
that "the message has no wish to be illumined by our reality
(l)
but our reality is to be illumined by the message." In
light of his understanding of God's Word, Ebeling asserts
that effective, relevant sermons are based upon the knowledge
that ultimately all reality has meaning solely with the aid
(2)
of God's Word. (In like manner, the present is not the
means by which the past is to be gauged and in terms of
which the past will be interpreted. Instead "...the text
by means of the sermon becomes a hermeneutical aid in the
(o )
understanding of present experience." 0 )
We can see now the very central role language or
word-event plays in Ebeling's theology. To underline this,
we can note his words: "...it is 'word' that unites God and
(1+)
man."; and also "knowledge of God is a linguistic
(5)
event..." Here we might stress the parallel with
Heidegger's later thinking on language by saying that he
too saw language as that which insured a point of contact
between man and Being; he also saw Being's revelation of
1 Ibid., p.198.
2 Ibid.. pp.199-200.
3 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", p.109.
!+ Ibid., p.103.
5 Ebeling, Word and Faith, p.351.
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itself as happening through language. Here the influence
of the later Heidegger is again most apparent.
We will not consider Ebeling's Christology as he
basically shares Fuchs' views. However, in his doctrine
of God we can see definite Heideggerian influences. We
have already noted that God's revelation is a linguistic
event and that "word" provides the link between God and man.
In addition, he sees this revelation as an event whereby
God illuminates and lights up man's Being and world. "...
revelation means the...illumination of the whole of my
existence with everything it embraces...revelation is
itself light...not anything at all that seeks to be con¬
sidered in itself, as little as the source of light is there
to be looked into (which everyone knows blinds instead of
illuminating).
By the same token, we previously saw how the later
Heidegger considered Being to be the source of the light
which enables beings to come into view. We noted too that
for him, "Being also hides or conceals itself as it lights
up beings." (see pageic?5). Here, then, we see striking
parallels in the thinking of Ebeling and Heidegger which
result from a shared position on the role of the transcen¬
dent power (God and Being) in man's life.
In his doctrine of God, Ebeling also employs the
later Heidegger's concept of the "ontological difference."
1 Ibid.. pp.350-351
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As he specifically refers to this Heideggerian tern itself
and employs it in a manner different from Fuchs* use of it,
we shall give the Heideggerian influence more attention at
this point. In his article "Verantworten des Glaubens in
Begegnung mit dem Denken M, Heideggers" he says« "It would
be a relapse into metaphysical thinking to explain the
ontological difference theologically. On the other hand,
if this were maintained as the difference between Sod and
creation, this would avoid any confusion with the metaphysi-
( 1 )
cal difference of two worlds..."
Here Sbeling is trying to employ the'ontological
*
difference in theology to distinguish between God and
creation without falling prey to the tendency to see the two
as totally separate and distinct realms, Heidegger himself
used this concept to indicate both the continuity and
discontinuity of Being and beings in their dependence
upon each other. In the above quote, Sbeling is striving
to emphasize the discontinuity between God and man (he even
refers to them at a later point as man the sinner and God
the justifier. ^ )
We can see him emphasizing the other side of this
Heideggerian concept, the continuity between the two realms,
when he states that the tendency in theology to speak of
God and world as separate entities is a serious error?
"...the fact is that God cannot be spoken of in theology
without the world coming thereby to expression as event, and
the world cannot be spoken of...without God thereby likewise
1 Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem
Denken M. Heideggers", p. 124-,
2 II? id.
29.1
coming to expression as event. Here, then, we can see
the direct influence of Heidegger's later philosophy on
Ebeling's theology.
And finally in our consideration of Ebeling's views
on traditional theological issues we come to his under¬
standing of faith. We shall continue to limit our
examination of this topic to that aspect which is not also
reflected in Fuchs* approach. Basically, Ebeling sees
faith as a word-event in that, like everything else, it is
made possible by language. As he explains, faith "...is
the becoming effective of the word as that which it claims
(2)
to be - as God's word..." Here again we see how his
understanding of language, for which he is indebted to the
later Heidegger, forms the basis for his theological views.
68; A critical appraisal
Having established the extent of Heidegger's
influence on Ebeling's theology, we turn now to a critical
appraisal of his use of this philosopher's thinking and
also to a consideration of how it might be better employed.
In his article concerning the response of faith to
Heidegger's thinking, he summarizes how this philosopher's
insights as a whole might best be utili2ed in theology.
He recommends this relationship be moulded according to
(8)
the traditional Lutheran law-gospel structure. J
1 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", p.101.
2 Ibid., p.6^.
3 Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem
Denken M. Heideggers", p.122.
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Basically, Heidegger's thinking is equated with
the law and since theology is also concerned with the law,
the two have a common point of interest. Furthermore, like
the law to a certain extent, this philosopher reflects the
contemporary outlook and this too is of interest to
theology. However, despite his claim to use Heidegger
only for a better understanding of the "law" and the con¬
temporary situation, our analysis would suggest that Ebeling
has been influenced also in his understanding of issues
which would come under the heading of gospel.
If we transpose the pattern of law-gospel into the
pattern of question-answer, we can see that Heidegger's
later insights into the nature of language have influenced
not only Ebeling's definition of reality and existence as
dependent upon language, as pointing away from themselves
in their dependence on and need for an ultimate or
transcendent power, thereby posing the question, but also
his answer to this question in the form of a God who appears
only linguistically and thereby brings reality into its own
and existence into authenticity.
Indeed Ebeling's use of Heideggerian insights in
his definition of faith, God, revelation and proclamation,
all issues which would come under the heading of gospel,
reveals that he does not abide by his suggested law-gospel
pattern. Instead, Heidegger's influence is far more
1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later
Heidegger and Theology, p.76.
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extensive and determinative than indicated in his
limitation of it to matters of the "law". By virtue of
his allied position with Ebeling on the nature of language,
Fuchs too would be susceptible to this same criticism of
using Heidegger in more ways than he is willing to
acknowledge. R.W. Funk, in his book Language, Hermeneutic.
and Word of God, is of the same opinion. He points out
that both, despite their attempts "to distinguish their
work from that of Heidegger" by use of "the law-gospel
dichotomy" are heavily influenced by his later thinking in
all aspects of their theology.^
Next let us consider how Heidegger's thinking
might be better employed in Ebeling's theology. In his
book God Talk John Macquarrie stresses that the great
strength of Heidegger's hermeneutics is its balance. This
balance results from the fact that his earlier views on
language stress a different aspect than his later views.
To focus on his later approach, as happens in the new
hermeneutic,is wrong in that "...it would be a mistake to
suppose that Heidegger's final word on language and
interpretation is that the interpreter can only be passive
(2)
and listen for the voice of Being."
Instead, Macquarrie recommends accepting
Heidegger's own claim that his earlier and later views
1 Robert W. Funk, Language. Hermeneutic.and Word of God.
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers,1966), pp.*+5-50.
2 John Macquarrie, God Talk. (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967),
p.167.
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constitute a unity and this would mean that language "...
has to be understood as both an existential and an
ontological phenomenon; interpretation demands both
questioning and listening, a sense of direction and a
willingness to be directed.^ By focusing so strongly
on the later Heidegger's views on language (although he
does employ earlier views at less important points),
Ebeling's own language analysis, which forms the basis for
his whole theological position, loses the balance so admired
by Macquarrie and a better appreciation of Heidegger's
earlier views would certainly strengthen Ebeling's position.
In conclusion to our analysis of Ebeling's theology,
we can see that the basic cornerstone of his theology, his
understanding of language, is influenced directly by the
later Heidegger's philosophy. As was the case with our
consideration of Fuchs, we have therefore further
substantiated our thesis that the new hermeneutic






69. Theology and language
We turn next to a theologian who also stresses the
importance of the role of language in theology, even though
he is not generally included in the new hermeneutic
movement. This is possibly the result of the fact that
Heinrich Ott also takes a great deal of interest in other
aspects of theology. While language is one of his basic
interests, it does not dominate his theology to the extent
it does that of Fuchs and Ebeling.
Nevertheless, we can justify our consideration of
him along with what generally is considered the new
hermeneutic theologians. In his essay "What Is Systematic
Theology?",Ott says: "The nature of theology as a whole is
hermeneutical. Theology is really hermeneutic...he who
inquires as to the nature and the program of theology
cannot avoid the problem of understanding, the hermeneutical
problem."^ Hence, like Fuchs and Ebeling, Ott broadens
the scope of hermeneutics (it considers the problem of
understanding as a whole, not just theories of interpre¬
tation) and sees theology and all its various fields in
light of the hermeneutical issue.
Like Fuchs and Ebeling, he also stresses the
1 Heinrich Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", The Later
Heidegger and Theology, trans, by J.M. Robinson, pp.78-79.
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importance of language for theology. The important role
of language for Ott is reflected in the title itself of his
book, Theology and Preaching. In it he explains how at
one time he "sought to define theology (and hence more
particularly dogmatics) as the reflective function of
preaching itself...Ziince/ preaching and dogmatics are in
the last resort a single activity of the Church, two aspects
of one and the same thing. Therefore language, in the
form of proclamation, is certainly one of the central
interests of his theology. This, combined with his under¬
standing of hermeneutics, supports our association of Ott
with the members of the new hermeneutic movement.
As for the influence of Heidegger's philosophy,
there will be no difficulty in establishing Ott's relation
to this philosopher as he openly acknowledges that the main
thrust of his thinking is concerned with incorporating
Heidegger's later insights into theology. Not surprisingly,
his essay provides the focal point for Robinson and Cobb's
work, The Later Heidegger and Theology. His interest in
the thinking of Heidegger is further reflected in the title
of his work Denken und Sein: Per weg Martin Heideggers und
der -veg Iheologie and his essay "Die Bedeutung von Martin
Heideggers Denken fur Methode der Theologie". Of the new
hermeneutic theologians, then, it can be said that Ott has
undoubtedly devoted the most attention and energy to the
1 Heinrich Ott, Theology and Preacnlng. trans, by Harold
Knight, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1965), p.19.
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theological relevance of Heidegger's philosophy.^^
Although he is more concerned with Heidegger's
thinking than the other theologians so far considered, we
shall devote less time to an analysis of Ott's theology
than we have to the others because it has had less impact
and influence than that of the others. The reason for
this could possibly be that his thinking has not yet
matured (he succeeded Barth at the University of Basel at
the relatively early age of 33) and thus his works are not
yet widely known.
Nevertheless, Ott should be considered as it is
quite possible that he will be remembered more than
Bultmann, Fuchs or Ebeling as the theologian who used
Heidegger's philosophy most constructively. In addition,
because in the works so far available he has focused on the
basic problems of method and presuppositions involved in
theology we will not be considering the usual topics of
Christology, soteriology, doctrine of God, etc. in this
analysis.
We begin by seeing how Ott understands the relation
of language and man. Like Fuchs and Ebeling, he does not
see language as a tool used by man. Instead man's speaking
is only possible due to his being spoken to or addressed.
In analysing the following lines from a poem by Joseph von
Eichendorff:
1 John R. Williams, "Heidegger and the Theologians", The
Heythrop Journal, vol. 12 (1971)» p.273«
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There stands written in the wood
A still, earnest word,
Of right doing and loving,
And what man treasures.
Ott declares that the being of entities actually speaks to
man and thereby enables him to talk. Rather than saying
that man has "...the special ability at his free disposal
to invent speech as the opportunity arises", he suggests:
"How should man be able to speak of the wood, if the wood
had not first spoken to him?"^
Ott goes on to explain that this is exactly what
Heidegger is speaking about when he calls speech "the1house
(2)
of Being' in which 'man lives'." Here, we see Ott
openly adapting the later Heidegger's insistence that language,
as Being, holds the initiative in the process whereby man
comes to speech and lets beings be. Hence, just as we saw
with Fuchs and Ebeling, the normal relation between man and
language is reversed.
Another consequence of this adaptation of the
Heideggerian approach wherein language holds the initiative
over man is that theological speaking is always prayer.
In Denken und Sein: Per ,ve^ Hartin Heideggers und der .'/eg
der rheologie. Ott explains that because all theology is
done in response to God's "call" to man, it has the character
of prayer. "Can one speak of God truly in any other way
than by prayer? Therefore, must not all theological
1 Heinrich Ott, "Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in
Theology", Journal for Theology arid the Church, trans, by
D,M. Smith, vol. 3 (1967), p.119.
2 Ibid.
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speaking in its ground and in its execution, both outwardly
as well as inwardly, be prayer?"^
Although he does not develop in depth his
definition of faith, we can see that it is developed along
similar lines to the linguistically centred approach of
Fuchs and Ebeling. In analysing the nature of theology,
Ott explains that theological thinking and speaking brings
man to a certain place or puts him in a position where he
has "freedom for the obedient hearing and proclaiming of
(2)
the Word of God. This hearing...we call faith."
Thus, for Ott faith is dependent upon language in that it
involves a linguistic event in which God reveals Himself.
Both faith and language have the character of response to a
prior linguistic act of God and here we see the Heideggerian
pattern emerging in Ott's theology.
70. The nature of theology
Ott has devoted a large part of his writing to
defining the nature and scope of systematic theology, or
dognatics. Both his article "What Is Systematic Theology?"
and his book Theology and Preaching dwell on this theme.
We have already noted that Ott closely associates theology
with preaching and this continues to be the basis upon which
he works in defining systematic theology. He explains
that this association is the result of the nature of faith
1 Ibi^., p.132.
2 Ott, Denken und Sein. p.192.
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itself. "Faith is aimed at communication and attaining a
common understanding, or a communication that makes faith
understandable.
Ott sees theology as a whole involving three basic
aspects; "the understanding of the texts, the understanding
of the subject matter coming to expression in the texts, and
the understanding of the contemporary witness to this
(2)
subject." As a result he divides theology into
exegetical, systematic and practical theology, and says that
systematic theology "finds its position, as it were, in the
middle of the arch extending from the text to contemporary
preaching. It stands between exegesis, which is primarily
concerned with the text as such, and practical reflection,
which is primarily concerned with the Church's preaching.^
As a result theology with its threefold function
is described as a "hermeneutical arch" stretching from the
past to the present. As stated previously, theology is
hermeneutics. A result of this is that theology can no
longer be allowed to break down into opposing factions with
exegetes disputing and refuting the positions of systematic
theologians and vice versa. Ott stresses the unity of
theology by using a familiar Heideggerian formula, the
hermeneutical circle. Its theological form is described
as follows: "...dogmatics is no more absolutely and one-
sidedly dependent upon exegesis than exegesis is absolutely




and one-sidedly dependent upon dogmatics. Rather, dogmatics
and exegesis stand in a relation of interaction with one
another... They mutually illumine and explicate one another."
(1)
What, then, is the function of systematic theology
in its "between" position in theology? Ott sees systematic
theology, with its interest in the gospel as a whole, as a
necessary counterbalance to exegesis and preaching, with
their interest in particular texts and therefore only
particular aspects of the gospel. He believes that the
concern of systematics is the "unspoken" of the gospel.
This "unspoken" results from the fact that the Christ event
is never exhausted in any of its particular manifestations
or accounts. Further, the gospel itself is never to be
identified with one particular gospel "according to..." for
"the one gospel itself is heard through all gospels and
(2)
witnesses..•"
Because of this nature of the gospel, systematic
theology plays a vital role in theology. It alone insures
that the unity and wholeness of the gospel behind the gospels
"according to..." is maintained in light of the interests of
preaching and exegesis. Heidegger's influence here is
quite apparent and Ott himself quotes the following
Heideggerian passage as the source of his insight into the
nature of systematic theology. "Every great poet composed




unspoken. None of the individual poems, not even the
total of them, says it all."
He then goes on to explain the meaning of the word
systematic in systematic theology. It "is not the putting
together of various doctrines into a doctrinal structure
that may be readily surveyed...This would be the metaphysical
understanding of systematic theology. Rather, the
systematic aspect consists in looking through the complexity
of what is spoken to the indivisible unity of the unspoken
(2)
..." Here we can see how Ott employs Heideggerian
insights in his definition of the nature and scope of both
systematic theology and theology as a whole.
Ott also employs Heidegger's approach in defining
the type of thinking which is involved in theology.
Basically, his approach at this point can be seen as an
effort to carry through in theology Heidegger's overcoming
of metaphysical thinking and he feels this is not to be
accomplished by simply declaring that all theological
thinking is objectifying and thus to be distinguished from
the faith encounter. Instead the theological parallel to
overcoming metaphysics "...takes place by understanding
(o)
thinking...as experiential thinking." J
Here we see Ott employing later Heideggerian
insights in attacking the Bultmannian separation of
1 Heidegger, Unterwees Zur Sorache as quoted by Ott, "What
Is Systematic Theology?", p.87.
2 Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.89.
3 IMi., P.109.
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theological thinking as objectifying and thereby once-removed
from the primary experience of faith. In place of this
approach, Ott adopts Anselm's definition of theology as
"faith seeking understanding." Theology now becomes "a
movement of faith itself" as it strives for clarity in the
believer's understanding.
Why does faith seek clarity and understanding?
Because it by nature strives toward language, expression,
and communication and this invariably involves clarity and
understanding. As we have already noted, being put into
language and communicated to others is an essential element
of faith and now theological thought is not once-removed
from faith, but is part of the faith process itself.
"Faith presses toward presenting itself in the clarity of
thought...But then the movement of 'seeking understanding',
that is, theology, is a movement of faith itself."^
The reason other contemporary theologians have not
been able to comprehend this relation of thinking and faith
is that they insist on seeing the thought process as
(2)
necessarily objectifying. However, Heidegger has
decisively overcome this approach and provided insights into
the deeper, more essential level of the thought process.
"For Heidegger, the essence of original, essential, i.e.
non-metaphysical, non-subjective thought consists in
1 Ibid., p.92.
2 Ott, "Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Theology",
pp.112-113.
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existential encounter or...is only possible as existential
encounter. Thinking...has the character of experience."
Hence faith and thinking both have an experiential
character, need not be set in opposition, and can be seen
as part of the same process.
Ott's understanding of theological thinking also
employs the Heideggerian insight into the primacy of language
in understanding. Like the other new hermeneutic
theologians, he sees language as playing a far greater role
in the process of understanding than has been traditionally
assigned to it. Understanding results not from thinking
but primarily from language and communication.
For Ott, the faith experience only reaches
culmination when it involves expression and communication.
"For in my efforts...to make faith and its subject matter
understandable to brothers in faith and to the world, I am
reaching an understanding with myself at the same time as to
my faith. What I make clear to others becomes clear to
(2)
myself.*."
While he does stress the primacy of language in
the process of understanding, Ott does not succumb to the
tendency noted in other new hermeneutic theologians to over¬
react against the traditional understanding of the role of
the thought process by severely minimizing it in favour of
1 Ott, Theology and Preaching, p.21.
2 Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.96.
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the language process. Instead, as we noted earlier (p.3?f ),
he maintains Heidegger's close association between the
thinking and speaking processes.^1 Thus, we can see how
Ott has employed Heidegger's "overcoming of metaphysics" in
his definition of theological thinking and we see in his
theology another way in which Heidegger's later philosophy
can be adapted theologically.
As we noted earlier, language is not as dominating
a concern for Ott as it is for Fuchs and Ebeling. We have
already encountered his interest in the nature of theology
as a whole and in the nature of theological thinking, and
now we turn to his doctrine of God. In Denken und Sein
Ott devotes a good deal of attention to utilizing Heidegger's
ontology in his doctrine of God.
He quotes Heidegger's question from "Was 1st
Metaphysik?": "Why is there any being at all and not much
rather nothing?" and says this can easily be converted into
the theological question "Why is there any God at all and
(2)
not much rather nothing?" Ott then interprets the
Heideggerian understanding of the contingency of beings,
"the wonder of all wonders: that beings are", into the
theological doctrine of God the Creator. "Faith in God
the Creator...experiences...the strangeness...of beings.
Faith is...thinking along with Heidegger, simply the
uncompromising persistence of the basic question as to 'why
1 Ott, "Response to the American Discussion", The Later
^eidegger and Theology, trans, by J.M. Robinson, p.211.
2 Ott, Denken una Sein. p.28.
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there is any being at all and not much rather nothing?
He then moves into the actual question of God in
Himself and begins by saying that, if Heidegger's thinking
is to be the guideline, God must be thought of as a being,
not as Being itself. He bases this on a Heideggerian
statement in the Introduction to "Was 1st Metaphysik?" in
which God is listed alongside a rock, a horse, and an angel
as beings, or things that are, but do not "exist" since
(2)
this belongs uniquely to Dasein's mode of Being.
One of the main objections to this approach would
be that it fails to respect the uniqueness of God in
associating Him under the general category, Being, with
other beings. However, Ott says this criticism is based on
the very thinking overcome by Heidegger's philosophy.
Being is no longer seen as at man's disposal and therefore
it could not be a category through which man could gain
control over God. Instead, this approach would protect
the initiative of God in revealing Himself to man.
Ott then explains the nature of God's Being.
"The Being of God...means an occurrence of revelation: that
God reveals himself to thinking as who he is; that he...
gives himself to thinking as matter for thought...the
thinking which is met by the Being of God is the thinking
of faith. Here we see how by defining God's Being in
1 Ibid.. p.88.
2 Ibid., p. 1^-2.
3 Ott, Penken und Geln. p.1^8.
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terms of the aletheia aspect of Being, Ott has avoided the
danger of constructing a concept by which man could strive
to manipulate God.
However, Ott's attempt to fit Heidegger's
philosophy directly into a theological framework was later
seen as overly ambitious and he withdrew somewhat from the
position of Denken und Sein to a more defensible under-
standing of Heidegger's relevance for theology. Heidegger
himself suggested to a meeting of German theologians that
his work might best be related to theology by means of an
"analogia proportionalitatisi A is to B as C is to D. As
philosophical thinking is related to Being, when Being
speaks to thinking, so faith's thinking is related to God,
(1)
when God is revealed in His word."
In light of this proposal (made in I960, one year
after the publication of Denken und Sein) Ott adopted a
position of doing theology within its own framework that is
structurally parallel to Heidegger's thinking. This avoids
such difficult problems as deciding whether God is to be
thought of as a being or as Being itself.
Unlike Fuchs and Ebeling, Ott openly acknowledges
the extensive influence of Heidegger's later thinking on
his theology. He explains that as a Reformed theologian
he feels no need to structure his relation to Heidegger
according to a law-gospel pattern. Instead, he can "take
1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion", p.*+3.
4C7
philosophy seriously as a theologian" and "...test from
case to case the extent to which philosophy has perhaps
discovered something that the theologian too can acknowledge
as suitable and helpful and hence can appropriate."^'
Ott's insight is particularly significant in light
of the fact that the influence of Heidegger's philosophy
has mainly been restricted to Lutheran theologians, e.g.
Bultmann, Fuehs and Ebeling. However, Ott has shown now
that Reformed theologians, less restricted by this law-
gospel pattern, also can fruitfully utilise Heideggerian
insights and can perhaps do so even more constructively
than their Lutheran counterparts.
With this we come to the conclusion of our analysis
of Ott's use of Heideggerian insights. We have noted how
he has employed these Insights not only in his understanding
of language but also in his definition of the nature of
theology as a whole, of systematic theology, of theological
thinking, of faith, and in his doctrine of God.
Moreover, the Heideggerian insights involved here have been
mostly from the thinking of the later Heidegger, e.g. his
views on language, poetry, the overcoming of metaphysics,
and on Being. Therefore, this further supports our thesis
that the new hermeneutic theologians have been influenced
mainly by the philosophy of the later Heidegger.
1 utt, "Response to the American Discussion", The Later
Heidegger and Theology, p.199.
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71. A critical appraisal of the new hermeneutic
In seeking to appraise the contribution of this
theological movement in light of Heidegger's influence upon
it, we need to focus our attention on its understanding of
the language process since this provides the foundation on
which the rest of its views are based. Basically the new
herraeneutic has erred in attributing more importance and
initiative to Being as Language than this process can
reasonably be able to claim.
The language process certainly does play an
important role in man's make-up and in the structure of
reality as a whole but this is not to say that it is the
single most important factor. By the same token, we saw
in those instances where new insights and clarity of
understanding occur in the effort to express and communicate
a particularly difficult idea that the language process
does have a creative aspect and does possess a certain
amount of initiative in granting reality and understanding
to the speaker.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that man plays an
entirely passive role in this process. The new
hermeneutic's claim that language uses man is a distortion
of this basically sound insight that language plays a more
creative and central role than is often realized. Even
allowing for the fact that these theologians have greatly
expanded the meanihg of this term (language includes non¬
verbal acts as well as speaking), their emphasis on its role
409
is still extreme.
This flaw in the new hermeneutic theologians'
outlook can easily he traced back to its origin in the way
they adapted Heidegger's insights into language. It was
noted in our analysis of his development that having focused
on the Dasein side of the Dasein-Being relationship, he
then over-reacted somewhat by stressing the initiative of
Being in its revelation to man. The result was an
unbalanced outlook in which man was portrayed as little more
than the messenger or loudspeaker for Being as language.
In restricting their use of Heidegger's insights
to this period, the new hermeneutic theologians (especially
Fuchs and Ebeling) carried over this unbalanced approach
into their own theology. However, a better appreciation
of Heidegger's over-all approach would have prevented this
undue stress on the role of the language-process. As we
saw earlier, language was but one of several avenues
through which Heidegger saw Being revealing-concealing
itself.
Ott rightly saw that thinking should not be
portrayed as a weak sister to language since it too provides
an opening through which Being can shine. By the same
token, we established that anxiety was another aspect of
man's structure which was open to Being. The variety of
ways in which Being revealed Itself was further seen in his
discussions of history, the "ontological difference",
aletheia and others. Indeed, the theme which runs
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throughout Heidegger's ontology is that Being reveals
itself in many ways, none of which can claim exclusive
rights to Being's revelation.
Hence these theologians' extreme emphasis on the
language process is not in keeping with Heidegger's outlook.
As we saw in his understanding of Being as the "ontological
difference", the role of beings (or man) must always be
protected and appreciated over against the role of Being,
thereby maintaining a balanced view of their need for each
other. The failure of these theologians (5\ichs and Bbeling
more than Ott who does at least recognize that Being reveals
itself through modes other than the language process) to
retain this balance results in the rather extreme nature of
their approach.
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72. An existential-ontological theology
In our consideration of Heidegger's influence on
theology we have so far looked at the theology of Rudolf
Bultmann, who utilized mainly the earlier Heidegger's phil¬
osophy, and also the theology of the "new hermeneutic"
theologians, who utilized mainly the insights of the later
Heidegger. We come now to a theologian who insists on the
unity of Heidegger's philosophy and strives to adapt it
accordingly.
We have already encountered the work of John
Macquarrie as he has devoted much attention to interpreting
and critically developing the insights of both Heidegger and
Bultmann. The unusually clear and concise style of writing
in his books on these thinkers has greatly contributed to a
better appreciation of both. To this point we have been
concerned only with Macquarrie as a commentator on other
thinkers, but we now begin a consideration of his own theo¬
logical contributions.
It is not difficult to establish that Heidegger
influences this theologian's work. In the preface to
Principles of Christian Theology (the one volume devoted
solely to establishing his theological position in a system¬
atic way) Macquarrie directly acknowledges the use of
Heidegger's philosophy which he believes can "...provide the
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basis for a viable twentieth-century philosophical...
theology, and can be used further for the articulation and
elucidation of the whole body of Christian truth in a contem-
"(1)
porary way.
We noted in our previous analysis of Heidegger's
philosophy that Macquarrie was among those commentators who
stressed the unity of his outlook and the value of his
ontological as well as existential contributions. We shall
now establish that he adapts this philosophy into his theo¬
logical approach according to this balanced interpretation
and it is thus appropriate that we conclude our analysis of
Heidegger's influence with a consideration of Macquarrie's
theology.
That he uses both the earlier and later Heideggerian
insights is reflected in the title he gives to his approach
in Principles of Christian Theology, "existential-ontological
theism." While this phrase is used mainly in only this one
book, the outlook it represents underlies what is said in all
of this theologian's works. We shall see how he stresses
the need for appreciating the role of existential involvement
as well as that of an ontological ground in the themes running
throughout his theology.
In his understanding of God, we shall note how he
strives to establish the reality of God in Himself as well
as to appreciate that God can only be known insofar as He
1 John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology. (London:
SCM Press, 1966), p.IX.
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acts upon man. In his analysis of history, we shall see
how he appreciates both the need for existential involvement
in historical events as well as the need for grounding such
involvement in concrete factual occurrences. In his
analysis of language, we shall note his appreciation of the
existential (language as an existential structure) and
ontological (language as Being uses man) aspect of this phen¬
omenon. In his dogmatics, we shall note how he seeks to
develop both the existential and ontological components of
such issues as the human-divine nature of Christ, atonement
and salvation. Although there will be some overlapping,
generally the first portion of this analysis will cover the
apologetical and pre-theological issues in Macquarrie's





73. The language process
The first area of Macquarrie's thinking we shall
consider concerns his views on language. We shall begin
with his analysis of the language process in itself and then
move into his discussion of language in theology. Through¬
out we will note Heidegger's influence as it occurs.
In God-Talk he performs a phenomenological analysis of
language which seeks to avoid the presuppositions and
outlooks of previous language analyses and strives to "take
developed human speech as we find it."^ He begins with
an etymological analysis of the various words for saying,
speaking and talking. He finds that all such words refer
to a process wherein what is talked about is "brought into
the light" and he immediately relates this to Heidegger's
understanding of truth as aletheia. or unhiddenness.
He then seeks to break down the language process
into its various components, being very careful to respect
the "discourse-situation", or to avoid isolating any one
aspect of the language process to the exclusion of the rest.
Basically he analyses language from the standpoint of its
three components: the speaker, the spoken to and that about
which something is said.
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk. p.63«
4-15
When seen from the side of the speaker, language
involves expression, in the sense that in speaking a person
expresses something of himself. Macquarrie stresses that
what is expressed in speaking is not an isolated subject
which seeks to relate itself to an external world. Like
Heidegger, he insists that existence is always being-in-the-
world, and that self and world are inseparable. As a
result, in the most primordial mode of speaking the 'total
existence' of the speaker finds expression.
However, there are other modes of speech where only
certain aspects of being-in-the-world come to expression.
In certain specialized modes of speaking it is possible to
"dim down" that part of existence related to feeling, concern
and value-judgments. The various specialized modes of
speaking have a proper role to play and are of great value so
long as they do not usurp the place of the primordial mode of
speaking which expresses the "full range of what is implied
in being a self-in-the-world."^^
He next considers that about which something is said
in the language process. The key words here, 'referring'
and 'representing', describe the relation of "talk to that
which is talked about." These words describe how language
always points beyond itself to some "person, thing, or state
of affairs." More particularly, he expMihs that language
refers to or represents in various ways, the link between
word and reference being sometimes direct, other times
1 Ibid., pp.68-71
416
indirect, sometimes concrete other times abstract.^
yvhen seen from the standpoint of the person spoken
to, language is described as communication which is based on
the sharing of a common world by the speaker and the spoken
to. "Communication takes place when some aspect of the
shared world is lit up and made accessible to both parties
(2)
in the discourse." Here Macquarrie is simply referring
to the fact that unless two people share certain basic
understandings, e.g. language, culture and historical back¬
grounds, they are unable to communicate.
The components of language or discourse as understood
by Macquarrie,then, are expression, representation and
communication. As he explains, unless something is expressed,
nothing can be 'brought into the light'. Further, if
something is expressed which does not refer to or represent
anything, or fails to represent the same thing for the person
spoken to, then there is no communication and again nothing
is "brought into the light". Thus all three components are
needed to ensure the functioning of the language process.
Having completed his phenomenological description
of language, Macquarrie then seeks to penetrate to even more
basic relations that make possible the relations between
the speaker, the spoken to and that which is spoken about.
He proposes two such relations which allow for the possibi¬




this refers to the fact that existence or being-in-the-
world is characterized by a certain 'openness'. Not only
is man open in the sense of having sensuous intuition of
objects in his surroundings but, even more basically, he
has an openness which reveals not just particular aspects
of his being-in-the-world but also 'total existence.'
Such intuitions, he says, are what existentialists call
affective states (e.g. anxiety) and these are the most fun¬
damental types of intuition.
The second basic relation allowing for the language
process is called the person-to-person relation. In
explaining this concept he quotes Heidegger's understanding
of discourse as always involving the existential i3eing-with,
e.g. speech always implies the existence of another, the
hearer. In concluding his analysis of language, Macquarrie
says that these two relations can be seen as the result of
one basic trait of existence, its openness to both being-in-
the-world and to being-with-others.
Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's analysis is
two-fold. The various concepts involved here, being-with,
being-in-the-world, and the openness which basically char¬
acterizes existence all stem from Heidegger's fundamental
ontology. Further, the direction of this analysis and the
way in which it develops also stems from Heidegger's
methodology which proceeds from an analysis of the phenomena
as they are found to a laying bare of more fundamental
structures which ground and make possible the more visible
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phenomena. In Macquarrie's analysis this pattern involves
his moving from a description of the relations involved in
language as we know it (between speaker, spoken to and that
which is spoken about) to the more basic relation in the
openness of existence to its being-in-the-world and to other
centres of existence-in-the-world.
Prom an analysis of language in general Macquarrie
turns his attention to the problem of language in theology,
i'he theme of this analysis stems from his previous discussion
of that which is spoken about in language. In the case of
religious language the most crucial topic spoken about is
God and Macquarrie proposes that one of the great problems
for twentieth century theologians has been their failure to
establish the relation between the word God and that to
which it refers.
In An Existentialist Theology Macquarrie explains
that Bultraann's desire to limit all speaking about God to
existential language about God as He is experienced reflects
a certain vagueness in the relation between the word God as
he uses it and that to which the term refers or about which
it speaks. In a discussion of the Roman Catholic reaction
to demythologizing, Macquarrie stresses that Bultmann has
correctly seen the existential side of God-talk (one can only
talk about God insofar as His actions have been experienced)
but has failed to explain adequately the ontological
reference of such talk.
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Macquarrie explains that while God-talk must always
illuminate existence, it must also throw a certain amount of
light on the nature of God in Himself. He quotes one Roman
Catholic commentator, L. Malevez, who claims (in a somewhat
exaggerated manner) that Bultmann's theology speaks only
about existence and is silent about the nature of the God
which it urges people to worship.
In God-Talk Macquarrie sets the stage for his own
way of speaking about God by evaluating the thinking of the
three leading contemporary theologians on this issue. He
refers to Bultmann's use of analogical language to supplement
his existential language about God (we can know God only
insofar as we experience Him) as an "unexplained leap or
hiatus in his thought." He sees this unexplained gap as
the result of Bultmann's failure to establish how language
which normally refers to the human realm can have an indirect
(2)
reference to an ultimate dimension.
While Hultmann approaches the problem of God—talk
from the human side, Karl Barth stresses the divine factor
in this issue. Barth suggests that analogical language can
reveal God, not through any virtue of its own but through
the gracious intervention of God in the language process.
Since this divine intervention, like the incarnation, is
essentially a mystery, Macquarrie points out that Barth's
1 Macquarrie, i'he Scope of Demvthologlzing. p. 127.
2 Macquarrie, God-Talk. p.*+l.
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explanation of Gocl-talk also involves a leap, in this case
a leap of faith.
Although they approach the problem from different
sides, Barth from the divine and Bultmann from the human,
neither seem to Macquarrie able to bridge the gap between
the human word and the divine realm. Paul Tillich's
understanding of God as Being itself is then suggested as
the contemporary approach which comes closest to bridging
this gap in the God-talk problem.
In that God is Being and all that "is" participates
in Being, language about the realm of being can also refer
indirectly to Being itself. The problem with this basically
sound approach is that Tillich's language about Being is
somewhat vague and ambiguous, thus Macquarrie proposes to
clarify and build on Tillich's solution employing Heidegger's
(2)
insights into the Being-process.
7^. Symbolic language
Macquarrie's understanding of religious language,
and particularly God-talk, centers around his definition
of symbols. Using this concept he seeks to move beyond
the positions of Barth and Bultmann by retaining the
strengths of both, and the weaknesses of neither. In that
his approach is to be existential, it can acknowledge




He is related to man. In that Macquarrie's religious
language will stress the ontological aspect of God's nature,
it will respect Barth's insight that the initiative in any-
divine-human contact must stem from the divine side.
By symbols, Macquarrie refers to those words "which
stand for a thing or phenomenon which is itself a symbol,
in so far as it stands for something else, so that the word
...refers indirectly through its immediate reference to whatever
this may symbolize." As an example of symbolic language,
he cites St. Athanasius' description of Christ's outstretched
hands on the cross waich symbolized the unity of the Hebrews
and Gentiles in Christ's body. The words refer immediately
to the outstretched hands and refer indirectly to that which
the hands symbolize, the unity of the various members in the
body of Christ.^
Macquarrie's understanding of analogical language
plays a key role in the way he defines symbolic language.
He poses the problem for analogical and symbolic language
about God by asking how language which normally refers to
the human realm can validly refer to the divine realm, e.g.
God the vather?
First of all, Macquarrie stresses that the users of
analogical language do not claim to gain direct knowledge of
God through it. The knowledge gained is indirect, but is
nevertheless knowledge of God. "Here indeed we see as in




see."^^ Although only claiming to give indirect know¬
ledge, symbolic and analogical language still must establish
some connection between that which is represented by the
symbol and its reference (or that which is indirectly brought
to light.)
For bridging the gap between symbol and symbolized,
for establishing the link between the two, Macquarrie turns
to three aspects of Heideggerian philosophy, Being as the
"ontological difference", the nature of time and man as the
"ontological animal." For Heidegger, as seen in his under¬
standing of the "ontological difference", Being is both
transcendent of all beings and immanent and accessible in
(2)
them. It is this understanding of the relation between
Being and being which justifies symbolic talk of God for
Macquarrie. The fact that Being is present to some extent
in all beings means that symbols for the latter can refer
indirectly to the former also. Of time as a factor in
bridging the gap between human language and the divine
realm, Macquarrie says that all beings exist in time but
that man does so in a unique way. Rather than simply
moving from one moment to the next, man can be seen as
"constituted by his temporality" and as "extending himself
through past, present and future. Indeed it is
through his ability to relate constructively to the various
tenses of time that man gains authenticity.





At this point Macquarrie is following directly in
the path of Heidegger's fundamental ontology which penetrated
beyond Dasein's existentiell traits to the fundamental
existential "care" and then established the temporal basis
of care. Heidegger also saw Dasein's relation to time,
especially the future dimension, as constitutive for authen¬
ticity.
2Jow if time can be established as a factor in the
Being process then a certain likeness would exist between
Being and man which could provide the basis for analogical
language about Being. The very title of Heidegger's major
work, Being and lime, underlines how closely he believes
these two concepts are related. Indeed we can recall that
Heidegger was pointing toward establishing in Being and Time
that the Being process functions through time, (see p.^f )
Thus Macquarrie sees time as the common bond between Being
and man which allows the language for one to light up the
other in an analogical symbolic manner.
Similarly, Macquarrie sees the existentialists'
understanding of man as providing another link between being
and Being. Unlike other beings, man not only participates
in Being but is aware of and has a certain amount of res¬
ponsibility for his relationship to Being. In a sense, man
shares in the power and functioning of the Being process.
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is quite influential here
also. In that Dasein is the place, or d&, where Being
breaks through into the realm of beings, it is an invaluable
partner in the Being process. Heidegger's portrayal of man
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as the "ontological animal" reflects his understanding of
the distinctive relation between man and Being*
Macquarrie portrays this relationship theologically by
saying that man has a share in the creativity of God and is
created in the image of God. Like time then, man's special
relation to and openness for Being provides the basis for a
language which can refer both to God and to man.
Next we shall examine four important aspects of
symbolic language as understood by Macquarrie. The first
is related to the fact that symbolic language must always
involve both the existential and ontological dimensions.
A symbol is only effective insofar as it is related to some
aspect of human experience. God as he acts on and through
man is the concern for theology since it is the God of human
experiences which best commands the commitment and response
of worship and faith.
3y the same token, there must be some ontological
ground or basis for the reality of God. As noted in the
Roman Catholic criticism of Bultmann, there must be more to
God than human experience, otherwise He is just another
aspect of the finite, immanent realm. In stressing the
need for an ontological dimension in theological language,
Macquarrie recognizes that such language must have a v*lid
claim to represent a reality beyond the finite realm of
existence.
Indeed, he stresses tnat the existential power of
a symbol depends upon the strength of its ontological
reference :
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The power of a symbol to awaken an existential
response must be related to its power to yield
insight into some ontological reality. When this
fails to happen, the symbol becomes obscure, its
power is weakened and it may eventually fall out
of use.
Heidegger's philosophy, with its insistence that
all existential analysis leads straight into ontological
considerations and his stress that all ontological-
existential insights be derived from and related back to
the ontic-existentiell realm of everyday life, provides a
sound source from which Macquarrle feels he can draw a
symbolic language that maintains an existential-ontological
balance.
A second aspect of symbolic language concerns what
Macquarrie refers to as the "hierarchy of beings." A
problem arises in seeking to select certain beings as more
appropriate symbols of Being because 3eing participates in
all beings. There must be a criterion then for selecting
certain beings as the most appropriate symbols. Macquarrie
solves this problem and establishes this criterion by pointing
out that some beings light up Being more adequately than
others due to their greater range of participation in the
Being process.
The "hierarchy of beings" can be established
according to the respective beings' mode of participation in
Being and the greater the rank of a being in this hierarchy
the more appropriate a symbol it can be for bringing Being
1 Ibid., p.206
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into the light. Man is the most appropriate being for
symbolizing Being and stands very high in the "hierarchy
of beings" since his existence involves the material Being
of inanimate objects, the organic Being of animals, and
personal Being which is uniquely his.
Therefore Macquarrie says that "symbols and images
drawn from personal life have the highest degree of adequacy
accessible to us."^ Although many of the traditional
symbols of Christianity are inanimate objects (the cross,
bread and wine), they receive their significance from their
association with a personal being.
The third aspect of this concept of symbols as
developed by Macquarrie concerns its paradoxical nature which
stems from the fact that God must be affirmed in theology as
both hidden and revealed. Symbolic language must recognize
even while it seeks to bring God's nature to light that He is
utterly incomparable and transcendent. As Macquarrie
explains, the doctrine of analogy, upon which symbolic
language is built, tries to respect both sides of God's
nature, "acknowledging on the one hand that all our language
about God is oblique and inadequate, yet claiming that there
is a sufficient basis of likeness to make this language
(2)
meaningful and not merely empty."
It is this paradoxical nature of symbols which
Macquarrie offers as a safequard against idolatry. No
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.131.
2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.228.
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symbol can claim exclusive or direct reference to God but
must always be corrected by and understood in light of other
symbols. This nature of symbolic language stems from the
Heidegger!an insight that beings and Being are never to be
confused or too closely associated since Being is manifest
in various ways, through various beings, and always conceals
as well as reveals its nature through beings.
A fourth aspect of symbolic language is related to
that portion of the language process which Macquarrie called
'communication'. In order for something to be "brought
into the light" by a word between the speaker and the spoken
to, this word must be based on a common shared understanding
or reference. It is at this point that mythology breaks
down since its presuppositions are not those of the modern
world. The idea of a three-storey universe in which demons
from below and gods from above are constantly breaking into
actions on the middle level is no longer functional. Hence,
mythological language fails to communicate today.
On the other hand, Macquarrie's use of existential-
ontological language, which refers to the basic structures
of existence-in-the-world and does not infringe upon any
particular existentiell world view, offers a type of
language from which symbols with a wide range of communi¬
cation can be drawn. He explains that certain sets of
symbols which have arisen from a particular culture or
historical background would necessarily be limited as they
would have meaning only for those familiar with the
particular situation from which they arose. For instance,
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the significance and meaning of the black power fist salute
given at the Mexican Olympics would be lost on someone
unfamiliar with the racial problems of the United States.
However, language which deals with the structures of
existence and the nature of Being deals with that which is
common to all men, would have a much greater relevance and
is thus a proper source for Macquarrie's symbolic language^
Thus we can see how in his treatment of the God-
talk issue, which is the basic factor in the broader problem
of theological language, Macquarrie has adapted Heidegger's
insight into the Being-being relationship to provide the
link which allows language normally referring to entities of
one order (being) to refer to phenomena of another order
(Being). We also established a strong Heideggerian influence
on each of the four traits of Macquarrie's symbolic language.
75« Hermeneutics
We will consider Macquarrie's views on hermeneutics
by examining his hermeneutical principles and their exeg-
etical application. We will continue to focus on those
aspects of his theology which are influenced by Heideggerian
philosophy and will begin by noting several of the
characteristics Macquarrie attributes to any type of inter¬
pretation. The first is that interpretation always involves
some sort of pre-understanding of the matter to be con¬
sidered. However "vague and marginal" such an understanding
1 Ibid., p.239.
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might be, it is nevertheless the necessary condition for a
point of contact between interpreter and subject matter.
This same idea has already been discussed in our analysis
of Bultmann's and Heidegger's hermeneutics and the concept
is basically the same in the approaches of all three.
Another characteristic is the circularity involved
in all interpretation. This stems from the fact that while
the pre-understanding affects the interpretation of a text,
that interpretation allows for a new understanding based on
the text which in turn affects and develops the pre-under-
standing. Macquarrie seeks to maintain a "true reciprocity"
(2)
in the interaction of text and interpreter As a result,
he would stand with Bultmann who insists on the effect of
the pre-understanding on the text as well as the "new her-
meneutic" theologians who insist that the text interprets
the interpreter. These two approaches are thus seen as
dealing with different sides of the same coin. Here, too,
we can see the direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy
with its emphasis on the hermeneutical circle.
Indeed, in the conclusion to his analysis of how
Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics developed and
evolved through his career, Macquarrie suggests that the
lesson to be learned from this philosopher is that the




it demands "both questioning and listening, a sense of
direction and a willingness to be directed.
Another characteristic which reflects Heidegger's
influence ascribes an artistic nature to interpretation as
it "draws on the imagination and experience of the inter¬
preter in ways that seem to evade any attempt to formulate
them in rules." He suggests the following adjectives as
descriptive of this side of interpretation: personal,
(2)
creative, imaginative, revelatory and charismatic. In
light of Heidegger's reported claim of having written
important pieces of his work "in a state of inspiration"
and in view of descriptions of his work as "prophetic-
kerygmatic", it is not difficult to see his influence on
this last characteristic of interpretation as understood by
Macquarrie. ^
Macquarrie also fills out and explains his under¬
standing of hermeneutics by focusing on a particular case
study, Heidegger's interpretation in Being and Time of a
classical fable. He introduces this case study with a
review of how Heidegger's views on hermeneutics evolved and
developed in his writings. Basically his analysis agrees
with our own which emphasized a movement away from an under¬
standing of interpretation which stresses the role of
presuppositions and the action of the interpreter on the
1 Ibid., p.167.
2 Ibid.
3 Richard Kroner, "Heidegger's Private Religion", Union
Seminary Quarterly Review. II (1956J, p.26. and Laszlo
Versenyi, Heidegger. Being and Truth. p.l6U-.
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text to a later position which (like the "new hermeneutic")
stresses the action of the language in the text on the
interpreter, who plays a far more passive role in the inter¬
pretation process. Macquarrie stresses that Heidegger's
approach to hermeneutics must be understood in a balanced
manner, retaining and balancing off against each other the
excesses of the particular periods in his thinking.
From his interpretation of Heidegger's hermeneutics
Macquarrie draws two concepts which play a key role in his
own understanding of interpretation: repetitive thinking and
the idea of 'violence' in interpretation. By the former,
Macquarrie understands Heidegger to be referring to a re¬
thinking which is more than just a mechanical reproduction
of an earlier insight and implies "going into some experience
in such a way that it is...brought into the present and its
(1)
insights and possibilities made alive again."
Macquarrie sees this type of thinking as an aid in theology's
attempt to reach over the intervening interpretations of
prior commentaries for a fresh clear understanding of source
material.
Macquarrie understands Heidegger's use of violence
in interpretation as a "driving of words...beyond their
everyday usage so that they become creative and illuminating
(?)
for new and hitherto hidden areas..." In his own
hermeneutics Macquarrie calls this process the "stretching"
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.83.
2 Macquarrie, God-talk. p.l60.
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of language.
In evaluating a hermeneutics which employs these
concepts, Macquarrie correctly senses an openness to the
charge of being subjective and arbitrary. His answer is
that while this approach does focus on the creativity and
imagination of the interpreter, there are limits imposed by
the language itself. Nevertheless, "these limits are wide
ones, and clearly much depends on the sensitivity and per-
ceptiveness of the exegete."^^
The question to be asked here concerns the wisdom
of adapting a hermeneutical approach knowing full well that
its success hinges largely upon the "sensitivity and
perceptiveness" of the individual interpreter involved? Is
It not possible that such an approach only seems credible
when utilized by a thinker of Heidegger's character? For
an answer to the issue raised by these questions let us
consider a specific instance in which Macquarrie has applied
these hermeneutical principles in Scriptural exegesis.
One of the basic concepts in Macquarrie's Principles
of Christian Theology is his understanding of God as holy
Being (he defines Being as a process of letting-be, as we
shall see later.) In seeking to give a Scriptural ground
to this association of God with Being defined as 'letting-
be', he turns to the Old Testament passage in which God
reveals His identity as "I am who I am". (Mxodus 3:1*+)
1 Ikld-> P«l6*+
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Macquarrie accepts a translation of the key verb
in this passage as "I cause to be" or "I bring to pass"
which he openly acknowledges has been rejected by a majority
of scholars. His reason for accepting what he recognizes
as a dubious translation is that it would "fit in remarkably
well with the exposition of Being given in the earlier part
of this passage: "I let be what I let be."^
Here Macquarrie seems very susceptible to the criti¬
cism against which he defended Heidegger's hermeneutics,
subjectivism. Rather than allowing the text to speak for
itself and be brought into the light, he appears to be in
danger of coercing its meaning into a pre-conceived position
within his own system. He seems to be in danger of stepping
beyond the limits, wide as they are, imposed by the language
of the text itself.
The crucial question is whether this instance
invalidates his method as a whole or whether it merely points
to the difficulties and weaknesses involved in adapting
Heidegger's hermeneutical principles for theological inter¬
pretation? Unless used responsibly, Heidegger's hermeneutics,
with its emphasis on repetitive thinking, on being more Greek
than the Greeks, and on "violence", could be used to support
less than responsible exegetical practices. However,
because Macquarrie recognizes the limitations of this
approach and the danger of it slipping into a groundless
1 Macquarrie, Hrinciples of Christian Theology, pp.179-180.
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subjectivism it seems fair to say that his rather question¬
able exegesis in this particular instance points more to
the difficulties and subtleties involved in adapting
Heidegger's hermeneutics rather than toward the impossi¬
bility of such a project altogether.
76. History
We turn next to another very important theme running
throughout Macquarrie's theology, his understanding of
history. He formulates his doctrine of history in reaction
to Bultmann's approach which he basically accepts with very
important qualifications. He appeals to Heidegger's views
on history, which we saw were influential on Bultmann's, as
the basis for moving beyond this theologian at certain points.
Like Bultmann, Macquarrie distinguishes between two levels of
history, the objective-historical and the existential-
historical. The former is the realm of objective fact while
the latter is the realm of significant, repeatable possi¬
bilities. He also agrees with Bultmann's emphasis on the
existential-historical as the realm of primary importance for
theology. However, he goes beyond Bultmann by insisting
that "every existential-historical event implies an
objective-historical event.
He bases this on the Heideggerian insight that while
history is primarily the realm of possibilities, these
possibilities are not random, groundless phenomena, (thus
history is more than legend or fiction) but are factical
1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.178.
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possibilities. As he explains, only a possibility which
has been factually actualized in the past can be repeated.
"To say that history is concerned with the possible does
not release it from the course of real happenings...from
the facts.
Thus Macquarrie stresses that the existential-
historical is the primary realm of interest for theology but
that it must always be supplemented by a respect for the
objective-historical realm. It is because of this stress
on the existential-historical that Macquarrie agrees with
Bultraann's opinion that "scientific historical research can
never be decisive either one way or the other for the claims
(2)
of Christianity as a historical religion."
Macquarrie suggests that in regards to the issue
concerning the relation of the kerygmatic Christ to the
historical Jesus, the balance between these two levels of
history can be maintained by speaking of a "minimal core
of factuality." He explains the content of this minimal
core in The Scope of Demvtholosizing as the fact "that there
was someone who once exhibited in history the possibility
of existence which the kerygma proclaims."'^ At another
point this core is described as the "assertion that at the
source of the Christian religion there was an actual
historical instance of the pattern of life proclaimed in
(b)
the kerygma under the notions of dying and rising."
1 Ij&d.
2 Macquarrie, i'fre 3cqpq of Demy^hpjogging, p.75.
3 Ibid., p.93-
b John Macquarrie, Ctudies in Christian Existentialism.
London: SCM Press, 1965^, p.l*+9.
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In view of the various and conflicting results
from previous portrayals of the historical Jesus,
Macquarrie feels that his much less ambitious approach (the
main purpose of which is to ground the existential-
historical understanding of Christ and not to portray the
historical Jesus) may "reasonably be assumed to be constant
and unshakable through all the shifting patterns of research."
(1)
He does not feel compelled to characterize the
veracity of this core as absolutely certain but instead
describes it as having "overwhelming probability" and it is
this which makes it sufficiently stable to free the theo¬
logians from a slavish dependence on the changing results of
(2)
historical research.
One of the more interesting results of his stress
on the need for grounding the existential-historical in the
objective-historical comes out in Macquarrie1s criticism of
Bultmann's views on the resurrection. He rejects this
theologian*s portrayal of the resurrection as a mythological
expression of the cross's significance since this inter¬
pretation fails completely to provide for any objective-
historical ground for the resurrection event. Because the
cross signifies the defeat of good and the resurrection
the ultimate defeat of evil, the significance of the latter
can best be protected by insisting that it too has an
(A)
objective ground in a factual event. J
1 Macquarrie, Ihe Gcope of Jemythologlzlng. p.98.
2 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, p.150.
3 Macquarrie, An H^lgbentlalist T^o3,ogy, p. 187.
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Based on the available historical evidence,
Macquarrie's interpretation stresses that Christ definitely-
appeared to his disciples after His death, ("in what way
we do not presume to say, nor do we think it needful to
inquire"). With his stress on the primacy of the exist¬
ential significance of the resurrection, however, Macquarrie
is able to say that he basically agrees with Bultmann's
understanding of the nature of the resurrection with only a
few reservations concerning the proper manner of expressing
the nature of this event.^
However, Macquarrie's insistence on the objective-
historical ground of the resurrection event definitely
resolves one o f the most criticized and debated aspects of
Bultmann's approach and can thus be seen as an improvement
on his views. (This makes it all the more regrettable that
Macquarrie's views on the objective ground of the resurrection
are not as clearly expressed in Principles of Christian
Theology where he systematically formulates his own theo-
(2)
logical position. )
Another aspect of Madquarrie's approach to history
which would indicate the direct influence of Heidegger (as
well as his indirect influence through Bultmann) concerns the
involvement of the hermeneutical circle in the historical
process. In an analysis of the existential approach to
1 Ibid.
2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.265-266.
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history (of which he gives a qualified approval
Maequarrie says that the primary subject matter for
historical reflection is human existence and it is a prior
understanding of existence which makes possible the study
of history. On the other hand, he feels that the study of
history also provides a new self-understanding and in a
paradoxical way, that which enables one to study history is
also that which is gained through such a study.
It is this paradox which reveals the circular logic
involved in all interpretation. He explains that the vague
preunderstanding which provides the initial point of contact
with the subject to be interpreted is that which is expanded
(2)
and developed in contact with the subject matter. As
was the case with his understanding of the two dimensions
in history and the resulting need for a minimal core of
factuality, the influence of Heidegger's philosophy can also
be seen in his understanding of the circular logic involved
in the study of history.
77* Anthropology
We turn now to consider Macquarrie's understanding
of man and we shall find that this leads directly into a
consideration of such matters as faith, revelation, sin and
God. Many of the issues we are about to discuss come under
the heading of philosophical theology in Macquarrie's
approach and his apologetical intentions for this
1 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demvthologizing. p.95*
2 Ibid.
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philosophical theology can be seen in the description of
its purpose as providing "...a bridge between our everyday
thinking and experience and the matters about which the
theologian talks...
He will provide this bridge by phenomenologically
describing existence-in-the-world and showing how this leads
inevitably to and involves one in matters of faith. We will
begin by considering his views on the structure of existence
and will later focus on those aspects of existence which
X
lead into a discussion of theological matters. Throughout
we will indicate the influence of Heidegger's philosophy.
We have noted in a previous discussion that
Macquarrie considers time as a basic factor in human exist¬
ence. In ntuflibg iq CfrrlsUaq ^IstQhtiali?^ he devotes a
chapter to analysing the self in terms of temporality.
This chapter closely follows Heidegger's consideration of
"care" and "time" as the basis for Dasein's mode of existence.
That he refers back to this chapter when later speaking of
his own views on the structure of existence indicates his
(2)
acceptance and use of Heidegger's approach.
Basically he explains how Heidegger derives the
three temporal dimensions from an analysis of care, an
existential structure. In that existence is factical and
man is thrown into a world of limited possibilities and
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.51.
2 Macquarrie, God-Talk. p.22*f.
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opportunities on which to act, it involves the past as that
from which man inherits his limited possibilities. In
that existence involves possibilities, man has always to
move forward out of himself, to project himself onto his
possibilities. Thus man is always on the way, striving
and planning for future activities.
The third aspect of care or existence-in-the-world
is falling, which refers to the way in which man operates in
the present by dealing with his environment in such a way as
to avoid his responsibility for the future, deny the limits
he has inherited from the past and thus live inauthentically
for the moment, or in the present. Hence, authenticity
stems from man's ability to unify these three temporal
dimensions in his 'self' and resolutely create a situation
out of the environment in which he finds himself.
We turn now to see how Macquarrie uses this con¬
temporary understanding of man apologetically to bridge the
gap between the secular outlook and theological concerns.
We can see this quite plainly in the way he describes the
theological concept faith in terms of what Heidegger describes
as authentic existence. As Macquarrie explains, authen¬
ticity involves both commitment and acceptance. The former
refers to an ability to hold to a "master possibility" toward
which one's future can be directed. The latter, acceptance,
refers to an honest acceptance of one's limited heritage.
1 Macquarrie, studies in Christian Existentialism, pp.6*+-70.
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For Macquarrie authenticity also involves a belief
that the ultimate dimension in existence is gracious,
enabling one to strive toward a master possibility despite
the limitations of factical existence. Furthermore, the
belief in such a gracious dimension is not speculative or
academic but demands existential involvement. Belief in
an ultimate dimension that is gracious, commitment, accept¬
ance, and existential involvement, what better terminology
could one find to describe the attitude intended by the
theological term faith, he asks?^
We shall focus next on two aspects of contemporary
existence which Macquarrie sees as having apologetical
relevance for the doctrine of revelation. In analyzing
the various existentialists' (especially Heidegger's) under¬
standing of moods, Macquarrie explains how their approach
nullifies the common understanding of such phenomena as
merely subjective, emotional feelings.
He explains that far from being groundless, passing
emotional states, moods or feelings have their own type of
understanding or awareness; each one refers beyond itself
to a particular situation. (In Brentano's language, moods
have an "intentional" structure.) He illustrates by
pointing out that the feeling of fear always refers to and
is based upon a definite object or situation. he refers
to Heidegger's phenomenological description of moods as a
mode of disclosure which "makes us aware of something, gives
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian ideology, pp.68-71.
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us to understand something,/ov7 asserts that to something
there belongs a certain character."
In particular, Macquarrie feels that the most basic
mood or feeling-state, anxiety, does more than just disclose
one aspect of a certain situation. Instead, it discloses
to man his total situation, the fact of his finitude, his
thrownness, his limited possibilities; because of its
comprehensive nature such a mood can be called ontological
(?)
for "it lights up man in his Being."
At another point, Macquarrie further develops his
understanding of anxiety and points out how it leads to the
experience of "nothingness" which breaks man's inauthentic
immersion in the beings around him in preparation for an
awareness of Being's unconcealing. In that anxiety as an
existential (a universal structure of existence) is the
result of a phenomenological description of man's structure
and provides the basis for an awareness of an ultimate
dimension, it can serve as a point of contact toward which
the theologian can apologetically relate a doctrine of
revelation.^
Another aspect of existence which bridges the gap
between this religious doctrine and the contemporary outlook
can be found in Heidegger's understanding of essential
1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian existentialism, pp.33"35.
2 Ibid., p.37.
3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.77.
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thought in which the initiative lies with what is known
rather than the knower. It involves a "meditative char¬
acter which contrasts with the probing activity of
calculative thinking"; it "waits and listens.
When the nature of thought is seen to have this
passive receptive character, the knowledge gained through
the revelatory process no longer stands in such sharp con¬
trast with knowledge gained through the usual thought
process. Furthermore, the knoitfledge gained through
essential thinking, like the knowledge of revelation, demands
existential involvement and commitment. Here then is
another aspect of the contemporary understanding of existence
which has apologetical relevance.
Macquarrie suggests that the contemporary under¬
standing of death also has apologetical relevance. Here
too he focuses on Heidegger's approach as representative of
the contemporary view. He explains that Heidegger is
interested in death as an existential rather than biological
or metaphysical phenomenon. Instead of considering the
physiological aspects of dying or the question of death as
the transition point between two worlds or levels of being,
he focuses on how death affects existence as it grapples
with the meaning of its pending end.
Heidegger refers to this existential significance
1 Ibid.. p.85.
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of death with the term Being-unto-death. He explains that
death is an integral part of factical existence; we are
thrown into the possibility of death from the moment our
existence begins. "Man is always old enough to die."
Furthermore, the way one exists towards death determines
the inauthenticity or authenticity of his existence.
Fallenness (as an existential) is characterized by flight
from or denial of death. On the other hand, to accept
death, the ultimate possibility, involves an acceptance of
one's finitude, sharpens one's awareness of the limited
number of possibilities which can be realized, and leads to
the creation of a responsible and unified self.^lj
Macquarrie acknowledges that Heidegger places more
emphasis on the role of death in the achievement of
authenticity than does the Biblical understanding but he
feels that both approaches have enough in common to allow
for Heidegger's to serve as the source for a contemporary
expression of Biblical content as well as an apologetical
starting point for explaining the theological doctrine of
death. He supports his claim that the two approaches
have much in common by saying that for the Biblical writer
as well, death is primarily important as it affects man
throughout his life:
Man is bidden to return to destruction, to the dust
from which he was formed, which seems to stultify his
existence; no sooner does he flourish than he is cut
down and withered: he may prolong his life for seventy
or eighty years, yet the best of his days are labour
1 Macquarrie, Aq SKigteqtlaUst Theology, p.119.
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and sorrow, and the inevitable end comes suddenly,
(based on Psalm 90, verses 3,6, and 10.
The inauthentic flight from death is reflected in
Jesus' story of the rich man who built barns to store his
wealth for his future years, allowing his absorption in
worldly concerns to blind him to the possibility of his own
death. By the same token, the Scriptural understanding of
accepting death as a factor in the transition to authentic
existence is seen in such sayings as one must "die to live"
and "whoever would save his life will loose it; and whoever
loses his life for my sake and the Gospel's will save it."
(p)
We can see, then, how Macquarrie establishes that
Heidegger's existential analysis of death has a two-fold
relevance for theology; it can serve as the starting point
for the explanation of the theological doctrine of death
and it can give contemporary form to the Biblical under¬
standing of this phenomenon.
This two-fold relevance is also apparent in
Macquarrie's use of Heidegger's thinking to explain the
relation between sin and death in theology. A traditional
problem for theology has been the need to clarify the
difference between death as punishment for sin and as an
inevitable, neutral part of finite existence. The point
should always be made that death belongs to existence
irrespective of the presence of sin.
1 Ibid., p.120.
2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.69.
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Heidegger's philosophy provides a useful model for
clearly expressing the dual significance of death. In
existence that is inauthentic, death is not viewed construct¬
ively but is overlooked, denied and thereby contributes to
the shallowness, brokenness and fallenness of existence.
This is death as punishment for sin. On the other hand, in
authentic existence, or the life of faith, death is dealt
with constructively, sharpening up the drive for realizing
possibilities and potentialities, and is thereby recognized
and accepted as an inherent part of finite existence.^^
Here then Heideggerian insights have given relevance and
clear expression to the theological understanding of the
relation between death and sin.
Our discussion of Macquarrie's views on death has
lead into a consideration of the doctrine of sin which he
feels would also benefit from an encounter with Heidegger's
philosophy. In an etymological analysis reminiscent of
Heidegger's controversial and often criticized approach,
Macquarrie establishes a connection between the words "sin"
(in German Sunde) and the verb "sunder" (German: sondern)
and says that originally sin involved a state of separation.
He feels that the original force and strength of the word
"sin" has gradually been lost and suggests that the
Heideggerian concept alienation provides a model for




By alienation (which is one aspect of the
existential 'fallenness'), Heidegger refers to Dasein's
falling away from its possibilities into an inauthentic
absorption in its world# Thus Dasein becomes alienated
from, has fallen away from, its true self. Furthermore,
because authenticity hinges upon an awareness of Being,
alienation affects Dasein's relation to the ultimate dim¬
ension also. Hence, Heidegger's concept, alienation, can
not only give relevance to the doctrine of sin but can also
(2)
help to restore its original connotation of separation.
The aspect of sin which the Scriptures refer to as
idolatry can also be given new expression in terms of what
Heidegger calls the forgetting of Being. Turning from God
to worldly affairs for support in the quest for meaning and
significance in life can be understood as the turn from
Being to beings in the quest for authentic existence.
Furthermore, idolatry or the forgetting of Being is not to
be considered a secondary or weaker force in life since it
involves the same urgency and motivation as the quest for
Being or God, namely the need for support and aid in
attaining an existence that is not broken by frustration
and distortion.
The relation between sin and the world is another
1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian existentialism, p.128.
2 Ibid., p.132.
3 Macquarrie, Pr&upjLple? of Chpj.g1^iqq ifreology, pp.233-239.
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aspect of Christian doctrine that is often difficult for
the contemporary outlook to appreciate. Macquarrie says
that the Scriptural alliance of the world with the "flesh"
and the devil over against God is not in keeping with the
more neutral contemporary understanding of the term "world"
as referring to the physical universe.
How, then, is the Scriptural understanding of the
world (as a reference to the "collective body of mankind in
its fallen and sinful state, cut off from God, and bringing
under its domination every individual existence born into
the world") to be understood? In particular the New Testa¬
ment term kosmos occasionally is used in reference to the
collective, cumulative nature of sin as opposed to individual
concrete sinful actions. How is this cumulative nature of
sin, which drives home the powerful nature of sin as a whole,
to be understood and expressed in contemporary terms? In
reply, Macquarrie points, out that the Heideggerian concept,
das Man (which refers to one aspect of existence-in-the-
world as that "depersonalized and dehumanized collective
body, responsible to no one, that dictates the standards of
the lowest common denominator to every individual existence"
adequately expresses the theological understanding of
sin in its cumulative state.
Heidegger's understanding of existence is also seen
as providing an apologetical base for explaining the
Scriptural portrayal of man as in the image of God. He
explains that of all the beings, man alone can be called an
1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian existentialism, pp.132-133.
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ontological entity "because he not only has being...but has
his Being disclosed to hiai, so that he has the potentiality
to become the being to which Being as such manifests itself,
gives itself, and entrusts Itself.
In light of this definition of Being as a process
of letting-be (which we will examine later) Macquarrie
explains that because of man's openness to Being, he acts
as a partner in the ultimate process of letting-be the
beings around him. Although his power of letting-be is
finite and limited, it nevertheless distinguishes him from
all other beings. (The influence of Heidegger's approach,
which understands existence as uniquely the place or <|a
where Being lights up beings, thus making Dasein a partner
in the Being process, is quite apparent here.) Existence,
which is man's unique mode of Being and indicates his close
relation to Being, thus provides a contemporary form of
expression for the unique relation between man and God
(2)
referred to Scripturally with the terra image of God.
In his understanding of existence Macquarrie also
stresses the finite and limited side of human nature, or
its facticity. In his explanation that facticity refers
to the limitations imposed on all men by their environment,
heredity and place in history, we can see that he uses this
term in the same way as Heidegger. The apologetical
relevance of this concept becomes apparent when he says
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.100.
2 Principles <?f Christian Theplpgy, pp.210-212.
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that the Biblical symbol "dust" refers not to man's body
over against his soul but rather to "all the factors in
man's existence that belong to his facticity."^
Finally, we shall consider how Macquarrie's phenora-
enological analysis of existence provides an apologetieal
base for explaining the religious belief in an ultimate
dimension. Relying heavily on such Heideggerian concepts
as facticity, possibility, fallenness and death, Macquarrle
concludes that the contemporary understandings of existence
take into account an element of frustration, imbalance and
alienation. However, there are two schools of thought on
this distinguished by their respective assessment of the
extent of brokenness in existence. One approach, epitomized
by Sartre, sees existence as a "useless passion" while the
other looks beyond it for meaning and purpose.
Like Heidegger, Macquarrie stands with the latter
approach in stressing that a phenomenological description
of existence leads inevitably to the recognition of an
ultimate dimension, for "human existence considered in
isolation does not make sense." The brokenness of existence
stems from the great gulf between human resources, the
limited heritage or factical possibilities, and the demands
made upon them, the disclosed possibilities or potentiality.
Thus Macquarrie feels:
Either we acknowledge the absurdity of a situation
in which we find ourselves responsible for an
existence which we lack the capacity to master...
1 Ibid., p.210.
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or else we look for a further dimension in the
situation, a depth beyond.•.man...that is open to
us in such a way that it can make sense of our
finite existence by supporting it and bringing
order and fulfillment into it.
In this way the stage is set for the appearance of
an ultimate dimension, Being or God, and we can see how he
has formed an apologetical bridge between theology's belief
in God and the secular understanding of existence. From a
starting point acceptable to both theology and the contem¬
porary outlook (the phenomenological description of
existence), he has established at least the feasibility of
belief in an ultimate dimension. His next apologetical
step is to clarify the nature of this ultimate power and see
whether it can be appropriately associated with the
theological doctrine of God. As we shall see, he relies
heavily on Heidegger's ontology in establishing his own
understanding of the Being process.
78. Being and God
He begins by clearly distinguishing between being
and Being.. He refers to Heidegger's concept, the "onto-
logical difference", as contributing to a better under-
(2)
standing of the difference between being and Being.
The implication of this concept is that Being is not to be
understood as the "absolute", whether this implies an
all-inclusive phenomenon or one understood as the totality
1 Ibid*« pp.63-71.
2 John Macquarrie, God and Gecularitv. (London: Lutterworth
Press, 1968), p.32.
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of all beings, because one would then have to consider this
"absolute's" mode of being, thereby establishing its nature
(1)
as another being.
What can be said of Being in an affirmative manner
then? Generally he lists three positive traits of Being.
First of all, it is strictly incomparable, a power which is
basically mysterious. On the other hand, a second trait
of Being is described as its presence and manifestness.
Paradoxically, this mysterious force also reveals certain
aspects of itself.
The presence of Being refers to the fact that it is
present in every being, indeed it is that which allows all
beings to be. All beings must participate" in Being.
The manifestness of Being is its revelation of itself
through this presence in beings. However, this manifest¬
ness is for the most part latent and when it does become
apparent is often subject to distortion. Thus he explains
that "Being is, paradoxically, both the closest and the
(?)
furthest."
In God-Talk, when referring to Being as God,
Macquarrie summarizes by saying that God is:
hidden as well as revealed, and that part of his God-
hood, without which he could not be God, is just his
incomparability and his transcendence of all human
understanding. Yet equally a part of his Godhood is
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.98-100.
2 Ibid., pp.103-10^.
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that he has come forth from his hiddenness and
given us such knowledge of himself as makes it
possible for us to worship him..,
The third trait of Being also concerns its relation
to beings. Macquarrie looks for a contemporary term with
a meaning similar to that of the words "act" and "energy"
which could characterize Being as the condition that allows
all beings to be. lie selects the term "letting-be" and
while he does not identify its origin or source we can
readily see that this is very similar to one of the many
ways Heidegger described the Being process, (see p. 1<=q )
By letting-be Macquarrie does not mean leaving alone or not
interfering with; instead he uses the expression in an
active sense, "meaning something like 'enabling to be',
(?)
'helping to fulfil the potentiality for being'."
Hence it is more correct to say Being lets-be
rather than Being is, for in the strict sense "is" refers
to a being's mode of Being; thus Being is not. However,
when used in a qualified sense, there is justification for
saying Being "is" (using the verb in a "stretched" manner)
since it is more beingful than any being, and "is the
prior condition that anything may be." He summarizes the
three traits of Being by describing it as the "incomparable
that lets-be and that is present and manifest in and
through the beings.
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, pp.227-228.
2 ibid., p.226.
3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.103-105.
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The next step is to consider the appropriateness
of this secular understanding of Being for expressing what
the theologians refer to as God. If the appropriateness
is established, the apologetical bridge from a phenomeno-
logical analysis of everyday existence to a belief in God
would be complete. He begins by denying that the terms
Being and God should be understood as synonyms since some
thinkers accept the reality of Being but consider it an
indifferent or alien factor in existence, e.g. the nihil¬
istic philosophers like Sartre.
In contrast, use of the word God generally indicates
one has adopted a different approach to existence by
accepting the reality of an ultimate dimension which provides
the means for healing the brokenness of existence. To
indicate his affirmative understanding of Being, Macquarrie
refers to it as holy Being, or Being that is gracious and
supporting. (When we recall that Heidegger used the term
holy to refer to the unconcealing positive side of Being as
aletheia, we can see how closely Macquarrie is following
Heidegger's line of thought.) Furthermore the use of the
word holy also underlines the existential side of Being as
(1)
a power which commands commitment, respect and awe.
As a gracious, supporting power which existentially
involves those who affirm it, holy Being certainly can be
seen as an appropriate model for expressing the theological
doctrine of God aid since the acceptance of holy Being has
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.101.
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ultimately been based on the phenomenological analysis of
existence, an apologetical bridge has been completed between
the secular and theological outlook.
In his analysis of the relation between the concepts
Being and God in Principles of Christian .theology. Macquarrie
acknowledges his debt to Heideggerian insights and then feels
compelled to deal with this philosopher's often repeated
assertion that Being is not God. Macquarrie interprets this
as a criticism of theology's attempts to associate God with
a concept of Being in which the difference between being and
Being has been overlooked.^^
Hence, Being as theology has traditionally understood
it, an absolute or all encompassing being, can never be
understood as God. In light of his recognition of the
"ontological difference" Macquarrie believes his association
of God and Being has not contradicted the intention behind
(2)
Heidegger's statement concerning this issue.
As we noted previously, Macquarrie refers to his
theological stance as "existential-ontological theism."
We can see in his term for God, holy Being, how he maintains
the tension between the existential and ontological
dimensions in this concept. As holy, Being is understood
as a power which involves the believer and in this involve¬
ment can be seen the existential side of holy Being. In
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Iheology. p.105.
2 Ibid.. p.106.
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that an understanding of holy Being can only be gained
through consideration of beings, particularly man, we can
see how ontological considerations are necessarily grounded
in and related to existential ones. To this point
Macquarrie has remained within the limits established by
the Bultmannian insistence that understanding of God is
always self-understanding.
In his stress on the ontological side of holy Being
can be seen Macquarrie's desire to move beyond Bultmann's
position toward some type of knowledge about God which trans¬
cends self-knowledge. The great shortcoming of existential
theology for Macquarrie is that it fails to provide "some
kind of transubjective validity for the experiences which
belong to the life of faith." As he explains, the claim
that God in Himself cannot be known, only God as He is
related to man, should never be taken as implying that "God
(l)
is nothing but a factor in human experience..."
The problem for existential theology is posed in
the following words of R.W. Hepburn:
...existentialist thought is in continual peril of
falling to emerge from the subjectivist circle...
A subjectivist account can provide an informative
description of what it is like to think and act as
if there was a God...but it is unable to...say
whether or not there exists a being /the words
'exist' and 'being' do not have the same meaning
here as they do for Heidegger and Macquarrie/
before whom the believer has taken up the attitude
of faith.
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, pp.2^2-2^3.
2 R.W. Hepburn, as quoted by Macquarrie, The Scone of
Demythologizlng. p.216.
4E1
How then is theology to establish the reality of
that which it calls God? Macquarrie begins by saying that
it would not be possible to establish the reality of God
independent of or prior to any experience of him. There
is no way to "get behind the experience or find a second
route to that which we know in the experience... To
attempt this is to deny the need for faith which is, of
course, necessitated by the finiteness, risk, and uncertainty
in existence.
Macquarrie then turns to a consideration of how
otner contemporary theologians have grappled with this
problem for guidance in constructing his own solution. We
have already noted that Bultmann felt compelled to supple¬
ment the existential language of demythologizing with
analogical references to God's actions. Macquarrie feels
that Paul Tillich has made the best effort to retain an
existential-ontological balance in the understanding of God.
With his consideration of God as Being, Tillich tries to
clarify the ontological reality of God and with his under¬
standing of Being (God) as of "ultimate concern" he
(?)
recognizes the existential dimension of this issue.
To answer constructively the question concerning
the reality of that upon which faith is based and toward
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.2^.
2 Macquarrie, God and Secularitv. p.33«
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which the term God refers, Macquarrie openly relies on
Heideggerian insights into the nature of existence and
Being. He suggests that just as moods ( a phenomenol-
ogically established aspect of existence should be
acceptable to the secular outlook) and essential thinking
point toward the reality of an ultimate dimension which
breaks into existence, so too can revelation be understood
as indicative of a transubjective God who acts upon the
believer. Furthermore, an analysis of symbolic, mytho¬
logical and analogical language which incorporates
Heidegger's insights into the Being-being relation can "at
least point to the theistic vision of the world as more
(2)
probable than the atheistic one." And finally,
Heidegger's ontology, with its stress on the inter¬
dependence of Being and Dasein, can provide the model for a
theological understanding of God which is grounded in the
existential dimension but moves on to a discussion of the
("5 )
ontological reality of God. J He has now completed his
apologetical bridge from a phenomenological description of
man to the reality of God or holy Being.
So far, Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's
approach has been very apparent. In the case of such
pre-theological concerns as the nature of language,
interpretation and history, we have noted how Heidegger's
1 Macquarrie, God-Talk. p.2k-7*
2 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demvthologiging. p.219.
3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.166.
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views have been openly incorporated into Macquarrie's
position. In addition we nave observed how he has
employed Heidegger's insights into the nature of existence
and Being in establishing his apologetical bridge from the
contemporary understanding of human nature to the
acceptance of what theologians refer to as God.
We have already encountered the name he gives to
his approach, "existential-ontological theism" and we have
noted how he maintained the existential-ontological balance
in his understanding of God as holy Being. As we turn to
the dogmatic portion of his theology, we shall give close
attention to the way Macquarrie seeks to carry out his




In considering Macquarrie"s dogmatic theology we
shall rely heavily on his Principles of Christian Theology
since this is the one work where he has systematically
presented his own theological position. We shall continue
to focus on those aspects of his theology where Heidegger's
influence is most apparent and we shall establish that this
influence stems mainly from Macquarrie's use of Heideggeriaa
categories and insights to give concise and contemporary
expression to traditional doctrines.
79. Doctrine of God
Macquarrie begins by formulating a doctrine of God.
He first considers the doctrine of the trinity, an extremely
complex theological problem, and employs the insights
previously established in his philosophical theology
concerning the relation of God and Being (as holy Being) in
order to express the trinitarian formula in a contemporary
form which he feels is less problematic and far more concise.
The traditional formula of one substance and three
persons is to be replaced since it "talks the language and
moves in the universe of discourse of an obsolete philosophy."
Nevertheless, what the traditional formula tried to express
must be retained and thus its value is not to be under¬
estimated. With its stress on the one substance of the
trinity, this formula emphasized the unity of God and with
its idea of three persons, it pointed out the diversity in
God, His triune nature. Any attempt to re-express this
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formula must keep these basic emphases in mind.^
Macquarrie begins his explanation of the trini-
tarian doctrine in existential-ontological terms by
grounding his association of God and Being in the Old
Testament formula "I am who I am." (see pp.+32-^3?for a
discussion of this) In the New Testament he refers to
to the Fourth Gospel in which so many of Christ's sayings
are introduced by the words, "I am..." and he says these
are allusions to the "I am" of the Old Testament. These
sayings stress the close relationship of Christ to God and
here "...we see the doctrine of God as Being converging with
the emerging doctrine of God as trinity..." Indeed the
foundation is laid for a trinitarian God in the Old Testa¬
ment ■understanding of God as Being where Being was under¬
stood dynamically, as including becoming, movement and
development.
Having, so to speak, protected his Scriptural
flank, Macquarrie next moves to re-establish the trinitarian
doctrine in contemporary terminology. Using St. Thomas'
insight into the substance of God as involving ran identity
of being and essence, he declares that if the three persons
are of one substance, and this substance is Being, then we
again find an "understanding of God as Being, rather than a
being, .and /are/likewise directed to understanding Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit in terms of Being rather than as three
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.176-177*
2 Ibid., p.181.
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beings." In this way the term "Being" replaces the term
"substance" in stressing the unity of the trinity. As for
the diversity or distinctions within the trinity, he
suggests that since the "word 'persons' has become so mis¬
leading, . .perhaps we would do better to think of 'movements'
of Being, or 'modes' of Being...
The first person of the trinity Macquarrie refers
to as "primordial" Being. This term points to the ultimate
"act or energy of 'letting-be'" and is the condition "that
there should be anything whatsoever." Furthermore, this
"primordial" Being is not to be thought of in isolation or
in itself but as a "source of outpouring which is inseparable
from the whole structure of Being." Beings can only "be"
(2)
or exist insofar as this outpouring occurs.
The second person of the trinity, the Son, is called
"expressive" Being. It is through expressive Being that
the energy and letting-be of primordial Being is poured out
into the world, thereby creating beings. This is in
keeping with the understanding of the Son as the Logos or
the Word, "the agent of the Father in the creation of the
world." It is through this second movement of Being or
Logos that Being participates in beings and it is also this
aspect of the trinity which is responsible for any
(l)
knowledge of God or Being. J
1 Ibid., pp.176-177.
2 Ibid., p.182.
3 Ibid.. pp. 182-183.
463
The third person of the trinity is described as
"unitive" Being and its function is to "maintain, strengthen
and, where need be, restore the unity of Being with beings,
a unity which is constantly threatened." Just as in
Heidegger's philosophy the relationship between Dasein and
Being is frequently distorted or even overlooked in
inauthentic existence, so also in this approach man the
creature often rebels against his Creator and tries to live
self-reliantly. It is the function of "unitive" Being to
restore the proper relationship between Being and beings.
Thus we can see how Macquarrie has employed Heideggerian
terminology and insights in giving new expression and clarity
to this traditional doctrine of the trinity.
Macquarrie further develops his doctrine of God by
relating the more important traditional "attributes" of God
to his existential-ontological approach. He feels that the
Heideggerian understanding of Being as that which is both
closest to and furthest from beings, as that which both
participates in beings but is never to be identified with
them, is an especially relevant way of expressing God's
nature in contemporary theology.
The reason for this, he explains, is that "the
nineteenth century was an age of theological immanentism"
and "the first half of the twentieth century so stressed
God's sovereign transcendence that any sense of his presence
in the world was almost lost." By understanding God as
Being, theology is "then compelled to think of him as both
transcendent and immanent." God's immanence finds
1 Ibid.. p.186.
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suitable expression in this new approach since Being is
always "present" in beings. By the same token, the
significance of such attributes as "incomparable" and
"incomprehensible" which seek to protect the mystery that is
God, is also retained in that Being is furthest from man
and is never to be confused with beings.^
Another attribute of God which has been particularly
prone to misinterpretation is "omnipotence." Against those
who have overemphasized this trait and portrayed God as "a
capricious despot" with "an arbitrary power to do anything",
Macquarrie accepts St. Anselm's belief that by the omni¬
potence of God, "...we do not mean an irrational force that
might break out in any direction, but a power that is ordered
and which cannot...do some things without disrupting itself."
(2)
Macquarrie suggests that a most appropriate way of
expressing God's omnipotence as a self-imposed limitation of
power would be to think of the possibilities open to Being
in contrast to the factical possibilities of man which are
limited by his situation. Unlike man's possibilities, those
of God are unlimited and ratner than being thrown into his
heritage, God is himself the source and horizon of His
possibilities, freely choosing and rejecting them according
to His own standards.
1 Ibid., p.187.
2 Ibid., p.189.
3 Macquarrie, God and Gecularitv. p.121*-.
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Macquarrie deals with several other attributes as
well, e.g. God's love can be better understood in light of
Being as letting-be since self-giving is a vital part of
love.^^ He concludes by saying that the attribute of
holiness is the most comprehensive of all in the sense that
it reflects most of the other attributes (omnipotence and
mystery contribute to a sense of holiness). Furthermore,
this attribute has a two-fold aspect in that it involves
both the nature of God (Being) in Himself and the existential
response to this nature. In his approach to these
traditional attributes of God, we can see that Macquarrie
has effectively utilized Heidegger's thinking not only in
giving contemporary expression to traditional content but
also in maintaining a balance between existential (God as
we know Him, immanent, awe inspiring) and ontological (God
/ p \
in Himself, transcendent, mysterious) factors.
80. Creation
Macquarrie next moves into a discussion of creation
and creaturely beings. His previous definition of God as
holy Being is also instrumental at this point in his dog¬
matics. Unlike past approaches which spoke of the Creator
as a being, Macquarrie's understanding of God as holy Being
means that the question of creation is not about how the
world began or who made it but is instead the existential
question about what it means to be a creature. Because of
1 Ibid-, p.125.
2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian theology, p.192
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the inseparableness of being and Being, the question of
creation deals not with the Creator in Himself but with the
meaning of creaturely existence.^1
He supports this Scripturally by pointing out that
the older of the two creation accounts begins with man and
then shows how his environment is built around him. On a
practical level, his approach is not only more in keeping
with the intentions of the Scriptures but also avoids
unnecessary conflicts with science. Furthermore, because
man only has first hand knowledge of his own mode of being,
discussion of the existential significance of creation would
be far more fruitful than idle speculation about "who",
(2)
"how", and "when" questions. The basic trait of
creaturely existence is dependence and when we recall that
existence makes demands upon man which he is unable to meet
by his own means (due to his factically limited resources),
and that it is the gracious intervention of holy Being alone
which can extricate him from his predicament, we are able
to understand his portrayal of creaturely existence as
dependence.^
His approach also throws new light on another notion
associated with creation, the idea of creatlo ex nihilo.
The significance of this doctrine is not to be found in
metaphysical speculations about matter, form, and nothingness.
Instead it stresses that, as a being, man stands always
1 Macquarrie, The Scope of PernvthologizinH. p.88.
2 Macquarrie, PrjAplplqg of Christian Iheplogy, pp.195-196.
3 Ibid.T p.196.
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between Being and nothingness with the chance that if he
ceases to be supported by Being he can slip back into
nothingness.^ To this point it should be noted that
Macquarrie's doctrine of creation is very existential.
While he continues to use Heideggerian terminology (e.g. the
facticity of existence and nothingness) to give expression
to this doctrine, he nevertheless is strongly favouring
existential factors over against any ontological elements.
He completes his doctrine of creation with a
consideration of creaturely beings or the realm of nature.
He defines nature by quoting the Heideggerian translation of
ohusis as "the process of arising, of emerging from the
hidden." This understanding of nature fits very well into
his doctrine of creation in which expressive Being pours out
into the world and "lets-be" beings. He also suggests that
creaturely beings (nature) can be ranked according to their
place in a hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy results
from the fact that beings have different ranges of parti¬
cipation in Being. As we noted earlier, man's mode of
Being, existence, manifests Being in various ways and thus
(2)
he stands above other beings in this hierarchy.
81. Providence
Macquarrie next considers the doctrine of provi¬




existentially since belief in providence inevitably results
from an existential experience. Biblically this can be
seen in the way men worked out an understanding of God's
providential concern based on such events as the Exodus and
the Cross. An existential approach also avoids a
mechanistic understanding which can be so problematic.
In existential-ontological terminology, providence
refers to the fact that having "let-be" beings out of
nothingness and having thereby exposed itself to the risk of
nothingness through a participation in beings, Being con¬
stantly strives to aid beings in fulfilling their potentiality
for Being and thereby avoiding dissolution into nothingness.
As for the problem of maintaining the balance in this doctrine
between God's control and man's freedom, he sees the
existential-ontological approach as offering a workable
solution. Man does have a great many possibilities for
which he is responsible; however, God (Being) has ultimate
control in that lie has fixed the boundaries of these possi¬
bilities (thus man's heritage is a factical situation).
Macquarrie also feels that, expressed in an
existential-ontological context, a doctrine of miracles
becomes less offensive to the contemporary situation while
still retaining its original significance. An understanding
of miracles as magical, supernatural manifestations of a
providential God should be just as offensive to theology as
it is to science. That this understanding is not that of
1 Ibid., pp.220-225.
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Jesus can be seen in His rejection of the devil's offer to
prove His status by a crass use of miracles.
The significance of a miracle is not that it
persuades anyone to accept God ("If they do not hear Moses
and the prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone
should arise from the dead." Luke 16:3*)• The significance
of the miracle lies not in its outward, extraordinary form
but what "is distinctive about miracle is God's presence and
self-manifestation in the event." There is a certain
element of "ambiguity" in miracles in that to some an event
(1)
appears ordinary, to others it appears extraordinary.
In contemporary terminology, one can say that in
all events holy Being (God) can be seen since just as every
being is potentially a symbol of Being, so is every event
potentially a revelatory one. However, forgetfulness of
Being (God) abounds and therefore this aspect of events is
often overlooked. Furthermore, just as some beings by
virtue of their position in the hierarchy of being are more
effective symbols, so too are some events more appropriate
(2)
for revelation.
At this point Macquarrie introduces a very important
concept in his approach, the idea of "focusing". Basically
this explains how God's activity, which is present everywhere




particular individuals. In focusing, God's presence is
brought to the conscious awareness. In the case of
miracles, what some see as an ordinary event, e.g. the
death on the cross, others see as symbolic of God's presence
and manifestness. ^ Symbols have an ambiguous nature in
that some perceive them in depth (through focusing) as
reflecting an ultimate dimension while others see them in a
shallower manner as ordinary events. Miracles are now
understood as symbolic events, the ambiguity of which is
dispelled by the eyes of faith focusing on God's presence in
them. When understood and expressed in such contemporary
language and in reference to a contemporary outlook
(Heideggerian ontology), Macquarrie feels the doctrine of
miracles need not be offensive to modern man.
Although this will be discussed in more detail later
it should be noted that with the introduction of this concept,
'focusing', Macquarrie is in danger of slipping into an emphasis
on the existential aspect of an issue. However, his
discussion of holy Being's providential concern for the
potentiality of beings does reflect an ontological concern
and this gives some balance to his interpretation of God's
providential activity.
82. The person of Jesus Christ
In his chapter "The Person of Jesus Christ"
Macquarrie applies his approach to another set of important
1 Ibid.
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Christian doctrines. Basically he understands Christ as
the "symbol" of Being. In reply to the accusation that
this destroys the identity of Christ with God (Being), he
replies that his definition of symbol and his understanding
of the relation of Being and being (which, of course, stems
from Heideggerian insights) actually protects the unity of
God and Christ. Previously, he had referred to Being as
"present and manifest" in beings that symbolize it and he
now explains that:
this expression...is peculiarly appropriate when we
think of Christ as...the revelatory symbol of God:
for 'presence' in Greek is parousia. and 'mani¬
festation' is epiphaneia. and these are precisely the
words that have been traditionally used for the
revelation of God in Christ, 'advent' and 'epiphany'.
In his consideration of the traditional titles for
Christ, Macquarrie selects two, "Lord" and "Word", as
particularly representative since they"transcend the limits
of a purely Hebrew or purely Hellenistic reference." In
addition, they also confirm his own approach in that together
"they constitute an existential-ontological interpretation of
(?)
Christ's person."
The title "Lord" which always implies rank and a
feeling of respect, also implies commitment, thereby indi¬
cating an existential dimension in the traditional under¬
standing of Christ. On the other hand, the title "Word" or




second person in the trinity, or expressive Being. To call
Jesus the "Word" is to imply that tnrough Him Being has come
into the world and in this we see the ontological dimension
in the traditional interpretation of Christ.^
The interpretation of these titles for Christ also
paves the way toward a solution of the precicament imposed by
the need to see Christ as both God and man. The two titles
and the assertion that Christ is true God and true man are
to be seen as interrelated approaches to His nature.His man¬
hood is necessary for existential reasons. As man, a
historical being, Christ's existence was factical; thus the
example He set is a real possibility for other men and
interest in Christ demands commitment instead of just being
an academic exercise. On the other hand, it is important
to recognize that Christ was truly God so that worship of
Him would not be idolatry, or dependence upon a being, but
an authentic turning towards Being (God).
By recognizing that Christ the man was also the
Word (expressive Being) one avoids ignoring the ultimate
dimension and by acknowledging that Christ as God is also
Lord (who demands existential obedience) one avoids a merely
adademic metaphysical approach to the problem. By inter¬
weaving these "various strands - Lord and Word, humanity
and deity, the existential and the ontological" one is able
(?)




How exactly are these two natures, divinity and
humanity, united in Christ? This too is a question that has
troubled theology down through the years and Macquarrie has
been particularly successful in employing Heideggerian
insights and categories to give consise and contemporary
expression to the traditional solution to this problem. He
begins by considering the Chalcedonian solution which employs
such terminology as "two natures" and "one person and
subsistence." The key word in the traditional inter¬
pretation is nature. As it has traditionally been
understood this word has caused many difficulties.
However, if understood etymologically, in light of
the original sense of phusis as emerging or coming into the
light, then Christ's humanity becomes more acceptable.^^
As a creaturely being, as part of nature, man is constantly
emerging and coming to light. This means that he is
constantly developing and potentially is capable of moving
ever closer toward fulfilling his potential for Being (God).
Although it does not normally happen, man could reach this
point of fulfilling his nature and become one with God.
This has happened uniquely with Christ. rfhile His nature
(2)
is truly human, He is nevertheless at one with God.
Coming at the problem from the divine side, we can
ask how Christ as divine^ can also be human? As divine,
Christ1s'hature" is still of an emerging, coming-into-light
type since, as we have already seen, the second person of
1 Ibid., pp.273-27^.
2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.210.
474
the trinity is to he understood as expressive Being through
which Being emerges into the world. The type of being with
the greatest potential for emerging would then be a suitable
avenue through which expressive Being could enter the world.
Man is the being with the greatest potential and Christ is
the particular man in which this potential has been reached.
In this way the divine Christ can also have a human nature.
(1)
In this instance we can see how a Ileideggerian insight
has influenced not only the form of expression for a solution
but also the solution itself of a theological issue.
Using this approach, the uhity of two natures in
"one person and subsistence" also makes far better sense.
The word subsistence (huoostasis) he interprets as referring
to a particular being, Jesus Christ. The word person refers
to personal Being which alone has the openness which would
allow the union with holy Being. In addition, we can also
better understand how Christ is "of the same essence"
(homoousios) as the Father. Personal Being, as a superior
and unique being with the ability to let-be, has the potential
of being "raised to an absolute level" and thereby becoming
essentially like holy Being in its pure form of letting-be.
(2)
How exactly was Christ's mode of Being raised to
the absolute level? Macquarrie replies that in any
existence the attitude toward death is instrumental in
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.275*
2 Ibid.
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determining how far one goes toward fulfilling his potential.
He refers to this attitude with the Heideggerian phrase
Being-towards-death and it is in Christ's Being-towards-
death that we can see the fulfilling of His potentiality.
"The death of Christ is taken up into His life as its climax
and fulfillment and it is in the moment of death that
Christhood fully emerges.
He goes on to explain that letting-be is always a
self-giving, or form of love, thus God's creation involves
His self-giving to beings. The most perfect example ever
observed of this love or self-giving was seen in Christ, the
symbol of Being (God) who "emptied" Himself in His lifetime.
What raises this aspect of Christ's existence to the
absolute level was precisely His Being-towards-death since
"death is the one absolute in life." In Christ's death,
"self-hood passes into Christhood, the human Jesus becomes
the Christ of faith." How we can better understand how
Christ's "most utter self-abasement" on the cross is also
(p)
seen as His ascension, His victory.
Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's Christology has
been two-fold to this point. As was the case with his
explanation of the two titles for Christ's person, Macquarrie
continues to use Heidegger's philosophy in giving a relevant,
concise form of expression to particularly complex theo¬




heidegger's views on the meaning of the terra phusis and his
interpretation of death, Macquarrie also has been directly
influenced by Heidegger in the formation of his own
explanation for these traditional theological issues.
83. Atonement
From a discussion of the person of Christ, Macquarrie
moves to a consideration of the work of Christ and begins
with the traditional doctrines of the atonement. In light
of the existential-ontological approach, he sees the past
tendency to take either an objective or subjective approach
to this doctrine as unsatisfactory. The objective views,
whether they take the form of a theory of satisfaction or of
sacrifice, err in their tendency to stress an atoning work
"outside of man and independent of him", since this overlooks
the existential dimension. On the other hand, the sub¬
jective views, with their emphasis on Christ's actions as
an example to be followed, fail to take into consideration
the depth and extent of sin, thereby overlooking the need
for a gracious intervention by a power above the human level.
In this way the ontological dimension suffers.
An alternative understanding is the "classic" view
of the atonement which is described as follows: "Man has
fallen into the grip of dark powers; Christ comes into this
situation, and battles against these powers, with His cross
comes the overwhelming victory, bringing deliverance and
new life to raan."^^ This approach, Macquarrie explains,
1 Ibid.. p.287
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has recently been revived and emphasized by Gustav Allien's
Christus Victor* When interpreted in an existential-
ontological manner, he feels this theory not only adequately
relates atonement to the contemporary situation but also
gives it a more comprehensive scope in which both the
subjective and objective approaches are combined.
The "dark powers" enslaving man can now be under¬
stood as the tendency of man to orient his life around beings
instead of Being. The depth and strength of this enslaving
power can be represented by such a term as das Man. Under¬
stood in this way we can see that this dark power is Just as
problematic in our technological era of man "come of age" as
it was in earlier times. Christ's battle with and victory
over this demonic power is now seen in His clear reflection
or symbolizing of Being (God) on the cross which reawakens
man to an authentic awareness of the ultimate dimension in
his existence. ^
Understood in an existential-ontological manner, the
classic view incorporates the important emphases of both the
subjective and objective theories of atonement. As an
historical figure who resisted temptation and remained
completely faithful and open to Being (God), Christ repre¬
sents a real possibility for which men can strive. As in
the subjective view, Christ is an example to be imitated.
However, this model draws attention to the objective aspect
of the atonement in that Christ's self-giving points to and
1 Ibid., p.288.
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stresses Being's self-giving. In this way the ontological,
or objective, aspect of God's action is also retained.
As for how Christ's atoning work on the cross can
become effective for later generations of believers,
Macquarrie recommends Bultmann's Heideggerian approach as
a viable answer. while the cross does have a "once-for-all"
character as an event which happened at a specific point in
time, there is also a side to it which Bultmann refers to
as its eschatological significance. Macquarrie explains
that this is comparable to seeing it as a source of "authentic
repeatable possibilities." It is this aspect which makes
the cross significant for later believers as an event that
"happens, not literally or factually, but none the less truly
over and over again in the experiences of those who have made
(2)
it part of their history."
Qb. The Holy Spirit
Before moving into Macquarrie's chapter "The Holy
Spirit and Salvation", we might remind ourselves that we are
in the process of observing how he uses the philosophy of
Heidegger, in the form of an existential-ontological approach,
to clarify and express his dogmatic (symbolic) theology.
He has already closely analyzed the roles of the first two
persons of the trinity and he moves next into a consider¬




As unitive Being, it continues and carries forward
the work of primordial Being in creation. In this we see
its relation to the first person of the trinity. As for the
second person, we have already noted that, like any symbol,
Christ could be seen either as just another being among
many or in His mode of Being could be seen the clear
reflection of holy Being. "It is this perceiving in depth,
this apprehension of the divine presence and activity...that
we attribute to the work of the Holy Spirit. In this
we see a relation to the second person of the trinity and
this gives us some idea of how Macquarrie seeks to establish
the interrelatedness of the trinity as he defines it. He
also stresses the need to realize that the Holy Spirit jj>
God. In contemporary form, the Holy Spirit can be portrayed
as "one of the modes or movements of Holy Being" and this is
"God at His closest to us." At another point he further
explains the Holy Spirit as "God's coming to man in an inward
way to enlighten and strengthen him; it is the awakening in
(2)
man of the realization of his kinship with Being..."
One of the great problems in dealing with the work
of the Holy Spirit is to maintain a balance between the
initiative of God in enlightening and strengthening man and
the responsibility and freedom of man in his relationship
to God and the world. Underestimating God's initiative




responsibility and freedom as he is affected by the Holy
Spirit results in the loss of existence itself. To be
related to the Holy Spirit then turns one into a puppet.^
This problem can be traced all the way back to the
conflict between Augustine and Pelagius. Here too Macquarrie
uses Heidegger's insights into the nature of existence and
Being to give a relevant form of expression to a doctrine of
the Holy Spirit in which the roles of both man and God are
constructively balanced. In his understanding of a being
that is most fully itself when completely open to the presence
of Being Macquarrie sees a perfect model for preserving God's
gracious intervention and guidance as well as man's freedom
(2)
and responsibility.
Macquarrie considers the work of the Holy Spirit by
discussing entry into and growth in the Christian faith. Of
the former he says that salvation involves four stages. He
stresses that the stages are merely devices used to aid the
process of understanding and are not to be seen as repres¬
entative of four successive, separate steps. Instead all
four stages are intermingled and constantly involved with
each other.
The first stage of entry into the life of faith is
conviction, wnich has been traditionally understood as that
process whereby the Holy Spirit convicts man of his sinful





and broken condition. The convicting work of the Holy Spirit
provides an excellent example of how God can graciously inter¬
vene in man's existence without thereby altering or destroying
its structure. In existential-ontological terms, all men
are aware of their shortcomings, of the lack in their
existence. This inherent awareness is then "heightened and
intensified" by the Spirit so that man understands the full
consequence of his broken nature and this "is no violation
of his being, but the raising of it to a higher level.
The next stage or "moment" of entry into the
Christian life is repentance, which means a "turning of the
whole person." In the life of faitn, repentance and
conviction are inseparable. Repentance includes conviction
as it is the awareness of sin that motivates the turning
away. By the same token, conviction for the Christian always
leads to repentance. For others, it might lead to despair
but "the revelation that convinces of sin also offers promise
of reconciliation." The turning away of conviction is always
the turning toward of repentance. Although it might seem
that this process of "turning toward" involves mainly an
effort of man, the fact that it is so closely related to
conviction, in which God's initiative has already been
established, shows that here too man has a responsible part
(2)




The next step is election, which he feels might
better be expressed as choosing. ("You did not choose me,
but I chose you." John 15*16)• In the doctrines of pre¬
destination and double predestination Macquarrie sees an
approach in which the existential element has been totally
ignored. The result is that God's nature as love or letting-
be is completely lost. However, if the doctrine of election
with its ontological emphasis is supplemented by an existential
interpretation, it can have a proper place in theology.^
Besides referring to an act of God, election should also refer
to the believer's awareness of having been chosen, in
particular of having been "chosen to be." He is called into
existence out of nothingness. In this way he feels the
balance has been maintained between the ontological (God's
act of choosing) and the existential dimension (man's response
to and awareness of this act).
The fourth stage of entry into the life of faith,
justification, expresses the "experience of being accepted
by Being, of emerging from lostness and alienation into a
right relation with Being." Macquarrie feels that since the
Reformation this stage has often been overemphasized to the
exclusion of the other stages. Actually, justification can
best be understood only in relation to these other stages,
he says. For instance, as "the experience of being accepted
by Being", we can see how closely justification is related
1 Ibid., p.303.
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to election as an awareness of having been chosen by Being.
While a valuable corrective to "abuses in the
medieval penitential system", the reformer's principle of
justification by faith in God's act can lead to a downgrading
of man's role in this process (or the existential element).
The result is a justification completely external to the
actual condition of the man involved; it is done for him by
God. In a balanced view of this process, however, justi¬
fication "must happen 4a man as well as for him" and "in
restoring a right relationship with God, it sets man on the
way to a right ordering of his own existence. In this
way both God's act and man's responsibility are protected by
the existential-ontological understanding of justification.
Macquarrie moves next from a consideration of entry
into the life of faith to analysis of "growth and progress"
in it, or from the doctrine of justification to that of
sanctification. Here also the two should not be thought of
as distinct and separate phases and the emphasis on both
man's freedom and God's initiative is to be maintained. In
his analysis of sanctification, he considers faith, hope,
and love.
He says that faith, a vital part of Christian life,
is to be understood in terms of its central content, Jesus
Christ. It is to be described in relation to the grace
expressed in God's action through Christ in the incarnation,
1 Ibid., p .3G5«
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cross and resurrection (the ontological dimension) and in
relation to the decision with which this confronts all men
(the existential dimension). By describing faith in terms
of both grace and decision, Macquarrie intends to maintain
the balance in his approach.^^
By the same token the Christian understanding of
hope whould also involve an ontological and existential
dimension. As it is based on a belief in God's activity
for the future, hope involves an ontological element.
However, Christian hope also indicates the need for obedient
participation and cooperation in God's plans for the future
(2)
and in this we can see the existential aspect.
Greatest of the characteristics of the life of faith,
or of the Christian virtues, is love. It can be thought of
as man's greatest potentiality since It was through Christ's
ability to reflect perfectly God's letting-be (which is love)
that His humanity was exalted to the divine level. We have
previously noted Macquarrie's ontological definition of love
as letting-be and on the existential level, "letting-be means
helping a person into the full realization of his potential-
(3)
ities for Being..." J At his best, when he has managed to
move toward a fulfillment of his potentiality, man's love (on
the existential level) for his fellow man clearly reflects





This brings us to the end of Macquarrie's discussion
of the nature and work of the third person in the trinity.
It is not difficult to see how he has utilized heideggerian
philosophy to give a contemporary form of expression to
traditional doctrines, e.g. election as having been chosen to
be, justification as the experience of being in correct
relation to holy Being, and love as a form of letting-be.
In addition, Heidegger's influence here is also apparent in
the way Macquarrie strives to respect the role of both
existential and ontological factors in his interpretation of
the various issues associated with a doctrine of the Holy
Spirit.
85* Eschatology
In keeping with the usual order of dogmatic theology,
Macquarrie concludes his symbolic theology with a discussion
of "The Last Things." He divides the traditional approaches
to eschatology into two camps. The first thinks of the
eschatological happenings as belonging to a "remote and
indefinite future." This approach is insufficient both
because of its reliance on an outdated mythological belief in
divine intervention and also because it overlooks the
existential dimension, thereby robbing eschatological belief
of its original sense of "urgency and responsibility."^^
In the second approach, which he calls realized
eschatology, the promised events are seen as having already
1 Ijbia., pp.315-316
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occurred. Support for this approach Is found in the
reference of St. John's Gospel to the Christian who already
"has eternal life" and has "passed from death to life."
This approach tends to be highly individualized and certainly
retains the existential dimension in all its strength. On
the other hand, it tends to de-emphasize the cosmic side of
eschatology, thereby down-playing the ontological dimension.
The model Macquarrie intends to propose should accordingly
have incorporated the strengths of both these approaches and
thereby be able to move beyond them.^
As was the case with his consideration of creation
as referring primarily to the relation between Creator and
creature, and not to the "how" of the world's beginning, so
too in his approach to eschatology Macquarrie believes that
the significance of the doctrine is not to be found in
speculation about the how and when of the world's end but in
its implications about the relation between holy Being and
world. Indeed, he feels that eschatology neerf not imply a
cataclysmic end to the world at all.
Instead, he interprets the doctrine of eschatology
to mean that "man and the world are destined for holy Being
and will find their completion and fulfillment in God, but
this is quite compatible with the possibility that the world
may continue to endure for ever." When we recall that God's
nature as holy Being can only be understood as constantly
moving out into the world, thereby letting-be beings, then
1 Ibid., pp.316-317.
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we can see that if His nature is to remain unchanged, the
world must always exist.^
Macquarrie defends the necessity for a Christian
doctrine of the end (not an ending in death and destruction
but in a complete merger with Being which involves new
possibilities of letting-be on a higher scale) for the same
reason he advocates an authentic Christian understanding of
Being-towards-death. Like an acceptance of death on the
individual level, this doctrine serves to provide theology
with a proper perspective and leads to a clearer understanding
and better appreciation of the overall picture with which it
, (2)
deals.
Macquarrie also prefaces his doctrine of eschatology
by acknowledging the frailty of any attempt to penetrate
into the mystery of God's future actions which as Paul
declares, "No eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of
man conceived."(1 Cor.2:9) However, he feels that a
limited amount of speculation on such matters is permissible
if it keeps within the guidelines established in other areas
of theology.(3;
Having qualified his approach Macquarrie bases his
analysis of the future actions of God or holy Being on His
activities as revealed in the doctrine of creation and





as creation was seen as an outpouring of Being as beings were
let-be, and providence was understood as holy Being's
continuing support of beings threatened by dissolution into
nothingness, so too is His eschatological activity understood
as a tendency to draw beings ever closer as they fulfill
their potential for Being (God) in their own acts of letting-
be.(1)
However, this culmination cannot be thought of as a
static end point in which all potentialities are finally and
completely fulfilled. If this occurred, the dynamic element
in Being would cease to exist as well as the separate beings
into wnich it must always be moving. Instead, these end
times must be understood as a "moving from perfection to
perfection." The tension between unity and diversity in the
relation between Being and beings must be maintained even in
this doctrine of the end time. If there were a complete
merging of these two, then holy Being as understood in theology
would cease and "the risk of creation, and its suffering and
(2)
striving, would have been sheer waste."
Thus the end times must be seen as leading toward a
"diversified unity." This unity would be "far more valuable
than any merely undifferentiated unity, and...each new stage
in this unity /would be7»..more valuable than the more
restricted one that went before it." As would be expected,




scale of potentiality for holy Being and that no part of
creation will be allowed ultimately to step back into the
hell of nothingness. Macquarrie openly acknowledges his
preference for a doctrine of universalism as it is more in
keeping with his overall position.
Again we can see Heidegger's influence both in the
form of expression Macquarrie gives to this traditional
doctrine and in the balanced manner in which he portrays the
role of divine and human (ontological and existential) elements.
In addition, through his influence on Macquarrie's under¬
standing of holy Being, Heidegger has directly influenced
Macquarrie in his rejection of a cataclysmic end to created
beings, in his understanding of the end times as a moving
from perfection to perfection, and in his preference for a
doctrine of universalism. (His position on all these issues
stems from the way he has defined the nature of holy Being.)
Macquarrie also reinterprets several other
traditional eschatological doctrines and we shall note those
where Heidegger's influence is most apparent. The first to
be interpreted is eternal life. He prefers this to the
term "immortality" which implies an imperishable soul or
self which breaks away from the material body to endure
forever. He feels this soul-body dualism is certainly not
reflected in the Scriptures which speak of a resurrected






As a more relevant alternative Macquarrie suggests
that the soul (or self) be understood as that potentiality
of existence which can either be realized or squandered
away through daily decisions and acts. This, in turn,
means that by eternal life one understands the soul's (self's
potential for overcoming inauthentic submission to a single
temporal dimension. Rather than living in the past, or
being subject to passing whims in the present, or idly
hoping for the future, the soul (self) can exist authen¬
tically by coordinating these temporal dimensions into an
integral whole. (The Heideggerian flavour of his thinking is
especially strong at this point. ) To exist authentically,
Macquarrie says, is to have a "taste" of eternal life and
since all will eventually develop ever closer to Being, this
is a possibility for everyone.^
However, the idea of eternal life has always implied
more than just a "taste" of eternity in this life and he
further defines it as the limit towards which existence point
Christ is the only man ever to reach this limit and this in
turn meant His identity with God. To attain eternal life
now means "to be adopted as sons with Christ into the life of
God" and this eschatological unity of beings with Being has
already been described. Macquarrie is careful to point out
that he is not suggesting an evolutionary approach whereby
man gradually works his way to God. Instead, this develop¬





Another concept to be re-interpreted is the idea of
heaven which is no longer to be thought of as a reward over
and above the life of faith. Instead it is the fruition of
the life of striving to develop one's potentiality for Being
and is "rightly identified with the 'beatific vision', that
direct indubitable awareness of the immediate presence of
God." This closeness to God means, in turn, the ability to
follow His example in letting-be and giving of oneself
for others. This is the significance of the early church's
insistence that only martyrs enter directly into heaven
without the usual need for purification since in their act
of self-sacrifice they clearly reflect holy Being's letting-
be and love.
By the same token, hell is not to be thought of as
a punishment God imposes for sinful deeds. Instead it refers
to the loss of Being which brings one closer to the lower
limit of existence, or nothingness. This loss of Being is
always a relative loss and never an absolute one. Just as
eschatologieal union with God was seen as implying ever new
sets of possibilities on increasingly higher levels, and
never a final unity with God, so too is hell seen as falling
ever further away from holy Being without reaching an
absolute point of no return. In addition there can be a
"taste" of hell as well as heaven in life. However, the





To conclude his consideration of eschatology,
Macquarrie considers the "crowning eschatological idea,"
the kingdom of God. Whereas the previous eschatological
concepts dealt mainly with the destiny of the individual,
with a consideration of this concept one comes directly to
the actions of holy Being itself. This kingdom would be "a
commonwealth of free beings, united in Being and with each
other through love, yet...preserving a diversity that
heightens the value of the unity far above that of any
undifferentiated unity.
Although the kingdom of God is already present, it
will nevertheless still come again "with glory" since in its
present form it is manifested in a very ambiguous manner.
As we noted before, while symbols of holy Being can be seen
in depth, as reflecting and pointing toward God, they can
also be seen in only their shallower dimension. It is
because of this that the kingdom is said to be presently
manifested in an ambiguous manner.
The influence of Heidegger's thinking on these
eschatological issues is representative of the two-fold
influence it has on the whole of Macquarrie's symbolic
theology. Primarily this influence can be seen in the use




expression to theological doctrines. However, the way
Macquarrie has interpreted Heidegger's thinking has also
spilled over into his own interpretation of theological
issues. Throughout our consideration of his dogmatics, we
have noted how he sought to maintain the same balance he
attributes to Heidegger's work in his own theological
position. 'The question we must now consider is, how




86. A critical appraisal
Based on his dogmatics in Principles of Christian
Theology, it seems that despite a claim to be maintaining
the tension between the ontological and existential dimensions,
Macquarrie nevertheless favours the existential side of his
theology. Not only shall we remain within the framework of
Macquarrie's stated intentions and outlook in supporting the
above claim but we also shall operate within this framework
in considering how best to restore and maintain the existential-
ontological balance he seeks. Thus,it will be a question in
this concluding analysis of fulfilling Macquarrie's expressed
intentions by developing and elaborating on the insights he
has himself established.
To do this within the confines of the problem as
Macquarrie has stated it, we must respect the Bultmannian
insistence that all understanding of God has to be related
to our own experiences; we can only know God insofar as He
has acted upon us. On the other hand, we must also respect
Macquarrie's feeling that knowledge of and language about
God does more than illuminate our own existence; it points
toward and clarifies a reality above and beyond our own
experiences. In his earlier work, An existentialist
Theology. Macquarrie declares that "every existential state¬
ment of the content of Christian faith assumes a proposition
about the real activity of God, a statement about God which
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is not reducible to a statement about human existence.
We shall consider the need to deal with the onto-
logical reality behind the existential experience as a
vital part of Macquarrie's expressed theological intention
and we shall establish that, as expressed in Principles of
Christian Theology, his approach in actuality does not
completely fulfil this intention. We shall then consider
how Heidegger's thinking might act as a corrective and
conclude by noting what Macquarrie's position on key issues
^would be if the existential-ontological balance of his
theology were maintained.
Essentially we will be approaching Macquarrie's
theology just as he approaches Bultmann's. He recognizes
Bultmann's awareness of the need for supplementing existential
statements with ontological ones (hence his use of analogical
language in conjunction with demythologizing) but feels that
Bultmann's approach "sometimes obscures the genuine intention
(2)
of his theology." The parallel between our treatment of
Macquarrie and his treatment of Bultmann continues in that
Heidegger's philosophy is a key factor in both.
One of the main issues on which Macquarrie takes a
strong existential stand is the doctrine of creation. He
correctly sees the need to deal with the significance of
creation in existential terms and yet he makes very little
1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology. p.l80.
2 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing. p.2*+3.
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effort to clarify the ontological reality of God's creative
act. The only sentence which even approaches such an
ontological consideration says simply that the prior letting-
be of Being which allows for any being to be is the creativity
of Being. The rest of his discussion is a strictly
existential interpretation of this doctrine and he seems in
real danger at this point of failing to fulfil an earlier
expressed desire to ground every existential-historical
consideration in an objective-historical one and of supple¬
menting existential understandings with ontological ones.
Macquarrie might have better maintained his
existential-ontological intention here by stressing that the
doctrine of creation refers both to the feeling of creaturely
dependence upon and need for an ultimate dimension as well as
to an ontological action of God (letting-be) in which all
creation has its ultimate ground. This could be stressed
without elaborating on the specific "how" of a creative act
or a specific beginning point in time. Indeed, in his
discussion of eschatology Macquarrie does visualize (in very
"approximate" language he says) something of the ontological
aspect of holy Being's actions in the eschatological gathering
(2)
up of all beings into holy Being. (Here too he stresses
1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.195* "A
being is a being in virtue of the fact that it is, but Being
is not something that is but rather the letting-be that is




that such an action would not mean an end to time nor should
it be understood as occurring at a particular point in time).
Just as he manages to stress the existential
significance of eschatology without ignoring its ontological
dimension, so also might he develop his doctrine of creation
in a more balanced manner. This would mean the elaboration
of an already established insight (holy Being's letting-be)
rather than the introduction of any new insights. Since
the problem here is more one of presentation than content,
any corrective action need not involve new philosophical or
theological factors.
A second and even more fundamental concept which
gives his dogmatics an existential imbalance concerns the
concept 'focusing', the importance of which is reflected in
his statement that it plays a crucial role in his inter¬
pretation of miracles, providence, the incarnation and the
eucharist. ' To begin our consideration of how focusing
tends to favour an existential emphasis, let us consider its
function in Macquarrie's understanding of the eucharist.
He sees God's presence in the eucharist as an
instance of His presence and manifestness which is everywhere
but which can become focused in particular beings and events.
(2)




initiative in approaching the believer through the elements,
the end result of his interpretation of the eucharist is
that God's presence in the eucharist is only distinctive
because the eyes of faith are focused on it.
Thus the distinctiveness of the 'real presence' in
the eucharist stems not so much from a special act on God's
part as from the believer's ability to become aware of an
ever-present reality through focusing on it. In this
approach, the ontological reality of God's act seems to play
a secondary role to the existential act of focusing. By
suggesting that God is present and manifest everywhere in an
ambiguous manner, Macquarrie has no choice but to establish
the distinctiveness of a divine act in the eucharist according
to an existential criterion.
Next let us consider his understanding of miracles
and see how the use of focusing leads to an existential bias
here as well. He begins by cautioning against the nine¬
teenth century theologians' mistake of overemphasizing God's
presence in all acts because "if everything can be called
miracle, the word has been generalized to the point where it
can be virtually devoided of content."
In place of past approaches which associated
miracles with supernatural interventions in actions defying
the laws of nature, Macquarrie suggests that "every event,
insofar as it is embraced within divine providence, can be




Now it is the act of focusing, wherein God's presence is clearly-
revealed, which reveals the miraculous nature of an other¬
wise normal event.
Again the existential dimension is the key factor
with the result that miracles are no longer to be seen solely
as the result of a special act of God (since all events are
potential miracles, God apparently is just as present and
manifest in one as in the other) but are also determined by
the eyes of faith, or an existential factor. The question
of the ontological reality of God's act is not sufficiently
developed here.
Macquarrie does recognize the problem and attempts
to resolve it by saying that "miracle is the approach and
self-disclosure of Being to us in and with and through the
focusing event... To say that God acts in and through
the focusing act is still to remain on the existential level
since focusing is primarily a human process.
Despite his recognition of the problem here,
Macquarrie ultimately fails to break out of the existential
realm with a discussion of the trans-human reality of God's
miraculous activity. (A direct result of this is that he comes
very close to repeating the very error against which he warns.
Because he says that all events potentially manifest God's
presence and fails to establish adequate ontological criteria
for determining the distinctiveness of God's actions in
1 Ibid.
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miraculous occurrences, he could easily be misunderstood as
portraying all events as miraculous, with some recognized as
such and others not.)
Since the explanation for miracles would also stand
for his understanding of providence (God providentially stands
behind all events in an ambiguous manner and His presence is
apparent only to the eyes of faith), we shall conclude our
consideration of focusing and its existential emphasis by
examining Macquarrie's views on the incarnation. As a symbol
of God, Christ manifests His presence in an ambiguous manner;
to some He appeared as a tragic and misguided zealot, to
others He was the son of God.
Again, the decisive factor is the believer's ability
to see Christ in depth as the symbol of God's activity. The
question of the ontological reality of God's activity in and
through Christ is not developed here any more than it was in
the previous instances. Thus because of his concern for
this concept of focusing, Macquarrie has not completely
fulfilled his intention of maintaining an existential-
ontological balance in his interpretation of several key issues.
Having established how Macquarrie fails to resolve
fully this problem as intended (despite the fact that he has
recognized and identified the issues clearly), let us next
consider how Heidegger's insights can be employed in recti¬
fying the situation (without moving beyond the framework
1 Ibid., p.232.
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established by Macquarrie). In his understanding of Being -
aletheia as a process of revealing and concealing, as
supporting and withdrawing, we have a model which would
provide for an understanding of God as a force which acts
distinctively in certain instances.
3y making more allowance for this withdrawing side
of the Being process, Macquarrie could establish that while
God is always present in an ambiguous manner (revealing and
concealing simultaneously), there are times in which this
revealing side is a more decisive factor in the revelatory
act. The result would be an occasion or symbol (or even
person) in which God's presence was more readily available
for the eyes of faith. By involving this withdrawing aspect
of Heidegger's understanding of the Being process, we are not
introducing a new element into Macquarrie's theology since he
too recognizes it in his portrayal of God as a mystery.
Instead we are simply developing this insight and expanding
its role In his theology.
Let us now determine whether this understanding of
the Being-process remains within the limits proposed by
Macquarrie for any theological approach: namely that one
can only speak of the ultimate insofar as it affects
experience and such talk of the ultimate must reveal something
of its trans-human reality. As for the first portion of this
statement, we can see in the phenomenological analysis of
anxiety as the experience of Being's withdrawal that speaking
about the ontological reality of God's withdrawing has an
existential basis in our own experience. As for how language
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about human moods can refer to a transhuman reality, we
find in the understanding of anxiety as a mood which is
intentional (points beyond itself), discloses something to
the individual, and breaks into or seizes the individual in
a manner beyond his control, a model for explaining how this
existential experience points to a distinctive action on the
ontological level (Being itself) about which some knowledge
is available.
Thus anxiety and withdrawal are concepts on the
existential and ontological levels which clearly reflect how
these two dimensions are inter-related as well as something
of their respective natures. Having established that this
understanding of Being as withdrawing remains within the
limits of Macquarrie's approach and is indeed merely an
elaboration on his own insight into the Being-process, let
us next see how this concept can be employed in fulfilling
his existential-ontological intentions.
In order to balance out the existential emphasis of
focusing, we need to establish that an act of God occurs
which corresponds to the comprehension involved in focusing.
Just as Macquarrie states that every existential-historical
event has an objective-historical ground, so would we want
to establish the ontological ground for every existential
act of focusing.
The understanding of Being as withdrawing or
concealing at the same time as it draws near and unconceals
itself provides a model for establishing how God's presence
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can be of a distinctive nature at certain times or in certain
symbols. This element of withdrawing and concealing allows
not only for the mysterious and ambiguous nature of God's
presence but also allows for 'degrees of presence'.
This is not to deny Macquarrle's insight that holy
Being is always present and manifest nor does it deny that
this presence is always ambiguous. Hence the need for
focusing continues and the existential dimension is not over¬
looked. Now it can be said that there is an ontological act
corresponding to the existential comprehension in focusing.
Thus this approach makes more allowance for speaking about
the mighty acts of God while also recognizing the need for
the holy Spirit's assistance in focusing on and recognizing
such acts through the eyes of faith.
Now the difference between God's presence and
manlfestness in the eucharist, miracles, Christ and His
presence and manifestness at all other times would be more a
matter of ontological as well as existential factors. In
particular it could be said that God acts less ambiguously
(but nevertheless still in an ambiguous manner) In the
eucharist, miracles and the incarnation than on normal
occasions. Hence, the significance of even these less
ambiguous acts would still be lost on the non-believer who
is unable to see the symbols of divine presence 'in depth'
as reflecting the ultimate dimension. No longer would all
events have to be seen as potentially miraculous, nor would
God's presence in the eucharist and Christ depend so strongly
on the existential perception of focusing.
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We have now completed our task of developing certain
aspects of Macquarrie's insight into Heidegger's philosophy
and employing them to maintain in a more adequate manner the
existential-ontological balance he seeks. In so doing we
have not been contradicting Macquarrie's approach in any way
but have been acting within his established framework in
carrying out his expressed intentions. That it was possible
to develop his position in this way underlines the basic
validity of both his theological adaptation of Heidegger's
thinking as well as an approval of his theological stance.
Earlier we established a criterion by which to judge
the effectiveness of any theological use of Heideggerian
insights: namely, whether or not the balance (reflected in
his concept, the "ontological difference") between a concern
for beings, Dasein in particular, and Being was respected and
retained in some form. We established not only Macquarrie's
intention of retaining this Heideggerian insight (in the form
of an existential-ontological theism) but also how his
theology developed out of an attempt to fulfil this intention.
It might also be held that any success enjoyed or to be
enjoyed by Macquarrie's theology is due in no small degree to
its adaptation of this Heideggerian insight into the relation





Let us begin by briefly summarizing the material
covered to this point in our discussion of Heidegger's
influence on theology. We first considered Heidegger's
pursuit of Being by way of Dasein, language, thinking and
other phenomena. We were careful to note the unity of
purpose which ran throughout his varied analyses and estab¬
lished that the strength of his philosophy stemmed from its
balance. When seen as a whole, his understanding of Being
avoided extreme emphases on any mode of its revelation and
it was this balance which we established as the criterion
by which to judge the success of various theological
appropriations of his insights.
Bultmann's was the first theological adaptation of
Heidegger's insights to be considered. Partly due to the
chronological factor (his first theological contributions
were made before the ontological direction of Heidegger's
thought was generally acknowledged) and partly due to a
basic similarity of approach (his theology has more in
common with Heidegger's existential concern than with his
ontological emphasis), this theologian relied primarily on
the earlier Heidegger's insights into Dasein. We noted
the effects of this on his theology and suggested how a
better appreciation of Heidegger's ontological interests would
strengthen his position on several theological issues.
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In considering the "new hermeneutic" theologians
it was determined that Heidegger's influence stemmed mainly
from his later insights into Being as language. While
Bultmann's theology was unbalanced due to an extreme emphasis
on the role of man, the "new hermeneutic" theologians so
stressed the initiative and dominance of Being as language
that man's role in the Being-being relationship was over¬
looked and subsequently his nature as a responsible and free
being was denied.
Here, too, it was shown that a better appreciation
of Heidegger's thinking would have strengthened the position
of Fuchs and Ebeling who distorted Heidegger's language
analyses to a certain extent by failing to take into account
his views on thinking and on Being in its other modes of
manifestness. Heinrich Ott, on the other hand, was seen to
have a better understanding of Heidegger's views but his
contribution was seen as limited by the fact that his position
had not yet matured and developed fully.
Of all those considered, Macquarrie alone attempted
to retain the balance of Heidegger's overall position. His
intention of stressing both the earlier and later Heidegger's
insights was reflected in the title he gave to his approach,
"existentlal-ontological theism". However, we noted that
his balanced existential-ontological intentions were somewhat
frustrated by a slight existential bias as reflected
particularly in the important role of focusing in his
approach to several crucial doctrines. That his approach
was basically sound, however, was reflected in the fact that
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it already contained the insights needed to fulfil its
existential-ontological aim.
An excellent way to draw together this summarized
material would be to consider the basic themes which have
run throughout its the relation of philosophy and theology,
anthropology, hermeneutics and language analysis, and the
relation between God and Being. These last three themes
correspond respectively with the central emphasis in each
of the last three chaptersj on Bultmann, the "new hermen-
eutic" theologians and Macquarrie. Not surprisingly then,
this conclusion will be touching on and drawing together
points already discussed. In addition, we will also seek
to go beyond the positions previously considered by raising
new questions and offering new alternatives on several
issues.
88. The relation of philosophy and theology
The basic theme which has run throughout this work
has been the relation between philosophy and theology. This
relation can be considered on three distinct but related
levels. Theology employs philosophy in regards to what
Macquarrie labelled a pre-theological inquiry in which the
presuppositions, methods and certain fundamental concepts
of a theology are examined. On another level, theology
employs philosophy in its apologetical efforts to stand with
and establish common ground with the non-believer. On yet
another level, theology uses philosophical insights to give
relevant form and expression to its dogmatic content.
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All the theologians we have considered correctly
saw that philosophy is necessarily involved in doing theology.
Therefore, the responsible theologian makes a conscious
effort to appraise the extent and nature of his contacts
with philosophy. On the pre-theological level, this means
involvement In such areas as language analysis, anthropology,
ontology and consideration of the thought process.
It is at this level that the theologian is most
involved with philosophy. Here he has to make critical
evaluations of how constructive and sound a particular
philosophical insight or overall outlook is; it is here that
he must diligently strive to understand correctly the
intentions of a philosopher, being careful not to manipulate,
coerce or distort any insights to fit a preconceived out¬
look. A mistake in this pre-theological analysis can have
serious consequences as it lays the foundation upon which the
whole theological enterprise stands and a weak foundation
eventually leads to faults in the overlying superstructure
which can never be entirely eliminated.
Therefore, the need for responsible pre-theological
inquiry into certain areas of philosophy must be maintained.
For instance, Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object
pattern in traditional metaphysics has repeatedly cropped
up in our analysis of these theologians. This has been an
important factor in Bultmann's portrayal of theological
thought as once-removed from the experience of faith and in
Ott's close association of theological thought, as
experiential and a form of encounter, with the faith
509
experience. Similarly, the"new hermeneutic"theologians
base their entire approach to theology upon a certain under¬
standing of language. In Ebeling's discussion of the
relation between the nature of God's Word and the human
capacity for speaking we can continue to see how important
language analysis is for theological concerns.
On a second level, theology uses philosophy in
fulfilling its apologetic goals. Here theology seeks to
move out from itself and stand sympathetically with the non-
believer. In order to communicate with and establish a
common ground with the non-believer, it must understand his
outlook and become adept at discourse on his level.
Macquarrie's philosophical theology, with its bridge linking
the non-believer with the realm of faith and its success in
establishing the credibility of often obscure phenomena such
as revelation, God and theological language, is an excellent
example of how apologetics can successfully employ philo¬
sophical insights.
The third level by which the relation of these
realms can be considered concerns theology's need to give
relevant form and expression to its content. It is on this
point that the debate concerning the wisdom of using
philosophy rages most fiercely. To ignore philosophical
forms of expression endangers the relevance of theology; to
become too involved leads to the danger of theological
content being swallowed by philosophical form. Both extremes
must be avoided and a balanced approach is crucial at this
point.
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Bultraann is generally thought to have erred on the
side of too closely associating these two realms. His
claim for a unique and special affinity between the New
Testament outlook and the existentialist school of thought
could pose a danger for theology. Theologians must never
allow their alliance with one particular school of philosophy
to become too strong since all schools of thought,
existentialism included, will eventually lose favour.
Nevertheless, theology must always be flexible and
open to new forms of thought, thereby retaining its relevance
and thus Bultmann's motive for seeking to express his
theological insights using a contemporary philosophy to
insure its relevance is basically sound. It is essential
here to realize that as theology provides the content for
the system it must always retain the initiative in the
relationship. Theological content must provide the criteria
for determining the suitability of philosophical forms and
never the reverse.
Theology's primary allegiance is to its own unique
sources e.g. Scripture, revelation and the Holy Spirit, and
these must always be the determinative factors in its make¬
up. Bultmann's tendency to eliminate, and not just
interpret, certain aspects of New Testament mythology stems
ultimately from his desire to make the Gospel relevant.
This failure in execution does not jeopardize his overall
intention however. Bultmann's success in giving existential
form to Pauline insights, or content, confirms just how
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constructive theology's effort constantly to renew its
outer garb and keep in step with the times can be. Simi¬
larly, Macquarrie's success in substituting contemporary
forms of expression for the outmoded trinitarian formulas
(substance, nature, etc.) and in explaining the divine-
human make-up of Christ also supports the need for this
type of theological approach.
While Bultmann can be criticised at certain points
for endangering content by his emphasis on relevance, Fuchs
and Ebeling are open to criticism for attempting to avoid
this pitfall by a superficial retreat behind the law-gospel
pattern. Although they professed to use philosophy to
perform the equivalent function of the law (setting the stage
for the appearance of the Gospel or asking the questions
which the Gospel alone can answer), we established that in
fact they employed philosophical insights in both aspects of
their theological systems: to pose the questions and to
frame the answers. It is important not only that theology
employ contemporary thought forms to give its content
relevance but also that it do so in a conscious and respon¬
sible manner, well aware of the extent to which it is
indebted to these forms and thereby able to guard against
any tendency to allow content to be devoured by form.
One other danger theology must constantly avoid in
its quest for relevance is the tendency to be defensive in
its relation to philosophy or the position of any non-
believer. It must never give the impression of turning to
philosophy because of its own insufficiency or weakness.
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Nor should it ever appear to alter its position on basic
issues in order to be more compatible with the contemporary
outlook. The skandalon of the gospel is its strength not
its weakness. Its hope lies not in playing down this side
of its nature but in giving its significance even clearer
expression for the contemporary situation. The question
for theology is not should the skandalon be brought to light
but rather how can this best be done.
Gerhard Ebeling makes this same point when he
stresses that faith should never set itself over against non-
faith and its claim to have a better grip on reality.
Instead faith should always insist that it alone really sees
things as they are. In this way, theology need never have
to assume the role of a weak sister to philosophy.
We have now seen how theology has a three-fold
relation to philosophy. It employs philosophical insights
in (a) a pre-theological analysis of its language, thought
forms and presuppositions, (b) its apologetic aim of standing
with the non-believer and bridging the gap between the
outlook of faith and non-faith, and (c) giving a relevant
form to its content. Throughout we have affirmed the need
for this relationship as long as theology is fully aware of
the pitfalls and dangers such an association involves.
89. Anthropology
Another major theme running through this analysis
of Heidegger's influence upon theology has been its
anthropological concern. We saw how each of the theologians
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considered established their own views on man's nature and
we can consider Heidegger's influence here on all three
levels of the theology-philosophy relationship.
On the pre-theological as well as apologetic level,
he offers an understanding of man's structure which is
extremely suitable for the needs of theology. He stresses
that Dasein cannot be understood as a self-contained,
independent unit. The analysis of existence is necessarily
an analysis of the ultimate domain as well; existentialism
is (fundamental) ontology; to consider Dasein (man) is to
consider Being (God). The implications of such an under¬
standing for apologetics are apparent in that it is not
difficult to move from this secular understanding, with its
openness toward the ultimate, to faith's understanding of
man as one whose heart is restless till it rests in God.
On the pre-theological level, Heidegger's existential
- existentiell distinction makes his anthropological analyses
especially suitable for theological adaptation. Because he
operates on the formal, a priori, neutral existential level
and theology is concerned with the concrete, everyday
existentiell level (e.g. Heidegger determines what it is
about man's make-up which allows him to make decisions while
theology discusses one particular decision), his insights
cannot clash with or contradict those of theology.
On the third level of the philosophy-theology
relationship, Heidegger's anthropological insights provide
a strong model by which theology can give relevant expression
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to its understanding of man as both made in God's image and
as fallen. Heidegger's anthropology provides a balanced
model for this theological doctrine in that it takes the
reality of inauthentic existence very seriously (indeed we
noted how he established that inauthenticity was the pre¬
dominant mode of existence) while also stressing that the
primary and most basic characteristic of existence is its
openness and transparency to the ultimate dimension (were
Dasein not basically an "ontological animal" his existential
analysis would never have taken place).
The theological understanding of man must walk the
tightrope of "being optimistic about human nature without
being naive or unrealistic. Man was created in God's image
and this aspect of his nature was not destroyed by the fall.
To deny such a basic component of human existence would be
to destroy man's identity as such (just as to deny Dasein's
inherent ontological opennessbecause it operates mainly on
the unthematic level due to the predominance of inauthenticity,
or "fallenness" as an existential« would be to destroy the
identity of Dasein.) Man as the ontological animal, then,
is a relevant model for expressing the Scriptural charac¬
terization of man as made in the image of God.
Similarly, Heidegger's portrayal of man as existing
predominantly in the inauthentic mode, which as .an
existential is an a priori fundamental trait of existence,
provides a relevant model for safeguarding that aspect of
human nature attributed by the Scriptures to the fall.
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Here, then, is one example of how Heidegger's anthropology
can provide a relevant and balanced model for expressing and
preserving theological insights.
Probably the greatest strength of Heidegger's
anthropological analysis and that aspect of it which theology
should strive to retain in adapting his insights, is its
balanced view of man's relation to the ultimate dimension.
In his earlier works, Heidegger was in danger of over¬
emphasizing the Dasein side of the Dasein-Being relationship;
hence the charges of being subjective and the portrayal of
his outlook as existentialism. To overcome this imbalance
he moved from a Dasein oriented position toward an emphasis
on the role of Being in the Dasein-Being relationship.
Here man was portrayed as a passive participant in
this relationship, e.g. he was the mouthpiece for Being as
language, or he was merely the da or opening through which
Being lit up beings, or his thinking was simply a reflex
response to the advances of Being which in withdrawing, drew
with it and drew out man's thoughts. In the end, however,
with his emphasis on the need of Being and beings for each
other, Heidegger achieved a balanced understanding of this
relationship and of human nature. Man is neither a totally
passive partner in the relation to Being nor is he completely
responsible for establishing and maintaining the relation.
None of the theologians we have considered were
completely successful in maintaining this balance in their
utilization of Heidegger's antnropology. In limiting his
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use of Heidegger to earlier existential insights it was
inevitable that Bultmann's theology should reflect the same
weaknesses which forced Heidegger to re-orient his thinking
toward a more explicit consideration of Being. Bultmann's
shortcoming can be excused to a certain extent by the
chronological factor; much of his work was done at a time
when Heidegger's thinking had not yet matured to its balanced
conclusion.
Macquarrie, on the other hand, is fully aware of the
need to maintain this balance in any theological adaptation
of Heidegger's philosophy. Although his expressed intention
is to provide a balanced existential-ontological system, we
saw that he was not completely successful in fulfilling this
intention. Indeed, he too seems to have taken a stance which
tends to favour the existential side of this relationship.
This is seen mainly in his stress on existential involvement
as the criterion for determining the reality of acts on the
divine or ontological level e.g. the reality of miracles and
providential acts depend upon man's ability to "focus" his
eyes of faith on otherwise ambiguous events.
Fuchs and Ebeling also lose this balance in that
they tend to limit their use of Heidegger to that period in
which he was over-reacting to his earlier Dasein emphasis.
In their portrayal of man as the tool of language (their
insistence that language uses man and not vice versa) can
be seen a failure to account for any human responsibility . in
the relationship to an ultimate dimension; man is simply a
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passive, mechanical partner to Being as language.
These theologians make the same basic mistake
although they err in different directions. One group loses
Heidegger's balanced view of human nature by overemphasizing
the existential side of the existential-ontological relation
while the other errs by overemphasizing the initiative of the
ultimate factor in this relation. Of all these theologians,
Macquarrie comes closest to maintaining this balance and we
have already noted how a better appreciation of the function
of Being would provide a workable model which could better
maintain the balance of his theological position by assigning
a slightly greater role to the ontological dimension as it is
related to the existential dimension.
90. Hermeneutics
Another basic theme running through this analysis
has been the scope and meaning of hermeneutics. The extremes
to be avoided in seeking to establish a sound and balanced
view of hermeneutics are, on the one hand, allowing the text
to be dominated by the interpreter and on the other, allowing
the interpreter to be dominated by the text. Or to put the
issue another way, does the interpreter question the text or
does the text call the interpreter into question? We will
first see how several of these theologians tend to move
toward one extreme or the other and then establish how
Heidegger's insights can provide the model for a balanced
view which avoids the weaknesses of extreme positions.
The alternatives from which one can choose in
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seeking to establish a sound understanding of hermeneutics
can also be expressed in the following way: either the past
is interpreted in light of the present or vice versa.
Bui tularin's approach favours interpreting the past in light
of the present. Those aspects of past mythology which are
no longer true for the present situation are either given
new form or eliminated altogether. Fuchs and Ebeling, on
the other hand, stress that the past is meant to interpret
and call into question the present. Ebeling explains that
sermons are not made relevant by moulding their content to
the present situation by way of contemporary illustrations
and digressions into current events. Instead, the effective
sermon will allow the content of the past text to question
the present situation. Here the criterion by which
interpretation is done is the past and the object of the
interpretation is the present.
Again, the issue can be expressed by asking: does
the interpreter question the subject matter or vice versa?
Is the interpreter the subject or the object of interpre¬
tation? Is his role active or passive? Of all those
considered, Fuchs and Ebeling seem to have the more extreme
tendency in regards to these alternatives. For them, the
interpreter plays a rather passive role in the interpretation
process.
The language-event just "happens" to man, he seems
to have very little responsibility or control over it. The
action seems to lie all on the side of the text. As Fuchs
explains, the interpreter is the mouse placed before the
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text which like a cat is then set into motion. These two
seem to be most in danger of slipping over into an extreme
hermeneutical position which emphasizes exclusively the
action of the text on the interpreter.
At this point we shall consider how Heidegger's
hermeneutical position evolved and see what relevance it has
had for more responsible theological views on interpretation.
In his earlier thinking, Heidegger generally stood within
the normal understanding of hermeneutics (a process in which
the interpreter acts on the subject matter rather than vice
versa) as he sought to interpret various subject matter,
e.g. Dasein and poetry.
However, in his later views this position evolved
into the more unusual outlook based on an etymological
analysis of hermeneuein as it comes from the name of the
divine messenger Hermes. In light of his new insight the
interpreter becomes merely the herald or messenger for
Being as Language. Here the subject matter or text assumes
the predominant role and it is this approach which Fuchs
and Ebeling utilize.
However, Heidegger's most constructive insight into
the nature of hermeneutics and one which is stressed at various
points throughout his development is his understanding of the
nerrneneutical circle. Basically this concept points out
that the interpreter acts on the text and the text acts on
the interpreter. Insofar as the interpreter must have a
vague, unthematic awareness of his subject matter which
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initially directs his investigation, the initiative is his.
However, once the interpreter is involved in the analysis
of the subject matter he must be prepared to let it correct
and inform his understanding, the nature of which changes
from a vague, unthematic awareness to a thematic and full
insight into the matter involved.
In this concept can be seen a balanced and sound
understanding of the herraeneutical process. Both the text
and the interpreter play vital roles, both question and in
turn are questioned. The past is interpreted in terms of
the present which in turn finds new meaning and significance
in light of the past. This model is utilized to some extent
by both Bultmann and Macquarrie.
The former develops his own understanding of the
hermeneutical circle which is composed of the relationship
between pre-understanding and understanding. The latter,
Macquarrie, affirms this aspect of Bultmann's approach and
in his own analysis of theological language (God-talk)
stresses that Heidegger's hermeneutics can be best appre¬
ciated by keeping both his earlier and later emphases in
mind; the interpreter questions the subject matter as well
as allows the subject matter to question him. Here then
is how Heidegger's insights can provide a balanced model for
the theological understanding and application of hermeneut¬
ical principles.
91. Being, revelation and God
Another very important theme in this consideration
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of Heidegger's influence on theology concerns his insights
into the nature of Being. Before considering Being in
itself, however, we need to consider how Being makes itself
known since this revelation is what makes any discussion of
it possible. The theological relevance of Heidegger's
insights into Being's mode of disclosure can be seen on all
the levels of the philosophy-theology relationship.
Apologetically Heidegger's understanding of man's
structure as basically oriented toward an ultimate dimension
is a relevant aspect of the contemporary secular outlook to
which theology can relate its doctrine of revelation. We
have already noted how his insights are in close accord with
the Scriptural concept, image of God, and this stress on
the continuity between man and Being provides a ready-made
model of the bridge linking the immanent and transcendent
domains which makes revelation a possibility. Hence his
philosophy certainly allows for the possibility, indeed
probability, of revelation.
In addition his understanding of language, essential
thought and moods also represents an aspect of the con¬
temporary secular outlook to which theology can relate on
this issue. His understanding of moods as an experience
sfc
of nothingness which confronts man with his finiteness and
contingency, dispels his fascination with and dependency
upon his immediate environment, and prepares him for an
experience of the ultimate dimension, provides an effective
means for explaining the Christian's need to face his own
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finiteness and need for grace and to endure his "dark night
of the soul" before encountering God's revelation.
Similarly Heidegger's understanding of language as
the result of a process wherein an ultimate factor speaks
through and utilizes man also prepares the secular outlook
for a better appreciation of how God speaks through man.
In that his understanding of essential thought has this same
tendency to stress the inbreaking and initiative of a trans-
human factor, it too has strong possibilities for apologetics.
All of these concepts, then, underline the relevance of his
thinking for a doctrine of revelation.
We can next consider the relevance of Heidegger's
philosophy for a doctrine of revelation on the pre-theological
level. On this level the theologian must be prepared to
deal with philosophy on its own terms, evaluating and criti¬
cizing its strength and weaknesses from a philosophical as
well as theological standpoint. A basic Heideggerian
insight which recurs throughout his writings and upon which
he builds a great deal of his philosophical superstructure
is his opposition to the subject-object pattern in thinking.
He repeatedly stresses that in essential thought the
initiative lies with Being as it reveals-conceals itself to
man through his thinking. No longer is man to be seen as
a thinker who grasps and sets over against him the object
of his thoughts.
Of all the theologians we have considered, Bultmann
alone refuses to adapt this Heideggerian position. The
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others depend heavily upon it in formulating their doctrines
of revelation and of God. Is this insight a sound one upon
which theology can depend in expressing and relating its
dogmatic content? In so far as it tends to set man the
subject over against God the object, this pattern does tend
to erect an unnecessary barrier between the two through
which revelation must then break.
Heidegger's approach avoids this problem but in
doing so encounters another equally serious one. In
stressing that the ultimate dimension works through man
rather than standing over against him in essential thought
and language, he is in danger of denying man any responsible
role in these processes. We have already noted in our dis¬
cussion of hermeneutics how man can be seen as merely the
tool for language and this applies to thinking as well.
In adapting this insight into essential thinking, theology
must not allow man to become a completely passive partner in
the revelation process or in thinking and speaking of God.
Similarly, in Heinrich Ott's attempt to utilize
Heidegger's insights into the language and thought processes
for eliminating the Bultmannian distinction between the
faith experience and theological thought and between the
language-event of the pulpit and the more abstract language
of theology, another serious problem is encountered. In
broadening the scope of the faith experience and encounter
to include the realm of theological thinking and speaking,
Ott tends to so broaden and generalize the meaning of the
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faith experience as to deny it any special significance.
Hence, the question that must be asked on this
pre-theological level is, can the subject-object pattern in
thinking be avoided entirely without destroying man's role
in the thought process and denying his nature? Is it not
rather the case that the subject-object pattern is necess¬
arily involved in man's assimilation of revelation's content?
A more constructive model might be one which
recognized two phases in the revelation process. In so far
as God revealed Himself to man, essential thought provides
a model which would protect God's initiative and avoid any
unnecessary barriers. In so far as man must be responsible
for accepting this revelation, for assimilating and applying
it to his own situation, and for communicating it to and
discussing it with his fellow man, then the subject-object
pattern is involved and insures that he too has a responsible
role in the revelation process.
This approach would protect the distinctive status
of the faith experience as well. Such an understanding of
revelation would recognize the position of both Bultmann and
Ott and while not being able to agree completely with
Heidegger's opposition to the sublect-object pattern in
thinking, it would nevertheless arrive at the same end
toward which his insights aim: the protection of the nature
and roles of both Being and beings (including Dasein) in
their need for each other.
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Finally we can consider how Heidegger's views can
be related to the theological doctrine of revelation on the
third level (providing a relevant form for dogmatic content.)
His portrayal of thought as waiting but not awaiting and as
a willed non-willing provides a balanced model whereby
theology can protect its understanding of revelation as a
process in which man has a part but which is ultimately the
result of divine initiative. We have already established
the need for preserving man's role in this process and this
concept of waiting, which leaves open and respects that for
which it waits (unlike awaiting which re-presents to itself
the anticipated subject matter and thereby closes itself
off to the experience of anything radically new), could be
used to describe a process in which man turns toward God
while remaining open for any guidance through revelation.
Similarly, his reference to essential thought as
a non-willing which requires an initial "trace" of willing
points to the need for man to make a conscious effort to
turn toward God or put himself in a position where reve¬
lation can be received. In this way these concepts could
provide a relevant form which would respect the intentions
of the theological content they express.
This completes our consideration of the relevance
of Heidegger's philosophy for the theological doctrine of
revelation on all three levels of the philosophy-theology
relation. We move now from a consideration of how God
reveals Himself to a discussion of His nature. That aspect
526
of Heidegger's philosophy most relevant here is, of course,
his understanding of Being.
On the apologetic level Heidegger's emphasis on the
role of an ultimate dimension in the world (Being) which
has a supportive, gracious and positive effect definitely
opens up the secular outlook to the possibility of God. On
the pre-theological level, we should determine whether Being
or being is the most fruitful aspect of this philosophy for
a doctrine of God. In light of the insurmountable diffi¬
culties Ott encountered in referring to God as a being, there
can be no question as to following this line of thought.
(Even Ott himself abandoned his project of referring to God
as a being.)
An aspect of the debate over portraying God as a
being or Being which has not been sufficiently considered
by these theologians is related to what has been said about
the revelation process. While God's nature as Being can
be protected in His revelation of Himself through man's
thoughts and language, it does not seem possible that this
nature can be retained when man completes the process by
assimilating and communicating the contents of revelation.
In speaking and thinking about God, which must
happen if man is to have a role in the revelation process,
is it not inevitable that His status assume the character
of a being rather than Being itself? As an object of man's
thought, the Being character of God would necessarily be
lost. Does this not mean that theological speaking and
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thinking of God is necessarily an idolatrous substitution
of a being for Being? The answer to this is yes and no.
Yes, insofar as idolatry is the great danger theology must
constantly guard against. The possibility of ascribing to
its finite interpretations, views and impressions an absolute
character is always a temptation for theology. No, insofar
as idolatry need not necessarily follow from approaching
God as a being. Theology is capable of acknowledging its
limitations and remaining within the scope of possibilities
open to it.
Furthermore, we have already established a model
expressing how God can be seen as both Being and being with¬
out threatening the unity of His nature. Just as Being
must always be comprehended through beings but never
identified solely with them, so too can God be comprehended
through our finite representations of Him without making
such thoughts and words an idolatrous substitution for God.
At first glance such an approach appears to be
positing a dual nature for God. On the epistemological
level, God as we know Him is treated as a being; on the
ontological level, God in Himself is portrayed as Being.
The understanding of the interaction of Being and being,
however, is what insures the continuity between these two
levels and preserves the unity of God's nature. God as a
being, or as we know Him, can reflect and open up God in
Himself, as Being, just as any being reflects Being. (The
concept of the "ontological difference" stresses that
neither Being nor being can "be" without the other and in
this can be seen their interacting.)
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On the third level, Heidegger's understanding of
the Being process provides a variety of models which theology
could employ in giving relevant form to its doctrine of God.
Being as the "ontologlcal difference" provides two such
models. As it expresses the absolute difference between
Being and beings it could be used to express the majestic
transcendence of the Creator who is not to be identified
with creation. As this concept stresses the close relation
between Being and beings (neither can be without the other)
it could also responsibly reflect the other aspect of God's
relation to creation, His omniscient and providential
immanence and presence in it.
Being as alethela. a simultaneous revealing and
concealing, also could be used to express the extent of God's
self-revelation. Basically, and most importantly, God does
reveal Himself to man in various ways. By the same token,
His revelation is always partial and incomplete (As Paul says
we see through a glass darkly and we prophesy in part) and
His mysterious nature is never completely dispelled by
revelation. Similarly the Being process is both revealing
(Being as Holy) and concealing (Being as mystery) in
Heidegger's understanding and this could provide a relevant
and balanced model for expressing theology's understanding
of God's self-revelation. This concludes our consideration
of how Heidegger's views on Being are and can be related to
the doctrine of God, the last of several themes running
throughout our analysis of his influence on various theo¬
logians.
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92. A maker of theology
In our consideration of Heidegger's influence on
contemporary theology we have established not only that he
affects theology but also how extensive his influence is.
We have seen how the complexity and range of his thinking
has been carried over into various theological camps. We
might conclude by noting John Macquarrie's estimate of this
philosopher ; "one could hardly hope to advance very far in
the understanding of contemporary theology without some
knowledge of Heidegger's thought...Though not himself a
theologian, he is a maker of theology, in the same way in v—
which Plato and Aristotle and Kant have been makers of
theology.
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